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PERSIAN GULF

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Editorial Note.

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,
General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Extent

The area here described includes the Persian Gulf proper together with the Gulf of Oman and the adjacent coastal regions.

The Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman lie between 22° 30′ and 30° 30′ north latitude and 48° and 62° east longitude, and are bounded on the south and south-west by the coastal districts of Arabia, at the head of the Gulf by those of Irak, and on the north-east by the coastal regions of south-west Persia.

The Persian Gulf proper extends in a south-easterly direction for 460 miles from the mouth of the Shatt el-Arab to the coast of the promontory of Oman.[1] Here a projection of the Arabian coast turns north-east as far as Ras Musandim, and narrows the entrance of the gulf through the Straits of Hormuz to a width of 29 miles. The Gulf itself has an average width of about 120 miles.

The Gulf of Oman is an arm of the Indian Ocean or Arabian Sea which forms the approach to the Persian Gulf proper. The outer limit may be taken as a line joining Gwattar in Persian Makran to Ras el-Hadd on the Arabian coast.

(2) Coasts, Islands, and River Systems

The Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman occupy the southern part of a great depression lying between the plateau of Arabia and the plateau of Iran, of which

[1] The term "promontory of Oman" is here used to describe that projection of the Arabian coast whose point nearly blocks the entrance of the Persian Gulf, and of which the base is a line running from the town of Abu Dhabi to the Baraimi oasis and thence to the town of Sohar.

Mesopotamia forms the northern part. The Euphrates and Tigris have, within historical times, silted up their mouths to an extent that has materially altered the coast-line of the Gulf, and these rivers seem destined in the future to unite Hasa to Fars, just as in the past they produced the fertile plain of Mesopotamia. The great depression is bounded for about two-thirds of its length, along the Persian littoral and the coast of Oman, by mountain ranges which have in places elevations of as much as 10,000 ft. These ranges run on the Persian side in an extraordinarily uniform direction from north-west to south-east as far as the Straits of Hormuz, where they bear eastwards, thence running along the coast of Baluchistan and Sind. The south-western side of the depression is similarly bounded by the mountains of Oman. In places the mountains run steeply down to the sea, but there is usually a narrow coastal plain or flat tract intervening.

The bottom of the Persian Gulf proper, outside the areas affected by recent coral reefs, is flat and gently undulating, and the depth exceeds 60 fathoms over only a small part of the area. On the Persian side, where the coast is mountainous, the water is naturally deeper than on the flatter Arabian side, where reefs and shoals extend into the Gulf for a distance of from 30 to 50 miles along almost its entire length. The sea-floor of the Gulf of Oman lies very much lower than that of the Persian Gulf proper, this being especially the case in the neighbourhood of the Musandim peninsula, where the depth of the water is about 60 fathoms. About 50 miles from Musandim the depth increases to 150 fathoms.

Of the numerous islands that dot the Gulf, many are partly at least of volcanic origin. The two largest of these are Kishm, which lies off the Persian coast just within the entrance to the Gulf, and Bahrein, off the Arabian coast.

The Persian Gulf is lacking in good harbours, the anchorages being for the most part shallow and exposed.

The coastal regions of the Gulf fall naturally into three groups.

The *Arabian Coastal Region*, which adjoins the south and south-west shores of the Persian Gulf proper, from the Khor Zobeir on the north as far as the entrance at Ras Musandim, and thence along the projecting butt of the Arabian continent as far as Ras el-Hadd, contains a group of sheikhdoms and emirates, the boundaries of which are not usually clearly defined, and includes Koweit, Hasa, El-Katr (Gattar), Trucial Oman, and a considerable part of the Sultanate of Oman, all of which maintain special relations with the British Government (see *Arabia*, No. 61 of this series, p. 22).

At the *Head of the Gulf* proper, the coast of the alluvial plains of Mesopotamia and Arabistan and a part of Behbehan, from the Khor Zobeir in the west to a point near Bandar Dilam in the east, including the districts inland as far as Basra and Ahwaz, comprises Turkish territory, now in British occupation, along the lower Shatt el-Arab, and the Persian province of South Arabistan, which is under the hereditary government of the Sheikh of Mohammera.

The *Persian Littoral*, the narrow coastal plain which lies between the shores of the Gulf and the main maritime range of the mountains, from Bandar Dilam on the north to the frontier of Baluchistan at Gwattar, together with the mountainous interior forming the southern side of the Iranian plateau, comprises the maritime districts of the Persian province of Fars and of Laristan, and includes the administrative districts which are under the governor of the Persian coast and islands, and the coastal district of the province of Persian Makran.

The importance of the Persian Gulf lies principally in its relation to international communications. The head of the Gulf affords the natural outlet to the shortest route from central and southern Europe to India, while at the same time the whole of the Gulf region lies adjacent to the flank of an advance through

Persia in a similar direction. Through the Persian Gulf lie the main trade routes to southern, central, and western Persia from India and from Great Britain, *via* the Gulf ports, Mohammera, Basra, and Baghdad, while with the development of Mesopotamia and the oilfields near the Gulf its importance will be still further increased.

ARABIAN COASTAL REGION

Surface

The Arabian coastal region occupies the lowest portion of the long and gradual decline between the central Arabian plateau and the shores of the Persian Gulf, the general slope being broken only by the mountainous district of Oman, which lies in the extreme south-east. The region is bordered on the east by the Dahana, a hard, gravelly plain, crossed at intervals by sand belts of varying width, which runs in a south-easterly direction in a continuous belt and joins east of Oman the enormous block of Arabian desert known as the Ruba el-Khali. For purposes of description the coastal region may be divided into two parts:—

(i) The district in the north-west which extends along the shores of the Gulf proper from Irak in the north to the foot of the promontory of Oman at Abu Dhabi.

(ii) The district in the south-east which includes the promontory of Oman and thence a part of the sultanate as far as the Ras el-Hadd.

(i) This region, which contains the Sultanate of Koweit, the province of Hasa', the promontory of El-Katr, and part of Trucial Oman, is composed of flat or slightly undulating plains, whose surface is broken only by low outcrops of sandstone or occasional isolated hills. In the interior, west of Hasa, there is a certain amount of continuous high ground, stony ridges running parallel to the coast here intervening between Hasa and the desert. With the exception of certain fertile tracts (see below, p. 6), the region consists for the most part of

steppe or desert land, parts of which support a scanty vegetation and yield a certain amount of grazing.

The *Sultanate of Koweit* extends along the coast for 190 miles from the frontier of Irak as far as the boundaries of the province of Hasa; its maximum breadth is about 160 miles, but the effective rule of the Sultan only extends for about a day's journey from the coast. The soil north of Koweit Bay is gravelly, but further south it is partly sand and partly clay, and there is only a small patch of fertile soil. There is no running water in the principality with the exception of one small stream.

Next to Koweit and adjoining its southern frontier, the *Province of Hasa* runs along the coast for 300 miles as far as the promontory of El-Katr, with an average breadth of about 50 miles. With the exception of the two fertile oases of Hasa and Katif, the province is a region of sandy or earthy steppe broken by many low white sandhills. It contains numerous shallow wells of drinkable water, and water is obtainable as a rule a few feet below the surface. There is a fair amount of grazing, and in places much scrub, with occasional depressions in which date palms and various bushes show the presence of water. In the north there are deposits of nitrate and common salt.

The *Promontory of El-Katr* is little known, but it is described as a rocky and pebbly desert, with a poor soil, consisting in the better districts of gravel and marl mixed with sand; the only vegetation is coarse grass mixed with a certain amount of low brushwood, although water is found below the surface without much difficulty.

Trucial Oman consists of a group of sultanates which extend along the coast for 300 miles from the foot of the promontory of El-Katr to the Ras el-Jebel district at the north of the Oman promontory. It is a low and sandy maritime plain, unsuited for tillage, but not without natural vegetation and even some wood; inland plains contain tracts with occasional cultivation. There are enough wells and water holes to support a

scanty Beduin population, and certain fertile districts are found in the neighbourhood of springs and wadi mouths.

The principal fertile districts in (i) are :—

(*a*) A small district of cultivated soil in the neighbourhood of Jahra, close to the foot of the Bay of Koweit and about 20 miles from Koweit town. This contains most of the cultivation in the sultanate.

(*b*) The two important oases of Hasa and Katif, which form the settled part of the province of Hasa.

The oasis of Hasa is a district which contains some cultivated areas of great fertility. It extends for about 30 miles north and south and 20 miles east and west, and is separated from the Gulf at Okwair by 16 miles of desolate sand ridges. There are extensive date groves in the fertile parts of the district; and in some parts a number of springs saturate the land and permit an elaborate system of irrigation for rice. The important town of Hofuf, capital of the province of Hasa, is situated in this district in the south-eastern corner of the cultivated area.

The Katif oasis is situated on the coast north-east of the oasis of Hasa. Its length from north to south is 18 miles, with an average breadth of 3 miles, the town of Katif lying in the middle. Most of the area consists of a sandy plain saturated by spring water. The cultivated tract ends 6 miles south of the town, but, as in Hasa, there are detached areas of cultivated ground.

(*c*) The Wadi el-Miya is a long valley or depression in the extreme north of the province of Hasa, containing numerous wells and springs. It has a dark brown cultivable soil, and in spring grass is abundant.

(*d*) Further south, in Trucial Oman, there are small spots of fertility at occasional wadi mouths.

(ii) The district in the south-east of the Arabian coastal region contains the most important part of the Sultanate of Oman, as well as a part of Trucial Oman,

with independent Oman in the interior. The most important physical feature is the hilly tract which, commencing at Ras Musandim (the entrance of the Persian Gulf proper), sweeps round in a curve parallel to the coast as far as Ras el-Hadd. The range whose northernmost part is the mountainous district of Ras el-Jebel is known as the Hajar of Oman. It is cut into two parts by the great cleft known as the Wadi Semail, and in the lofty Jebel Akhdar reaches heights approaching 10,000 ft. The rocks are mainly of limestone, but around Muscat there is an outcrop of volcanic serpentine which extends for about 10 miles along the coast. Igneous rocks are also found on the coast in the neighbourhood of Sur, and in a few places inland.

Along the Trucial coast of the promontory of Oman there is a wide and sandy maritime plain, but further north, in the Ras el-Jebel district, the mountains fall steeply into the sea. On the eastern side of the promontory the long and narrow coastal plain of Batina intervenes between the mountains and the coast for a distance of 150 miles, but in the neighbourhood of Muscat the coast is again mountainous and steep, and east of this the hilly district of east Hajar comes close to the sea. Inland the Dhahira district extends to the north-west for a distance of about 100 miles. It is a plain of uneven surface which slopes down from the foothills of Hajar to the Ruba el-Khali, in which its drainage is lost. South-east of this, Oman proper consists of a central plateau shut in on the north by Jebel Akhdar and on the south by the desert; its surface, outside the oasis, is rough and broken, and the central portion is a stony plain thickly dotted with small volcanic hills. The district in the south, however, has a wide and level surface sprinkled with dwarf mimosa and bunches of desert grass. Inland, in east Hajar, are sandy plains and a network of small valleys, with occasional patches of cultivation. Fertile districts in this south-eastern coastal region are:—

(*a*) Parts of the *Batina* coastal plain, which are

very fertile, with many date groves. The Batina plain is crossed by many watercourses, but irrigation is entirely from wells.

(*b*) South-west of Muscat in the *Wadi Semail* district, where there are a number of date groves.

(*c*) In addition to these there are many rich tracts in the inland districts which are situated under the main chain of Jebel Akhdar and its coastal continuation towards Ras el-Hadd, also in the Dhahira country.

Coast and Islands

The Arabian coast, with which is included the Trucial and Pirate coasts, and in the Gulf of Oman the Batina coast, runs in a south-easterly direction from the Turkish frontier at the head of the Gulf as far as Ras el-Hadd. The general trend of the land is interrupted by the promontory of El-Katr, which projects northwards from the coast about midway between the head of the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz, forming the eastern side of the Gulf of Bahrein; and also by the promontory of Oman, where the coast runs north-eastwards from Abu Dhabi to Ras Musandim before turning south-eastwards again to Ras el-Hadd.

(i) The coast-line of the Persian Gulf proper as far as the foot of the promontory of Oman is indented with a number of bays. This part of the coast is low, and reefs and shoals extend from 30 to 50 miles off it, making it difficult and dangerous of approach. Koweit and Bahrein are the only good harbours in this part. The shore is barren and desolate, and a great part of it has the appearance of a desert of white sand with occasional rocky hills of moderate height on which grow tufts of coarse grass. There are date trees near the few towns. The great reef, which commences about 70 miles south of Koweit, extends along the south-eastern and southern shore to the extreme south of the Gulf proper, and forms a labyrinth of reefs and shoals these being especially dangerous in the Gulf of

Bahrein, and between El-Katr and Abu Dhabi. The only island of importance is Bahrein, which forms the centre of the archipelago that constitutes the Principality of Bahrein. The island has an extreme length of 30 miles and a maximum breadth of 10 miles, and consists mainly of a stony plateau from 100 to 150 ft. high. Its coast is low; along the northern shore there is a belt of fertile land from two to three miles wide which is covered with date plantations; the remainder of the island is uncultivated owing to want of water.

Ports.—The bay of *Koweit* affords the only good anchorage for large vessels on this coast, with the exception of Bahrein. The bay itself is a large inlet leading out of the north-west corner of the Persian Gulf; it is 20 miles long from east to west, and 10 miles wide; in the greater part of the bay there is anchorage with good holding ground. The depths in the harbour are from 16 fathoms to $4\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms, shoaling to 4 fathoms in the narrows at its head; vessels drawing over 20 ft. have to anchor two miles from the town. Although Koweit is connected by caravan routes with the interior of Arabia, the principal stream of trade in that direction passes through Manama, the port of Bahrein, whence it flows to minor ports of the Arabian coast, notably Okwair (Ojair) and Katif. From these ports there are caravan routes to Hofuf, the principal town of the Hasa oasis, and thence to Nejd.

Manama or *Bahrein* is situated at the extreme north of the island of Bahrein. The harbour is scarcely more than an open roadstead, but is sheltered by the island of Muharrak on the south and east respectively, and by the Fasht el-Yarim to the northward. The latter island does not prevent a considerable sea getting up in the outer harbour during a strong *shamal* (north-west wind), but vessels ride easily at anchor. The inner harbour, which is really a bight in the reefs, is about a square mile in extent; it is chiefly used by *bagala* (dhows), and vessels drawing more than 15 ft. should not enter it. Vessels drawing over 20 ft. lie just over 3 miles from the shore.

The port of *Okwair* (*Ojair*) is situated on the Arabian coast about 24 miles west-south-west of the southern extremity of Bahrein island. The harbour, which seems capable of improvement, has an entrance 200 to 300 yds. wide; the channel and a part of the bay has a depth of 3 to 4 fathoms; the sea without is shallower in places and dangerous for ships.

El-Katif, situated in the oasis of Katif, is an important coast town which is 36 miles north-west by west from the nearest part of Bahrein island, and 64 miles north-west of Okwair, and shares with Okwair a considerable part of the trade with the interior of Arabia. It has great defects as a port, and vessels of over 7 ft. draught cannot reach the town. Larger vessels anchor 10 miles north-east of El-Katif, just within Ras Tanura.

The port of *El-Bidaa* (*Bida*), sometimes known as *Doha*, is situated on the eastern side of the promontory of El-Katr, and is connected by caravan route with Hofuf and the interior. There is a natural harbour 3½ miles long by 2 miles broad, whose approach is obstructed by reefs and shoals. The greater part of the harbour has a depth of 4½ to 5 fathoms, with anchorage in mud and clay.

(ii) With the exception of the Ras el-Jebel district (see below, p. 11), the coast of the promontory of Oman and of the sultanate as far as Ras el-Hadd has few bays or indentations; a great part of it is mountainous and bold. The coast round Muscat is rugged and steep in places, and east of this the foothills of the mountains run down to the coast. The coast to the south-west of the promontory of Oman, which forms part of Trucial Oman, is a low and sandy desert, while the coast of Batina is also sandy, and is fringed for many miles with date groves. On this part of the Trucial coast the water is shallow though free from reefs, but the coast is open and exposed to the *shamal*, while there is, as a rule, a heavy surf along the coast on both sides of the promontory. There is deep water along the shores of the Gulf of Oman, but

the coast is deficient in good harbours; there are anchorages in the bays of Muscat and Matra, but both are imperfectly sheltered, the former from the north-west, the latter from the north-east winds; there is, however, a good shelter in the Khor Fakan. The importance of Muscat as a distributing centre is affected by the development of Sur, which lies 94 miles south-east of it on the same coast, and of Dibai, on the coast of Trucial Oman. Sur is an important coastal town, second only to Matra on this part of the coast; it has an open anchorage in from 8 to 11 fathoms. Dibai is a small but growing port, which supplies goods to the interior of the Oman promontory and to the Baraimi oasis district; there is anchorage in 5 fathoms, but no shelter from the north-west wind.

The mountainous district of Ras el-Jebel is indented on both sides of the promontory with numerous deep inlets; of these, two, which are known as Malcolm and Elphinstone inlets, form fine natural harbours with 14 to 20 fathoms depth; the winds in these are baffling, and the heat in summer is almost intolerable.

River System

There are no rivers in this or any region of Arabia which flow perennially from source to mouth. There are, however, in Hasa and Oman, as in other parts of the country, watercourses (*wadis*), which carry floods after rainstorms. Those which originate east of the western watershed of Arabia, many of which pass through the region under consideration, are mostly long and shallow, their beds being depressed very little below the general level. These wadis carry water beneath their beds, which can be reached by wells at varying depths; they also provide a possible means of communication, and, where the ground moisture rises near or into their surface, they create chains of oases.

The numerous streams, springs, and ponds which water the oases of Hasa and Katif are said to form a part of the drainage of central Arabia which has passed underneath the Dahana (see p. 4).

HEAD OF THE GULF

Surface

The coastal region at the head of the Persian Gulf lies between the north-eastern corner of the Arabian desert and the south-western edge of the Persian plateau, and consists of the alluvial plains of Turkish Irak and of south Arabistan, although the coast of the former touches the sea on a narrow front only, between the mouth of the Khor Zobeir and the Shatt el-Arab. The district extends along the coast from the Khor Zobeir, which is the boundary between the sultanate of Koweit and Turkish Irak, to a point between the mouth of the Hindian river and Bandar Dilam, a distance of about 130 miles. The plains are featureless, and the surface is broken only in Arabistan, in the east and north of the Hindian district, where there is a considerable hilly tract, and in Ahwaz district, where a range of hills about 30 miles in length rises to a height of 200 ft.; this range is pierced at Ahwaz by the Karun river. With the exception of certain highly cultivated areas enumerated below, the plains are barren or thinly covered with desert scrub; in some parts there are saline tracts, but a considerable part of the plains is in spring covered with grass, and the soil is probably fertile when the water can be brought to it. Large areas of the country are completely covered with swamp, especially in the Felahieh and Hawiza districts of Arabistan and on the Turkish side of the Khor Zobeir.

Fertile areas are:—

(*a*) The *banks of the Shatt el-Arab*, where between Basra and Mohammera the date groves are practically continuous on both sides of the river, and have a depth inland of from ½ mile to 2 miles. On the right bank below Mohammera there is generally a fine palm belt.

(*b*) Considerable tracts of irrigated land in the *Felahieh* (*Fellahia*) *and Hawiza districts*, which are watered by the lower courses of the Jarrahi and the Karka rivers.

(*c*) There is a certain amount of land irrigated by the Hindian river.

The Karun is at present used for irrigation purposes on only a very small scale; belts of tamarisk and willow and other bushes fringe the banks of the rivers, but, as a rule, there are no large trees.

Coast and Islands

The coast of the alluvial plain at the head of the Gulf is low and marshy, liable to flood, and fringed with flat mudbanks, which have been formed by silt brought down by the Shatt el-Arab and other rivers. The head of the Gulf seems to be gradually silting up, and the delta is being extended into the sea more rapidly than any known delta; according to one authority it now advances a mile in seventy years. The shallows and mudflats make the coast difficult of approach. The two large banks, Marakat Abadan and Marakat Abdullah, between which passes the channel to the Shatt el-Arab, may be said to be underwater prolongations of the mainland. The most important indentation on the coast is the entrance to the Shatt el-Arab; but, besides the river mouth, there are numerous deep creeks, of which the most important are the Khor Musa, a large inlet of which the mouth is about 36 miles east of the Shatt el-Arab, and the Khor Zobeir. In the Khor Musa there is a good natural anchorage, but the bar would require dredging to admit vessels of a large size. The Khor Zobeir, which runs up into the desert towards Basra, has fairly deep water, but its approaches make it unsuitable for use as a harbour. With these exceptions there are no natural harbours in this district, although there is an anchorage for small vessels at Bandar Dilam.

Bubian is a large low island about 26 miles in length by 12 in breadth, situated at the north-western corner of the Persian Gulf, which is divided from the mouth of the Shatt el-Arab by the Khor Abdullah, and from the possessions of the Sheikh of Koweit by the Khor as-Sabiya. The island is barren, and is destitute

of fresh water; parts of it are at times submerged by the sea. The other islands at the head of the Gulf are little more than mudbanks, and the strip of land which lies between the Shatt el-Arab and the Haffar and Balmanshir channels of the Karun, which is sometimes called Abadan island, may be considered as part of the mainland.

Ports.—The two ports of the district, Basra and Mohammera, are both situated on the Shatt el-Arab.

Basra is situated on the right bank of the Shatt el-Arab, 70 miles from the outer bar at the river mouth, and 539 miles by river from Baghdad. It is the chief port of extensive districts of which Baghdad in Mesopotamia and Kirmanshah in Persia are the trade centres, and is also the port of shipment for the date and grain trades of Mesopotamia. There is anchorage in mid-channel in Basra reach for a considerable number of ships in from 5½ to 8 fathoms. At Margil, 5 miles above Basra, there is a long strip of foreshore with deep water close to the bank, and here some 2 miles of deep-water wharves have been constructed. If improvement to the navigation of the Shatt el-Arab were effected Basra would quickly take its place as a first-rate port, and as the terminus of the Baghdad railway it seems likely to play a most important part in the future economic development of the Persian Gulf region.

Mohammera is situated about 16 miles below Basra, close to the junction of the Karun river (through the Haffar channel) with the Shatt el-Arab. Large steamers which cannot swing in the Haffar channel anchor near the left bank of the Shatt el-Arab. The port of Mohammera owes its importance partly to its position at the mouth of the Karun, through which a considerable trade to Persia at present passes, and partly to the fact that the refineries of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company are situated close by. If land transit from Persia *via* Ahwaz to Basra should take the place of river transit, it seems unlikely that the port will develop further to any great extent.

River System

The most important feature of the district at the head of the Persian Gulf is the river *Shatt el-Arab*, which forms a main line of communication along which passes a large section of the trade of Mesopotamia and central and western Persia. The Shatt el-Arab is formed by the confluence of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, which unite at Kurna, about 125 miles from the bar at the mouth of the river; it is joined at Mohammera, 48 miles from the river mouth, by the greater part of the waters of the Karun. The width of the river at its mouth is 1½ miles, and the land is very low on both sides of the entrance. Below Mohammera the river is rich in silt contributed largely by the Karun. The waters of the river serve to irrigate through numerous channels and distributaries the extensive date groves which line its banks to a depth of from ½ mile to 2 miles inland.

The chief obstacle to the navigation of the Shatt el-Arab is the outer bar at the mouth of the river, which is formed by flats composed of mud and silt of a width of nearly five miles; a smaller bar forms in the river at certain seasons in the neighbourhood of Mohammera. Above these two bars, however, the river can be ascended as far as Basra by any vessels able to cross the bar, which at spring tides admits ships up to 20 ft. draught, at other times those up to 17 to 18 ft. The Shatt el-Arab is wide, with a depth at low-water spring tides of 30 to 40 ft., and there are no very awkward bends in the river, which is navigable as far as Kurna by vessels of 15 ft. draught. In order to give satisfactory access to the port of Basra the bars at the mouth of the Shatt el-Arab and below Mohammera should be removed and the channel kept clear; it is said that this work would not present any great engineering difficulties.

The *Tigris* has so far deteriorated through systematic abstraction of its waters for canals and irrigation ditches that its usefulness for purposes of navigation has been seriously impaired; it forms, however, an

important avenue of commerce to Baghdad and thence to Persia. The river between Basra and Baghdad is practicable throughout the year for steamers drawing 4 ft., but there are numerous *bunds* and shoal patches which interfere seriously with navigation when the water is low. The volume of water in the Tigris varies considerably during the year; the low-water season lasts from July to November, the high-water from December to June.

The *Karun* is the largest and only navigable river in Persia; it rises in the mountains in the Bakhtiari country about 100 miles west of Isfahan. After winding through deep valleys and mountain gorges it emerges from the hills above Shustar and then flows south by west; it breaks through the line of sandstone hills at Ahwaz in a series of rapids, and from that point it winds through the alluvial flats of south Arabistan for a further distance of 115 miles. The main volume of the water of the Karun flows through the Haffar channel into the Shatt el-Arab at Mohammera, the remainder through the Balmanshir channel, reaching the sea about 12 miles east of the mouth of the Shatt el-Arab. The river is navigable as far as Ahwaz by river steamers of 2 ft. draught at any time, and of 5 ft. draught when the river is high. The Karun, which when full carries a brown silt, is not at present much utilised for irrigation purposes. The seasonal variations in the volume of water follow the same general course as those of the Tigris, but the Karun is more subject than the Tigris to sudden irregular rises. The rapids near Ahwaz are practically unnavigable, but above them navigation is again possible to within a few miles of Shustar. The Balmanshir channel can be navigated by vessels of 7 ft. draught up to 30 miles from the sea. It is said that the Karun is not capable of material improvement for navigation purposes except at prohibitive cost.

There are other smaller rivers in this region, and of these the chief are the following:—

The *Jarrahi* rises in the Ramuz district of Arabistan; it flows into the Felahieh district, where it is mostly carried off by canals for irrigation purposes, the lands watered by the Jarrahi being among the most fertile and productive in Arabistan. The remnants of the stream become the Felahieh—Marid canal.

The *Hindian* is formed by the junction of the two streams which rise in the Persian hills between Behbehan and Shiraz. The river reaches the Gulf through mudflats about 30 miles east of the Khor Musa; there is a bar of soft clay at the river mouth. The Hindian in its upper reaches flows through several channels, and is made use of to a considerable extent for irrigation. The depth of water at the bar is not less than 3 ft., and above it 6 ft.; the river can be ascended by native craft as far as the town of Hindian, which is 16 miles north-west of the river mouth.

The *Karka* (Kharkah, Kharkeh) river, which rises in the district north-west of Dizful, enters the plains of Arabistan about 15 miles further west than the Diz river, and waters large areas here and in the Hawiza district. Its waters are dissipated in streams and marshes which have submerged and ruined the district, but a certain amount of the water eventually finds its way through the marshes to the Tigris and the Shatt el-Arab.

PERSIAN LITTORAL

Surface

The narrow coastal plain of south-western and southern Persia consists of belts of low land of varying width, situated between the sea and a great maritime range of limestone, which forms the southern rim of the Persian plateau. The plain extends along the whole length of the coast from Bandar Dilam to the frontier of Baluchistan at Gwattar, with the exception of that part between Kangun and Asalu, where the maritime range may be said to fall directly into the sea. The

width of the plain varies as a rule from 15 to 30 miles, but in some places, e.g., at Bushire, and again between Bandar Abbas and Minab, the hills retreat, thus widening the maritime plain, which at Bushire attains a width of 45 miles, while further north it reaches a breadth of 60 miles. The surface of the plain is broken by a series of subsidiary coastal ridges and hills, which are from 1,000 to 3,000 ft. high; in places these skirt the coast and give the plain the character of a trough parallel to the sea; in other parts they divide the plain into three parts: inland valley, coastal ridge, and maritime strip; in such cases the inland valley is usually fertile. These coastal ridges contain large quantities of gypsum, and in places, as at Bustaneh and Khamir, there are deposits of sulphur. The soil of the plain is largely a light loam of great fertility, with specially fertile alluvial districts at the foot of the hills, in the deltas of the Rud-Hilleh and the Minab rivers, on which Bushire and Bandar Abbas are respectively situated, and of the Mund river, and also in the tracts along the course of the rivers. Large quantities of cereals are grown, and there is good natural grazing in the hills between May and October. Above the foreshore there are numerous date groves. Along the coast there are extensive mudflats, and there is a certain amount of saline desert or swamp, bearing only coarse grass and tamarisk bushes. Mangroves are found in the swamps beyond Jask.

In *Persian Makran* the greater part of the coastal plain is a sandy waste impregnated with salt and seamed with lines of drainage, but in places there are patches of alluvial soil; the plain is here wider than on the coast of south-western Persia, and the formation of the coastal ridge and maritime plain less regular.

Adjoining the coastal plain and in places actually abutting on the coast is the south-western portion of the great Persian plateau, the ascent to which from sea-level is almost everywhere accomplished by a series of sudden steps indicated by rugged and precipitous mountain ranges. These ranges, which as a rule run

parallel to the coast, overlook the littoral district in its entire length; they increase in height as they recede inland. The general north-west to south-east trend of the ranges suggests easy communications between the Mesopotamian depression and the interior of the Iranian plateau, but this method of approaching the plateau is, as a matter of fact, extremely difficult. The part of the main range which adjoins the coastal plain rises in places to a height of 5,000 ft.; inside the range and co-extensive with it is a large trough divided into two parts by a watershed. Between the ranges are a series of alluvial plains, in places fertile, which vary in length from 15 to 150 miles and increase in altitude until the central plateau is reached. Further inland, more especially in the province of Fars, the southern slopes of the mountains are generally fertile; they provide very good grazing, or are terraced for vines or other cultivation. In some parts large trees and wild almonds grow above the 3,000 ft. line, and there are forests of dwarf oak. Elsewhere the mountain districts are bare and rocky.

Coast

The coast of the Persian littoral from Bandar Dilam to Gwattar includes the Dashtistan, Tangistan, and Shibkuh coasts in the Gulf proper, the Biaban coast in the Straits of Hormuz, and the coast of Persian Makran. The general trend of the coast is in a south-easterly direction from the head of the Gulf to the Straits of Hormuz, and thence due east along the shore of Persian Makran. It is comparatively free from bays or indentations, and is generally deficient in good harbours, while the seaward face of the various sandstone ridges which occur in the coastal plain is rugged, precipitous, and absolutely barren. There is deep water as a rule fairly close to the shore, which is usually clear of outlying shoals, the only considerable one being the Ras ul-Mutaf, which lies off the Tangistan coast.

The coast-line is either low, rising about 15 ft. above sea-level, or else there are precipitous ranges rising about a mile inland, and occasionally there is much swampy ground.

Ports.—There are three principal ports on the Persian littoral from which the caravan routes ascend the plateau and penetrate into the interior, viz., Bushire (leading to Shiraz and Isfahan), Bandar Abbas (for Yezd and Kirman), and Lingeh.[1] All of these are more or less inadequate and ill-protected from prevailing winds. There are also a number of anchorages close in shore which afford shelter to small boats only.

Bushire, which may be called the principal seaport of Persia, is situated at the northern point of the Bushire peninsula, about 140 miles south-east of the mouth of the Shatt el-Arab. The peninsula projects from the south into a large bay, the greater part of which is very shallow. The outer anchorage (about 4½ miles from the shore) is from 4 to 4½ fathoms deep, and is open and exposed. The inner anchorage, situated in what may be called the entrance of the bay, lies north-north-west of Bushire town, and has good holding ground; it can be entered at any time, except when a *shamal* is blowing, by vessels from 15 to 17 ft. draught. It is said by some that to deepen this approach would be a costly operation, but this is disputed. It is open to question, however, whether Bushire could be converted into a convenient port except at disproportionate cost, and should alternative routes to the interior be developed its importance would be likely to be diminished.

Bandar Abbas is situated on the bare and sandy plain which borders on the Straits of Hormuz; the town is fronted by a flat about 1½ miles broad with less than 3 fathoms of water. There is anchorage in 4½ fathoms about 3 miles off shore. The chief drawback to Bandar Abbas as a port is the slight slope of the shore, and there is also a lack of facilities for

[1] The natural port of entry for Isfahan is Ahwaz.

handling merchandise. The holding ground, however, is good, and the roadstead, which is well sheltered, except from the south-east, affords anchorage to a fair number of vessels. Bandar Abbas is the natural port of south-eastern Persia, and also provides the outlet for trade routes from the central tract between Herat and Yezd, Meshed, and Bampur, although the last two are also reached from Charbar and Gwattar. From it there are possible routes to the interior which may prove of considerable importance in the future. In the event of improved port facilities being required, it is open to question whether they can be provided at Bandar Abbas, but there are said to be possibilities of a good commercial port at Bustaneh, about 18 miles to the west. The Clarence Straits, which lie to the west of Bandar Abbas, narrow to a width of 3 miles, and contain good anchorage in deep water.

Lingeh is situated about 296 miles south-east of Bushire; there is good anchorage in 5 fathoms of water at three-quarters of a mile from the beach, with good holding on a clay bottom; it is exposed, however, to south and south-east winds, which sometimes make communication with the shore impossible. From Lingeh caravan routes run to Bastak, Lar, and Jahrum; but although the roadstead has some advantages over those of Bushire and Bandar Abbas its development is checked by the mountainous and arid nature of the interior. The trade formerly carried on from Lingeh with the Arabian coast, and especially with Trucial Oman, has now been largely diverted to Dibai.

Of the harbours in Persian Makran the most important is *Charbar* (*Chahbar*). The bay of Charbar is 7½ miles wide at the entrance and 10 miles in length. It has the makings of a deep-water port, but the anchorage is exposed to the monsoon and is dangerous during that season. There is a depth of 4 fathoms at a distance of 1 mile off shore at Charbar town; the 5-fathom line is 2 miles from the beach.

There is an important station of the Indo-European

Telegraph Department at *Jask*; it is situated on a promontory about 140 miles south-east of Bandar Abbas, and about 130 miles north-north-west of Muscat. There are anchorages suitable for steam vessels on both sides of the Jask promontory, in which shelter can be found from all but southerly winds. Ships generally anchor $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the shore in the west bay; there is usually a very heavy surf on the beach. The 5-fathom line is nearly 3 miles from the shore in the west bay, and two-thirds of a mile from the shore in the east bay.

Gwattar (*Guattar*) bay is a great indentation on the Makran coast, at the meeting-point of Persian and British territory; the width at the entrance is 19 miles, the depth about 11 miles. The whole of the bay is entirely open to the south; a considerable swell runs straight in during the monsoon, and the sea breaks in 6 fathoms, rendering it unsafe to enter. From Gwattar there is a caravan route to Bampur, which forms an easy line of approach to the plateau.

The relation between the ports on the Persian coast and their corresponding trade centres on the Persian plateau is closely concerned with the nature of the back-country through which the routes which connect them must pass. The general trend of the mountain chains, which from the Turkish frontier to the Straits of Hormuz run parallel to the coast, from north-west to south-east, makes a direct ascent to the plateau from any point between Bushire and Lingeh very difficult. Between Bushire and Shiraz are four ranges of mountains, and the post road between these points, which constitutes the shortest means of access to the plateau (to Shiraz and thence to Isfahan), is one of the steepest and most arduous routes in Persia. For the first 50 miles the route traverses a level plain which is liable to become heavy or impassable after rain. Between that and Shiraz four difficult passes have to be crossed through rough and rocky defiles; of these the highest is the Kutal-i-pir Zan, which is 7,400 ft. high. The principal alternative route, which is that *via* Firuzabad, crosses a series of passes, of which the

highest is the Muk (6,600 ft.); none of these are as formidable as those on the post road, although the Ahram and other rivers are difficult to cross in times of flood; these, however, occur but seldom. This approach to the plateau, which is to some extent in a transverse direction, is less difficult than the post road, and the same may be said of a possible line of communication between Bushire and Jahrum and thence to Shiraz. Between Shiraz and Isfahan the altitude of the central plateau varies only from 5,000 to 8,000 ft., and there are no difficult obstacles to be surmounted.

Towards Bandar Abbas the valleys between the ranges which form the outer rim of the plateau open out towards the coast, and there is a line of approach to the plateau towards the north-west in a direction parallel to the ranges, from Bandar Abbas to Shiraz *via* Lar and Jahrum. This route, which traverses a succession of fertile plains as well as mountain passes of no great difficulty, is usually made use of as a means of approach to Lar from the coast, in preference to that from Lingeh, which traverses country presenting numerous obstacles in the shape of passes and ravines, and is also deficient in water. The country to the north of Bandar Abbas, through which pass the caravan routes to Kirman and Yezd, comprises a considerable area of the central plateau as well as the ranges which form its outer boundary. The ascent is considerably less arduous than that between Bushire and Shiraz, although the routes are considerably longer. Most of the routes use either the Tang-i-Zagh or Tang-i-Zindan passes, which constitute fairly formidable obstacles, and are situated in the southern part of the routes at a distance of about 80 to 60 miles respectively from Bandar Abbas. Considerable areas of the country are sterile and stony desert, with desolate ranges of hills and numerous ravines; some of the valleys, however, contain fertile soil. There are numerous rivers and fords to be crossed, some of which are at times impassable. The high mountain passes are blocked with

snow in winter, but there is usually an alternative route available. North-east of Bandar Abbas there is a depression in the outer rim of the plateau where the boundary range begins to turn east instead of south-east; in this direction is easier country, through which passes the longer route to Kirman by way of Rigan. Only two passes present any difficulty on this route, which provides a fairly easy way for a cart road or railway to the Persian plateau.

The route from Gwattar to Bampur by way of Sarbaz is said by an authority to be the best one from the sea coast on to the plateau. There are no high passes with steep gradients; but, on the contrary, a considerable part of this road runs along stony river beds, and three times a year, when the Sarbaz river is in flood, would be impassable.

Islands

There are several islands strewn along the Persian littoral, usually at a few miles' distance from the coast. Between Bandar Dilam and the outlet through the Straits of Hormuz are the islands of Kharak, Sheikh Shuaib, and Kais, which are all small, low, rocky, and fringed by reefs. Large quantities of valuable building stone are now being transported from Kharak to Basra. Kharak and Kais have both at different times been in British occupation.

The principal island on the Persian littoral, however, is Kishm; this is situated in the Straits of Hormuz, and stretches along the Persian coast from Lingeh almost to Bandar Abbas; it is separated from the mainland by a channel known as Clarence Straits. The island of Kishm is 60 miles long and 90 miles broad, and is nearly covered with precipitous table-topped hills; at one point a low plain extends for several miles across the island. The highest point reaches an elevation of 1,300 ft. The coast is generally rocky. There is an anchorage at the foot of Kishm in 5 fathoms about three-quarters of a mile from the shore; larger vessels anchor 2 miles off in 6 fathoms.

The islands of Henjam and Larak, to the south and east of Kishm, are barren and hilly; they may be regarded as being physically appendages of the larger island. On the island of Henjam there is a British coaling station and also a telegraph station. On the small island of Hormuz, which lies a few miles south-east of Bandar Abbas, was situated the once-celebrated city of Ormuz, which has now disappeared. The island is barren, and contains large quantities of rock-salt and red oxide of iron.

River System

Although the coastal plain is seamed by numerous lines of drainage, rivers in this region are few and unimportant, dwindling at certain seasons of the year to a mere trickle; at other times, especially at the season of the melting of the snows, they increase considerably in volume, and at times become impassable. Many of the rivers and streams are brackish and of no use for irrigation purposes. The river systems which have their origin in the back-country of the Gulf proper run in a north-west and south-east direction, following the natural trend of the mountain districts, and find their way to the coast with difficulty; those of Persian Makran, where the mountain ranges are more interrupted, flow as a rule from north to south into the Arabian Sea.

The only rivers in the district worthy of mention are the Mund, the Rud-Hilleh, and the Minab.

The *Mund*, which rises in the neighbourhood of Shiraz, emerges from the hills in the Dashti district, about 60 miles south of Bushire; at times it is not more than 3½ ft. deep, but after rain discharges a large volume of water into the sea; the water is brackish. The river is navigable for a short distance by small native craft. The *Rud-Hilleh*, which reaches the sea just north of Bushire, is formed by the junction of two other streams, one sweet and the other brackish, about 30 miles inland. The *Minab*, which enters the Straits of Hormuz a few miles east of Bandar Abbas, has at

Minab town a width of 400 to 600 yds.; it usually carries a fair volume of water. It is one of the few rivers of which the water can be used for irrigation, and in summer is drained almost dry by numerous channels taken off for this purpose.

In Persian Makran there is no river of importance.

(3) Climate

In the Persian Gulf region weather is a subject of great commercial importance, for, apart from the pearl fisheries, the prosperity of the country depends chiefly on agriculture, which in its turn is to a great extent dependent on rainfall.

The Persian Gulf lies almost outside the region of the south-west monsoon, and its effect on the climate is for the most part indirect. On the Arabian side, within Ras el-Hadd, the monsoon is not felt at all, while on the opposite or Makran coast the monsoon rains do not extend further than Ormara in Baluchistan. The monsoon reaches Jask only in the form of a light south-easterly breeze.

In the Persian Gulf region the summer is very hot and practically rainless; in the winter there is cold and stormy weather with a certain amount of rain. The hot season may be said to extend from the beginning of May to the end of October, and the cold from the middle of November to the middle of March, the remaining periods being transitional. From the middle of May till the middle of July the heat is intense, but is moderated at the upper end of the Gulf by a constantly-blowing *shamal* or north-west wind. From the middle of July to the middle of August the heat is very oppressive owing to the stillness of the atmosphere and the excessive moisture. Bad weather generally begins after the middle of December, and January and February are cold and boisterous.

Winds.—The prevailing north-west wind, known as the *shamal*, blows in the northern half of the Persian Gulf for about nine months in the year, being very strong in April and almost incessant in June. In

summer *shamals* are rarely more than moderate; in winter they are often fresh and hard gales. The next most prevalent and distinctive wind is the *kaus* or south-east wind, which in winter alternates with the *shamal*. Other winds are the *nashi*, or north-easter, which blows strongly in the Gulf of Oman, especially in winter; during this period the Batina coast is dangerous. The *suhaili*, or south-west wind, is much dreaded by native mariners, as it strikes nearly all the sheltered anchorages on the Persian coast.

Temperature.—The difference in temperature between the northern and southern ends of the Persian Gulf is considerable. At the southern end it never freezes, and snow is not seen except on distant mountains, but in Turkish Irak there are hard frosts at times, and snow has been known to fall at Bushire. The highest absolute temperatures are probably experienced in Irak, but the heat is most felt in the lower part of the Gulf, on account of the humidity; it is, perhaps, more unbearable at Bandar Abbas than elsewhere. Mean daily maximum temperatures in July and August average:—

	July.	August.
Muscat	92° F. (33° C.)	88° F. (31° C,)
Bahrein	98° F. (36½° C.)	100° F. (37½° C.)
Bushire	95° F. (35° C.)	95° F. (35° C.)

Irak is the hottest of the districts and also the coldest; a reading of less than 19° F. (−7° C.) has been obtained at Baghdad.

Rainfall.—Rainfall in the Persian Gulf region is extremely light; the following table shows the annual average in inches at the places where observations have been recorded:—

Arabian side.	Head of Gulf.	Persian side.
Bahrein 3¼ in. (80 mm.) Muscat 3-6 in. (75-150 mm.)	Baghdad 9 in. (230 mm.) Basra 6 in. (150 mm.) Fao 2-4 in. (50-100 mm.)	Bushire 12 in. (300 mm.) Jask 4¼ in. (110 mm.) Charbar 5-6 (130-150 mm.)

Rain is almost confined to the winter months, and hardly ever falls before the middle of October or after the end of May. The principal rainy months are December, January, and February.

The humidity is considerable. At Baghdad, which is a long distance from the Gulf, the average humidity is only 56 per cent., but in Bahrein it is over 79 per cent.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

The climate of the Persian Gulf region is, during several months of the year, very trying to Europeans, but it is not altogether unhealthy. The cold weather, though less unpleasant, appears to be more unhealthy than the hot; sickness is most prevalent in the transitional seasons, spring and autumn. Malarial fever is the principal disease of the region, and prickly heat and boils are very prevalent. Plague has shown itself at intervals in the Persian Gulf since 1899, especially in the Gulf ports; but there is little plague in Mesopotamia. Epidemics of cholera are frequent, and at times severe, but they have almost entirely confined themselves to the river towns of the Shatt el-Arab. Small-pox is prevalent in the Persian Gulf region, and at times assumes an active epidemic form.

There was no general organization of quarantine before the war; local systems were under the management of Turkey and Great Britain. Turkish quarantine, which was prescribed by the Constantinople Board of Health, by excessive stringency and constant variation of rules proved a serious impediment to commerce in Irak, while its protective value was slight.

On the Persian coast arrangements as to sanitation were entrusted by the Persian Government to the British authorities in 1897. In 1903 an attempt was made to transfer the control from the British authorities to the Imperial Persian customs; in 1904 the Persian Sanitary Council was founded, but there has

not been much evidence of its activities in the Persian Gulf. The Government of India dispensary was opened at Bandar Abbas in 1906, and has been the means of relieving much suffering.

The chief quarantine officer in the Persian Gulf is the Residency Surgeon at Bushire, an officer of the Indian Medical Service, who represents the Persian Government.

ARABIAN COASTAL REGION

(5) Race and Language

The population of the Arabian coastal region of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman is almost exclusively Arab, although alien elements occur in many of the coastal towns, especially in Oman.

A large number of the population of the oases of Hasa and Katif and the island of Bahrein belong to a race or class known as Baharina; these may number 100,000. Their origin is doubtful, and they are regarded either as an aboriginal tribe conquered and absorbed by the Arabs, or as a class formed by the conversion of certain Arab tribes to Shiism about 300 years ago. The term as now employed on the west coast of the Persian Gulf is practically a synonym for Arab-speaking Shiah Mohammedans.

The Arabs of Oman belong traditionally to two supposed racial groups: (1) Yamani, said to have been the first Arab settlers in Oman; (2) Nasiri (Nizari), less purely Arab, who were for the most part later immigrants. Each of these groups is divided into a large number of tribes, sections, and sub-sections.

The nomads are exclusively Arab or quasi-Arab. Among the non-Arab elements are included the following elements:—

(i) On the shores of the Gulf proper there are about 1,000 Persians in Koweit, and 2,500 in Abu Dhabi and Dibai. (ii) At Dibai there are about 1,400 Baluchis. (iii) Along the coast of Oman there are colonies of Persians, in part relics of Persian occupation.

(iv) In the neighbourhood of Sohar and elsewhere there are Baluchis and Jadgals, of whom the former, now very numerous, were originally introduced as mercenary troops. There are also considerable Indian communities in Muscat and Matra. (v) Negroes, both emancipated and slaves, are found in considerable numbers in the coastal towns of the Gulf proper, and along the coast of Oman, the outcome of several centuries of slave trade.

Arabic is spoken almost exclusively in this region; but Persian, Hindustani, and Baluchi are also spoken in certain of the coast towns.

(6) Population

Distribution

Owing to the barren and waterless nature of the region the inhabitants are found mostly in the coastal towns; villages are numerous only where there are oases or springs and cultivation is possible. There are many villages in the oases of Hasa and Katif, in the island of Bahrein, along the Batina coast, in the Wadi Semail, and in the mountains of Oman.

In the larger towns, and especially in Hofuf, where contact with the outside world is maintained through Indian and other merchants, buildings and architecture are more elaborate, and a higher standard of life prevails. Village life is primitive, and the inhabitants of villages are engaged almost exclusively in agriculture.

(i) The total population, settled and nomadic, of the districts adjoining the Gulf proper is said to be in the neighbourhood of 300,000. This is made up as follows:—

	Settled.	Nomadic.
Koweit	37,000	13,000
Hasa..	100,000	50,000
El-Katr	25,000	Unknown
Trucial Oman	72,000	8,000

The islands of Bahrein have about 100,000 inhabitants. The population of the district as a whole is extremely scanty, and vast tracts are either uninhabited or inhabited only at certain times of the year by a few nomads.

The chief centres of population are:—

(*a*) Certain *coastal towns and ports* connected with the interior by caravan routes. The great majority of the inhabitants of these towns take part in the pearl fisheries and in the small industries connected with them, such as boat-building, sail-making, &c. There are also considerable sea fisheries, in which some of the pearl fishers take part during the winter.

The numbers of the inhabitants of these towns are as follow:—

Koweit	35,000
El-Katif	5,000
Bida	12,000
Abu Dhabi	6,000
Dibai	20,000
Sharga	15,000
Manama, on the island of Bahrein	25,000
Muharrak, on the island of Bahrein	20,000

(*b*) The *oases of Hasa and Katif*; these include extensive districts of considerable fertility, and the inhabitants are mainly occupied in agriculture. Hasa oasis has a population of 67,000, of whom 25,000 are included in the capital, Hofuf. The population of Katif oasis is 26,000.

(ii) Of the districts which adjoin the Gulf of Oman, the Sultanate of Oman has about 500,000 inhabitants, of whom 30,000 are nomads, in the interior. Oman proper is said to have a population of 34,300. Beduins are numerous in Oman proper and on the verge of the desert generally, but their numbers cannot be estimated.

The most populous districts of Oman are:—

(*a*) The *coastal plain of Batina*, which has a settled

population of 105,000, engaged for the most part in agriculture and the cultivation of dates, and in the fisheries.

(*b*) The *Wadi Semail*, which is a most populous valley with a settled population of 2,800, engaged largely in date cultivation.

(*c*) The *coastal towns*, of which Muscat has a population of 10,000, and Matra one of 11,000. Matra is the starting-point of a caravan route to the interior, as are also Sur, with a population of 12,000, and Sohar, with 7,500. Kabura has 8,000 inhabitants.

The inhabitants of the coastal towns are engaged in the fisheries and local maritime trade, and also in trade with India and the east coast of Africa.

Movement

Increase and decrease in population are due in the Arabian coastal region chiefly to local causes. In the months between May and September there is a considerable influx of population for the pearl diving, and boats come to this coast from the Persian shore and all parts of the Gulf. In autumn there are local movements of the population for the purposes of the date harvest.

The population also varies according to the movements of the Beduin. These are engaged in the rearing of flocks of sheep and in camel breeding. During the winter and spring they wander far and wide over the plains in search of pasture, but in the hot weather they come in to the wells and oases. They also visit the towns in order to make purchases and to sell live stock and *ghi*.

HEAD OF THE GULF

(5) Race and Language

The population at the head of the Persian Gulf is principally Arab. In the town of Basra there are, in addition, a few Europeans and Indians, together with about 3,000 Persians and 1,000 Jews.

In *south Arabistan* the population is mostly Arab, with probably in places an admixture of Persian blood. The following non-Arab elements, however, occur :—

(i) In the town of Mohammera there are, besides Arabs,[1] a considerable number of Persians and a few Jews, Sabians, and Oriental Christians. (ii) In Hindian and other districts there are some Persians. (iii) In the eastern part of the country there are a certain number of Lurs. (iv) In Mohammera district there are some negroes and a few Baluchis.

In the province of Behbehan Kuhgiluya the population is Lur; and in Behbehan town and plain there is a population of mixed Persian (or possibly Lur) descent, who are known as Behbehanis.

The language of the region at the head of the Gulf is Arabic, which is spoken in south Arabistan with an admixture of Persian words, while Lur dialects are used in the eastern districts.

(6) Population

The population of the districts of Irak at the head of the Gulf probably approaches 120,000; of these about 40,000 inhabit the town of Basra, and most of the remainder are found in the numerous villages which are situated in the date groves that line the banks of the river. These are engaged in agriculture, principally date culture. The population in the interior is scanty.

The population of south Arabistan is probably rather over 200,000. The town of Mohammera has about 15,000 inhabitants, Hawiza has 5,000, Felahieh 2,000, and Hindian about 4,000. Large parts of the country are uninhabited or only sparsely populated. The numbers of settled inhabitants and nomads are probably about equal. The former, with the exception of the comparatively small numbers who live in towns,

[1] Arabs in Mohammera town are chiefly local Arabs with some descendants of Arab refugees from Bahrein.

are found in the villages which are numerous in certain parts of the country, e.g., on the left bank of the Shatt el-Arab, on the banks of the Karun in the Mohammera district, and on the Hindian. In the Felahieh district most of the villages are agricultural settlements, situated on canals taken from the Jarrahi river.

The great bulk of the nomads inhabit the districts of Ahwaz and Hawiza; in summer and autumn they camp in the marshes, in winter and spring they roam over the desert with their flocks and herds. A proportion migrate between the Persian and Irak sides of the frontier. The Muhaisin, who are looked upon as a settled tribe, leave Mohammera at certain times of the year in order to cultivate their grain lands on the Karun.

The population of the town of Behbehan is said to be from 12,000 to 15,000.

PERSIAN LITTORAL

(5) Race and Language

The population of the littoral of the Persian Gulf proper from Bandar Dilam to the Straits of Hormuz is composed of a medley of races and racial blends. Among the inhabitants of the coastal region of the Gulf proper the most important elements are Persians and Persian Arabs, the latter of whom may be described as Arabs under Persian rule who have become denationalised by settlement, subjection, or intermarriage; considerable numbers of them now adhere to the Shiah sect of Mohammedans, and they speak as a rule the Persian language. The settled population of the region probably consisted originally of Persians or Persian-speaking tribes, and the numerous Arab settlements seem to have come partly from the mainland, from south Arabistan and the Kaab tribe, partly from the opposite side of the Gulf, from among the Dawasir at Bahrein, and from the Ajman, Al Ali, and

Shammar tribes in the mainland of Arabia. In some parts the two races seem to have blended, in others they are more clearly differentiated, as in the case of Dashtistan, where there is an important group of Arab settlements, of which Chakuta is the largest. There are Arab tribes in the Lingeh district and a considerable semi-Arab population in the Shibkuh district.

Besides these races there is in the north a strong Lur element, while in the south-east, in the neighbourhood of Hormuz, a Baluchi strain appears, this being stronger further east, the inhabitants of Biaban being described as all Baluchi.

In Persian Makran there are a number of tribes, mostly claiming to be descended from Arabs, who either originally settled in Makran or moved there later from Sind or Kach. Some of the inhabitants are of Indian origin, and there are many Baluchis. There are also a number of negro slaves.

In the coastal towns the population is also very mixed. The inhabitants of Bushire are principally Persians, but include about 600 Jews and a few Armenians, Goanese, Baghdad Mohammedans, and Europeans. In Bandar Abbas most of the population belong to a hybrid race of mixed Persian, Baluchi, Arab, and negro descent, and are known as Abbasis. There are a number of immigrants, including Persians from Lar, Avaz, and Bastak, also Hindus, Khojahs, and Arabs. Lingeh also has a very composite population, of which the basis is Arab, chiefly immigrants from Trucial Oman and Bahrein. There are some negroes.

Behind the coastal belt the population is extremely scanty. It is composed of tribes of mixed origin, partly settled and partly nomadic, in which Irani, Turki, and, to a small extent, Arab strains are present. Among the chief tribes are the Kashkai, a nomad tribe of Turki origin, a large number of whom descend to the *garmsir*, or warm pastures, from the mountain districts of the Persian plateau for the winter and spring months, and the Mamassani, a group of five tribes of Lur descent.

The Persian language, or a dialect of it, is almost universally spoken in the districts of the Persian coast, both among Persians and Arabs, although a certain amount of Arabic is spoken in places, and in some parts Arabic, Lur, or Baluchi modifications are introduced into the Persian dialect. In Bandar Abbas a dialect known as Abbasi is spoken by a section of the population. In Persian Makran the language of the country is a dialect of Baluchi called Makrani, which contains a number of Persian and Arabic words.

(6) Population

The number of inhabitants is probably over 300,000; this includes the population of coastal towns, of which Bushire has 12,000–20,000, Lingeh about 12,000, and Bandar Abbas about 8,000. The population of Persian Makran is estimated at about 114,000. Except in the towns mentioned above, the population is scattered in numerous small villages along the sea coast, or in the coastal plain at the foot of the mountains. The inhabitants are engaged principally in agriculture or in seafaring occupations, pearl-diving, sea-fishing, and the local carrying trade. There is a considerable amount of coastal trade between the seaports of the Persian littoral; also between these ports (notably Lingeh) and the Arabian coast, and especially Bahrein and Trucial Oman. Dwellings in the villages are for the most part primitive, and consist largely of huts made of date leaves plastered with mud; in the towns buildings are more substantial, and are made of stone and plaster of Paris, or sun-dried bricks and mud.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Summary

c. 1602 Portuguese expelled from Bahrein.
1622 Expulsion of Portuguese from Hormuz.
1652 Expulsion of Portuguese from Muscat.
1763 British Residency established at Bushire.
1766 Utubi Arabs settled in El-Katr.
1783 Conquest of Bahrein by the Utubis.
1792 Guadar and Charbar annexed to Oman.
1794 Sultan of Muscat obtained control of Bandar Abbas and its dependencies.
1795 Wahabi conquest of Hasa.
1798 Agreement between Great Britain and Sultan of Muscat.
1805 First British expedition against Kawasim.
1806 Agreement by Kawasim to respect the flag and property of the British.
1809 Second British expedition against Kawasim.
1812 Mohammera rebuilt by Muhaisin tribe.
1814 Anglo-Persian Treaty.
1818 First Egyptian occupation of Hasa.
1819 Third British expedition against Kawasim.
1820 General Treaty of Peace signed by Arab chiefs.
1833 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and Muscat.
1835 First Maritime Truce.
1837 Capture of Mohammera by the Turks.
1838 Second Egyptian occupation of Hasa.
1839 Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and Muscat.
1844 Treaty of Commerce between France and Muscat.
1853 Perpetual Treaty of Peace signed by Arab chiefs.
1854 Cession of Kuria Muria Islands to Great Britain by Sultan of Muscat.
1856-57 Anglo-Persian war.
1857 Treaty of Paris between Great Britain and Persia.
1861 Convention between Sheikh of Bahrein and Great Britain.
Award of Lord Canning separating Muscat and Zanzibar.
1862 Declaration by Great Britain and France respecting the independence of Muscat and Zanzibar.
1868 Agreement between Sheikh of El-Katr and Great Britain.
Lease of Bandar Abbas to Oman cancelled.
Anglo-Persian Telegraph Convention.
1871 Turkish expedition to Hasa under Midhat Pasha.
1872 Charbar captured by Persia.
1880 Agreement by Sheikh of Bahrein with Great Britain.
1888 Karun opened to foreign shipping and trade.
1891 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between Great Britain and Muscat.

1891 Agreement with Great Britain regarding cession of territory by Sultan of Muscat.
1892 Exclusive Agreement between Great Britain and Sheikhs of Trucial Oman and Bahrein.
1898 Grant by Sultan of Muscat of lease of coaling station to the French.
1899 Agreement between Great Britain and Sheikh of Koweit.
1900 Question of French coaling station settled.
1901 D'Arcy concession for oil exploitation in Arabistan.
1903 Baghdad Railway Convention.
1905 Muscat Dhows Arbitration.
1907 Second Agreement between Great Britain and Sheikh of Koweit.
1913 Expulsion of Turks from Hasa by Ibn Saud.
Convention between Great Britain and Turkey respecting the Persian Gulf and adjacent territories.
1914 Treaty between Ibn Saud and Turkish Government.
Collective assurance from Great Britain to Gulf Chiefs.
1915 Treaty between Ibn Saud and Great Britain.
1916 Treaty between Sheikh of El-Katr and Great Britain.
1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement.

(1) Introduction

The Persian Gulf is from its geographical position one of the highways of the world, an important link in a chain of communication between East and West. For some centuries the Powers that border the Gulf have been incapable of exercising control over its waters; and the region had become a backwater in the stream of civilisation when Great Britain set her hand to the task of establishing peace and security. That it is now possible for all nations to enjoy free access to peaceful markets in this region is due to Great Britain alone; and the *de facto* predominance of this Power in the Gulf has been achieved, as will be shown, by many years of unselfish toil. The historical position of Great Britain in the Gulf has been thus described:—[1]

" If England has become, in any sense, the arbiter and guardian of the Gulf, it has not been through a

[1] T. J. Bennett, *The Past and Present Connection of England with the Persian Gulf* (Journal of the Society of Arts, June 13, 1902).

restless ambition urging her on to the control of the waste places of the earth, but in obedience to the calls that have been made upon her in the past to enforce peace between warring tribes, to give a free course to trade, to hold back the arm of the marauder and the oppressor, to stand between the slave-dealer and his victim . . . .

" In the case of England and the Persian Gulf the position is unique; for, although England has at no time enjoyed or even asked for territorial acquisitions in those regions, she has for generations borne burdens there which no other nation has ever undertaken anywhere, except in the capacity of sovereign; she has had duty thrust upon her without dominion; she has kept the peace amongst people who are not her subjects; has patrolled, at intervals, waters over which she has enjoyed no formal lordship; has kept, in strange ports, an open door through which the traders of every nation might have as free access to distant markets as her own."

(2) History of the Gulf States to 1914

The southern and western littoral of the Persian Gulf is in the occupation of Arab tribes, while the northern and eastern shores are included in the dominions of Persia. To realise the nature of the *status quo*, the maintenance of which has been a cardinal feature of British policy, it is necessary to have an acquaintance with the history of each of the States bordering the Gulf.

Muscat.—The greater part of the Sultanate of Oman, the dominion of the Sultan of Muscat, lies to the south of the entrance to the Persian Gulf, but is included in the same political system. The boundaries of the State have never been precisely defined. Great Britain[1] has declared the southern limit on the coast of Arabia to be near Ras Sakar; from this point to Khor Kelbeh the coast-line is continuously under the

[1] British counter-case, presented to The Hague Tribunal in the Muscat Dhows Arbitration in 1905.

sovereignty of the Sultan of Muscat,* whose claim to the Musandim peninsula from Ras Dibba to Tibba was also recognised in 1905 by His Majesty's Government. The Sheikh of Sharga rules the coast from Khor Kelbeh to Ras Dibba.[1]

From 1784 to 1856 Muscat and Zanzibar were under the same ruler; after 1794 the Sultan of Muscat governed the islands of Kishm and Hormuz and territory on the Persian coast from Bandar Abbas to Lingeh, but in 1868 his lease was cancelled by the Shah. Guadar,[2] an enclave on the confines of Persia and Baluchistan, has since 1792 been a dependency of Oman, in spite of various attempts at seizure on the part of Persia. Charbar was annexed to Oman in 1792, but was captured by Persia eighty years later.

From A.D. 751 until 1783 Oman was governed by an elective Imam, possessing supreme religious, military, and political authority. After 1783 the ruler of Muscat ceased to be elected, and is styled Seyyid or Sultan more correctly than Imam. Muscat had become finally independent of the Baghdad Caliphate by the tenth century, and from the expulsion (1652) of the Portuguese, who for a short period held the coast, has maintained its position as an independent State, except for an interval of Persian sovereignty (1737-44). The Persians were driven out by Ahmed bin Said (otherwise Sultan bin Ahmed), the founder of the existing Al Bu Said dynasty.

British treaty relations with Muscat date from 1798, when a Deed of Agreement was executed between the East India Company and the Sultan for the exclusion from his territory of the French and Dutch so long as they should be at war with England. This agreement was confirmed in 1800 by a second, which in addition granted permission for an agent of the East India Company to reside permanently at Muscat. Under treaties concluded with Seyyid Said (Said bin Sultan) by France in 1807 and 1808 a French Consular Agent

[1] This was admitted by the French Government in 1905.

[2] Not to be confused with the port of Gwattar.

came to Muscat, until the capture of Mauritius by the British in 1810 destroyed for a time the power and prestige of the French in East African and Arabian waters.

A Treaty of Commerce was concluded between Great Britain and Muscat in 1839, on the model of a similar treaty signed in 1833 between the Sultan and the United States of America. The Sultan entered into various other engagements with the British for the suppression of the slave trade and for the regulation of customs duties; and in 1854 he ceded to the British Government the Kuria Muria Islands, which the French had previously made several efforts to obtain.

On the death of Seyyid Said in 1856 a dispute between two of his sons as to the division of his Arabian and African dominions was submitted to the arbitration of the Viceroy of India, Lord Canning. By his award in 1861 it was decided that Zanzibar should be independent, but should pay an annual subsidy to Muscat. In 1873, in return for agreements concerning the suppression of the slave trade, Great Britain undertook the payment of this subsidy to the Sultan of Muscat "so long as he continued faithfully to fulfil his treaty engagements and manifest his friendship towards the British Government." Payment has been made almost without intermission to the reigning Sultan by the Government of India, without whose recognition no Sultan has since been able effectively to establish his position.

The intervention of the Government of India in the dynastic disputes of the Muscat State, the deportation to India of claimants or pretenders, and the diplomatic and armed assistance lent to the Sultan in various crises, particularly against the Kawasim[1] (Joasmee) and the Wahabis, and for the suppression of piracy in the Gulfs of Oman and Persia, have resulted in the political predominance of Great Britain in the affairs of Muscat. By a Declaration signed at Paris on March 10, 1862, the British and French Governments

[1] See below, p. 44.

bound themselves reciprocally to respect the independence of the Sultan of Muscat. This agreement precluded the establishment of a British protectorate over Oman. In 1891, however, after the signature of a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between Great Britain and Muscat, the Sultan voluntarily entered into an agreement binding "himself, his heirs and successors, never to cede, to sell, to mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, the dominions of Muscat and Oman or any of their dependencies." This agreement covers the Musandim peninsula, to which considerable importance is attached on account of its natural harbours and commanding position at the entrance of the Gulf.

In 1894 a French Vice-Consul was appointed at Muscat, and French influence succeeded in 1898 in obtaining from the Sultan a grant for the lease of a coaling station at Bandar Jissa, in his territory. In consequence of the presentation of a British ultimatum the Sultan cancelled this lease; and in 1900 the question of a French coaling station was settled by the French acceptance of the British offer of half of the site already occupied by British coal-sheds in the Makalla cove.[1]

The practice followed by French Consuls at Muscat and elsewhere of granting French ship's papers and flags to Muscat dhows has occasioned much difficulty in the past. Many of these flagholders engaged in the slave and arms traffic; and their claim that the Sultan was not entitled to board or search their vessels or to exercise any jurisdiction over them opposed serious obstacles to the maintenance of law and order. The Sultan appealed for assistance to His Majesty's Government, who on several occasions made representations on the matter to the French Government. A crisis arose in 1903, and the whole question was

[1] In 1916 the French Government agreed to lend these sheds to His Majesty's Government, and they were duly taken over at the beginning of 1917.

submitted in 1905 to the arbitration of The Hague Tribunal. By the award France was permitted to renew licences granted to owners of dhows before January 2, 1892; no licences given since that date were to be valid unless the grantee was a *bonâ fide* French *protégé* before 1863; licences were not to be transmitted or transferred to any other person or vessel. By these enactments the number of French flagholders was greatly reduced, and will soon reach vanishing point.[1]

The reigning Sultan of Oman, Seyyid Taimur bin Feisal, succeeded his father on October 4, 1913, and was recognised by the British and French Governments on November 15 of that year. He had to face a serious rebellion of the tribesmen of the southern interior, who formulated their independence under an elective Imam. Since July 1913 the rebels have been held back from Muscat by a contingent of the Indian Army. The forces of the Sultan are few in number and are not to be depended upon for aggressive action.

Trucial Oman.—The region known as Trucial Oman extends from Shuam (Sha'am), just within the entrance to the Persian Gulf, to El-Odeid, on the border of El-Katr; it also includes about 50 miles of territory from Ras Dibba to Kelbeh on the coast-line of the Gulf of Oman. The number of independent rulers within these limits has varied at different times; eight chiefs, excluding the Sheikhs of Bahrein, signed the General Treaty of Peace in 1820, but in 1914 the Sheikhs of Ajman, Abu Dhabi, Dibai, Umm al-Kawein, and Sharga alone were considered independent, although the Sheikh of Ras al-Kheima was only nominally subject to Sharga.

Until the signature by the Sheikhs of the Maritime Truce the region in question was commonly known as the Pirate Coast. The chief power was exercised by the Sheikh of the Kawasim, whose capital at this time was Ras al-Kheima. His subjects succeeded in the

[1] In 1917 only twelve Oman dhows were entitled to fly the French flag.

eighteenth century in establishing themselves on the Persian coast and islands, and his fleet scoured the seas, plundering indiscriminately. The Bombay Government joined the Sultan of Muscat in 1805 in a punitive expedition against the Kawasim, whose chief signed in 1806 an Agreement binding himself and his subjects to respect the flag and property of the British. This treaty appears to have been concluded without reference to the Wahabis, who at this time were said to dominate the eastern coast of Arabia, and to be responsible for the increase of piracy. From 1806-8 there was a temporary cessation of piracy, which may be attributed to the presence of a large British fleet in the Gulf. The spread of Wahabi domination led, however, to a revival of trouble, and strong measures were taken by the British authorities, who stated expressly in 1809 that the Kawasim were to be treated as an independent power.

Effective action was taken by the British against the pirates in 1819, which resulted, in 1820, in the signature of a General Treaty of Peace[1] by eight Sheikhs of the coast. This Treaty, which provided for the cessation of plunder and piracy by land and sea, proved insufficient, since regular maritime warfare was not prohibited, and normally degenerated among the Arabs into indiscriminate piracy. In 1835 the first Maritime Truce was signed; it was constantly renewed and extended until 1853, when it was succeeded by a Perpetual Treaty of Peace,[2] which still prevails. After 1835 the Pirate Coast came to be known as Trucial Oman. Treaties for the suppression of the slave trade were signed by the Maritime Chiefs in 1838, 1839, 1847, 1856, and 1873. In consequence of the Turkish expedition to Hasa under Midhat Pasha in 1871, and of Turkish and other foreign intrigues in Trucial Oman, an Exclusive Agreement was concluded separately by the British Government with each of the Trucial Sheikhs—at this time six in number—in

[1] See Appendix I, p. 78.
[2] See Appendix II, p. 80.

March 1892. By this treaty they bound themselves, their heirs and successors, (1) on no account to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government; (2) without the assent of the British Government not to consent to the residence within their territories of the agent of any other Government; (3) on no account to cede, sell, mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation, any part of their territory, save to the British Government. In the following year the Porte was informed of this Agreement; and in 1903 it was made known to the French and Persian Governments. In that year the principle was affirmed that the representation of the Trucial Sheikhs in dealings with other Powers should be undertaken by Great Britain. In 1902 an Agreement was signed by all the Trucial Sheikhs for the suppression of the arms traffic in their territories. At the same time it was reported that new chiefs, on their accession, generally sought British official recognition, and that the advice of the British Resident in the Gulf was obeyed and even welcomed in internal affairs.

Since the suppression of piracy, pearl-diving has been the principal and almost the sole occupation of the maritime population. The increased security in the Gulf, achieved by British efforts, has resulted in a marked development of the pearl industry, and consequent prosperity for the Arabs of the coast.

El-Katr.—The El-Katr peninsula lies south of Okwair (Ojair) in the district of El-Katif, and north of El-Odeid, which forms the western limit of the territories of the Trucial Chiefs. It is believed that before A.D. 1766 the peninsula was included in the dominions of the Beni Khalid Sheikhs, whose headquarters were at that time at Hasa. In 1766 the Utubis from Koweit settled at Zabara, from which they conquered Bahrein in 1783. As a dependency of Bahrein, El-Katr became subject to the provisions of the General Treaty of Peace in 1820 and of the Maritime Truce of 1835. The prevalence of piracy, however, occasioned much anxiety to the British authorities in the Gulf, who adopted

strong measures for the maintenance of order and security. Serious disturbances in 1867, following an attack upon El-Katr by the Sheikhs of Bahrein and Abu Dhabi, necessitated British intervention, and on the restoration of peace in 1868 the British Resident concluded an Agreement with the Sheikh of El-Katr binding him never to put to sea with hostile intent, to refer all disputes to the British Resident, and to maintain the relations which had formerly existed with the Sheikhs of Bahrein. The claim of the Sheikh of Bahrein to sovereignty over El-Katr was, however, disallowed by the Government of India. Efforts were made by the Wahabis during the nineteenth century to bring El-Katr under their rule, and the tribute which they exacted from the Sheikh of Bahrein was probably contributed in part by the inhabitants of El-Katr as a security against aggression.

The Turkish expedition to Hasa under Midhat Pasha in 1871 considerably affected the situation in El-Katr. In spite of repeated assurances by the Porte that "not the slightest idea was entertained of making new conquests or subduing independent tribes," a Turkish garrison was established at Doha (El-Bidaa); and in 1874 the Ottoman Ambassador in London put forward a claim to Turkish sovereignty over the whole of Arabia as the inheritance of the Caliphate. The Turkish garrison remained at Doha until 1914, but the Porte was on several occasions informed that Great Britain would not admit Turkish claims to sovereignty over El-Katr.

The advent of the Turks enabled Sheikh Jasim to evade direct responsibility to the British Government for maritime disturbances, and there was a marked increase in piracy. In 1882 Sheikh Jasim declared that the agreement of 1868 with Great Britain was still valid; and more than once subsequently he expressed a desire to enter into the same relations with the British Government as were maintained by the Sheikhs of Trucial Oman. In consequence, however, of his anomalous position in regard to the Turkish Govern-

ment, no action was taken on his requests. In the Convention between Great Britain and Turkey, signed at London on July 29, 1913, the Ottoman Government renounced all their claims to the El-Katr peninsula, and His Majesty's Government declared that they would not permit its annexation or the infringement of its autonomy by the Sheikh of Bahrein (see below, p. 75).

Bahrein.—The original inhabitants of Bahrein are held by some authorities to be of Persian and by others of Arab descent. From the eleventh to the sixteenth century they appear to have been subject only to native chiefs. During the sixteenth century the island was held by the Portuguese, who were eventually expelled by the Persians about 1602. Persian domination was maintained, with interruptions, until 1783, when the Utubi Arabs from the mainland conquered the island In 1800 and 1802 Bahrein was invaded and occupied for a short period by the Sultan of Muscat, by whose aid Wahabi garrisons were expelled in 1811. Since that date the Utubis have remained the chief power in the island, in spite of aggressions by Wahabis, Omanis, Egyptians, and Turks, who have at various times exacted tribute or attempted to assert authority over Bahrein.

The Bombay Government were unable to grant a request made by the Sheikh of Bahrein in 1805 to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf for the assistance of one or two vessels of war. The increase of piracy, however, made the establishment of treaty relations desirable; and in 1820 the Sheikh of Bahrein signed the General Treaty of Peace for the cessation of piracy by land and sea. From this time Great Britain has refused to tolerate the pretensions of other Powers to Bahrein.

British efforts for the establishment of security on the pearl banks have resulted in a series of treaties concluded with various Sheikhs of Bahrein in 1820, 1847, 1856, 1861, 1868, 1880, and 1890. By the Convention of 1861 the Sheikh of Bahrein bound himself to abstain from maritime aggressions of every description,

and from the prosecution of war, piracy, and the slave trade by sea so long as he received the support of the British Government in maintaining the security of his own possessions against similar aggressions. In consequence of Turkish schemes against Bahrein, and of rumours in 1879 that the Turks proposed to establish a coal depot to be converted gradually into a political agency, the British Government in 1880 executed an Agreement with the Sheikh binding him to abstain from entering into negotiations or making treaties with Governments other than the British, and to refuse permission to any other Government than the British to establish diplomatic or consular agencies or coaling depots in Bahrein territory, unless with the consent of the British Government. In 1892 the Sheikh signed a further Exclusive Agreement identical with that signed by the Trucial Chiefs in the same year.

The capture and destruction by British naval forces of a hostile fleet at Zabara in 1905 saved Bahrein from attack by Arab tribes under Turkish instigation. British influence became increasingly strong, and was directed towards the regulation of the succession to the sheikhship and the improvement of internal administration. In 1905 a British Political Agent was appointed at Bahrein, and has exercised wide judicial powers there. British consular protection has for over fifty years been habitually extended to Bahreinis in foreign countries. The protection of the British Government has converted the island from a scene of chronic external aggression and intestine feud into a relatively peaceful and flourishing centre of industry and commerce.

Hasa.—The Sheikhs of the Beni Khalid tribe ruled Hasa until about 1795, when their power was broken by the Wahabi Emir, who used Hasa as a base for the extension of his influence in Arabia. From this time until the arrival of the Turks in 1871 the Wahabis continued to dominate this region, except for two short intervals of Egyptian occupation.

Wahabism dates from about the year 1742, when

Abdul Wahab (or his son) founded the sect which was destined to become the chief power in Central Arabia. The movement was at first purely religious, and took the form of a puritanical Moslem revival. It later acquired a political and military significance not unlike that displayed in the early history of Mohammedan expansion. The first secular chief to adopt Wahabi principles was Mohammed Ibn Saud, Sheikh of Deraya, and ancestor of the present Emir of Nejd. The Wahabis reduced the province of Hasa for the first time in 1792, and conquered it finally in 1795. Five years later they took El-Katif by storm. Meanwhile Wahabi aggressions in Western Arabia and Mesopotamia had aroused considerable alarm, and involved the Emir in hostilities with the Ottoman Government. Hasa was occupied by the Egyptians, under Ibrahim Pasha, in 1818, but was evacuated in the following year. About 1824 the Wahabis again began to assert themselves in this district; and by 1833 the whole Arabian coast of the Gulf of Oman and that of the Persian Gulf, as far north as El-Katif, owned the sovereignty, or at least the suzerainty, of the Emir of Nejd.

The designs of Mehemet Ali, Viceroy of Egypt, embraced Eastern Arabia; and in 1838 the Egyptians for the second time occupied Hasa, in violation of assurances given by Mehemet Ali in that year to the British political representative at Cairo. Egyptian encroachments met with consistent opposition on the part of the British Government, and early in 1840 the Egyptians found themselves obliged to withdraw from Hasa. A pro-Egyptian Emir, who had been appointed Turkish Vali of Central Arabia, was speedily overthrown, and Wahabi influence again predominated.

From the time of the arrival of the Wahabis upon the coast of Arabia their activities became a matter of concern to the British Government. Wahabi influence effected an increase of piracy and maritime disorders: but, by the instructions of the Government of India, the offending tribes were held directly responsible by

the naval authorities in the Gulf, and conflict between the British and the Wahabis was avoided. Friction between the Wahabis and the Sheikhs of Bahrein, and an attempted invasion of the island in 1859 from El-Katif and Damaun necessitated strong British countermeasures. These elicited a protest in the following year from the Turkish governor of Baghdad, on the ground that Damaun formed "part of the hereditary dominions of the Sultan." The British resident, in his reply, denied the claim of Turkey, and asserted the right of Great Britain to deal directly with the Wahabi Emir. After an open breach with the British authorities, a Wahabi envoy, authorised by the Emir, signed on April 21, 1866, a declaration binding the Emir not to oppose or injure British subjects residing in territories under his authority, and not to injure or attack the territories of the Arab tribes in alliance with the British Government.

A conflict between rival candidates for the Emirate was the direct occasion of Midhat Pasha's expedition to Arabia in 1871 and of the Turkish occupation of Hasa. General disorder and piracy resulted, for the suppression of which British intervention was necessary. In consequence of the continued insecurity of the Gulf, the incapacity of the Turkish authorities, and the failure of all efforts to effect an arrangement with the Porte by conciliatory action, Her Majesty's Government decided in 1881 to authorise the commanders of British cruisers in the Gulf to act as might be necessary to prevent or punish disturbance of the peace of the seas.

From 1888 onwards there was intermittent warfare between Ibn Saud, Emir of Nejd, and the Emir of the Jebel Shammar, Ibn Rashid, who was favoured by the Turks. An alliance was formed between the Sheikh of Koweit and Ibn Saud, who in 1902 requested that "the eyes of the benevolent British Government might be fixed on him." His Majesty's Government were, however, reluctant to become involved in the quarrels of the Wahabi Emir, and contented themselves with remon-

strances at Constantinople against the despatch of Turkish assistance to Ibn Rashid. In 1906 peace was declared between the two Emirs, each of whom received at this time a monthly subsidy from the Turkish Government. Renewed overtures were made by Ibn Saud to the British Government, who, however, again declined to interfere in the internal affairs of Arabia.

Meanwhile the condition of Hasa under Turkish rule was one of chronic insecurity. In 1905-6 the Turkish authorities attempted to take a census of the population in the Hasa and Katif oases, apparently with a view to the imposition of a poll tax. Serious riots, however, resulted, and the proceedings were stopped. A recrudescence of piracy interfered seriously with the trade of the Gulf; Turkish co-operation for the punishment of offenders could not be obtained, and continual obstacles were placed in the way of the British authorities. On land robberies were frequent, and communications constantly interrupted. In 1913 Ibn Saud descended on Hasa and expelled the Turkish garrisons from the province. In the Convention signed at London in July of the same year His Majesty's Government recognised Hasa as part of the Ottoman Sanjak of Nejd. Subsequent negotiations between the Turks and Ibn Saud resulted in the signature of a treaty by Ibn Saud and the Vali of Basra, on May 15, 1914. By this treaty Ibn Saud was appointed Turkish Vali of Nejd, and the succession of his descendants was guaranteed on condition of their loyalty to the Ottoman Government; Turkish control over the internal affairs and foreign relations of the vilayet was established; and the Vali was pledged to provide assistance for Turkey in case of internal disturbance or war with a foreign Power. In spite of this treaty, however, Ibn Saud replied to a letter from the Sheikh of Koweit in October 1914, that "in the event of war with Turkey he would stand by the Sheikh and the British Government" (see below, p. 76).

Koweit.—The town of Koweit seems to have been founded about the beginning of the eighteenth century

by the Utubi tribe, originating from Central Arabia. It grew rapidly in wealth and importance, and when in 1776 Basra was captured by the Persians, the Indian trade with Baghdad, Aleppo, Smyrna, and Constantinople was diverted to Koweit. In consequence of difficulties with the Turkish officials in 1793, the staff of the British factory at Basra established themselves for over two years at Koweit. In 1805 the Sheikh suggested that the British Government should guarantee him protection against the Wahabis, but his proposals were not entertained. The British Residency at Basra was removed in 1821 to Failaka, in the jurisdiction of the Sheikh of Koweit, again on account of trouble with the Turkish authorities. These circumstances appear to indicate that Koweit was practically independent of Ottoman rule, although in 1829 the Sheikh was said to pay an annual tribute to the Turks. Colonel Pelly, in his report of 1863, stated that the suzerainty of the Porte was merely nominal; and at that time there was no mention of tribute paid to Turkey.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, increased interest was directed by the Porte to the political situation in the Gulf. Koweit assumed a new importance as a possible terminus for the Baghdad Railway, and various attempts were made by Turkey to establish some degree of control over the Sheikh. In 1897 Sheikh Mubarak requested British protection. His overtures were then declined, but subsequent designs on the part of Russia and Turkey made the exclusion of foreign influence from Koweit appear desirable. On January 23, 1899, the Sheikh signed an Agreement with the British Government, binding himself and his successors to cede no territory and to receive no foreign representative without the sanction of the British Government. In return the Sheikh was assured of the good offices of the British Government and received a sum of money. The political situation remained somewhat unsatisfactory until September 1901, when the Porte undertook to maintain the *status quo* at Koweit, and not to send troops

thither, on condition that His Majesty's Government would not occupy that place or establish a British protectorate. The Marquess of Lansdowne gave the required assurance to the Ottoman Ambassador.

On several subsequent occasions, however, British naval and diplomatic support was considered necessary to protect the Sheikh against Turkish designs. In 1902 the Turks established military posts at Umm Kasr and Safwan, and also upon Bubian Island, territories which the Sheikh claimed as lying within his jurisdiction. The Government of India took a serious view of these aggressions; and the importance of asserting the Sheikh's claim to Bubian was emphasised by an Inter-Departmental Committee in 1907. British influence at Koweit was strengthened by the visit of the Viceroy of India in 1903, and the establishment in 1914 of a British Political Agency.

In view of the conflicting territorial claims of the Sheikh and the Turkish Government, and of the prevailing uncertainty as to the exact definition of the *status quo*, it was decided in 1913 to regularise the position. Accordingly articles 1–10 of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of that year, respecting the Persian Gulf and adjacent territories, declared the territory of Koweit, as defined in articles 5 and 7,[1] to form an autonomous Kaza of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the Ottoman Government recognised the validity of existing agreements[2] between the British Government and the Sheikh.

Irak.—The influence of Turkey in the Persian Gulf did not last long, nor was it ever securely established. The situation in Hasa and Koweit has already been described. Irak for nearly three centuries formed part of the Ottoman Empire, from which it has now been separated; but before the middle of the nineteenth century the authority of the Porte in the Basra pashalik was seldom more than nominal. After the administrative reforms of Midhat Pasha in 1869,

[1] The islands of Bubian and Warba were included.

[2] Besides that of 1899, there was an Agreement in 1900 prohibiting traffic in arms, and a Postal Agreement in 1904.

the district from the Khor Zobeir to the Shatt el-Arab formed the Kaza of Fao in the Basra sanjak. The Sheikh of Koweit has for many years possessed large private estates in this region, and has been subjected to many annoyances on their account by the Turkish authorities. The Sheikh of Mohammera is also a wealthy landed proprietor; and many of his subjects reside permanently, or for part of the year, on the right bank of the Shatt el-Arab.

Considerable importance has been attached to Fao, both from its commanding position, and, since 1864, as the point of connection between the British submarine cables from India and the Turkish telegraph lines. The construction of fortifications, begun there by the Turks in 1886, was opposed by Her Majesty's Government and by Persia as contrary to the decision arrived at between Turkey and Persia, through the mediation of Great Britain and Russia, previous to the ratification in 1848 of the Treaty of Erzerum. In consequence of remonstrances, the fort was left for some years without artillery, although a Turkish garrison was maintained.

The Shatt el-Arab from the year 1640 marked the boundary between Turkey and Persia. The policing, surveying, charting and buoying of this waterway, as elsewhere in the Gulf, has been for generations performed by Great Britain solely. Basra, which is accessible to ocean-going steamers, is the chief port in the Persian Gulf, and has had for many generations an organic connection with India.

South Arabistan.—The whole of the north-eastern littoral of the Persian Gulf, from the Shatt el-Arab, is included in the Persian Empire, but the degree of control exercised by the Shah and his Ministers varies considerably in different districts. South Arabistan, of whose population at least 95 per cent. are Arabs, although nominally a division of the Persian province of Arabistan, is actually under Arab administration, which has consistently resisted attempts on the part of the Persian Central Government to exert control:

The Kaab tribe of Arabs seems to have entered Arabistan at some time in the seventeenth century. Their power increased rapidly, and their Sheikh maintained virtual independence in his relations with both Persians and Turks. The Kaab were notorious pirates, and made frequent depredations on shipping in the Shatt el-Arab and Persian Gulf. Several Anglo-Turkish expeditions were undertaken against them in the eighteenth century, but the results were on the whole unsatisfactory.

In 1812 the town of Mohammera, which appears to have been six centuries ago a port of some renown, was rebuilt by the Sheikh of the Muhaisin tribe, between whom and the Kaab, whose capital was at this time Felahieh, considerable rivalry existed for some years. The chief power in the province belonged at this period to the Sheikh of the Kaab, who shortly after 1832 declared Mohammera a free port. In 1837 the town was seized and plundered by the Turks. They withdrew in the following year, but the rival claims of Turkey and Persia continued to cause disturbances until, by the Treaty of Erzerum in 1847, Mohammera was declared to be within the Persian Empire.

With the possible exception of Russia, Great Britain was the only European Power which at this time exhibited any interest in Arabistan. In 1841-42 the principal rivers were navigated by British agency; and continuous efforts were made to develop British commercial interests in the province. In consequence of pressure from Great Britain, the Karun below Ahwaz was opened in 1889 to foreign shipping and trade; and a service of steamships was instituted and maintained by Messrs. Lynch, in spite of constant obstruction from the Persian authorities. Outbreaks of piracy on the part of the Kaab occurred from time to time, and British efforts to obtain the punishment of the guilty frequently occasioned friction with the Turkish and Persian officials. Vigorous British action succeeded, however, in establishing some measure of security.

During the British occupation of Mohammera (1856-7) the Sheikhs of the Muhaisin and Kaab tribes sought from the British authorities some guarantee of protection, which, however, could not be granted in view of the attitude of Her Majesty's Government towards Persian integrity. It was reported that under the Muhaisin Sheikh Mizal (1881-97) the resources of Mohammera were potentially under British control for the extension of commerce and other purposes. A British Vice-Consulate was established at Mohammera in 1890.

In 1897 Sheikh Mizal Khan was assassinated; he was succeeded by his brother, Sheikh Khazal. Shortly afterwards the Kaab Sheikhdom of Felahieh was abolished, and the tribe passed under the direct rule of the Muhaisin Sheikh of Mohammera. Many of the Kaab Arabs cultivated large territories west of the Shatt el-Arab, though continuing to own allegiance to the Sheikh of Mohammera. The latter thus acquired much influence and wide interests in Turkish Irak, which were frequently a cause of friction between him and the Turkish authorities. Considerable distrust existed between the Sheikh and the Persian Central Government, which made various efforts to undermine his autonomy and semi-independence. In 1898 the Sheikh asked to be taken under British protection. The request was refused, but he was assured of the constant support of the British Minister at Teheran.

Until 1902 the Sheikh of Mohammera had complete control over the customs of Arabistan, but in that year the management was transferred to the Imperial Persian Customs Department, under Belgian administration. The Sheikh evinced great hostility to the transfer, and again asked for British protection, expressing a desire to have his position assimilated to that of the Sheikh of Koweit. In view of Russian designs against Mohammera, His Majesty's Minister at Teheran was authorized to give the Sheikh certain

assurances of British support,[1] which were renewed in 1903. British influence was employed to induce the Sheikh to submit to the customs innovations, and to obtain for him in 1903 the grant from the Persian Government of certain districts "as perpetual property," thus securing his title to the greater part of Southern Arabistan.

Meanwhile commercial development had continued under British auspices. In 1901 a British capitalist, Mr. d'Arcy, obtained from the Persian Government an important concession for oil exploitation in Arabistan. This concession was taken up in 1909 by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, who made an agreement with the Sheikh in that year, and laid a pipe-line from the oilfields to Mohammera port. They also established a refinery on Abadan Island, in the territory of the Sheikh of Mohammera. Whatever progress was made in land communications in Arabistan was due entirely to British enterprise.

In 1908, and again in 1910, the general assurances already given by His Majesty's Government to the Sheikh of Mohammera were repeated and extended to his successors. The Persian Government were informed in 1910, in answer to an enquiry, that the Sheikh was not "protected" by Great Britain, but that His Majesty's Government had special relations with him, and would support him in the event of any encroachment on his rights. In May 1914 His Majesty's Government acquired a predominant interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Sheikh Khazal had in the previous December asked for further assurances from Great Britain for the strengthening of his position *vis-à-vis* the Persian Government and the Bakhtiaris. The matter was still under discussion at the outbreak of the recent war.

[1] Sir A. Hardinge's letter to the Sheikh, December 7, 1902, contained this statement: "We shall protect Muhamrah against naval attack by a foreign Power, whatever pretext of intervention may be alleged; and also, so long as you remain faithful to the Shah and act in accordance with our advice, we will continue to give you our good offices and support."

Persian Coast and Islands.—The Persian littoral consists generally of a narrow strip of flat land, separated from the plateau of the interior by a maritime range running parallel to the coast. This region is ethnically as well as geographically distinct from the rest of Persia, for the coast strip is populated almost entirely by Arabs, and, with the exception of Bushire, there is not a single really Persian town or village from Mohammera to the border of Baluchistan. Maritime power is essential for the control of such a littoral; but the Persians have no liking for the sea, and the Shah has never possessed a navy worthy of the name.

With the aid of the fleet of the East India Company, whose position in Persia was established in 1617, Shah Abbas the Great expelled the Portuguese from Hormuz in 1622, and brought under his rule the coast and islands on the northern side of the Gulf. More than a century later, Nadir Shah entertained the ambition of possessing a navy in the Gulf, but on his death in 1747 the project was abandoned. Karim Khan, however, continued attempting to bring into subjection the Arab sheikhs of the coast, who did not as yet pay tribute to the Persian Government. To this end he offered in 1764 to subsidise one or two British cruisers for permanent police duty in the Gulf. He succeeded in obtaining the assistance of the Sheikh of Bushire, who at this time possessed a considerable fleet.

On the death of Karim Khan in 1779, Persia at once ceased to be the predominant State in the Gulf. In 1794 the Sultan of Muscat obtained the lease of Bandar Abbas and its dependencies, including Shamil, Minab, and the islands of Kishm and Hormuz. Wars with Russia between 1804 and 1828 absorbed the energies of the Persian Government, and the Gulf districts escaped from all control beyond that of their local chiefs. In 1808 the hereditary Arab Sheikh of Bushire was supplanted by a Persian governor, who reported in the following year that, in the event of hostilities between Great Britain and Persia, all the

Arab tribes of the coast south of Kangun would join the British in the hope of shaking off the Persian yoke.

Representatives of the East India Company had settled at Bandar Abbas in 1623-24. A British Residency was established in 1763 at Bushire. The Portuguese finally disappeared from the Gulf about the year 1720, and the Dutch about 1766. Between 1796 and 1809 France despatched several missions to Persia with a view to the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance against Great Britain and Russia. A treaty, by which the island of Kharak was ceded to France, was negotiated in 1807, but apparently never ratified by the Shah. The situation had previously aroused the apprehension of the British Government, and treaties of friendship and alliance between Great Britain and Persia were concluded in 1801, 1809, 1812, and 1814. The treaty of 1814 bound the British sovereign not to interfere in any internal dispute in Persia, and to respect the integrity of the Persian kingdom. By the eleventh article the British Government undertook, "if convenient and practicable," to assist the Shah in the Persian Gulf with ships of war and troops.

The British expedition despatched against the Kawasim in 1809 found it necessary to extend operations to the Persian coast, as the pirates had many accomplices and settlements on that side of the Gulf. The Persian Government concurred in the measures adopted, and promised co-operation by land, which was not, however, forthcoming. The British destroyed the port of Lingeh, and visited and searched other places on the coast. On the occasion of Sir W. Grant Keir's expedition, a British garrison was in 1820 placed on the island of Kishm, under a grant from the Sultan of Muscat. The Persian Government protested against the British occupation and assumed full responsibility for the maintenance of order.[1] The

[1] A note addressed to the British Chargé d'Affaires in December 1820 contained this remark: "If any further steps are necessary to check piracy in the Persian Gulf, these can effectually be taken by the Prince of Fars, and no foreign aid is requisite."

Shah undertook to enforce on the Persian coast regulations similar to those imposed upon the Trucial Sheikhs by the treaty of 1820, but the engagement was never fulfilled. In 1822-23 the British garrison was withdrawn from Kishm, but a tract of land granted by the Sultan of Muscat to the British Government at Basidu has since remained a British station, and was until 1879 the headquarters of the Indian Marine in the Gulf.

In 1828 the Sheikh of Bushire secretly applied for British protection, and professed his willingness to enter into any engagements which the British Resident might consider expedient. His application was refused by the Bombay Government as inconsistent with the terms of the Anglo-Persian treaties. Constant friction between the Sheikh and the Persian Government resulted in disorder and unrest on the coast. Arab rule was finally overthrown at Bushire in 1850; and a Persian governor was installed, with the title of Lord High Admiral.

In consequence of Persian operations against Herat in 1837-38, a British expedition to the Persian Gulf was organised and a force maintained on the island of Kharak until the Persian Government had complied with the demands of Great Britain. In 1841 an Anglo-Persian commercial treaty was signed, which contained a most-favoured-nation clause and extended Persian recognition to the British Residency at Bushire. A treaty was concluded between Persia and Oman in 1856 with reference to Bandar Abbas and its dependencies, over which the Sultan of Muscat claimed independent sovereignty. It was now declared that the whole territory formed an integral part of the Persian province of Fars. A fresh lease was granted to Oman in 1868, but was terminated by the Shah in the same year; and the districts reverted to Persian rule.

When war broke out between Great Britain and Persia in 1856 Sir J. Outram was placed in command of the British expeditionary force, which, operating from the Gulf, captured Bushire in 1856 and

Mohammera in 1857. The British troops occupied Kharak from 1856 to 1858. The British Government had expressly stated that Persian subjects were not to be instigated to rebel against the Shah; and these instructions were most faithfully observed. A treaty was signed at Paris between Great Britain and Persia on March 4, 1857, establishing perpetual peace and friendship between the two nations. The British Government, its servants and subjects, were to receive most-favoured-nation treatment in Persia; and, on the ratification of the treaty, Great Britain undertook to withdraw her troops from all Persian territory. An Anglo-Persian Convention signed in 1851,[1] for the restraint of the slave trade, was the only previous agreement between Great Britain and Persia that was renewed by the Treaty of Paris (1857). The British Resident resumed his duties at Bushire on its evacuation by the troops in 1857. The prestige accruing to Great Britain from this campaign was further increased by the construction between 1868 and 1870 of telegraph lines in and across Persia.

After the lapse in 1868 of the lease of Bandar Abbas to the Sultan of Muscat, no Arab principality with any claim to independence existed on the Persian littoral. A degree of autonomy was for a time enjoyed by the Arab Sheikh of Lingeh, and by other petty sheikhs along the coast. The Persian Government, however, were quick to take advantage of local disturbances to secure the expulsion of the Arab rulers. In 1887 the seaboard towns, including Bushire, Lingeh, and Bandar Abbas, with their dependent districts and islands, were formed into a Gulf ports [illegible] independent of Fars. In the same year the Persian flag was hoisted on the island of Siri and maintained there in spite of a protest from the Sheikh of Sharga, who claimed the island as belonging to the Kawasim. The Persian occupation of Siri has never been recognised by His Majesty's Government.

[1] This treaty, which was for eleven years only, was replaced by a permanent convention in 1882.

The idea of a Persian navy in the Gulf, entertained by Nadir Shah in the eighteenth century, was revived by Nasir-ud-Din Shah. About the year 1865 he had proposed to acquire three or four armed steamers, to be commanded by British naval officers and manned by Arabs or Indians. The scheme was discountenanced by the British Government, who were aware that it concealed aggressive designs upon the islands and pearl fisheries of Bahrein. In 1883, however, the Persian Government gave a contract to a German firm for the construction of two steamers, the "Persepolis" and the "Susa," which arrived in the Gulf in 1885. Neither vessel proved satisfactory; and the policing of the Gulf continued as before to devolve upon Great Britain.

During the reign of Nasir-ud-Din Shah the Persian Government exercised on the northern shore of the Persian Gulf more authority than at any period since the time of Shah Abbas. On the death of Nasir-ud-Din Shah in 1896, however, Persian control of the coast at once declined. No fewer than nine Governors of the Gulf ports succeeded one another in the space of about fifteen months. Arab rule was re-established at Lingeh in 1898; and although the Persians returned in the following year, much unrest prevailed. The inclusion in 1900 of the Gulf districts in the sphere of operations of the Imperial Persian Customs Administration, under Belgian management, aroused much local opposition. The activity of the Belgian officials resulted in the establishment of many new customs posts in the Persian Gulf, and tended towards increased centralisation of authority in the hands of the Persian Government. In 1909 the Nationalists seized the customs and assumed the government at Bandar Abbas, Lingeh, and Bushire, and a British force had to be landed at Bushire to restore tranquillity. The Persian Governor, without troops to enable him to assert his authority or to collect revenue, and harassed by instructions from Ministers at Teheran with no appreciation of the local situa-

tion, was powerless to stem the tide of disorder; and conditions down to 1914 remained most unsatisfactory.

Persian Makran.—Persian Makran, although outside the limits of the Persian Gulf, is, like Muscat, within the same political system. It is inhabited chiefly by tribes of Arab or Baluchi descent. Nadir Shah in 1739 attempted to extend his authority to this region, but for a century afterwards no further efforts were made to enforce the Persian claim to sovereignty. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the whole country was divided among local chiefs, who were in every respect independent. With the exception of a short interval in 1804, Charbar remained in the possession of the Sultan of Muscat from 1792 until it was captured by Persia in 1872. The Sultan also held Jask, which was included in 1794 in the lease of Bandar Abbas and its dependencies.

Persian efforts to control Makran were renewed in 1844, when the Governor-General of Kirman occupied Bampur and endeavoured to assert Persian authority east of Jask. The proposal of the Indo-European Telegraph Department in 1861 to lay a line of telegraph from Karachi to Jask afforded the Persian Government an opportunity to advance extravagant claims. Five years later, however, the Persian Vazir of Kirman declared that Persian control on the Makran coast was too slight for him to undertake to protect telegraph construction east of Guadar. The Anglo-Persian Telegraph Convention of 1868 granted an annual subsidy to Persia for operations in places under her sovereignty, but made no territorial definition. The British Government undertook in 1869 to make yearly payments to the principal chiefs of Persian Makran, who pledged themselves to protect the telegraph line. The frontier between Persia and Kelat was fixed by a British Commission in 1872 at a point 8 miles east of Gwattar. A British garrison was maintained at Jask for the protection of the telegraph station from 1878-87, when the district was

included in the jurisdiction of the Governor of the Gulf ports.

On the death of Nasir-ud-Din Shah in 1896 anarchy in Persian Makran reached the pitch of open rebellion against the Persian Central Government. In consequence of the murder of a British telegraph official severe punitive measures were adopted by the Persian authorities, under pressure from Great Britain. Political unrest, however, continued; and in 1898 British garrisons were established at Jask and Charbar. It was reported in 1905 that the Jask district continued to enjoy exemption from payment of any ordinary revenue to the Persian Government. Throughout this period British political interests in Persian Makran were in charge of the Director of Persian Gulf Telegraphs, who was subordinate in political matters to the Resident at Bushire. A blockade of the coast for the suppression of the arms traffic was maintained by the ships of His Majesty's navy from 1910-14. It was reported about this time that the Persian Government had long ceased to exercise any authority in the coast districts of Persian Makran; and anarchy appears to have prevailed down to 1914.

(3) European Activity in the Gulf

Portugal.—The first European nation to establish a footing in the Persian Gulf was Portugal, whose influence was felt there for nearly two centuries after her initial occupation of Hormuz in 1508. Portuguese supremacy established by conquest on land and sea during the sixteenth century was challenged and finally overthrown in the seventeenth by the English and the Dutch. After the collapse of their naval power the Portuguese continued to maintain certain commercial interests in Persia and Irak, but their importance diminished, and about 1720 they finally disappeared from the Gulf.

Holland.—The Dutch, who co-operated with the English to secure the downfall of the Portuguese,

reaped much of the benefit of English achievements and pioneer work, and became dangerous rivals to the East India Company, both commercially and politically. For some years Dutch influence predominated in the Gulf, but towards the close of the seventeenth century English trade revived and the interests of the Dutch declined. The last of their factories, a fortified settlement on the island of Kharak, was captured by Arabs in 1766; and Dutch activity in this region was brought to an end.

France.—French enterprise in the Persian Gulf dates from the formation in 1664 of the French East India Company, which had for a time a factory at Bandar Abbas and later a small trade with Basra. The French position at Muscat rests upon the Franco-Muscat Commercial Treaty of 1844 and the joint Anglo-French Declaration of 1862. The former set up a "most-favoured-nation" relationship between the two States, and gave French subjects the right of complete freedom of trade at Muscat,[1] and permission to purchase, sell, or rent land, houses or warehouses in the dominions of the Sultan. By the Declaration of 1862 Great Britain and France jointly guaranteed the independence of Muscat. As interpreted in connection with the attempt of France to establish in 1898 a coaling station at Bandar Jissa,[2] this treaty precludes the acquisition or lease of territory belonging to Muscat.

From 1891 onwards close relations existed between France and Russia resulting in increased French activity in the Gulf. In 1895 French war vessels began to visit these waters; in the following year the Messageries Maritimes Company instituted a subsidized steamer service between Bombay and the Gulf ports, but the venture failed.

[1] Certain restrictions were placed on trading in ivory and gum copal. In 1914 the French Government renounced the right of invoking privileges conferred by this treaty where they conflicted with local regulations for the control of the arms traffic.

[2] See p. 42.

On the settlement in 1905 of the question of the grant of French flags to Muscat dhows Franco-British relations in the region of the Persian Gulf improved considerably. A certain amount of friction was engendered by the Muscat arms traffic, in which French merchants were actively engaged. The French interest was, however, finally bought out by the Indian Government in 1914 (*cf.* above, p. 42).

Russia.—Until comparatively recent years Russian influence and interests in Persia did not extend to the region of the Gulf. In 1881, however, Russia established a consulate at Baghdad, and for some years subsequently engaged in the prosecution of a policy hostile to British interests. Her influence was employed at Teheran to the same end. In 1888 Great Britain was assured of preferential rights in regard to railway construction in Southern Persia; but, by an Agreement with Russia in 1889, the Persian Government engaged that no railway should be constructed in Persia for ten years; the term was afterwards prolonged to 1910. Further evidence of Russian activity included a series of naval demonstrations in the Gulf, the despatch of plague missions to Southern Persia. and the foundation in 1900 of the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company, subsidised by the Russian Government to run a steamer service between Odessa and the Persian Gulf, and to establish commercial interests in that region. Persistent endeavours on the part of Russia to obtain a naval base in the Gulf of Persia or Oman at length evoked from Lord Lansdowne in 1903 a statement of British policy, which was reaffirmed by Sir E. Grey in the course of negotiations respecting the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The aversion of the Nationalist party in Persia to foreign control manifested itself in strong public feeling against Russia in the Persian coast districts.

Germany.—German interest in the Middle East became prominent in connection with the Baghdad Railway scheme. The Convention of 1903 envisaged an

extension of the railway to a point on the Persian Gulf, where for a few years previously Germany had made organised efforts to achieve political ascendancy by commercial penetration. Her relations with Turkey enabled Germany to place many obstacles in the way of British interests in Mesopotamia and the northern end of the Gulf; her trade increased rapidly; and she made constant efforts to extend her influence in Persia. The visits of German warships to the Gulf began in 1899; and agents of the German firm of Messrs. Wönckhaus established themselves at various points about the same period. In 1906 the Hamburg-America line instituted a service of steamers between Europe and the Persian Gulf, and appointed as their agent the representative of Messrs. Wönckhaus at Bahrein. In the same year this firm entered into a contract with a native concessionnaire for a monopoly of the purchase of oxide of iron from the mines of Abu Musa. When the Sheikh of Sharga cancelled the concession, the German Government approached Great Britain on the matter. The question was still unsettled on the outbreak of war in 1914. German activity in the Persian Gulf, in conjunction with the policy, freely avowed in her press, of regarding the Middle East as a bridge to world-dominion, made of this region one of the principal theatres of British and German rivalry before the war. In 1913 and 1914 Germany made unprecedented efforts and spared no expense in importing arms and ammunition into the Persian Gulf area.

Great Britain.—The political relations of Great Britain with the Persian Gulf date from the expulsion of the Portuguese from Hormuz in 1622, when, under an agreement with Shah Abbas, the Honourable East India Company undertook "to keep two men-of-war constantly to defend the Gulf." British commercial interests had been established in this region some years previously, and during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Great Britain extended and consolidated her influence in the face of keen competition from Portu-

guese, Dutch, and French in succession. In the second half of the eighteenth century the commercial ascendancy of Great Britain became unquestioned, and she exercised a widespread political influence in the Gulf. In the early nineteenth century three expeditions were despatched from Bombay for the suppression of piracy and lawlessness on the part of the Arab tribes; additional responsibility was assumed as the situation demanded, and as the inability of any local authority to exercise control became increasingly apparent. The treaty relations entered into by Great Britain with the Arab States of the littoral have been dealt with above. By these treaties the British Resident at Bushire became the arbiter of all disputes among the Sheikhs. An enormous advance in general security and prosperity has been effected in the Gulf by the *Pax Britannica*, maintained with rare exceptions from that time.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century there was no legal obstacle to the slave trade in any part of the Persian Gulf, and it was carried on extensively. In defiance of her commercial interests and her popularity with the Moslem population of the Gulf, Great Britain set herself to suppress the trade. Beginning with the General Treaty of 1820, and a treaty with the Sultan of Muscat two years later, a series of agreements was concluded with Muscat, Trucial Oman, Bahrein, El-Katr, Hasa, Koweit and the Turkish and Persian Governments in restraint of the traffic. The arduous task of enforcing the observance of these treaties fell upon the Indian Government, and involved great sacrifice of lives and money.

Great Britain alone has been responsible for the work of policing, surveying, charting, lighting, and buoying the Persian Gulf. Since at least 1864 she has undertaken sanitary control and quarantine administration in this area. Until the recent appearance of Russian and German vessels, she enjoyed a monopoly of the steam navigation; and her commercial interests have far exceeded those of any other nation. The maintenance by the Indian Government since 1864 of the sub-

marine cables from Fao to Jask, and of the lines from that place to Karachi and Muscat, has tended to increase an already preponderating influence. The protection of the pearl fisheries, on which the existence of the maritime Arabs depends, has also devolved upon Great Britain, who has, moreover, consistently warded off intruders, British subjects and foreigners alike, who sought to interfere with the time-honoured rights of the Arabs.

From 1900 onwards the traffic in arms assumed alarming proportions in the Gulf; it aroused all the piratical instincts latent in the character of the maritime inhabitants, and brought about a state of general demoralisation that constituted a serious menace to the maintenance of peace. Various efforts were made by the British Government to restrict the traffic; but French influence, based on the treaty of 1844 with Muscat, prevented effective action at that port, the chief emporium of the whole trade. In 1910 Great Britain established a naval blockade of the Makran coast. This measure was continued, at great expense, down to the outbreak of war, and achieved such a degree of success in the Gulf of Oman as to lead to a settlement with France (*cf.* above, pp. 42, 66). The traffic, checked in the southern, became, through German efforts, increasingly flourishing in the northern part of the Gulf, and during the first half of 1914 caused much anxiety to the British authorities.

The threatening activities and ambitions of other European Powers in the Gulf led Lord Lansdowne to declare, in the House of Lords in 1903, that "we should regard the establishment of a naval base or a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it by all the means at our disposal." This declaration was formally reaffirmed in 1907 by Sir E. Grey, in a despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, which further stated that "His Majesty's Government will continue to direct all their

efforts to the preservation of the *status quo* in the Gulf and the maintenance of British trade. In doing so they have no desire to exclude the legitimate trade of any other Power." These declarations have never been openly challenged; but in the years immediately preceding the war Turkey, under German instigation, adopted a policy of encroachment which seriously threatened the *status quo* at the head of the Gulf. In 1912-14 His Majesty's Government entered into far-reaching negotiations with the Turkish and German Governments, with the object of regularising the position. The resulting agreements had not, however, been ratified before the declaration of war.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

The Mohammedan religion in one form or another prevails, almost to the exclusion of other creeds, in all the countries bordering on the Persian Gulf. Jews are few, except in the towns of Irak, and members of the Oriental Christian congregations are hardly found outside that province. The chief Mohammedan sects in the Persian Gulf region are Shiah, Sunni, Ibadhi, and Wahabi. On the western coast of the Persian Gulf proper, Sunnis, including nominal Wahabis, predominate in every territorial division, although there are strong Shiah communities in Hasa and Bahrein. On the eastern coast Shiahs are in the majority in most districts. The population of Arabistan is almost exclusively Shiah, and that sect predominates also in Irak. In the Gulf of Oman Shiahs are few in number; Persian Makran is entirely Sunni; while the Sultanate of Oman is Ibadhi and Sunni, with a small proportion of Wahabis.

Roman Catholic Missions have had a footing in the Persian Gulf since the seventeenth century, but latterly they have had only three permanent stations in Irak. The American Arabian Mission is established at Basra, Bahrein, Muscat, and Koweit. Schools are maintained by the Christian Missions, but there is on the whole very scanty provision for education in the Gulf.

(2) Political

The districts which adjoin the western coast of the Persian Gulf proper comprise a group of sheikhdoms and emirates under Arab rulers. Of these the Sheikh of Koweit is a mediatised ruler under British protection, and Hasa is ruled by Ibn Saud, Emir of Nejd, who in June 1914 accepted the title of Vali of Nejd

and Hasa from the Turks, but has remained in close relation to the British and Indian Governments, and during the war threw in his lot with the British. The island of Bahrein is under the personal rule of Sheikh Isa, who has been supported by the British against other claimants of his family. El-Katr is now also under the control of Ibn Saud, Emir of Nejd. In Trucial Oman the position of the five ruling sheikhs, which include Sharga, Dibai, Abu Dhabi, and Ras al-Kheima, is governed by agreements with the British Government.

The Government of Oman is a sultanate or absolute monarchy, the present hereditary sultanate having arisen out of an ancient elective imamate. The populations of both west and north Oman do not acknowledge his sway, and live in practical independence of him under their own chiefs, the Sultan's authority being limited to his capital and the coast. A rival Imam has been set up in the interior by the principal Ibadhi Sheikh.

Of the Arabs of the coastal region the large majority are settled and live in towns, as the Beduin nomads who wander over the plains and interior, and reach even as far as Nejd or Jebel Shammar in the interior, form a proportion of the population which is small, and varies from time to time according to the location of the tribes. The population of the towns includes many Arabs recently nomadic who have now become settled. Among the settled Arabs of this region the main distinctions are either religious or political; tribal feeling is weak.

In Oman, political differences divide the population into two opposing factions known as Hinawie and Ghafiria, the result of a general civil war in the eighteenth century. The Hinawi faction consists mostly of Yamani tribes, while the Ghafiri are for the most part Nasiri. They live intermingled in groups and villages, and the factions are equally marked among settled and among Beduin tribes. The great majority of Hinawi tribes belong to the Ibadhi sect

of Islam; of Ghafiri tribes a considerable proportion are orthodox Sunnis, and a few are Wahabis of Oman.

Tribal organisation in Oman is loose; some tribes are scattered, others, though compact, are broken up into sections headed by sheikhs who acknowledge no common authority, and in only a few cases is the tribe governed by a Tamima, a chief whose power extends over all its branches. This office, which is nominally elective, is in practice hereditary.

Among the nomads of the Arabian coastal region tribal feeling is strong. Important tribes are: (*a*) the Ajman, of whom the greater number have their headquarters in Hasa; (*b*) the Awazim and Rashaida, who are found for the most part in Koweit territory.

The districts of Irak at the head of the Gulf formed, before the war, a part of the Turkish vilayet of Basra. On the right bank of the Shatt el-Arab are Arabs belonging chiefly to the tribe of Idan, with a few Muhaisin from across the river. Power is in the hands of the landowners and village sheikhs; there is very little tribal feeling, except among the Muhaisin and the Kaab, who look to the Sheikh of Mohammera as their chief.

The government of south Arabistan is administered by the Sheikh of Mohammera as Governor of Mohammera and its dependencies, nominally under the Persian Government; he is head of the Muhaisin tribe, and also exercises control over the powerful Kaab tribe. The Sheikh has been virtually independent, but his position was weakened when in 1902 the control of the customs of the port was transferred to the new Belgian Administration in exchange for a subsidy (*cf.* p. 56).

In Arabistan the tribal system is more highly developed; it does not rest, however, upon a rigid basis of race, and the strength of the tribe or section is liable to be increased by addition to its numbers from without, or diminished by desertion from within. Sheikhs or headmen of the tribes or sections are generally chosen from a family in which the office is hereditary. Some of the tribes are settled, others are nomadic,

while a considerable number are in a transitional stage between the two. The settled and semi-settled tribes are mainly agricultural, and the nomadic mainly pastoral, but even the latter cultivate a certain amount of grain in winter.

In south Arabistan the principal tribes are the Muhaisin and the Kaab; the former are politically, the latter numerically the stronger. The Muhaisin have their centre at Mohammera and are a settled tribe. The Kaab, whose focus is Felahieh, should probably be regarded as settled. The principal nomad tribes are the Beni Turuf, Beni Saleh, and Beni Tamim. Behbehan, although geographically belonging to Fars, has a government and administration of its own. A large number of the inhabitants belong to the Kuhgilu, a division of the Lur tribe; each division of the tribe has its own chief.

Local districts of the Persian coast are for the most part under the government of a local hereditary chief, khan, or sheikh, who collects the land-tax in his own domain on behalf of the Persian Government. Certain districts are in a very disturbed state, others are remarkably orderly, but the coastal inhabitants are for the most part much more civilized than the tribesmen of the interior. Blood feuds are common, and cattle raids sometimes lead to encounters between the different tribes and factions. There are no criminal courts beyond the personal administration of the Governor or local khan; civil justice of a sort is dispensed, but it is extremely venal.

Persian Makran is nominally administered by a Governor, who has his seat at Bampur, subject to the authority of the Persian Governor-General of Kirman; as a matter of fact, however, this official is rarely appointed, and the country is in a condition of anarchy. Makran is divided into five districts, each of which is ruled by a chief who is supposed to pay tribute to the Governor, but in the administration of his district is free from interference by the Persian executive. The

chiefs of districts are assisted by the religious authorities or *mullahs*, and by headmen of the villages. There is no organized system of law and order, and serious disturbances have been common in recent years. The blood feud remains customary, and slavery prevails in most parts of the country.

During the course of the recent war, treaty relationships were established between Great Britain and all the rulers of the Arab littoral from Muscat to Mohammera. A collective assurance was issued to the Gulf Chiefs and their subjects on November 3, 1914, to the effect that Great Britain would do her utmost to preserve for them their liberty and religion. In consideration of professions of loyalty from the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammera on the outbreak of war with Germany, the Government of India undertook that Basra should never again be subject to Turkish authority; that Koweit should be recognised as an independent principality under British protection; that Great Britain would endeavour to maintain the Sheikh of Mohammera in his present state of local autonomy *vis-à-vis* the Persian Government, would support him against encroachment upon his rights or property by any Power, and would safeguard him to the best of her ability against any unprovoked attack by a foreign Power. The undertakings to the Sheikh of Mohammera also included a limited dynastic guarantee.

The expulsion of the Turks from the shores of the Gulf made it desirable for Great Britain to regularise the position of El-Katr. By a treaty signed on November 3, 1916, and ratified on March 23, 1918, Sheikh Abdullah of El-Katr assimilated his position to that of the Trucial Chiefs, and affixed his signature to all the treaties and engagements existing between them and Great Britain. The British Government, in addition, undertook to afford their good offices to the Sheikh in the event of unprovoked aggression by land. A proclamation prohibiting the arms traffic was issued by Sheikh Abdullah at the same time.

The friendly attitude of Ibn Saud on the outbreak

of war with Turkey made it imperative that His Majesty's Government should come to a definite understanding with him. As a result of negotiations a treaty was signed on December 26, 1915, and ratified on July 18, 1916, by which Great Britain recognised Ibn Saud as independent ruler of Nejd and Hasa (the boundaries to be determined hereafter), and gave him a limited dynastic guarantee. British arbitration and support were promised to Ibn Saud in the case of foreign aggression. Great Britain assumed control of the foreign relations of Ibn Saud, who, moreover, undertook not to alienate any territory to a foreign Power except with the consent of His Majesty's Government. Ibn Saud promised to refrain from aggression on Koweit, Bahrein, El-Katr, and Trucial Oman. Provision was made for the conclusion of a further detailed treaty between the two parties.

These agreements constitute no departure from the traditional policy of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf, but they strengthen her position for the continuance of her work of maintaining the *status quo* against internal disorder or foreign menace.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The situation in the Persian Gulf does not appear to offer any ground for disagreement between those nations who share in the benefits of British achievements in this region, and who are required only to acquiesce in established treaty relationships and in the principle of self-denial in regard to territorial acquisition to which Great Britain herself has adhered.

The peculiar interests—strategic, political, and commercial—of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf have never been denied; they are intimately connected with the welfare of India and the security of communication with the outposts of the Empire. For the safeguarding of these interests the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Gulf and the absence of competing foreign influences in the interior of Arabia are

essential. The freedom of the Arabs from foreign domination has been promised, and should in some form be assured. It is imperative that their relations with the British Government should be maintained unimpaired, and that Great Britain should continue, as hitherto, to perform her especial duties and to retain complete ascendancy in the Persian Gulf.

APPENDIX

I.—GENERAL TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE ARAB TRIBES OF THE PERSIAN GULF, 1820.

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.

Praise be to God, who hath ordained peace to be a blessing to His creatures. There is established a lasting peace between the British Government and the Arab tribes, who are parties to this contract, on the following conditions:—

Article 1. There shall be a cessation of plunder and piracy by land and sea on the part of the Arabs, who are parties to this contract, for ever.

Article 2. If any individual of the people of the Arabs contracting shall attack any that pass by land or sea of any nation whatsoever, in the way of plunder and piracy and not of acknowledged war, he shall be accounted an enemy of all mankind, and shall be held to have forfeited both life and goods. An acknowledged war is that which is proclaimed, avowed, and ordered by Government against Government, and the killing of men and taking of goods without proclamation, avowal, and the order of a Government is plunder and piracy.

Article 3. The friendly (literally the pacificated) Arabs shall carry by land and sea a red flag, with or without letters in it, at their option, and this shall be in a border of white, the breadth of the white in the border being equal to the breadth of the red, as represented in the margin (the whole forming the flag known in the British Navy by the title of white pierced red); this shall be the flag of the friendly Arabs, and they shall use it and no other.

Article 4. The pacificated tribes shall all of them continue in their former relations, with the exception that they shall be at peace with the British Government, and shall not fight with each other, and the flag shall be a symbol of this only, and of nothing further.

Article 5. The vessels of the friendly Arabs shall all of them

have in their possession a paper (register) signed with the signature of their Chief, in which shall be the name of the vessel, its length, its breadth, and how many Karahs it holds. And they shall also have in their possession another writing (port clearance) signed with the signature of their Chief, in which shall be the name of the owner, the name of the nacodah, the number of men, the number of arms, from whence sailed, at what time, and to what port bound. And if a British or other vessel meet them they shall produce the register and the clearance.

Article 6. The friendly Arabs, if they choose, shall send an envoy to the British Residency in the Persian Gulf with the necessary accompaniments, and he shall remain there for the transaction of their business with the Residency; and the British Government, if it chooses, shall send an envoy also to them in like manner; and the envoy shall add his signature to the signature of the Chief in the paper (register) of their vessels, which contains the length of the vessel, its breadth, and tonnage; the signature of the envoy to be renewed every year. Also all such envoys shall be at the expense of their own party.

Article 7. If any tribe, or others, shall not desist from plunder and piracy, the friendly Arabs shall act against them according to their ability and circumstances, and an arrangement for this purpose shall take place between the friendly Arabs and the British at the time when such plunder and piracy shall occur.

Article 8. The putting men to death after they have given up their arms is an act of piracy, and not of acknowledged war; and if any tribe shall put to death any persons, either Muhammadans or others, after they have given up their arms, such tribe shall be held to have broken the peace; and the friendly Arabs shall act against them in conjunction with the British, and, God willing, the war against them shall not cease until the surrender of those who performed the act and of those who ordered it.

Article 9. The carrying-off of slaves, men, women, or children, from the coasts of Africa or elsewhere, and the transporting them in vessels, is plunder and piracy, and the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature.

Article 10. The vessels of the friendly Arabs, bearing their flag above described, shall enter into all the British ports and into the ports of the allies of the British so far as they shall be able to effect it; and they shall buy and sell therein; and, if any shall attack them, the British Government shall take notice of it.

Article 11. These conditions aforesaid shall be common to all tribes and persons, who shall hereafter adhere thereto in the same

manner as to those who adhere to them at the time present. End of the Articles.

(Sd.) W. GRANT KEIR,
Major-General.
,, HASSUN BIN RAHMAH,
Sheikh of Hatt and Fahleia, formerly of Ras-ool-Kheimah.
,, KAZIB BIN AHMED,
Sheikh of Jourat al Kamra.
,, SHAKBOUT,
Sheikh of Aboo Dhebbee.
,, HASSUN BIN ALI,
Sheikh of Zyah.
,, ZAID BIN SYF,
Uncle of Sheikh Muhammad of Debay.
,, SULTAN BIN SUGGUR,
Chief of Shargah.
,, SYUD ABDOOL JALIL BIN SYUD YAS,
Vakeel of Sheikh Suleman bin Ahmed and Sheikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, of the family of Khalifa, Sheikhs of Bahrein.
,, SULEMAN BIN AHMED.
,, ABDOOLLA BIN AHMED.
,, RASHED BIN HAMID,
Chief of Ejman.
,, ABDOOLLA BIN RASHID,
Chief of Umm-ool-Keiweyn.

II.—TREATY OF PEACE IN PERPETUITY AGREED UPON BY THE CHIEFS OF THE ARABIAN COAST IN BEHALF OF THEMSELVES, THEIR HEIRS AND SUCCESSORS, UNDER THE MEDIATION OF THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1853.

Article 1. That from this date, *viz.*, 25th Rujjub 1269, 4th May, 1853, and hereafter there shall be a complete cessation of hostilities at sea between our respective subjects and dependants, and a perfect maritime truce shall endure between ourselves and between our successors respectively for evermore.

Article 2. That in the event—which God forbid!—of any of our subjects or dependants committing an act of aggression at sea upon the lives or property of those of any of the parties to this agreement, we will immediately punish the assailants and proceed to afford full redress upon the same being brought to our notice.

Article 3. That in the event of an act of aggression being committed at sea by any of those who are subscribers with us to this engagement upon any of our subjects or dependants, we will not proceed immediately to retaliate, but will inform the British Resident or the Commodore at Bassidore, who will forthwith take the necessary steps for obtaining reparation for the injury inflicted, provided that its occurrence can be satisfactorily proved.

We further agree that the maintenance of the peace now concluded amongst us shall be watched over by the British Government, who will take steps to ensure at all times the due observance of the above Articles, and God of this is the best witness and guarantee.

(Sd.) ABDOOLLA BIN RASHED,
Chief of Ummool Keiwyn.
,, HAMED BIN RASHED,
Chief of Ejman.
,, SAEED BIN BUTYE,
Chief of Debay.
,, SAEED BIN TAHNOON,
Chief of the Beniyas.
,, SULTAN BIN SUGGAR,
Chief of the Joasmees.

Approved by the Governor-General in Council on August 24, 1853.

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See also Handbooks of this series, No. 58, *Turkey in Asia;* and No. 61, *Arabia.*

MAPS

The Persian Gulf and adjacent countries are shown on the War Office Map (G.S.G.S. 2385), scale 1:4,055,040 (1908, additions 1919). Lower Mesopotamia between Baghdad and the Persian Gulf is shown on another map (G.S.G.S. 2563), scale 1:1,000,000. Corrected to 1916. Railways revised, 1919.

HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 63

MESOPOTAMIA

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1920

Editorial Note.

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,
General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

The geographical limits of Mesopotamia cannot be precisely defined, except on the east, where the delimitation of the boundary between Turkey and Persia was completed by a Turko-Persian Commission in 1914. The frontier then determined lies along the mountains forming the western rim of the Persian plateau, and reaches the Shatt el-Arab 10 miles above Mohammera. The remaining boundaries of the area dealt with in this account are roughly as follows: to the south the Persian Gulf; to the south-west the desert of northern Arabia; to the west the Syrian desert; and to the north the mountains of Armenia and Asia Minor. The area is approximately 180,000 square miles.

(2) Surface, Coast, and River System

Surface

Mesopotamia as a whole consists of a great depression running south-east from the north-western corner of Syria and the mountains of Armenia down to the head of the Persian Gulf. Under the high mountains which enclose Mesopotamia on the north-east is a belt of lower hill country, varying in breadth from 40 to 100 miles, and below this again are the Mesopotamian plains which form the floor of the depression. Not far to the north of Baghdad the upper plains end in a

drop of 20-50 ft., marking a former coast line, and the great alluvial plain of Irak begins. This district, lying between the Euphrates and Tigris, is exceedingly fertile; its area is about 35,000 square miles. In general the surface of the upper plain country decreases in fertility from north to south.

Lower Mesopotamia.—In Irak the only noticeable eminences are the mounds that mark the sites of dead cities, the high banks of old canal-beds, and here and there knolls or slight ridges of gravel or sand. The slope of the Irak plains from the neighbourhood of Baghdad to the Persian Gulf is very slight. Baghdad is 105 ft. above sea-level, Kut el-Amara on the Tigris 55 ft., Nasrie on the Euphrates 15 ft., Basra 8 ft. There are also very gradual transverse inclines away from the rivers (due to the heightening of the river-beds by the deposit of silt), and a slope from the foot of the Persian hills to the neighbourhood of the Tigris; these, in so far as they determine the present flood-areas and marshes, have great importance for the cultivation of the country as it is to-day, and also for projects of irrigation.

The soil is mainly an argillaceous, calcareous loam of great fertility; but by far the greater part of the country is either marshland or arid waste. In the southern part of Irak there are extensive permanent swamps, the water of which rises and falls with the season. In addition, the winter and spring floods of the rivers overflow into wide inundations, which generally dry up in the latter part of the summer, but sometimes, when they have no adequate outlets, may remain standing for some years. The position and extent of these temporary flood areas vary, within certain limits, from year to year. Where and when the country is not swamp, it is for the most part open plain. Cultivation is almost entirely limited to the neighbourhood of the rivers and canals.

The Arabian desert, where it borders on south-western Irak, is a fairly hard gravelly plain, broken in places by belts and patches of sand. It is inter-

sected by *wadis* (water-courses, dry except after rain) running towards the Euphrates. The rains produce some grass vegetation, which for a time affords a fair amount of camel-grazing. The usual low desert scrub is also found. West of the Euphrates, from Hit down to Nejef, the Syrian desert (Hamad) has the same general character.

Upper Mesopotamia.—The plains of the Jezireh (El-Jezire, "the island"), which lie between the Tigris and Euphrates, extend to about 48,000 sq. miles. They are generally more or less undulating, though they contain some wide expanses of flat country. Here and there they are traversed by ranges of hills; most of these are quite low, but the Jebel Sinjar, a line of basalt hills west of Mosul, rises to some 3,000 ft. above the surrounding country; the surface of the plains is open and treeless.

A great part of the northern Jezireh has a good soil, and large areas could be brought under cultivation by means of irrigation works. South of the Jebel Sinjar and the lower Khabur the plain becomes increasingly arid, and towards its lower end turns to a hard desert, the surface of which is composed of gravel, gypsum, marl, borax, or sand. There are also large areas in which water from *wadis* collects, and on evaporation leaves an incrustation of salt.

On the western and eastern sides of the Jezireh the Euphrates and Tigris have cut for themselves shallow valleys or troughs 1 to 5 miles wide, bordered by low hills or cliffs. At the bottom of these valleys occur stretches of alluvium where the rivers have deposited their sediment in flood-time. Parts of the Euphrates trough are moderately cultivated; elsewhere the valley is either bare or filled with tamarisk and other scrub. There is a considerable amount of cultivation along the banks of the Tigris between Mosul and the mouth of the Great Zab. South of the Lesser Zab, down to the beginning of the alluvial plain near Beled, the river valley is mostly untilled. The southern plains, east of the middle Tigris, are open steppes of clay and

gravel, clothed with grass in spring. The country in the region of the Zabs has a fertile soil.

The lower hill-country, east of Kifri, Kirkuk, Altun Keupri, and Erbil, consists either of rolling downs or of lines of rocky heights in which sandstone predominates. In spring the downs and valleys have much grass on them. Between this region and the higher ranges are the well-watered upland plains of Suleimanie and Rania.

Along the Persian frontier is the high mountain country of southern Kurdistan. It is well watered by numerous streams flowing through deep valleys or gorges into the Lesser Zab. Central Kurdistan is the most difficult section of the mountain barrier that divides Mesopotamia from Armenia and north-western Persia. The mountains rise to heights of 11,000 to 14,000 ft., their sides are generally barren and sparsely wooded; the valleys and lower slopes contain patches of cultivable ground.

The plain of the Jezireh is bounded on the north by the Jebel Tur or Tur Abdin plateau (east of Mardin), and by the hill-country which has its centre and highest point in the Karaja (Qarajeh) Dagh. On the western side of the plateau there is a depression, which affords an important line of communication between Diarbekr on the north and the great Mesopotamian plain. The soil of the Jebel Tur, though much overlaid with stones, is often fertile; but water is scarce in summer. The least stony and best-watered part of the plateau is the north-western, towards Diarbekr.

The country bordering the middle Euphrates valley on the west is arid desert in its southern part, and becomes gradually less arid towards the north.

Coast

Mesopotamia touches the sea only on a narrow front at the head of the Persian Gulf. Desert, marsh, and inundation make the coast difficult of access from the land. Shallows and mud-banks obstruct approach

from the Gulf. The bar at the mouth of the Shatt el-Arab needs dredging to make it passable at all tides by large ocean-going steamers. West of the Shatt el-Arab the Khor Zobeir, which runs up into the desert towards Basra, has fairly deep water for a part of its length; but its approaches from land and sea, its configuration and dimensions, appear to make it unsuitable for regular use as a harbour.

River System

The Euphrates and Tigris drain the Armenian tableland, the western side of the Persian plateau, the hill country of northern Mesopotamia, and the Mesopotamian plains. The two rivers unite at Kurna into a single stream, which reaches the Persian Gulf under the name of the Shatt el-Arab.

The volume of water in the Euphrates and Tigris varies considerably at different periods of the year The great increase during certain months is caused by rainfall and melting snow in the highlands of Armenia, Kurdistan, and Persia. The low-water season may be said to last from July to November, the high-water season from December to June. Both rivers, and especially the Tigris, are liable to rise in sudden and violent spates, and bring down a great quantity of sediment in the high-water season.

The Euphrates between Feluja and Diwaniya flows at a higher level than the Tigris between Baghdad and Kut el-Amara, and the country between the rivers in north-western Irak is therefore flooded mainly from the Euphrates. Just below Museyib (70 miles by river below Feluja) the Euphrates divides into two large branches, called the Shatt Hindie and the Shatt Hilla, which join again 110 miles further down near Samawa. Between 1865 and 1890 the main stream shifted from the eastern (Hilla) branch to the western (Hindie). After several unsuccessful attempts to check the process, which was threatening to dry up the Hilla branch altogether, the new Hindie barrage and the Hilla regulator were constructed

(1913) to regulate the flow of water down the two channels. From Nasrie downwards the Euphrates, now flowing at a lower level than the Tigris, receives from the north a great quantity of Tigris water, which finds its way through the canals and marshes between the two rivers. The volume of the Euphrates, thus increased, is beyond the capacity of the channel leading to Kurna (called the Old Channel), and most of the Euphrates water is forced southwards, and forms a large area of open water and swamp, through which the New Channel drains into the Shatt el-Arab at Gurmat Ali, a few miles above Basra.

The Tigris is liable to flood more or less of the neighbourhood of its banks from above Baghdad down to Kut el-Amara. At the latter place a large channel, the Shatt el-Hai, branches southward from the right bank of the Tigris and reaches the Euphrates just below Nasrie. Below Kut el-Amara more and more flood-water drains southwards into swamps, and fears have been expressed that unless preventive measures are taken the Tigris may altogether leave its present bed below Amara.

(3) Climate

The climatic conditions of Mesopotamia are those of a sub-tropical area which lies at a distance from any ocean, and they are, therefore, in the plains and lower uplands, of a semi-arid type. The following tables give the mean daily maximum and the mean daily minimum temperature in the hottest and coldest months respectively.

Mean daily maximum, July and August:—

Basra, 104° F. (40° C.).
Baghdad, 110° F. (43° C.).
Mosul, 109° F. (43° C.).

Mean daily minimum, December and January:—

Basra, 47° F. (8° C.).
Baghdad, 40° F. (4° C.).
Mosul, 36° F. (2° C.).

In northern Irak absolute maxima of over 120° F. (49° C.) are reached in July and August. At Basra, however, where the neighbouring marshes keep the humidity of the air at a high level during the summer months, the heat is more trying than in the dryer atmosphere of Baghdad.

In the mountains bordering on the Mesopotamian depression the summer is temperate, and the cold in winter is severe, especially on the edge of the Armenian plateau.

In the plains and lower hills the rainy season lasts from November to April; December, January, February, and March are the wettest months. In lower Mesopotamia many places may have no rain at all from June to October. In upper Mesopotamia there is usually a slight fall in May, and, at least in some places, a very little in June, September, and October, while July and August are rainless.

The amount of rainfall decreases from north to south. At the northern end of the Jezireh plains and in the uplands of Diarbekr the total fall in the year is 13-16 in. (330-410 mm.), in Irak it is only $2\frac{1}{4}$-7 in. (57-179 mm.), and a large proportion of the total often falls in one day.

Snow falls in northern Mesopotamia in December and January, and sometimes in February or even March. The main thaw and heavy rains come in March and April, and cause the great spring floods on the rivers of Mesopotamia.

The prevailing winds in the Mesopotamian lowlands are from the north-west; blowing with some freshness at intervals from June to August, they mitigate the heat and help to reduce the floods.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

The principal disease of the country is malaria. This is worst in the neighbourhood of marshes and inundation-areas, and it is therefore especially prevalent in lower Mesopotamia, and above all in the swamps of southern Irak. In the plains during the

summer months fatiguing work in the open, especially in a humid atmosphere, is likely to bring on heat stroke.

Epidemics of cholera and bubonic plague occur from time to time. On the whole, however, if proper precautions can be taken, particularly with regard to water, the health conditions for Europeans, outside malaria-infested districts, may be regarded as fairly good.

Under Ottoman rule the towns have been left in a most unhealthy condition. Almost the only sanitary measures taken by the Turkish authorities have been those of quarantine.

(5) Race and Language

The numbers of the various races which form the population of Mesopotamia may be estimated roughly as follows :[1]

Arabs	1,450,000	Armenians	57,000
Kurds	380,000	Yezidis	21,000
Turks and Turkomans	110,000	Chabaks	10,000
Persians . ..	70,000	Circassians	8,000
Jews	60,000	Sabians ..	2,000
Syrian Christians ..	60,000	Miscellaneous ..	10,000
Total ..	.. 2,238,000		

The floating population of pilgrims to the Shiah shrines, which may number 150,000 to 200,000 in a year, is not included in the above estimate.

The *Arabs* are, both numerically and politically, the dominant element in the population. They number probably about a million and a half, and if united among themselves would constitute a factor of the highest importance in the general situation. Differences, however, of religion, character, pursuits, and interests constitute intersecting lines of cleavage which have effectually prevented any enduring combination. Those Arabs who are dwellers in the towns, or settled on the land as agriculturists, are for the most part

[1] In the absence of reliable statistics, no accurate estimate of the population can be given.

satisfactory members of the community; about one-half of the total number consists, however, of nomad or semi-nomad tribes, and it is they who have hitherto placed insuperable obstacles in the way of the development of the country. Beyond the immediate vicinity of the towns, which are few in number, Mesopotamia is a tribal country; the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra are almost entirely apportioned into areas which various tribes occupy in virtue of an ancient prescriptive right. These tribes have maintained for 4,000 years the system of patriarchal government, and, although for the sake of convenience many families are collected together under the rule of one chief, he can only govern so long as he has the majority in his favour. The Muntifik, the Beni-Lam, and the Shammar are among the principal Arab tribes in Turkish territory, and nominally under Turkish authority. The position of the Chaab tribe has been the cause of much friction; originally Turkish, the tribe came after 1740 to acquire a permanent footing in Persian territory near the Karun, and since 1768 has been virtually independent of Turkey. About the year 1745 four-fifths of the land inhabited by the Chaab belonged unquestionably to Persia, and the members of the tribe appear to have been regarded as naturalized Persian subjects, renting certain Turkish property as foreigners. The Ottoman Government has not exercised control over the Chaab since 1768, and Turkish claims to the allegiance of the tribe since that date seem to be unfounded. Indeed, only a limited authority has existed even over those tribes admittedly within the bounds of Ottoman jurisdiction; and tribal jealousies have been deliberately fostered by the Turkish administration from inability to exercise effective control. Each tribe has been assessed at a certain revenue; and, so long as that is paid, it is practically exempt from Turkish authority. The collection of the revenue frequently leads to friction, and sometimes to open rebellion, with disastrous effects on the country. On such occasions

traffic is held up, crops are destroyed, and the banks of the rivers are broken down.

The Arab is generally intelligent, quick, and impressionable; often he has a certain subtlety of mind which is capable of a high degree of cultivation. But he is slovenly and uncreative in practical matters, and is lacking in the power of co-operation and of sustained labour in the face of difficulties. He has a natural bent for intrigue, is much under the sway of personal ambitions and jealousies, and is very much of a time-server. For the wilder tribesman blackmail and thieving are normal and proper ways of earning a living.

The *Marsh Arabs*, or Ma'adam, who are found on both banks of the Tigris between Amara and Kurna and in the neighbourhood of the lower Euphrates below Suk esh-Sheyukh, are a peculiar people, non-Arab in origin, living mainly by fishing and the produce of their herds of buffaloes, but cultivating here and there a little rice.

The *Kurds* predominate in the hills, and, since many of them dwell in Persian territory, their lawlessness has occasioned much trouble on the Turko-Persian frontier. They have little tribal cohesion, and are addicted to blood feuds. The Kurd has not the intelligence, subtlety, and imagination of the Arab, but of the two he is the more industrious and capable worker. In danger he is cooler and steadier, he has a better physique, and altogether has greater physical and mental stamina. But he is also more callous than the Arab, and is extraordinarily reckless about taking human life. He has the makings of a good cultivator and a good workman, but has generally neither the good nor the bad qualities that are likely to make a successful trader.

The *Turks*, as the governing race in Mesopotamia, occupied the majority of the official positions, both civil and military. A few thousand of the inhabitants of Baghdad claimed Turkish origin, often without justification. There is a Turkoman population in the

neighbourhood of Tuz Khurmatli, Kirkuk, and Altun Keupri. Turkomans are also found in the plains east of Mosul, and west of Mosul at Tel Afar.

The *Persians* in Mesopotamia are concentrated especially at the Shiah holy cities in Irak; thus at Kerbela they form the majority of the population, and at Nejef about a third. They number several thousands in Baghdad, where they are for the most part engaged in trade. There are a few Persians in the towns towards the Turko-Persian frontier, and some have recently come from the Gulf coast to work as labourers in southern Irak.

There are *Jewish* communities in the principal towns of Mesopotamia, particularly in Baghdad, where the Jews number perhaps about 50,000. They form an important element in commercial affairs, and the trade of Baghdad and Basra is much under their control.

The Syrian *Christians* dwell principally in northern Mesopotamia. There are also a few thousand in Baghdad. *Armenians* are found chiefly in the Diarbekr vilayet; there are also a certain number in Baghdad, where many are wealthy men of business. There are some thousands of Yezidis in the Jebel Sinjar, and also in the neighbourhood of Mosul. They form a marked group, owing to their peculiar religion. Very few are left of the *Circassians* settled in Mesopotamia by the Turkish Government after the Russian War of 1877. Their numbers have been reduced by their failure to adapt themselves to the climate, and by quarrels with their neighbours. Other groups, such as the Sabians, Chabaks, Indians, Afghans, Pathans, and Lurs, number only a very few thousands, and are of no political importance in the country.

The total number of *Europeans* resident in the country before the war was perhaps about 200; they were missionaries (French, British, and American), representatives of commercial enterprises and engineers (chiefly British and German), consuls, and

archæologists. The missionaries were principally in upper Mesopotamia, the Europeans engaged in business or engineering work were mostly in Irak and in Arabistan over the Persian boundary. The principal European business communities were at Baghdad, Basra, and Mohammera. Except among the missionaries, there were few Europeans who could be regarded as permanently settled in the country.

The distribution of languages in Mesopotamia follows the distribution of races. Arabic naturally predominates, but Persian is of considerable importance for commerce, and Kurdish dialects are commonly spoken in certain districts. The Armenians have their own language. Syriac is spoken by the Christians of the Central Kurdish highlands. Various dialects of Turkish are spoken by Turks and Turkomans.

As regards European languages, the commercial and social predominance of French in other parts of the Turkish Empire has its influence on Mesopotamia. A certain acquaintance with French is to be found among members of the wealthy business class in the chief trade-centres; and the higher Turkish officials usually had some, though often a very imperfect, knowledge of the language.

Some knowledge of English is possessed by persons —chiefly Christians of northern Mesopotamia—who have visited America or have been educated in American Mission Schools. A few men of business are acquainted with English, but it seems to be much less widely known than French, even where, as at Baghdad, British commercial influence has been predominant.

(6) Population

Distribution

The population of Mesopotamia has been roughly estimated at 2,238,000; of this number it is calculated that 1,511,000 inhabit Irak, and the remaining 727,000 are distributed in upper Mesopotamia.

In Irak probably over 90 per cent. of the population is grouped along the rivers and canals. The rural population is on the whole densest in the following areas: (i) along the Shatt el-Arab; (ii) along and near the Euphrates, especially between Museyib and Diwaniya on the Hilla branch and Kufa on the Hindie branch, and again in the Nasrie—Suk esh-Sheyukh area; (iii) on and near the Shatt el-Hai; (iv) to the north and north-east of Baghdad, along the Tigris, and in the country watered by the Khalis—Tawila canal between the Tigris and the Diala and in the Bakuba district; (v) in the country around Amara on the lower Tigris. The neighbourhood of the Euphrates is, owing to natural conditions, far more densely inhabited than that of the Tigris.

The number of pure nomads whose movements are confined to Irak is very small, but the desert south and west of the Euphrates is visited by tribes from the Nejd and elsewhere at certain seasons of the year, and in Irak itself a proportion of the inhabitants still keep to a semi-nomadic life.

In the plains of upper Mesopotamia the sparse population is distributed chiefly in the following areas: (i) parts of the middle Euphrates valley, which in the past forty or fifty years has been gradually recovering a settled population, after being nearly emptied by anarchy; (ii) between the rivers on the north-western and northern sides of the plain; (iii) between the rivers, in the Jebel Sinjar and the country at the foot of that range to south and east; (iv) east of the Tigris, in the Mosul—Erbil plains and southwards to the Lesser Zab; also at various points under

the Kurdish foothills from Altun Keupri down to Kifri.

Both in the plains and the hill-country of upper Mesopotamia nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes circulate on their yearly rounds.

Towns

The position of the chief town of Irak, Baghdad (200,000),[1] is eminently favourable to the existence of a great city. On Baghdad converge naturally, in conformity with physical features, all the lines of communication which enter Irak from the north-west, the north, and the north-east; to the south there is easy communication with the thickly-populated Kerbela—Hilla region; and lastly there is the waterway of the Tigris leading from the Persian Gulf, and navigable up to Baghdad by river steamers. For its food supplies Baghdad can draw easily both on the Euphrates to the south and on the Bakuba—Khalis canal area to the north.

Basra (80,000) is the port at the southern gate of Mesopotamia; ocean-going steamers can ascend to it by the Shatt el-Arab. Kerbela and Nejef (50,000 and 40,000) are pilgrim-centres which attract Shiahs from all parts of the Mohammedan world, but chiefly from Persia and India; Nejef is also the starting-point of a pilgrim-route to Mecca, and both Kerbela and Nejef, situated on the edge of the Arabian desert, are markets for the Beduin. Samarra (3,000) is a place of pilgrimage for Shiahs, but much less important than Kerbela and Nejef. Of the other towns, some are markets along the Euphrates, Tigris, or Shatt el-Hai, the centres of fertile districts, or situated at the junction or diverging-point of waterways; others are strung along the great Baghdad—Kermanshah road; and others are in oases.

[1] The figures given for the population of towns must be taken as guesses, giving perhaps some rough indication of their size; they may often be wide of the truth by some thousands.

The towns of upper Mesopotamia are markets and administrative centres, and support some small trades and industries.

There is a group of towns lying on that caravan-route from Aleppo to Mosul which has avoided the open plains and the southern end of the Karaja Dagh country as too insecure and too waterless, and has gone north by Diarbekr. These towns are Birijik (7,000), Urfa (30,000), Diarbekr (40,000), Mardin (30,000), Nisibin (5,000), and Jezire ibn Omar (5,000).

Mosul (70,000) not only lies on the trade route between Diarbekr and Baghdad, but is the chief collecting and distributing centre for the commerce with central Kurdistan. Bashkala (5,000) lies on the Van—Urmia caravan-route, and its position as a meeting-point of local tracks made it an important military post from which the tribes were watched. Amadia (3,000), on the southern edge of central Kurdistan, is a trading centre for the Hakkiari country.

In southern Kurdistan, Rowanduz (5,000) lies on a caravan route from Mosul to Tabriz, but the roads are bad, and the trade is declining. Suleimanie (12,000) is the chief market of southern Kurdistan, and has a commercial connection with Baghdad and Mosul.

On the edge of the hills, Erbil (6,000), Altun Keupri (3,000), Kirkuk (20,000), Tuz Khurmatli (1,200), and Kifri, or Salahie (4,000). lie along the Mosul—Baghdad road, and from them routes branch eastwards to the hill-towns. On the Tigris, Tekrit (5,000) lives mainly by the down-stream raft traffic from Mosul to Baghdad.

Lastly, there are the towns in the middle Euphrates valley below Birijik: Deir ez-Zor (12,000) and Ana (15,000). They live partly by their position on the valley road from Aleppo to Baghdad and on the water-way of the Euphrates. They are also centres of contact with the Beduin. Deir ez-Zor holds a very important position. Not only is it near the

mouth of the Khabur, but the Syrian desert to west of it, and the Jezireh to east, being less arid here than farther south, are traversed by caravan-routes, from Deir to Damascus on the one hand, and from Deir to Mosul on the other.

Movement

As there are no statistics of births, deaths, or migration, nothing definite can be said about any change in the total number of the population. On the whole, it seems to have been growing slowly in the years preceding the European War, but the increase in some districts had been at least partly counterbalanced by a decrease (generally due to disorder) in others.

There was a tendency among the nomadic population to settle down and take to cultivation. The Turkish Government tried to encourage this tendency, but also in some degree checked it by failing to create confidence or to give adequate protection against disorder.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Summary

2200 B.C. Hammurabi makes Babylon centre of Empire
539 Cyrus conquers Mesopotamia.
629 A.D. Disastrous floods.
636 Moslems defeat Persians at Kadisiyah.
637 Kufa and Basra founded.
749 Fall of the Omayyads.
762 Caliph Mansur founds Baghdad
c. 836 Decline of Abbasid dynasty.
1258 Capture of Baghdad by Mongols.
Fourteenth century. Tamerlane's invasion.
1520-66 Suleiman I.
1534 Annexation of Erivan, Van, Mosul, and Baghdad by Turks
1603 Shah Abbas of Persia conquers Mesopotamia.
1623 Persians occupy Baghdad.
1638 Murad IV recaptures Baghdad.
1638 Bishop of Babylon appointed. "Permanent peace" between Persia and Turkey. East India Company establishes factory at Basra.
1730-46 Intermittent wars.
1740-94 Bishop of Babylon *ex officio* French Consul at Baghdad
1796-97 French political mission at Baghdad.
1798 British Residency at Baghdad established.
1802 British Resident recognised by Sultan.
1835-37 Colonel Chesney's expedition.
1837 Destruction of Mohammera by Turks.
1847 Treaty of Erzerum.
1861 Formation of Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.
1881 Russian Consulate established at Baghdad.
1888 Railway Concessions in Asia Minor granted to German Syndicate.
1903 Baghdad Railway Convention.

1913 Conclusion of negotiations respecting Turko-Persian frontier, and navigation of Tigris, Euphrates, and Shatt el-Arab.

1914 Conclusion of Anglo-Turkish negotiations respecting railways, irrigation, and oil concessions. Anglo-German Agreement initialled. Demarcation of Turko-Persian frontier completed.

(1) Introduction

Isaiah, writing of Mesopotamia, speaks of "the glory of kingdoms, the beauty of the Chaldees' excellency."[1] A recent report describes the same region as "a miserable wilderness of barren desert, alternating with vast swamps." Such is the change that has been wrought in the course of time. The natural resources of the land in early ages brought wealth to its inhabitants, and led to the development of civilization in the very dawn of history. For about two thousand years before, and nearly three thousand years after Hammurabi made Babylon the capital of his empire (about 2200 B.C.) Mesopotamia was a centre of dominion and civilizing influence. The great powers of the ancient world, Sumerian, Assyrian, Babylonian, obtained their riches and extended their sway from the land of the two rivers, which has been considered one of the four earthly paradises.

In 539 B.C. Cyrus the Great conquered Mesopotamia, and incorporated it in the Persian Empire. Neither Achæmenian, Macedonian, nor Seleucid rule affected the general prosperity of the country; a large population continued to flourish; huge canals and dykes were kept in repair; and the crops yielded "for the most part two-hundredfold, and at the best even three-hundredfold."[2] Babylon continued to be the greatest city in the world until the death of Alexander the Great, when Seleucia, on the Tigris, became the centre of Hellenistic civilization in the Seleucid Empire and

[1] Isaiah, ch. xiii.
[2] Herodotus, I, 193.

the greatest commercial city of the East. Ctesiphon, on the opposite bank of the Tigris, was the residence of the Parthian Arsacids, and continued under the Sasanian dynasty of Persia to be the royal capital. For seven centuries Rome fought Parthia and Persia for the possession of this coveted land; there were constant changes of frontier; but from the second century A.D. the north was more or less continuously held by the Romans and the south by the Persians under the Sasanian Kings. Subsequent efforts by the Romans to extend their conquests, particularly under the Emperor Julian in 363 A.D. and under Heraclius between 624 and 627 A.D., produced no permanent alteration in the *status quo*.

The rise of Islam was responsible for the next change of rule in Mesopotamia. In 628 A.D. Mohammed called upon the Persian King to embrace the new religion or prepare for war; various causes combined to postpone the campaign, but in 636 the Moslems defeated the Persians in the Battle of Kadisiyah, and proceeded to occupy the valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris. The Arabs eventually extended their conquests to the Taurus Mountains.

The physical conditions of Mesopotamia have altered considerably at different periods. Eridu, the principal seaport of the Sumerians, was 130 miles from the present coast-line; and in Babylonian times the Euphrates and Tigris reached the sea as separate rivers. The alluvial area that now stretches from Beled, north of Baghdad, to the head of the Gulf has been formed by deposits of silt, and is said to increase at the rate of about 72 ft. per annum. Changes have also taken place in the courses of the rivers as the result of floods and the formation or decay of different canal systems. About the year 629 A.D. great floods burst the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris; in spite of the efforts of the Sasanian King to reclaim the land, the swamps thus formed became permanent, and in the ensuing years of warfare the irrigation works fell into disrepair.

During the rule of the Orthodox and Omayyad Caliphs, Mesopotamia was a province of the Arabian Empire. Kufa and Basra were founded as Arab strongholds in 637 A.D., and the country was ruled by governors appointed by the Caliphs. It was on the fall of the Omayyads in 749 that the hegemony passed from Syria to Irak. The Abbasid Caliphs bestowed great care on the irrigation system of the country, and under their rule its ancient prosperity was renewed. In 762 the Caliph Mansur founded Baghdad, which soon rose to a position of eminence and became unrivalled for splendour throughout Western Asia. Northern Mesopotamia paid Harun-al-Rashid as great a revenue as did Egypt, and its cotton commanded the market of the world. The seat of government was temporarily removed in 836 A.D. to Samarra, and the decline of the Abbasid dynasty set in at about that time. The Caliphs were then dominated by their Turkish guard, and Turkish soldiery became the chief power in the country. About the year 1005 A.D. several petty States arose in Mesopotamia; but, in spite of wars and disturbances, Baghdad remained until the Mongol invasions "the metropolis of Islam and the centre of learning and culture."[1]

Early in the thirteenth century a vast confederation of Mongolian nomad clans was formed in Central Asia. These swept westward, spreading ruin and devastation; the Persian principalities were overthrown; a huge horde under Hulaku Khan invaded Irak, and in 1258 captured Baghdad. The city was sacked and burnt; the inhabitants were massacred; the whole system of irrigation was ruined. A second invasion under Tamerlane in the fourteenth century completed the depopulation of the country; and for the next two hundred years Mesopotamia practically disappears from history.

In the reign of Sultan Suleiman I (1520-66) the Ottoman Turks engaged in several wars against the

[1] Browne, *Literary History of Persia*, p. 211.

Persians. Erivan, Van, Mosul, and Baghdad were added to the Turkish Empire; and the Tigris and Euphrates became the boundary between Turkish and Persian dominions. In 1603 Shah Abbas of Persia conquered the greater part of Mesopotamia; and twenty years later the Persians occupied Baghdad. In 1638 Sultan Murad IV undertook an expedition for the recapture of the city, which was effected in December of that year, after a siege of some weeks. In the massacre that ensued almost the whole Persian garrison and 30,000 of the inhabitants are said to have perished. A strong Turkish force was left in Baghdad, which remained from that date until 1917 continuously in Turkish hands.

(2) Early Period of Turkish Occupation, 1638-1834

Since its occupation by the Turks, Mesopotamia may be said to have been without a history. This, however, is no matter for congratulation; rather it is a case of "*ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.*" For two centuries after the fall of Baghdad affairs in Europe commanded the attention and the resources of the Ottoman Empire; and the government of Mesopotamia was relegated to the Pashas of Baghdad and Basra, who were supported by a force of Janissaries, and were generally, until 1834, appointed by the Sultan from the ruling families of the country.

In the year 1639 a "permanent peace" was signed between Turkey and Persia, and the common frontier was defined in general terms. This did not entirely put an end to friction between the two nations; the aggressive policy of Nadir Shah led in 1730, to a war which continued intermittently until 1746 (when the treaty of 1639 was reaffirmed); and on two separate occasions the Persians were in occupation of Basra for a series of years. On the whole, however, neither Turks nor Persians were capable of sustained effort on this frontier.

The influence of European Powers began to be felt in Mesopotamia during this period. The Portuguese, through their position in the Gulf, were able to assert themselves occasionally at Basra; but by 1757 they had disappeared entirely from Turkish Irak. The Dutch had for many years a Residency at Basra, but it was withdrawn about 1752, and they never again established themselves in the country. In 1638 a French Carmelite was appointed the first Latin Bishop of Babylon; and in 1679 Louis XIV by a decree appointed the Superior of the Carmelites at Basra to be *ex officio* French Consul there. About 1740 the office of Bishop of Babylon was combined with that of French Consul at Baghdad; and the double duties appear to have been discharged by a succession of bishops until 1794. In 1796-97 a French political mission visited Baghdad and a "Commissioner for Commercial Relations" was appointed to act as French Consul there. No European Power, however, possessed interests at this time in Mesopotamia in any way comparable with those of Great Britain.

British intercourse with Mesopotamia arose from the dealings of the East India Company's servants with the local Government. The Company established a factory at Basra in 1639; and the agent stationed there to protect commercial interests came to occupy the position of British Resident, and to acquire considerable influence over the local authorities. In 1798 a British Residency was permanently established at Baghdad; and in 1802 the Resident was formally recognised by the Sultan.

After its capture by the Turks in 1638, Baghdad contained only 14,000 inhabitants, and its trade suffered considerably from the massacre of many of the richest merchants. Basra at this time formed a separate Pashalik, the possession of which was frequently disputed by the Arabs and Persians, both of whom occupied the city at different times for periods varying from a few months to several years. The ravages of plague and flood, which the Administration

was unable to combat, increased the disorganisation and anarchy occasioned by the rebellious tribes in Mesopotamia. The dangers of the situation were aggravated by the war with Persia, the aggressions of the Chaab tribe in the south and by the fear of a Wahabi invasion from Central Arabia. By 1834 it was reported that the population of the Pashalik of Baghdad had decreased almost beyond belief; the cultivation had more than proportionately diminished; and almost every vestige of the ancient prosperity of the country had disappeared.

(3) Later Period of Turkish Occupation, 1834-1914

Between 1834 and 1914 increasing attention was directed towards Mesopotamia, both by the Central Government at the Porte and by the Great Powers of Europe. This interest, however, was aroused less by the condition of the country than by its relation to questions of international importance, and may be attributed chiefly to the changed attitude of the Porte towards provincial administration, to the prominence of the Turko-Persian boundary negotiations, and to the development of British interests in the country, combined with a growing connection between Mesopotamia and India, which incited other Powers to rivalry with Great Britain.

(a) *Relations with Persia*

Conditions in Mesopotamia during this period were adversely affected by the disturbances in the Persian frontier districts. The line of boundary was the chief point in dispute; but the territorial question was complicated by religious considerations. The hostility between Shiah and Sunni Mohammedans became invested with a political character, and was aggravated by the attitude of the Turkish authorities towards Persians in Turkish territory, particularly the

pilgrims to Kerbela and Nejef, the Holy Cities of the Shiahs. The destruction of Mohammera by the Turks in 1837, combined with the Persian occupation of the district of Zohab, brought matters to a crisis, and a request was made for the mediation of Great Britain and Russia. Under their auspices a conference between Turkish and Persian representatives was held at Erzerum in 1843; and in 1847 the Treaty of Erzerum was signed, providing for the determination of the frontier by a Turko-Persian Commission, including British and Russian delegates. After many delays and obstructions, an identic map was submitted in 1869 to the Ottoman and Persian Governments, representing a zone of country from 20 to 40 miles broad, within the limits of which it was stated that the boundary lay. A special Commission was appointed for the demarcation of the frontier within this zone, but their efforts towards a settlement were unsuccessful.

In 1905 the situation became disturbing owing to the advances by Turkish troops east of the zone in which the frontier was said to lie. The Turks appeared to covet all territory occupied by Sunnis, and induced many tribes in Persian territory to claim Turkish nationality, with the result that whole districts were in a state of anarchy. Turkish aggressions continued; but Great Britain and Russia finally succeeded in securing the signature, on November 17, 1913, of a Protocol, to which they, as well as Turkey and Persia, were parties, laying down the general line of frontier, and giving specific directions for the settlement of certain details by a Delimitation Commission. The British and Russian delegates on this Commission were empowered not merely to mediate but to arbitrate in cases of dispute between their Turkish and Persian colleagues. In September 1914 the demarcation of the frontier by this Commission was completed.

(b) *British Influence*

The period from 1834-1914 was remarkable for a great expansion of British interests in Mesopotamia, together with increased difficulty in protecting them. This difficulty arose partly from the inevitable multiplication of points of contact and friction; partly from the bureaucratic influence of Constantinople in Baghdad affairs; and partly from the overweening and chauvinistically Turkish spirit of the Pashas now posted to Baghdad by the central authorities. The part played by Great Britain in the Turko-Persian boundary disputes tended to increase her influence, but not to improve her relations with the Turkish authorities. The latter, however, continued, as before, to appeal for British assistance in difficulties; at the beginning of the Crimean War there appeared a probability that Persia might join Russia against Turkey, but the despatch of two British warships to Basra had a tranquillising effect not only upon Persia but also upon certain rebellious Arab tribes in Turkish territory.

British official activity was further extended by the influx of British Indians into the Holy Cities in consequence of the Oudh Bequest. This instrument, agreed on by the King of Oudh and the Governor-General of India in 1825, came into operation in 1849, and provided for the monthly payment of sums amounting to £10,000 a year to Shiahs at Kerbela and Nejef Owing to complaints that the funds were being misappropriated to political or personal ends, the Bequest was in 1852 made payable from the Baghdad Treasury, and the British Resident came to exercise a certain supervision over the expenditure. The development of British and British-Indian trade in Mesopotamia, the navigation by British vessels of Mesopotamian waters, and the measures taken for the suppression of piracy and the protection of traffic on the Shatt el-Arab gave to the British Government "a paramount local influence."[1] This was strengthened

[1] Reported by Colonel Rawlinson in 1852.

by the institution, in 1862, of a British mail service between Irak and India and the construction by British agency of lines of telegraph from Baghdad to India, Constantinople, and Teheran. In the latter part of the century, however, the development of British commerce and influence, together with the emphasising of British protection over the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammera, aroused considerable hostility on the part of the Turkish authorities. This attitude became increasingly pronounced with the growth of German influence at Constantinople.

(c) *Influence of other European Powers*

Until 1881 the only European Power represented at Baghdad besides Great Britain was France, who had no local interests except such as were connected with the Roman Catholic religious orders. Russia obtained a certain influence through her mediation in the Turko-Persian frontier disputes. A Russian Consulate was created at Baghdad in 1881, and was raised in 1901 to a Consulate-General; but the material interests of Russia in Irak were small. Belgium, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the United States of America each acquired certain commercial interests in the country, and established Consulates at Baghdad. During the reign of the Sultan Abdul Hamid, Germany was the only foreign country maintaining constant good relations with Turkey. The beginning of modern German interest in Ottoman affairs may be traced in the writings of List, von Moltke, and others; and when Bismarck had in some measure secured the maintenance of Germany's position in Europe he allowed the rising stream of commercial prosperity to follow its own course. This resulted in the eighties and nineties in the *Drang nach Osten*, which took more definite shape in 1898 on the occasion of the Emperor's visit to Constantinople. Thenceforth Germany's influence was directed towards the furtherance of her designs in the

Near East and the obstruction of British development. Her endeavours in this direction were crowned with success by the Baghdad Railway Convention of 1903. German influence received a check from the advent to power, in 1908, of the Young Turkish party, whose sympathies, it was hoped, might be with Great Britain; but the conflict of British and Turkish aims in Mesopotamia combined with other causes to make this expectation short-lived.

> " On the other hand, the steady penetration of Turkish commerce by Germany; the calculated abstention in German publications and speeches from any comment or criticism on the unconstitutional methods employed by the Turkish Government; the idea, which undoubtedly obtained, that Germany was not ' suspect ' as regards Turkish territory, and that her projects in Asia Minor were commercial and not territorial; and the sale of cruisers to Turkey at a time of crisis —all contributed powerfully, it would appear, to cause the Turks to lean towards Germany."[1]

Between 1889 and 1912 German trade in Turkey increased tenfold, but the real purpose of such commercial penetration is demonstrated by Dr. Rohrbach, who stated in his work *Die Bagdadbahn* in 1911 : " All economic measures we may take in Turkey are only a means to an end, not an end in themselves "; and went on to show that the end was the establishment of German political ascendancy from the North Sea to the Indian Ocean.

(d) *Internal Conditions*

The main principle of the internal administration of Mesopotamia in this period was the suppression of every kind of influence that competed with the authority of the Porte. Until 1834 the government of the province rested with the Pasha; the Sultan was regarded rather in the light of suzerain than of ruler, and his authority in Irak was constantly defied. In 1834, however, attempts were made to centralize the

[1] *The Baghdad Railway Negotiations* (Quarterly Review, October 1917).

administration of the Empire, and to substitute direct control by the Porte for the semi-independent rule of the Pashas. The latter were no longer to be selected from local families, but were despatched to the province from Constantinople. The efforts of these governors to fill the public purse by a stricter collection of the revenues aroused dissatisfaction among the Arabs; and rebellions were of frequent occurrence.

Midhat Pasha, who had reorganized the civil administration of the Empire in 1867, was sent to Baghdad in 1869 to introduce the vilayet system of government. He caused considerable concern to the British authorities by his efforts to extend Turkish sovereignty along the coast of the Persian Gulf. The policy of centralisation in Mesopotamia was continued by the Sultan Abdul Hamid, during whose reign the Turkish administration became, on the whole, more effective. The Turkish Revolution of 1908 was welcomed by the majority of the population; but the chauvinist policy of the Young Turks disappointed the hopes that had been entertained. The state of anarchy on the Persian frontier exercised a disturbing influence; disaffection among the Arabs was prevalent; and down to 1914 there was general disorder and insecurity throughout Mesopotamia.

(4) Commercial Development

Many enterprises, apparently exclusively commercial, have eventually proved to be of the highest political importance. This is pre-eminently true in Mesopotamia, whether such enterprise has been undertaken for the advancement of purely commercial interests without ulterior motive, as exemplified by the history of British navigation of Mesopotamian waters, or whether, as in the case of the Baghdad Railway, strategic and political aims have been deliberately disguised as commercial projects.

(*a*) *Navigation.*—British intercourse with Mesopotamia was begun by the ships of the East India

Company in the early part of the seventeenth century; the continued navigation by British vessels of Mesopotamian waters has been responsible for the development of British trade and influence, for the measure of improvement effected in the economic condition of the country, and, in a large degree, for whatever has been accomplished in the way of the suppression of lawlessness and the establishment of security of traffic.

In 1639 the East India Company made their first attempt to trade with Basra; and British ships navigated the Tigris and Euphrates throughout the eighteenth century. No opposition on the part of the local authorities is recorded; on the contrary, the assistance of the Company's warships was frequently sought and obtained by the Pasha of Baghdad in his operations against Arabs and Persians. From 1820 or earlier Government vessels, under the British flag, were attached to the British Residency at Baghdad; and in 1840, after Colonel Chesney's expedition[1] to Mesopotamia, a British armed flotilla of four vessels was formed for use on the Tigris and Euphrates. Under the command of Lieutenant Lynch, of the Indian Navy, this flotilla navigated and surveyed the rivers, assisted in maintaining order, and regularly carried the British mails up the Tigris to Baghdad.[2]

For many years previously, British merchant vessels, under the British flag, had plied between Basra and Baghdad; and an agreement executed by the Pasha in 1823[3] indicates that the usage

[1] 1835-37. This expedition was undertaken for the purpose of surveying the route, in order to test whether steam navigation could be established *via* the Euphrates for the conveyance of the Indian mails from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf.

[2] Three of the vessels were withdrawn in 1842, but the remaining steamer continued to carry on its duties as before without restrictions.

[3] This agreement stated that "no tax, except one previously well defined and arranged, should be levied on boats the property of British subjects or protégés; such, for instance, as pass between Basra and Baghdad."

was recognised by the Ottoman Government. From 1842, however, the Turkish authorities showed a disposition to curtail the privileges hitherto enjoyed by British merchant ships; and constant disputes arose over the illegal exaction of transit duties. An agreement was therefore concluded in 1846 between Great Britain and the Porte formally recognising the right of British vessels to navigate Mesopotamian waters. In 1861 Messrs. Lynch Brothers formed the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, whose first steamer was placed on the Tigris in the following year. All attempts to extend or facilitate British commercial navigation in Mesopotamia met, however, with constant opposition from the Turkish authorities. In 1867 a line of steamers was constituted under the Turkish flag and under official direction, and from the time of Midhat Pasha's rule at Baghdad these steamers were used almost exclusively for commercial purposes, with the object of driving the British boats off the river. In spite of the resulting competition, the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company continued to carry the British mails, to develop trade, and to extend British influence in Mesopotamia. From 1907 a fusion of this company with the Turkish Government Company was projected, but negotiations were abandoned in 1910.

The Porte then declared that the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates would be thrown open to Ottoman subjects only; and various permits were issued, to which His Majesty's Government took exception as encouraging unfair competition in view of the restrictions imposed upon the British company.

As the general position was far from satisfactory, it was insisted, in the negotiations between the British and Ottoman Governments which resulted in the Declaration signed at London July 29, 1913, that the rights enjoyed by Lynch Brothers should be specified in express terms and in treaty form, and be recognised as permanent. It was also arranged that all other commercial navigation by steamships should be the

monopoly of a new Ottoman company, with a British chairman recommended by the British Government.[1]

An Anglo-Turkish Convention was also signed at London on July 29, 1913, for the establishment of a Commission to improve the conditions of navigation on the Shatt el-Arab. This river marks the boundary between Turkey and Persia, the whole waterway being *de jure* within Turkish limits; the Sheikh of Mohammera has always exercised a *de facto* jurisdiction on its waters; and by the Treaty of Erzerum in 1847 Persian ships were guaranteed freedom of navigation. The approaches and upper reaches of the river have been charted and periodically surveyed by British agency, which has also been responsible for the maintenance of buoys to mark the channel across the bar. In 1912, 90 per cent. of the ocean-going vessels were British; Germany was represented by 12 steamships, Russia by 5, and France by 1. The proposed Commission was to consist of two members, one of whom should be British; the engineer-in-chief and the inspector of the river were also to be of British nationality. The Shatt el-Arab was to remain open to the vessels of all nations on terms of equality; no dues were to be levied for navigation, but only in payment of services rendered. The terms of the Convention met with no opposition on the part of the interested Powers, whose acquiescence was obtained.

(*b*) *Railway Communication.*—At the time of Colonel Chesney's expedition (1835–37) the question of railway communication between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf was much discussed in England. The Euphrates Valley Railway Company was formed in 1856, and obtained in the following year a general concession for the construction of a railway between Suedia (Alexandretta) and Basra. Without a guarantee, however, which neither the Imperial nor the Indian Government felt justified in giving, British capitalists hesitated to support the enterprise, and no

[1] For details of this agreement, see below, p. 96.

further steps were taken. In the latter part of the nineteenth century British influence with the Porte declined; and Germany seized the opportunity to make a bid for political expansion under the guise of economic development in Asiatic Turkey. In 1888, when direct railway communication was established between Berlin and Constantinople, a German syndicate secured valuable railway concessions in Asia Minor; and in consequence the Anatolian Railway Company was constituted. Further concessions were granted in 1893; and in 1899 a Convention was signed conceding in principle rights subsequently defined by the Baghdad Railway Convention of 1903. By this Convention the Ottoman Government granted to the Anatolian Railway Company[1] a concession for the prolongation to Baghdad and Basra of their existing line. Provision was made for certain branch lines, including one to a point on the Persian Gulf to be subsequently determined. The Company was to be allowed to work all minerals found within 20 kilometres on either side of the line, to establish ports on the Persian Gulf, and to navigate the rivers in the service of the railway. Further, it was stipulated that no section of the line between Baghdad and Basra might be worked before the completion of the main line from Konia to Baghdad; from which it appears that the economic development of Mesopotamia was of secondary importance to the linking up of Constantinople (and thereby Berlin) with the Middle East.[2] German proposals for British participation in this concession were not such as to find acceptance. In 1911 the right to continue the line from Baghdad to the Gulf was surrendered to a suitable Ottoman company, but with the reservation that

[1] It was provided that the Anatolian Company should form an Ottoman joint stock company, under the title of the Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company, which should take the place of the Anatolian Company in all that concerned the new line from Konia to the Persian Gulf.

[2] For the financial arrangements of the Baghdad Railway Convention, see below, p. 60.

the Baghdad Railway Company should participate therein to an extent not less than any non-Turkish element; the possibility of British predominance in this section of the line was thus eliminated. In 1912, after prolonged negotiations, His Majesty's Government intimated to the Ottoman Government that they were prepared to withdraw their request for British participation in the Gulf sections of the Baghdad Railway, and would agree to an increase in the Turkish Customs if certain specific points at issue could be satisfactorily settled. An arrangement was concluded with the Ottoman Government in 1913, which stipulated, *inter alia*, that—

(*a*) There should be no differential treatment on any railway in Asiatic Turkey.

(*b*) Two British representatives, approved by His Majesty's Government, should be admitted to the Board of the Baghdad Railway Company.

(*c*) The terminus of the Baghdad Railway should be at Basra.

(*d*) No railway should be constructed from Basra to the Gulf without the sanction of His Majesty's Government.

Both Great Britain and Germany pledged themselves to endeavour to secure that these provisions should be carried into effect, and further arranged that the construction and exploitation of ports at Basra and Baghdad, authorized by the Convention of 1903, should be carried out by a separate Ottoman Ports Company. The German Government agreed not to oppose the acquisition by British interests of 40 per cent. of the share capital of this Ports Company. In return, the Baghdad Railway Company were granted a certain participation in the new Ottoman Company for River Navigation. The Anglo-German Agreement was initialled in London on June 15, 1914, but its ratification depended upon the conclusion of the negotiations between Germany and Turkey, which had not been effected on the outbreak of the European war

(c) *Oil Concessions.*[1]—A German expert, who in 1901 visited the oil-bearing districts of Mosul and Baghdad, reported that "these petroleum regions are among the richest in the world," and subsequent reports tend to confirm this view. The concession of these oil wells was granted by firmans in 1889 and 1898, to the Turkish Civil List, transferred in 1908-9 to the Ministry of Finance, and has since been the property of that Department.

In consequence of a provision in the Baghdad Railway Convention of 1903, an agreement was signed in 1904 between the Anatolian Railway Company and the Civil List for working certain mines in Mosul and Baghdad, the option for which was to be open for two years. At the end of that time the Civil List invited a German syndicate to take up the option, but the offer was declined.

A British subject, Mr. D'Arcy, who had considerable oil interests in Persia, started negotiations at Constantinople in 1902 with a view to acquiring the oilfields of the two vilayets, and received from two Grand Viziers the promise that the concession would be transferred to him. From 1912 onwards attempts were made to effect a fusion of British and German interests, and an agreement was drawn up in 1914. In pursuance of this agreement, a company was incorporated in Great Britain under the name of the Turkish Petroleum Company, Limited; and the British and German Ambassadors at Constantinople were informed that the Porte agreed to lease to the company the oilfields in the vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad. No definite settlement as to the terms of the lease was reached before the outbreak of the European war; and in November 1915 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, representing Mr. D'Arcy's interests, were informed that the agreement no longer possessed legal validity.

[1] The oil-belts of Mesopotamia are described below, p. 84.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

Throughout the Ottoman Empire the State religion is Mohammedanism; and since 1517, when Selim I induced the Caliph Mutawakkil to transfer the Caliphate to the Ottoman Sultan and his successors, the Sultan has claimed the position of spiritual head of all orthodox Moslems. The phrase "spiritual sovereignty," as applied to the Sultan, is debatable, for, while his executive and judiciary powers are unlimited, he has never possessed "legislation." For the Moslem, "legislation" means merely the interpretation of the divine law itself by the *'ulama*. It is, therefore, difficult to say in what the authority of the Sultan over Islamic populations resident in non-Turkish countries consists.[1] In Mesopotamia, the home of the Abbasid Caliphs and early stronghold of Islam, Mohammedans constitute an overwhelming majority, and are reckoned to outnumber the adherents of other creeds in the ratio of 10 to 1. Religion in Mesopotamia is for the most part a question of race; with few exceptions, all Arabs, Kurds, Turks, and Persians are Moslems; all Armenians and Syrians are Christians; and Jews, Yezidis, Sabians, and Chabaks have their own distinctive religions. The Koran shows little tolerance for non-Moslems; and, although the law of the Tanzimat (1839) and the Hatt-i-Humayun of 1856 guaranteed freedom of religious worship and perfect equality among all Ottoman subjects,[2] the provisions of these laws were frequently disregarded, and

[1] See Nallino, C. A. *Appunti sulla Natura del "Califfato" in genere e sul presunto "Califfato Ottomano,"* pp. 5-12. Rome, 1917.

[2] See *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series.

the Koran continued to be both the religious and civil code. In Mesopotamia, however, there appears to have been little persecution; and it has been reported that in Baghdad the Christian and the Jew enjoyed a "rare freedom in comparison with other Mohammedan towns." Notorious Moslem outrages against Christians have occurred in the north, as a rule by the agency of the Kurds; but on the whole the animosity between the two chief Mohammedan sects, the Sunnis and the Shiahs, is more marked than that between Moslems and non-Moslems.

The Turks and Turkomans, the Kurds, and the Arabs of the Jezireh are Sunnis, and are estimated at 1,037,000 persons; the Persians and most of the Arabs of Irak are Shiahs, and are calculated to number about 1,173,000. The political significance of this cleavage is emphasised by the refusal of the Shiahs to recognise the Sultan as Caliph. Further, since the Shiah doctrine is the national creed of Persia, the religious bond between Shiahs in Persia and Mesopotamia has frequently been a cause of serious embarrassment to the Turkish authorities. Feeling between the two sects runs particularly high at the time of the pilgrimages, and in the neighbourhood of the Holy Cities. The principal Shiah shrines are at Nejef, Kerbela, and Kazimain; there is a great influx of pilgrims to these places, particularly during the winter months, from Persia, India, and other Mohammedan countries. The numbers are believed to amount to 150,000—200,000 in the year. The Mujtahids, or chief men of the sect, exercise considerable influence, both religious and political. The Mujtahids of Nejef and Kerbela have authority superior to that of any other Mujtahids throughout the entire Shiah world.

The most important Sunni shrine in Mesopotamia is at Baghdad, and is the resort of pilgrims from regions so remote as Afghanistan and India. The Nakib of Baghdad, the hereditary custodian of the shrine and official head of the Arab community in the city, has a widespread influence among his co-religionists.

The Christian sects in Mesopotamia may be divided into three groups: (1) the independent Asiatic Churches; (2) the Uniates, in communion with the Roman Catholic Church; (3) the Protestant communities. The most important of these religious bodies have at various times obtained the recognition of the Turkish Government, and have been constituted as authorized communities, or *Millets*. The Turkish Government appointed the spiritual head of the Church as civil administrator of the *Millet*, and although his functions were considerably reduced as the law of the Turkish Courts became less entirely based upon the Koran, yet the patriarch remained primarily responsible to the Government for the political control of the *Millet*.

The independent Asiatic Churches include the Gregorian Church of Armenia, the Nestorian or East Syrian, and the West Syrian or Jacobite. The Churches which acknowledge the spiritual supremacy of the Pope are the Armenian Uniat, the Chaldean or East Syrian Uniat, and the West Syrian or Jacobite Uniat. Mention should here be made of the connexion between the West Syrian or Jacobite Uniat Church and the ancient Christian community of Southern India, which is a factor of considerable importance in Malabar and Travancore. This community acknowledges the Patriarch of Antioch as its supreme authority; its bishops are appointed from Syria, and the connexion may be noted as constituting an existing link between Syria and the British Empire. Each community has its separate hierarchy, although the Pope exercises some limited power in the appointment of the bishops and patriarchs. Communities of various Roman Catholic religious orders have been established by the Italians and the French in northern Mesopotamia and in Baghdad and Basra. The Protestants in Mesopotamia are mainly Armenians, but include other converts of the American and Anglican missions.

The number of Jews in the country is said to be about 60,000; they are almost exclusively confined to

the towns, particularly Baghdad, where they outnumber the Turks and Arabs. The Yezidis, who are estimated to be about 21,000, are chiefly found in the Mosul vilayet. They have suffered much persecution, and are considered by the Moslems and Christians as idolaters. They have no central ecclesiastical authority, but a hierarchy of castes and sects. The Chabaks (10,000), the Sabians (2,000), and members of other creeds are of comparatively slight importance, and carry no political weight in the country.

(2) Political

The internal administration of Mesopotamia was conducted from 1869 on the vilayet system, which was introduced into the country by Midhat Pasha. Zor,[1] Diarbekr, Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra formed separate vilayets, which were sub-divided into sanjaks and cazas. Each vilayet was governed by a Vali, assisted by an Administrative Council. The Vali of Baghdad took precedence of the other Governors, but each vilayet was placed directly under the central Government at Constantinople. The Vali had no authority over the regular troops in the province, but could call upon their commander for support; attempts at effective action were, however, constantly paralysed by the division of authority. In times of peace the maintenance of law and order depended upon the gendarmerie, who were under the control of the Turkish War Office, but were distributed as military police under the orders of the civil authorities. The Valis had no power to appoint their subordinates, and had no control over the Courts of Justice, the Departments of Land Records, Posts and Telegraphs, Religious Endowments, Customs, Public Debt, the Tobacco and Salt Monopolies, Public Instruction, and Sanitary Service. The local chiefs of these Imperial Departments received their orders direct from Constantinople—an arrangement

[1] Zor was technically a *mutessariflik*.

which had certain advantages, but was frustrated by the difficulties of communication.

In each vilayet the Vali was the political representative of the Ottoman Government, and as such conducted all dealings with foreign Consular officers and with the chiefs of the semi-independent tribes. He also controlled the Provincial Departments, of which the most important was that concerned with the collection of taxes and the keeping of the general accounts. The Turks employed the system of farming the taxes, with the result that bribery and corruption were rife. It has been stated on good authority that in the vilayet of Basra alone, which contained a relatively large settled population, seven-tenths of the people successfully escaped all taxation.

The late Sultan, Abdul Hamid, converted into his private property some 30 per cent. of the best cultivated lands in the vilayets of Basra and Baghdad, and considerable areas in the northern provinces. This estate was called the Da'irat es-Saniyeh.[1] In 1909 the Young Turkish party transferred it from the Civil List to the Ministry of Finance, the management was taken over by the State, and the revenues were expended in the interests of the Committee of Union and Progress.

(3) Educational

The Department of Public Instruction under the Ottoman Government maintained in every sanjak and caza a primary school, in which Turkish and Arabic were taught. There were, in addition, a secondary school for boys and a primary school for girls at Baghdad and at Basra. These were all Government institutions, where instruction was given free of charge. There were also a primary and a secondary military school at Baghdad, and industrial schools at Baghdad and Basra. The committee which managed the Da'irat es-Saniyeh maintained primary schools on some of the rural parts of the estate.

[1] See below, p. 82.

Religious schools were maintained by the Shiahs at Kerbela, where the Sunnis also had one school. At Baghdad the Jewish, Chaldean, Syrian, and Armenian communities each had a school; in that of the Jews English and French were taught, and the general instruction was said to be excellent. There was also a Jewish school at Basra for boys and girls.

The Carmelites, and the nuns who worked in association with them, had several boys' and girls' schools in Irak. These schools were under French protection; and the instruction was in Arabic and French, with a little English. In 1906 the German Consul at Baghdad offered to subsidise liberally the Carmelite schools in the country if they would undertake to teach German. The French Dominicans and nuns at Mosul conducted over a dozen schools in the neighbourhood for boys and girls, and carried on educational work among the Chaldeans and other Uniats. A school for boys and girls was maintained by the Americans at Basra; there were also American schools in northern Mesopotamia. The Church Missionary Society had schools at Baghdad and at Mosul.

In spite of this provision for education, it appears to be generally admitted that Moslem instruction in Mesopotamia has been negligible, and has been restricted almost entirely to the official classes. The education provided by French, English, and American schools has affected only a small proportion of the town populations; and the people as a whole, including all the nomad tribes, are entirely illiterate. The Trade Commissioners reported in 1917 that education was the great need of the country. During the present British occupation thirteen Government primary schools, four municipal State-aided schools, a teachers' training school, and a survey school have been opened. The local demand for education is said[1] to be very insistent, and is being met as rapidly as the supply of teachers will permit.

[1] Statement by Lord Robert Cecil in the House of Commons, July 23, 1918.

(4) General Observations

(a) *Irrigation*

The question of irrigation is intimately connected with the past prosperity of Lower Mesopotamia, and with its present poverty. The ancient civilisations of Babylonia obtained their wealth from the land, and expended this wealth in constructing vast irrigation works, which obtained for the country the title of " the granary of the world."

The Mongol invasions of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and the Turkish conquest in 1638 destroyed the irrigation works, and with them the prosperity of the country and its powers of recuperation. Attempts have occasionally been made by the Ottoman authorities, particularly by Midhat Pasha when Vali of Baghdad, to irrigate the country, but through lack of resources or a strong administration no success was attained. In 1909 Sir William Willcocks, as Adviser to the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works, submitted a scheme for the irrigation of 3½ million acres at a total capital cost of 26 million pounds. The first portion of the scheme, including the erection of the Hindie barrage, was undertaken by the British firm of Sir John Jackson, Ltd., in 1911, and the barrage was formally inaugurated in December 1913. Tenders for about a third of the whole scheme were invited by the Ottoman Government in 1912, and submitted by two British firms only. The Ottoman Government, for financial reasons, did not then proceed with the work, but in 1914 arranged with His Majesty's Government that all irrigation works in Mesopotamia, other than those already tendered for, should be put up to open tender.

It is held by some competent authorities that the persistent destruction of forests in the highlands of Armenia and Kurdistan by goats (see *Armenia*, No. 62 of this series) has materially affected the rainfall of

the region in which the Tigris and Euphrates have their sources. On this assumption, the volume of water in the Mesopotamian rivers would depend to some extent upon the afforestation of Armenia.

All schemes, however, for the agricultural development of Mesopotamia are conditional on, and limited by, the quality and extent of the labour available, not only for the construction of irrigation works and for the excavation of canal systems, but for the upkeep of such works and for the increased demands of cultivation.

(b) *Labour*[1]

The question of how to obtain the additional labour which is vital to the development of the country presents a serious difficulty. Numbers of Lurs have already settled round Baghdad without opposition on the part of the Arab tribes; and improved conditions in Mesopotamia would doubtless lead to a supply from the border peoples of useful and acceptable labour. As has recently been remarked, "fertility of soil, settled administration, facility of communications, and last, but not least, the possession of pilgrim centres of great sanctity, are all magnets to attract immigration; and nature may safely be trusted to find means of filling the vacuum if it is proved to exist."

Many of the semi-nomad tribes were at one time settled, and might be induced to become so again. Sir Louis Pelly in 1863 expressed the opinion that even the Beduin is capable of adapting himself to a changed environment; and the pastoral population under improved conditions would be an important and profitable element in the country.

(c) *Capital*

The provision of capital is necessary for the restoration of Mesopotamia to prosperity. Almost every

[1] The economic aspect of this question is dealt with on p. 67.

country has discovered as a result of the war that there was a political side to the commercial and industrial enterprise of Germans in its territories. In Turkey, where German trade increased tenfold between 1889 and 1912, and has long been openly fostered as a means to political ascendancy, this policy of commercial penetration[1] has been especially significant for two reasons. Firstly, it has been relatively easy of accomplishment, owing to the temperamental disinclination and administrative inability of the Turks to conduct large commercial enterprises themselves; secondly, it has been openly and widely advocated in Germany as a menace to Great Britain's command of the sea, and as a peril to her connection with Egypt and the East. A constructive commercial and financial policy is the best antidote to German penetration.

(d) *Conclusions*

The ancient prosperity of Mesopotamia, revived under the Caliphs, was finally destroyed by the Mongol invasions, the effects of which were perpetuated by the Turko-Persian wars and subsequent years of Turkish misrule. During the whole period of its inclusion in the Ottoman Empire Mesopotamia suffered from a corrupt administration, internal strife and rebellion, injustice and oppression, poverty and want. It appears to be agreed that the elimination of all Turkish participation in the future administration is imperative; a return after the war to the *status quo ante* would be fatal to the interests of the country.

No Power in the world has any claim comparable with that of Great Britain to control the destinies of Mesopotamia. For over two centuries Great Britain has performed countless services, involving the sacrifice of many lives and the expenditure of much money, in the development of international trade, in the establishment of communication by steamship, post and

[1] This question is dealt with in detail below, p. 98.

telegraph, in the protection of traffic, and in the suppression of lawlessness and piracy on the rivers of Mesopotamia and in the Persian Gulf. The consequently unique position of Great Britain in this region, the peculiar interests—strategic, political, and commercial—which she has at stake, and the intimate connection between Mesopotamia and India combine to make the future administration of the country a matter of vital concern to the British Empire. Moreover, the great improvements effected during the recent military occupation, the millions of money expended upon the port of Basra, the work on the Hindie barrage and canal system, by which 300,000 acres were brought into cultivation in 1918, and the friendly relations established between the British authorities and the Arabs, point to continued progress in the future under British auspices.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) INTERNAL

(a) *Roads, Paths, and Tracks*

MESOPOTAMIA abounds in tracks, but before the war had very few roads, and those of an indifferent kind, metalled only in small sections. Only upon the trade routes radiating from Mosul and Baghdad was wheeled traffic general, and even upon these much of the transport was carried on by means of camels, mules, donkeys, and, to some extent, baggage ponies.

In Irak or Lower Mesopotamia, when the Tigris and Euphrates are in flood, the roads and tracks are, generally speaking, impassable, but this condition of affairs is less serious than might be supposed, because it is at the time of flood that navigation on the rivers and canals is at its best. During the low-water season wheeled traffic can use the roads between Baghdad and Kut, Hilla, Kerbela, and Nejef.

Away from the rivers, the main difficulties of movement are due to the desert and waterless character of most of the country. Though the going is often rough and (after rain) heavy, the ground is usually more or less passable for wheels in the plains and rolling country of the Jezireh, the Syrian Desert, and the area between the Tigris and the mountains on the east.

The main routes of Mesopotamia are those used either for trade or by pilgrims visiting the different shrines situated in the Delta, of which the most important are those at Kerbela, Nejef, and Baghdad. The

roads can therefore most conveniently be grouped round Baghdad and Mosul, the most important trading centres of the interior.

The chief roads round Baghdad are as follows:—

(1) *Baghdad and Khanikin.*—This is the main route for trade to Kermanshah in Persia from the west and south, and is also largely used by pilgrims visiting the shrines of Mesopotamia. The size and importance of the pilgrim traffic on this route may be judged from the fact that in 1905 no less than 95,000 pilgrims paid sanitary taxes to come into Mesopotamia at Khanikin, bringing with them some 8,000 corpses for burial, some 60,000 beasts of burden, and upwards of 10,000 packages of merchandise. All these pilgrims have to return carrying with them merchandise from Baghdad and the holy places. The distance from Baghdad to Khanikin is about 94 miles, and to Kermanshah about 222 miles. The complete journey to Kermanshah takes about twenty days for camels and about fourteen days for horses or mules. In dry weather the road is suitable for wheeled traffic right into Persia; in wet weather the surface becomes in places impossible for wheeled traffic. A motor service was running between Baghdad and Bakuba (about 31 miles) in 1913.

(2) *Baghdad and Mosul.*—Here there are two routes:—

(*a*) Along the line of the Jebel Hamrin, *via* Kifri, Altun Keupri, and Erbil (293 miles). Though the longer, this is the better and more frequented route, as it is less subject to floods than the lower route along the Tigris Valley, and passes through a well-watered and populous district. The crossings of the rivers which flow down to the Tigris present difficulties, but this route is generally suitable for wheeled traffic, and the

entire journey has been accomplished in a motor-car.

(*b*) Following the right bank of the Tigris, *via* Samarra, Tekrit, and Kalaat Sherghat (230 miles). North of Samarra the route was before the war a mere track, not suitable for wheeled traffic. According to a German map recently captured, it is now fit for wheeled traffic for its whole length.

(3) *Baghdad and Aleppo, via* Feluja, Hit, Abu Kemal, Deir ez-Zor, and Meskene. This is a regular route for caravans, which make the journey in from twenty to twenty-five days; a carriage can cover the distance in about fifteen days, and the section between Ana and Aleppo has been traversed by motor-car in 31 hours. The route follows the Euphrates from Feluja to Meskene, at which point it leaves the river and goes west across the plain to Aleppo.

(4) *Baghdad and Damascus or Homs*, following route (3) to Deir ez-Zor, and thence proceeding south-west to Tadmur (Palmyra). This is a regular caravan route, both goods and passenger traffic being fairly regular. Caravans cross each way every forty or sixty days.

The three chief routes round Mosul are as follows :—

(1) *Mosul and Baghdad* (see above).

(2) *Mosul to Rania, via* Erbil and Keui Sanjak, and thence into Persia. This route is suitable for wheeled traffic only as far as Rania, from which point the route into Persia degenerates into a track.

(3) *Mosul and Diarbekr, via* Nisibin and Mardin, whence there are good roads leading north to Erzerum and south-west to Aleppo and Alexandretta. Before the war this was the chief route from the Mediterranean to Mesopotamia.

(b) *Rivers and Canals*

The important rivers of Mesopotamia are the Tigris, the Euphrates, and the river formed by the confluence of these two at Kurna and known as the Shatt el-Arab. Of less importance are the four tributaries which join the Tigris from the Persian hills on its left bank, the Great and Lesser Zab, the Adheim between Mosul and Baghdad, and the Diala just below the latter town. The length of the Tigris between Mosul and Kurna is about 723 miles, that of the Euphrates between Meskene and Kurna about 1,002 miles; the length of the Shatt el-Arab is 107 miles.

From the economic point of view, the main interest in Mesopotamia centres round the Tigris and Euphrates. Mesopotamia owes its past importance to the wealth won from the rich soil of the Delta by means of the ancient systems of irrigation, of which abundant evidence exists even to-day, and the future progress of the country depends upon the proper utilisation of its rivers for irrigation and navigation.

The Shatt el-Arab is navigable by ocean-going steamers. At Fao the average width of the river is 1 mile, decreasing gradually to ½ mile at the mouth of the Karun River, which flows in on the left bank 49 miles above Fao; above this point the river immediately decreases to a mean breadth of 600 yards. Between Basra and Kurna the river gradually narrows to 250 yards. Its utility for navigation is at present impeded by a bank of silt known as the Fao bar, which lies across the mouth of the river at Fao, and gives at low water a maximum depth of 11 feet only, with the result that vessels of larger draught are compelled either to wait for the tide or to trans-ship a portion of their cargo to lighters outside the bar. The depth of water over the bar at spring tides is 20 ft., at neap tides 17 ft. Beyond the bar there is a depth of from 30 to 40 ft. up to Basra, except at two places, of which the more serious is the Mohammera bar, just below the confluence of the Karun River. Vessels drawing

not more than 15 ft. can get up as far as Kurna.[1] Native craft used on the Shatt el-Arab are mostly *bellams*, long, narrow boats which can be sailed, rowed, or, as is more usual, punted or towed, and which can carry a load of 50 tons. The only places of importance on the Shatt el-Arab are the Persian port of Mohammera, at the junction of the Karun River with the Shatt el-Arab; Basra, the seaport of Mesopotamia; and Nahr Umar, which is on the right bank, 20 miles above Basra, and has been developed as a port since the British military occupation.

The Tigris, from the point of view of navigation, can most conveniently be considered in two sections: first, the section between Kurna and Baghdad, which is at present the upper limit of steam navigation; secondly, that between Baghdad and Mosul.

The distance from Kurna to Baghdad, following the general direction of the river, is under 300 miles; but the frequent bends make the distance by water about 448 miles. Owing to the river's winding course, the silt deposited during the season of flood forms banks which, when the water is low, constitute a great hindrance to navigation.

In high-water season, steamers of not more than 5 ft. draught can navigate the Tigris from Kurna to Baghdad; and the difficulties of navigation are mainly those caused by the swiftness of the current, which, according to some authorities, reaches 6 miles per hour at the height of the flood. At low water, vessels drawing more than 3 ft. cannot navigate the section between Ezra's Tomb and Kale Sale, where the river has been much damaged as a waterway by native cultivators, who have thrown out brushwood groynes in order to assist irrigation or to reclaim the land, and have done other damage by cutting irrigation channels at the concave sides of the bends. Sir William Willcocks, who was called in to advise the

[1] For the terms of the agreement of 1913, under which the navigation of the river was to be surveyed by a special Commission, see above, p. 31.

Turkish Government as to the best method of irrigating the Delta of the Tigris and Euphrates, expressed the opinion that the Tigris would soon cease to be navigable between these two points unless steps were taken to remedy matters. The rest of the river up to Baghdad is navigable at all seasons of the year by vessels drawing not more than 5 ft. of water. There are bridges of boats crossing the river at Kale Sale, Amara, Kut, Gerara, and Baghdad. For steamers with a speed of 10 knots the journey from Baghdad to Basra takes about 47 hours, and from Basra to Baghdad about 78 hours in the low-water season, and about 100 hours in flood-time.

Before the war steam navigation on the Tigris up to Baghdad was carried on by Lynch Bros., Ltd., by the Turkish Government River Administration, and by the Agra Jaffer Company. The last-named company ran three steamers, towing one barge each, on the Tigris, and another on the Shatt el-Arab, between Basra and Mohammera. The Turkish Government, immediately before the war, had a fleet of seven or eight steamers trading on the Tigris. Lynch Bros. have for many years had the right to maintain on the Tigris two steamers, each towing two barges; and recently they were allowed to put on a third steamer, also with the right of towing two barges, on condition that it sailed under the Turkish flag. Some of their steamers could, in favourable conditions of the river, take a cargo of as much as 400 tons. Of other vessels trading on this part of the river the most important types were the native craft known as *safineh* and *quffeh*. The *safineh* are the more important, being large boats, drawing from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to $4\frac{1}{2}$ ft. of water, and capable of carrying a cargo of 100 tons; they can be sailed or rowed with the stream; up-stream they are usually either punted or towed. The *quffeh* is a large coracle, used for the conveyance of passengers. It cannot be used satisfactorily against the stream. The interruption of navigation by the hostility of the Arab tribes inhabiting the river banks has been much less

frequent of recent years, but is reported to have interfered with the trade of the river below Baghdad in 1907, 1908, and 1909. The rates of steamer freight on the river for the four years before the war averaged 27*s.* 6*d.* per ton from Basra to Baghdad, and 15*s.* a ton from Baghdad to Basra.[1]

In 1913 the Turkish Government granted a concession to Lord Inchcape for navigation on the Tigris and Euphrates as far as Mosul and Meskene respectively. The main provisions of this concession are given on pp. 96-7.

Above Baghdad the bed of the river is alluvial up to Beled, above which town the river flows over a bed of either clay, sand, hard conglomerate, or shingle, and there are numerous rapids, islands, and rocks, which render navigation up-stream impracticable by steamers, though a small launch plied between Baghdad and Samarra (90 miles) before the war, and there is a record of a steamer having, in 1838, reached a point 28 miles below Mosul. Commercial traffic on the river between Baghdad and Mosul is carried on, down-stream only, by native *keleks*. These are large rafts of timber or poles and brushwood, supported on inflated skins, and are floated down on the current, being kept in the stream by two rough sweeps. They can carry 5 to 35 tons, according to their size. On arrival at their destination, these rafts are broken up, the timber sold, and the skins taken back to the point of departure. When the river is in flood the journey from Mosul to Baghdad takes three or four days; at low water, when rafts have to lie up at night, it takes between ten and twelve days. The distance from Baghdad to Mosul is 275 miles. The river is crossed by boat bridges at Mosul, Samarra, and Kazimain.

Of the tributaries of the Tigris, the Diala is navigable from the beginning of December to April as far as Bakuba (about 52 miles), and the Lesser Zab

[1] These rates have been very considerably increased during the war.

for rafts down-stream from Altun Keupri (74 miles). Neither the Adheim nor the Greater Zab is navigable.

The Euphrates.—It is doubtful whether the Euphrates has ever been used for navigation to any considerable extent, except by small native craft. Immediately before the war its use as a commercial waterway was insignificant, and was attended by some dangers owing to the attitude of the Muntifik Arabs. A glance at the map makes the idea of the commercial use of the Euphrates between Basra and Meskene very attractive, but it is clear that, before any such scheme could be put into practice, prolonged study of the river would have to be undertaken, and no doubt very large engineering works would be required. It will be convenient here to consider the navigation of the Euphrates in three sections, the first from Kurna to the Hindie barrage, the second from the Hindie barrage to Hit, the third from Hit to Meskene.

(i) *Kurna to the Hindie Barrage.*—Owing to the numerous irrigation canals, which have been cut without system and allowed to fall into disrepair, the river has ceased to be navigable below Nasrie except in flood-time, and Sir William Willcocks reported that the old channel of the Euphrates, from Suk esh-Sheyukh to Kurna, had ceased to carry any considerable quantity of Euphrates water, and that the water was finding its way through the Hammar lake to the Shatt el-Arab at Gurmat Ali. Looking at the question solely from the point of view of irrigation, he proposed to use the old channel merely as a drain for water diverted from the Tigris below Amara for irrigation purposes. Shortly after the British military occupation of Lower Mesopotamia, steps were taken to render navigable this old channel, and for this purpose the Chubaish bar was cut through, and dredging was begun at the northern end of the Hammar lake. This work was, however, discontinued for military

reasons, and the river is in about as bad a condition as before. Between Nasrie and Samawa the river flows in a firm bed, the familiar obstacles to navigation are absent, and a minimum depth of 5 ft. of water can be obtained at all times of the year. Between Samawa and the Hindie barrage all the difficulties of navigation found in the lower stretches of the river recur in an aggravated form. The Hindie branch of the river (the only one upon which navigation can be carried on all the year round) is surrounded by *khors*, or marshes, which are sometimes above and sometimes below water level, and water is drawn off by numerous canals. In consequence, the river between Samawa and the barrage can, at certain seasons of the year, be navigated only by vessels drawing less than 2 ft. of water. There are two locks at the Hindie barrage, which are designed to take vessels of about 5 ft. draught at the period of lowest water.

(ii) *Hindie Barrage to Hit.*—This section is navigable by steamers drawing not more than 4 to 5 ft. at all seasons of the year, though, until the wash of steamer traffic has helped to clear the channel, navigation at some points might be difficult. The river flows between high banks, and its width varies from 150 to 500 yards. The current, which at low water is about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles per hour, increases to 5 miles per hour in flood.

(iii) *Hit to Meskene.*—Above Hit the bed of the river ceases to be alluvial, and there are rapids at various places, especially between Hit and Ana, which render navigation extremely difficult and dangerous, except when the river is in flood. Banks of shingle and sand are also found. From April to July, when the river is full, its descent would be easy for light-draught steamers, and could be accomplished at a great

speed, but the journey up-stream would be very slow, and between Hit and Ana would probably be impossible for any steamer whose speed was less than 12 knots an hour. At present practically all traffic on this section is down-stream, and is carried on by *shakhturs*, flat-bottomed boats built at Birijik, which when loaded do not draw more than $1\frac{1}{2}$ ft. of water. These craft carry a load of about 5 tons, are steered by clumsy sweeps in the bows, and are floated down-stream loaded and towed up-stream empty.

Of the channels which take off from the Tigris and Euphrates many are navigable by small native craft at certain seasons of the year, but only the Shatt el-Hai, which leaves the right bank of the Tigris at Kut, and the Saklawie, which runs from the Euphrates, about 10 miles above Feluja, to the Tigris at Baghdad, are navigable for large craft. In flood-time both these are navigable by *bellams*, and it is stated that the Saklawie has been navigated by steamers as recently as 1916.

With the future of navigation in Mesopotamia are involved two questions—first, the requirements of water for irrigation, and secondly, the competition between river navigation and railways. The former would affect navigation from Tekrit and Ramadie downwards, the latter might threaten its very existence as a commercial proposition.

Down to the summer of 1914 the only expert report bearing on these problems was that made by Sir W. Willcocks to the Turkish Government upon the possibilities of reviving the irrigation of Mesopotamia. Sir W. Willcocks' conclusions are summed up in the words "rivers for irrigation, railways for communications"; and his report proposed seven large schemes for the irrigation of the Delta between the line Feluja—Tekrit and Fao, and for the prevention of floods, and one small scheme for the improvement

of navigation on the Tigris between Amara and Kurna. The total cost of the scheme was estimated at £T.29,000,000,[1] and the plan was admitted to depend commercially upon the construction of adequate railways between Baghdad and Basra along the line of the two rivers, and possibly of a further railway from Mesopotamia across the Syrian Desert to one of the Syrian ports on the Mediterranean; the cost of these was not included in the scheme.

Recently Sir W. Willcocks' report has been subjected to considerable criticism upon purely engineering grounds; for instance, it is doubtful, having regard to the enormous quantities of silt carried by the Tigris and Euphrates when in flood, whether his devices for preventing floods would be permanently successful. In any case there are drawbacks to any scheme which accepts as permanent the degeneration of the Lower Euphrates, and is prepared to acquiesce in the abandonment as an irreclaimable swamp of the large area between Suk esh-Sheyukh and Gurmat Ali, which in the past has been a prosperous and fertile agricultural district. Moreover, Sir W. Willcocks' scheme is open to criticism on other grounds. First, it advocates the reclamation by irrigation of enormous areas, for which there is at present no agricultural population, and from which no return could be obtained for a very long time. Secondly, it overlooks the political difficulties to which the introduction of settlers would inevitably give rise. Thirdly, there is no reason why irrigation and navigation should not be effectively combined, and, indeed, be made mutually advantageous for a long time to come.

Recently Sir George Buchanan has made a report on the regeneration of the river systems of Mesopotamia, which throws a great deal of light upon the condition of the rivers to-day, and the possibilities of their utilisation as waterways in the future. He states that the difficulties of navigation on both the Tigris and

[1] Turkish pounds. Normally the Turkish pound = 18*s*.

the Euphrates and their present unsatisfactory condition are due to three causes:—

(1) An enormous quantity of silt is carried in suspension in times and seasons of flood, and is deposited in the bed of the river and over the country in the immediate neighbourhood as soon as the current is lessened from any cause; in consequence of this the level of the river bed has, in the course of centuries, been raised above the surrounding country, so that it is difficult to control floods.

(2) The ignorant Arab methods of irrigation have been allowed to go on unhindered for centuries. Irrigation cuts made during the low-water season have developed in flood-time to broad rivers, spreading uncontrolled over the country, which, by lessening the flow in the river bed, have caused silt to be deposited in such quantities that by degrees the original bed of the river in places has become only a channel for carrying flood-water; of this there are instances both on the Tigris and the Euphrates, the best known being that which has occurred at Hindie, where the main Euphrates river has ceased, except during the high-water season, to flow down the Hilla branch, past the site of Babylon, and now goes down the Hindie branch.

(3) The Arabs had a system of building out *bunds* (hurdle-work projections) into the river, either for the purpose of assisting irrigation, or in order to collect silt, and thereby reclaim land for cultivation.

Owing to the military situation at the time he made his report, Sir George Buchanan had no opportunity of considering in detail the problems presented by the Euphrates; moreover, the whole question of the regeneration of the rivers is one upon which reliable conclusions can only be reached after more careful study of the rivers than has been possible hitherto. But the experi-

ence gained from certain works which were carried out on his instructions for the purpose of improving the navigation of the Tigris between Amara and Kurna, shows (1) that where steps are taken to keep the river within bounds it will quickly lower its bed, establish a better channel, and maintain that improvement; (2) that improvements in the river can be made without sacrificing its use for irrigation, though in some districts this would involve an alteration of the methods of cultivation not altogether to the liking of the Arabs.

It is probably safe to assume that if works are taken in hand with the object of keeping the rivers within bounds in all but the very highest flood-times—a period which may be measured in weeks—and of making them scour out again the channels which they used in the past, both the Tigris and Euphrates might be made navigable throughout the year by steamers of considerable tonnage as far as Samarra and Hit respectively, and in the case of the Tigris this would probably not be a very difficult or expensive matter.

Sir George Buchanan deprecates the adoption of the scheme proposed by Sir W. Willcocks, or of any other scheme, until the problems of regeneration, navigation, and irrigation have been considered in all their bearings by a competent committee of engineers. He is of opinion that it will be many years before the waters of these rivers will be required for irrigation to such an extent that navigation will have to give way.

No reports are available upon the possibility of making the Tigris navigable above Samarra and the Euphrates above Hit. The main differences between the problems of the upper rivers and those presented within the irrigation area are, first, the absence of the competing claims of irrigation and navigation, and, secondly, the difference in the nature of the beds over which the rivers flow. The expense of upkeep of any improvement in navigation made in the upper reaches would be much less than that which must necessarily be involved in the alluvial regions of Lower Mesopotamia.

Lynch Brothers have expressed the opinion that it

would not be difficult to render the Euphrates navigable between Hit and Meskene. The obstructions to navigation to-day are chiefly caused by stone aqueducts, used for carrying water for irrigation from water-wheels working in the river, and, to a less extent, by rocks and the ruins of old bridges in the bed of the river. The actual cost of removing these obstructions would probably be small, but it would be necessary to provide other means for irrigating the land after the removal of the water-wheels and aqueducts. There is to-day a considerable traffic down-stream, but the traffic up-river is very small. Lynch Brothers are of opinion that a river transport service on the upper Euphrates would in time be commercially profitable.

With regard to the Tigris, Lynch Brothers consider that it would be possible at moderate cost to make the river navigable as far as Shirghat (about 80 miles below Mosul). Blasting operations would be necessary, in order to remove rocks in the channel, and a certain amount of dredging would also be involved, but these operations would not be costly. Between Shirghat and Mosul it would probably be found essential to construct some canals and dams, in order to make navigation practicable across the rapids.

As to how far the initial capital outlay on the work of improving the channel could be made remunerative, it is difficult to obtain a reliable opinion. There is no reason to doubt that much of the produce which now goes by caravan to Aleppo would be diverted to Baghdad, and that there would be a large export of grain, wool, &c. On the other hand, the continuation of the Baghdad Railway from Mosul to Samarra would naturally have an important bearing on the commercial possibilities of river transport services.

All questions of navigation must hinge on the question of railway competition. How far railways will in the future supersede navigation in Mesopotamia it is impossible to forecast. Sir George Buchanan expresses the opinion, based on his experiences in India, where the same problems have arisen, that a

well-managed river service would easily hold its own, and thinks that, though at first there might be some difficulty in making both railway and river pay, in the future there would certainly be sufficient trade to keep both well employed.

(c) *Railways*

Baghdad Railway.—This railway enters Mesopotamia at the crossing of the Euphrates at Jerablus; and the distance from that point along the proposed route is about 575 miles to Baghdad, and about 970 miles to Basra, without allowing for curves. Branches to Urfa, Khanikin, and the Persian Gulf, were included in the original concession as part of the line which the company was to undertake to build; branches towards Birijik, Mardin, Erbil, and Tuz-Khurmatli were not obligatory, but the company had preferential rights to construct them.

The line has been completed from Baghdad north to Tekrit, west to Feluja on the Euphrates, south to Hilla (whence a light railway of 2 ft. 6 in. gauge has been completed to Kefl), also from Jerablus east to El-Helif, south-east of Mardin. Of these sections the first mentioned only was built, as far as Samarra, before war broke out. Construction has also been begun upon the section Tekrit to Shoreimie. The gauge is the normal European gauge of 4 ft. $8\frac{1}{2}$ in., and the mode of traction is the usual adhesion system. According to the specification, the line is to be made capable of carrying a very heavy load. At Jerablus there is a bridge about 890 yards in length, consisting of 10 spans with overhead lattice girders. Its width is 20 ft., including a 4-ft. pathway.

The concession for the construction of the line was granted to the Société du Chemin de fer Ottoman d'Anatolie by a convention dated March 5, 1903,[1] but

[1] The political importance of the concessions under which the Baghdad Railway Company was formed is dealt with above, p. 32.

the rights were transferred to a company formed by the concessionnaires, under the title of "The Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company," with a share capital of 15,000,000 francs, of which the Anatolian Railway Co. was bound to subscribe and hold 10 per cent., and the Turkish Government had the right to subscribe a further 10 per cent. The whole of the capital has been issued and is paid up to the extent of 50 per cent. In 1913 there were 27 directors, of whom the President and 10 others were German, 4 were Turks, 8 French, 2 Swiss, 1 Italian, and 1 Austrian. The concession is for 99 years. The railway was to be constructed in sections of approximately 200 kilometres in length, and it was intended that the whole line with its branches should be completed within 8 years from the date of the convention. The line was to be a single track throughout, but land sufficient for a double line was to be acquired in the first instance, and the company was placed under an obligation to build a second line at its own expense as soon as the gross receipts reached 30,000 francs per kilometre per annum.

The financial arrangements were as follows:—

The concessionnaires undertook to build the railway at their own expense, the Turkish Government guaranteeing an annual sum of 11,000 francs per kilometre constructed and opened for traffic, and a further annual sum for working expenses of 4,500 francs per kilometre. It was arranged that this kilometric guarantee of 11,000 francs should be capitalised, and that the Turkish Government should hand to the concessionnaires State bonds bearing interest at 4 per cent., with a sinking fund of ·0875 per cent., redeemable during the period of the concession. On the basis agreed the Turkish Government was therefore bound to hand to the company bonds of a nominal value of 269,110 francs per kilometre constructed and open to traffic. The issue price of the bonds was agreed at a minimum of 81½ per cent. The convention contained a very indefinite provision to the effect that as soon as the growth of the traffic and receipts and the

financial situation permitted, the concessionnaires should issue bonds of their own to replace the bonds issued to them by the Imperial Government.

The receipts of the line were apportioned between the Turkish Government and the Company as follows:—

(1) The first 4,500 francs per kilometre were to go to the Company in relief of the Government's obligation to cover the working expenses at the agreed rate.

(2) The surplus above 4,500 francs per kilometre up to 10,000 francs per kilometre was to go to the Turkish Government.

(3) Of any excess over 10,000 francs per kilometre the Government was to get 60 per cent. and the Company 40 per cent.

From the point of view of the concessionnaires the bargain was a good one, provided the bonds of the Turkish Government could be realised at a fair price. The bonds necessary to secure the kilometric guarantee were issuable to the concessionnaires on the signature of the special convention relating to each section; consequently the concessionnaires were not under the necessity of finding any money themselves if they could succeed in placing the Turkish bonds upon the European market, and the liberal payment per kilometre allowed for by the terms of the convention gave them an ample margin for doing this.

How far the arrangement was financially sound from the Turkish point of view is matter of opinion. The amount of the bonds issued by the Turkish Government to cover the kilometric guarantee on the first section was 54,000,000 francs, on the second section 108,000,000 francs, and on the third section 119,000,000 francs, or a total of 281,000,000 francs, involving an annual sum for interest of over 11,000,000 francs. It is argued that the kilometric guarantee undertaken by the Turkish Government when the Anatolian Railway was

constructed was higher than that undertaken in this case, and that nevertheless that line has proved a source of profit to the Turkish Government. If the development of agriculture in the districts to be tapped by the Baghdad Railway is equally rapid, the burden which the Turkish Government has undertaken may not prove more than the country can carry, but the large amount of bonds issuable in respect of the guarantee must of necessity prove a hindrance to financial operations required for other purposes.

It is impossible to do more than generalise as to the economic prospects of the line. It will tap a large area, which possesses enormous agricultural possibilities; and its branch lines to the Persian frontier and elsewhere will put it into immediate touch with the places where traffic is most capable of expansion. The flow of pilgrims to Baghdad, Nejef, and Kerbela is also expected to provide an abundant source of revenue. There is a provision of economic importance under which the concessionnaires may work any mines discovered within a zone of 20 kilometres on each side of the line; but this right does not give them any privilege or monopoly.

The Company paid dividends up to 5 per cent. regularly down to 1912, and at the end of that year's working had a reserve of over 6,000,000 francs. The war has naturally had disastrous effects, and at the meeting of the Company held in February 1918 the chairman stated that the receipts for 1916 had been nearly 15,000,000 francs less than those for 1915; he was silent as to the result of the year 1917. He stated, however, that the contract with the construction company had been denounced, and that the railway company was in urgent need of financial help.

Other Railways in Mesopotamia completed or under construction are all the work of the British army of occupation, and have been built for military purposes. With the exception of a small 2ft. 6in. line between Sadiyeh on the Tigris and Shahroban on the Khanikin road they are all of 1-metre gauge.

Proposed railways.—As has already been said, Sir William Willcocks, in connection with his irrigation schemes, proposed the construction of a considerable system of railways in Lower Mesopotamia, and of a trunk line, connecting Baghdad by the Euphrates valley with either Homs or Damascus and the Mediterranean. Commercially all these proposed lines depend upon the development of Mesopotamia and the adequacy or otherwise of the rivers for the conveyance of goods; and upon these points it is at present impossible to arrive at any useful conclusions.

(d) *Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones*

The Turkish postal service in Mesopotamia was extremely uncertain; special messengers, travellers, and passing muleteers were much used to supplement it.

There used to be a fortnightly camel-post from Hit to Damascus for letters only, but this was discontinued in 1912 owing to the frequency of attacks by Beduins; between 1912 and 1914 the Baghdad-Damascus post adopted the long Aleppo route, of which the Baghdad-Aleppo section alone required eight days in summer, ten in autumn, and fourteen in winter.

There was a parcel-post from Europe to Baghdad either by Brindisi, Bombay, and Basra, or by Beirut and Aleppo; the former, being safer, was usually preferred.

Money orders could be obtained from the Anglo-Indian Post Office at Baghdad; the Turkish Post Office would only issue money orders for inland use.

Fao is the terminus of the Indo-European Telegraph Department (cf. *Persia*, No. 75 of this series); the office, formerly Anglo-Turkish, is now wholly British.

Before the war the Turkish main telegraph lines ran as follows:—

(1) Fao — Basra — Kurna — Baghdad — Kirkuk —Erbil—Mosul.

(2) Baghdad — Feluja — Hit — Ana — Meskene— Aleppo.

(3) Baghdad—Khanikin—Kermanshah—Teheran.

(4) Mosul—Nisibin—Mardin—Diarbekr.

There was a loop line from Kurna to Baghdad round the Euphrates towns — Kurna — Suk esh-Sheyukh — Samawa — Hilla — Kerbela — Museyib —Baghdad.

Erbil had two lines towards the Persian frontier, one to Rowanduz, the other *via* Rania to Kaladiza.

Kerbela had lines to Baghdad *via* Hilla, and to Kufa *via* Nejef.

The working of the telegraph was often unreliable.

There were no telephones in Mesopotamia before the war.

(2) External

(a) *Ports*

Basra is situated on the right bank of the Shatt el-Arab, 70 miles above Fao. With the possible exception of Nahr Amr (*see* below), Basra is the only port of Mesopotamia which can be used by deep-sea steamers. Its population in 1914 was about 80,000, mostly Arabs.

Basra is not only the centre of the import trade of Mesopotamia, but the port to which are consigned practically all goods destined for Kermanshah in Persia, such goods being trans-shipped to river steamers for Baghdad, whence they are forwarded into Persia by road. The imports consist chiefly of Manchester goods, sugar, wood, gunnies, indigo, iron and steel, and general merchandise; exports are cereals and rice, dates, wool, gall-nuts, hides, and horses.

The following statistics of the trade and shipping of Basra for the years 1906 and 1911-1913 are taken from the Consular Reports:—

—	1906.	1911.	1912.	1913.
		TRADE.		
	£	£	£	£
Imports	1,511,545	2,855,677	2,653,984	3,899,273
Exports	1,644,220	2,525,847[1]	3,246,560[1]	1,939,259
		SHIPPING.		
Total				
Number	668	569[2]	578	445
Tonnage	257,222	332,807	324,457	346,939
British				
Number	243	259[2]	294	300
Tonnage	218,711	265,308	253,649	266,309
German				
Number	6	15	12	20
Tonnage	9,411	41,249	30,948	55,149

Before the war there was no accommodation for steamers, and the loading and unloading of cargoes was done in the river by means of lighters and native craft. The inadequacy of the service of river steamers for the forwarding of goods up-country gave much ground for complaint, especially during the low-water season, as goods had often to remain at Basra for so long that the market at Baghdad was lost, and consignees were compelled to store goods until the following year. In 1906 as much as 3,000 tons of cargo were lying at one time at Basra awaiting trans-shipment by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. Matters were subsequently improved by the grant of permission to Lynch Brothers to run an extra steamer.

A further source of complaint has been the Turkish Customs House at Basra. Until the completion in 1913 of the new Customs House (the construction of which was begun in 1905), the old Customs House had been left untouched for 25 years, and much damage

[1] The export figures for 1911 and 1912 are inflated owing to the exceptional harvest of 1911, which affected the shipments of 1911 and 1912.

[2] Includes steam lighters to and from the bar.

was done to cargo owing to its inadequacy and bad state of repair. Since the military occupation wharves have been built, where vessels can lie alongside and discharge their cargoes at all states of the tide, whilst there is mooring accommodation in the river opposite Basra for 24 sea-going steamers.

The future of Basra depends upon the removal of the bar at the mouth of the Shatt el-Arab, so as to make the river navigable by large vessels at all states of the tide. Assuming that this is done, Basra has a great future before it. Sir George Buchanan, in a report upon the development of Basra as a port, has expressed the view that, under favourable conditions,

(i) Basra will become the principal seaport of Persia as well as of Mesopotamia.

(ii) The Persian Gulf ports will be largely served by coasting steamers from Basra rather than from Europe or India direct;

(iii) There will be a great increase of trade with the Far East and India, and India will find in Mesopotamia and Persia a ready market for manufactured goods;

(iv) There will be a large passenger traffic between Basra and ports in India;

(v) The trade of the port of Basra will have nothing to fear from railway competition *via* the Baghdad Railway.

Nahr Amr, on the right bank of the Shatt el-Arab, twenty miles by river above Basra, has recently been developed as a port of discharge for ocean-going steamers. Particulars as to the accommodation there are not available, but recent information is to the effect that the capacity of discharging cargo at Basra and Nahr Amr is equal to about 150,000 tons per month.

(b) *Shipping Lines*

The steamship lines which had regular sailings to Basra before the war were as follows:—

The British India Steam Navigation Co., Ltd.
The Ellerman and Bucknall Steamship Co., Ltd.
The Strick Line.
Marcus Samuel & Co.
Andrew Weir & Co.
The Arab Steamers, Ltd.
The Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd.
The Haji Sultan Ali Shustari Line.
The Hamburg-Amerika Line.
The Russian Steam Navigation Co.

The quarantine regulations for vessels entering Basra from India used to be very onerous and involved considerable delay, but in 1909 they were modified so as to enable all vessels not less than ten days out from India to obtain free pratique after medical inspection.

(c) *Cable and Wireless Communication*

There were wireless stations at Baghdad and Basra before the war. Cable communication with all parts of the world was available from Fao.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

The agricultural development of Mesopotamia is conditioned and limited by the capacity, character, and temperament of the inhabitants; agricultural regeneration can only be effected if labour is available, not only for the construction and upkeep of irrigation works, but for the constant and exacting toil upon the land which the extension of cultivation will involve. The population of the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra does not exceed 1,500,000, and is probably not more than 1,000,000; this gives a density of less than 10 persons per square mile, which is quite insufficient for any far-reaching scheme of agricultural development. Of this population Arabs form the vast majority, but Kurds, Turkomans, Persians, Jews, and Armenians are

largely intermingled, and amongst the Arabs, in addition to the barrier interposed by differences of religion, there are lines of cleavage between the town-dweller and the nomad or semi-nomad, which hinder combination and progress.

Before the war it was said of the Arab that he was averse from hard manual labour, and was imbued with an optimistic fatalism destructive of all material progress. On the other hand, it was found that, where he had learnt to appreciate a greater standard of comfort, his Semitic instincts acted as a spur, and he became industrious. It must, however, be remembered that conditions have not been favourable; the climate in the south is enervating, the soil is rich, and under the system of agriculture adopted by the Arabs sustained effort has so far been unnecessary. Moreover, the general feeling of insecurity to which the vagaries of the rivers contributed in no small degree, and the absence, under Turkish rule, of any redress against the depredations of envious neighbours, discouraged efforts towards material prosperity.

The Arab has, however, come remarkably well out of the tests which have been made of his industrial capacity, both immediately before the war, when there was a large demand for labour in connection with the construction of the Hindie barrage, and since the military occupation by the British armies. Sir John Jackson's firm, which constructed the barrage for the Turkish Government, found that labour was plentiful and good, except during the seed-time, harvest, and irrigation periods. The employment of Arab labour for military purposes on a large scale, and under organized conditions, has brought out the following instructive facts:—

(1) There is a considerable surplus of labour beyond that required at present for the tilling of the soil.

2) If the demand for labour is made with reasonable consideration for the habits of the people,

and for the fluctuating requirements of agriculture at different seasons, no unwillingness is shown in meeting it.

(3) Arab labour is extremely efficient and can command high wages on piece-work. Those responsible for the recent organization of this labour pay high testimony to its merits. They say that the Arab is cheerful, uncomplaining, and willing, that he does more than the average Indian coolie, and is easy to handle if properly treated, and provided that somebody is placed over him to whom he can explain his grievances in his own language, and scrupulous attention is paid to tribal distinctions.

The Arab is less conservative than the Indian coolie, is easily taught, and readily adapts himself to modern methods.

There has been from time immemorial a certain amount of immigration of the surplus Arab population into Mesopotamia, and even to-day the Shammar tribe, which is settled on the right bank of the Tigris south of Mosul, is looked upon as part of the tribe of the same name which is found in central Arabia. Immigration of this kind will no doubt continue, and will provide some additional small sources from which labour will be available.

The rates of wages for unskilled labour before the war were from 3 to 4 G.S.P.[1] (6*d.* to 8*d.*) per day. Skilled labour was paid from 5 to 10 G.S.P. (10*d.* to 1*s.* 8*d.*) per day.

(2) Agriculture

According to Herodotus, the yield of the soil of Mesopotamia in his time was as high as 200 or even 300 to 1. Even to-day, although a great part of the country is an arid waste, the chemical constituents of the soil are such that only irrigation and tillage are

[1] Grand Seigneur piastres.

necessary to bring out its potential fertility, and reproduce former conditions.

In north Mesopotamia agriculture is in a less deplorable condition than in the south and is improving, but there the soil is more stony and less fertile, the rivers do not lend themselves so easily to irrigation, and the country suffers from drought. The latter difficulty is to some extent being overcome by the introduction of centrifugal pumps driven by oil engines.

The decay of agriculture in Lower Mesopotamia has been progressive since the beginning of Turkish rule in the year 1258. Under the Turks both irrigation and river conservancy have been neglected, and tract after tract of once fertile land has fallen out of use, until to-day only about 1/25th of the country is cultivated. The richest soil is found in the alluvial plains of Irak, but only 5 per cent. of the cultivable area of Basra vilayet is now tilled. Great permanent swamps have been formed, and, even where the swamps are not permanent, the evaporation of flood-waters has left in the soil deposits of salt, which are detrimental to agriculture, whilst the lack of irrigation has turned thousands of acres of fertile land into desert. German writers have variously estimated the *sabad*, or rich alluvial soil of Mesopotamia, at from 25 to 60 million acres in extent; but these are probably over-estimates; in any case, from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to nearly 5 million acres are continually flooded.

Of the other causes which have contributed to the decay of the country the following are the most important:—

(*a*) In the days of her prosperity Mesopotamia was the centre of trade between the East and the West. The course of trade, however, was altered by the discovery of the route by the Cape of Good Hope, and subsequently by the construction of the Suez Canal, and Mesopotamia is to-day in a backwater.

(*b*) No attempt has been made until quite recently to develop adequate internal communications.

Turkey has been quite apathetic about the needs of the country in this respect, and even so late as 1912 was placing every possible difficulty in the way of an adequate steam transport service on the Tigris.

(*c*) The absence of a Government strong enough to prevent the feuds between neighbouring tribes, and incursions of Kurds from the hills, has created a sense of insecurity fatal to the development of agriculture. The vagaries of the rivers also contributed to this feeling, because districts which in one year were rendered fertile by irrigation might in the next year be either arid wastes or under water for months together.

(*d*) Owing to the uncertainty of land tenure, there has been no incentive to improve the soil. Even the sheikhs rarely held land on more than a five years' lease, and their tenants often only yearly.

(*e*) The Government system of farming out its land taxes offered every opportunity for exaction and oppression.

(*f*) The scarcity and uncertainty of labour frequently caused the postponement of wheat and barley sowing till long past the date when it was most advantageous to sow. Moreover, it prevented attention being given to the intensive cultivation of cotton, tobacco, &c.

(*g*) The lack of agricultural credit facilities discouraged the cultivator.

(*a*) *Methods of Cultivation*

In Mesopotamia there are two harvests. Wheat, barley, and miscellaneous crops, such as beans, are sown in the autumn or winter, and are harvested in April and May; rice, peas, and maize are sown during the spring floods, and are harvested between August and November.

Cultivation is primitive, and intensive methods are unknown outside the immediate vicinity of the towns. This is largely due to the uncertainty of tenure, but

also to the ease with which the Arab, thanks to the fertility of the soil, can obtain a crop sufficient to satisfy his needs. The ground is given only one very light ploughing, and is never properly broken up, and the upturned soil is not exposed to the sun and air for any length of time. Moreover, the practice of waiting for the first rain before sowing often results in the seed being put into the ground much later than it should be. Wheat and barley are often sown so late as March. This is because the population is in many places insufficient to look after both the rice crops and the spring crops. The wheat and barley tribes migrate to the rice tracts after the spring harvest, and do no ploughing for their spring crops until the work of gathering and threshing the rice crop has been finished. Thus nothing is done towards the preparation of the soil for the young crops until about the end of December.

Irrigation is the basis of cultivation, and the crops grown are conditioned by the possibilities of obtaining water. The main systems of irrigation practised in Mesopotamia to-day are the following:—

(1) Irrigation by means of *cherrads* or water lifts with pulleys and buckets. This system is mainly used for date gardens, and only to a small extent for the irrigation of arable lands. It is found in Lower Mesopotamia (i.e., south of Baghdad), and also higher up the rivers, especially along the Euphrates above Hit. The system is expensive in labour and leaves little profit to the cultivator; it is being to a small extent supplanted by the use of centrifugal pumps driven by oil engines.

(2) Irrigation by means of channels along which the fresh water is forced by the rise of the tide on the Shatt el-Arab.

(3) Irrigation by canals. The silt brought down during the annual floods has raised the rivers and their branches above the surrounding country, so that there is a gradual descent from the borders of all rivers and canals to the swamps.

The higher ground is only irrigated at the time of full flood, and is always dry during the cold weather; the intermediate slopes can usually command water for irrigation during most of the spring and summer; the low land is always wet. There is, therefore, from every channel a graduation of slopes, of which the higher are suitable for growing wheat and barley, the intermediate for such crops as millet and maize, after the floods have somewhat subsided, and the lower for rice. The rice land is again subdivided into two classes, the higher land which can command water throughout the rice season, but is not always under water, and the lower land which is always under a certain amount of water. In the higher land rice is sown broadcast, while in the lower it is transplanted.

(b) *Products of Commercial Value*

Dates.—The cultivation of the date palm is the most important branch of agriculture in Mesopotamia, for dates are the chief article of food, and usually the most valuable export. The export averages about 60,000 tons annually, and is capable of considerable expansion. It has been said that Mesopotamia grows 80 per cent. of the world's total produce in dates.

Dates require a plentiful supply of water, and therefore their cultivation is general only in the alluvial tracts bordering the rivers in Lower Mesopotamia, although the date palm is found elsewhere also. On the other hand, flooding is bad for the trees, and causes "date fever." Consequently the groves have to be protected against floods by large dykes or *sudds*. The fertilisation of the blossom is done by hand, a few male trees being planted among the female.

The chief centres of cultivation are:—

(1) The Shatt el-Arab Belt. On the right bank the date palms form a continuous grove, half a mile to two miles wide, between the river and the

desert. On the left bank the groves are younger and more broken. The immediate neighbourhood of Basra is probably the finest date-growing region in the world. The date gardens of the Shatt el-Arab are intersected by irrigation trenches, connected with creeks along which fresh water is forced by the rise of the tide, and by this means fairly satisfactory irrigation is obtained.

(2) The Baghdad Belt. On the right bank of the Tigris at and below Baghdad there are eleven miles of date groves; north of the town they become less continuous until at Beled only isolated palms are met with.

(3) On the Euphrates Kufa, Kefl, and Kerbela are centres of date-growing, and so is the country watered by the Dujeil Canal. Groves also occur in patches as far north as Rawa, opposite Ana. The date groves of the Euphrates have suffered from the drying-up of the Hilla branch of the river.

The Mesopotamian date is inferior in quality to those of Egypt and Algiers, but varieties from these countries could be introduced into Mesopotamia. The finest are said to come from Mendali, near the Persian frontier, where satisfactory irrigation is obtained by a canal taking off from the Ab-i-Gunjir. Dates are not only the staple diet of the Arab, but are used as fodder for cattle and for the manufacture of a native spirit called *araq* (see *infra*, p. 87).

The packing is done by women and desert Arabs in temporary huts built along the river banks. The fruit is packed damp, and evaporation causes the crystallization of the sugar present; no sugar is added. Wood for date-boxes is imported.

The total crop in 1913, if we estimate it as being twice the export, would be nearly 128,000 tons. The average crop is probably about 91,500 tons; much higher figures have been given, but these are probably over-estimates.

The date palm supplies timber for building and furniture, but it is difficult to fell, and too valuable to be freely cut. The foot stumps furnish fuel and fibre from which cordage is made, while the leaves are used for matting, beds, and thatch. Dry branches are also used as firewood.

Rice of coarse quality is grown in large and increasing quantities in Irak, where its importance is second only to that of the date palm. It is also grown, but to a considerably smaller extent, in Upper Mesopotamia. As has already been said, rice is grown on the lowest of the slopes which descend from the raised river channels to the swamps.

It is very difficult to form any accurate estimate of the area under rice. At a very rough estimate it may be said that, in the Basra vilayet, it amounts to about 100,000 acres, from which the total production averages about 195,000 tons. Rice is cultivated in the land bordering upon the marshes of the Tigris below Amara, and in the marshy districts of the Euphrates between Hilla and Suk esh-Sheyukh. For the rice fields of the vilayet the markets are Amara and Qual'at Salib.

The figures of production of rice in the vilayet of Mosul are very uncertain; it is all sold within the country at absurdly low prices.

It is impossible to say what the production of rice to the acre is; the natives have the vaguest ideas of measurements, and their estimates show great variations. In any case the yield is very heavy, and the rice tribes are by far the wealthiest. Rice is the rival of wheat and barley, and, though primarily grown for home consumption, is exported to an increasing extent; 67,000 tons were loaded at Basra in 1912.

Wheat and barley are the chief crops of northern Mesopotamia, that is, of the vilayet of Mosul and the Mutessariflik of Zor, but the difficulties of transport have hitherto rendered impossible any considerable export from these districts, and much of the crops is

at present wasted. In the vilayet of Mosul the desert wastes alternate with large fertile valleys, and the rainfall is in general sufficient to bring the crops to maturity without irrigation; consequently, when adequate means of transport are available the cultivation of these cereals should be profitable.

On the Upper Euphrates barley and wheat are not much grown between Feluja and Birijik, owing to the difficulties of irrigation. North of Birijik conditions are more favourable, and the lack of water is to some extent overcome by the use of pumps. Consequently, wheat is grown there in larger quantities, and there is a considerable traffic in grain down-stream from Birijik.

In Irak the wheat crop is of less importance than dates, rice, and barley, and consequently suffers from a certain amount of neglect, but wheat and barley are sown on the banks of the rivers and canals where the ground is dry enough to admit of sowing before the rain comes, and is clear of floods before harvest-time in April and May. There are grain stores at many places on the Tigris and Euphrates, but these, as a general rule, do not adequately protect the grain stored in them against the weather.

Mesopotamian wheat is red, and of a hard quality; only small quantities are exported, as it is almost all converted into flour and consumed in the country. The barley is generally of excellent quality, and if properly cleaned would command the best prices in the markets of the world. Before the war the trade in grain from Mesopotamia suffered from the insufficiency of internal transport, and the consequent deterioration of the grain before shipment, and also from the custom of deliberately mixing dirt with the grain in order to increase the weight, a practice which rendered Mesopotamian grain unpopular in the market.

Other cereals are maize, millet, and sesame, which belong mostly to Irak, and are grown almost entirely for home consumption, though there is some export of millet and sesame.

Flour milling of a primitive kind is carried on all

over Mesopotamia, wherever corn is grown. In Baghdad there are over 100 mills, and Mosul boasts more than 300. The only modern mill is that at Baghdad, recently owned by the Turkish Government.

Two kinds of *cotton* are at present grown, one from native seed and the other from Bombay seed. The latter is of much better quality, but does not easily work off the native carding instrument, and is therefore little grown. Egyptian seed has given good results, but is not popular commercially.

The best cotton is grown in the Khanikin districts; it is also grown on a small scale at Shakhlawa, near Rania, and in the irrigated plain near Feish Khabur; the total area under cultivation for cotton is probably not much more than 1,000 acres. The product is used for stuffing pillows and coarse clothing; none is exported. The possibilities of cotton-growing in Mesopotamia are discussed on p. 126.

Tobacco is grown round Kerbela and Nejef, in the Diala valley, and in the north-east of Mosul vilayet, where the chief collecting centres are Golan, Keui Sanjak, and Taktak; the two latter stand on the Lesser Zab, and send tobacco down that river and the Tigris to Baghdad. The Public Debt Administration has a monopoly of the manufacture and sale of tobacco, which business it manages through the Tobacco Monopoly, or Régie, whose officials supervise the cultivation and collect the taxes. Of the crop the State gets approximately 1/6th, the proprietor 4/6ths, and the cultivator 1/6th. The total output is probably about 1,550,000 kg. per annum. This output could be increased with expert instruction and more intensive cultivation. Baghdad, Mosul, and Suleimanie are the distributing centres.

Other important crops are *opium* and *hemp*, both successfully grown in the Belikh Delta, north of Rakka, *lubiyeh*, a kidney pea cultivated in Irak on river banks and land liable to floods, and *mash*, a sort of vetch or pea (sometimes described as a lentil), which grows in damp, sandy plains, and requires little water.

Fruits and Vegetables.—The variations of climate between Diarbekr in the north and Basra in the south are well illustrated by the wide range of fruits produced. Grapes, olives, figs, melons, pomegranates, apricots, and apples are common to all parts of the country; the rest are confined to one or more tracts. It is noteworthy that at Mosul, where the climate is milder than in the foothills of the Taurus, the orange appears for the first time; other fruits belong essentially to the South European type, e.g., pears, pistachio nuts, almonds, raisins, walnuts, quinces, and cherries. Proceeding southward other fruits appear—mulberries and citrons at Baghdad and Basra—while the orange becomes universal. Orchards line the banks of the Euphrates continuously from Ana to Hit, and the fruit trees in and about Baghdad are said to number 130,000, mainly figs, pomegranates, plums, and apricots. Below Baghdad the date palm predominates.

There is hardly less variety among the vegetables, which include onions, radishes, beetroot, cucumber, cabbage, carrots, tomatoes, artichokes, lettuces, potatoes, &c. The potato is a recent introduction.

Except in the immediate neighbourhood of large towns, fruit and vegetables were, before the war, cultivated only for the needs of tenants and owners, and were treated as an entirely negligible quantity, being neither assessed to revenue by Government nor to rent by owners, who were usually satisfied by presents in kind in lieu of rent. A tax was imposed by the Turkish Government on vegetables brought to market in the big towns, and owners in like manner demanded a share of vegetables and fruit grown within easy reach of markets; elsewhere fruit and vegetables as agricultural assets were ignored. Under the British occupation efforts have been made to stimulate vegetable production in southern Mesopotamia with very satisfactory results.

Timber.—Chesney,[1] describing his journey up the

[1] See above, p. 29.

Tigris, speaks of that river as flowing between high, well-wooded banks. To-day, the only trees remaining in Irak are date palms, tamarisks, and a few poplars, which provide a scanty supply of fuel. Northern Mesopotamia has occasional oak-groves, especially east of Suleimanie; the slopes of the Kurdish hills were formerly well-wooded, but are being stripped; and the herds of goats kept by the Kurds do much damage to young growth. Pistachio trees, poplars, planes, and sycamores are found, but the staple tree is the stunted oak, chiefly valuable for gall-nuts. Large areas of tamarisk shrub line the middle course of the Euphrates.

It is known that in ancient days trees abounded in Mesopotamia, and the reafforestation of Irak will no doubt form part of any plan for the regeneration of the country, both as a means of assisting the control of floods, and as an important adjunct to the schemes for increasing the humidity of the soil.

Animals.—Live-stock is the principal or sole source of wealth of many of the inhabitants of Mesopotamia. There are, however, no reliable statistics as to the number of animals or their distribution before the war, and the following table should be taken merely as a rough indication :—

——	Baghdad.	Basra.	Zor.	Mosul.
Cattle	155,000	120,000	10,000	500,000
Buffaloes	80,000	80,000	4,000	
Horses	85,000	88,000	1,700	260,000
Donkeys	100,000	110,000	8,500	6,000
Mules	4,000	..	..	16,000
Camels	95,000	125,000	4,000	90,000
Sheep	2,100,000	1,200,000	450,000	1,500,000
Goats	4,000	..	..	

The wholly nomad Arabs in the western desert, the Upper Mesopotamian plains, and the drier parts of

Irak keep and breed camels, horses, sheep, some goats, and donkeys. The semi-nomad Arabs own camels, horses, cattle (in proportions varying with the nature of the district they frequent), sheep, some goats, and donkeys. The settled cultivators own cattle (buffaloes in the marshes), sheep, goats, donkeys, horses, and a few camels. In the hill country of northern Mesopotamia the semi-nomadic or nomadic Kurds breed sheep, goats, cattle, horses, and mules. The settled population of the hills and the edges of the plain own chiefly cattle (including buffaloes), sheep, goats, and mules.

The camel may be said in general to be characteristic of the dry, uncultivated plains (desert or steppe). The nomad tribes who breed camels depend on them for travel in the desert, for milk (the basis of the nomad's diet), and for hair for cloth-weaving. Different types of camel are bred, suitable respectively for riding and for transport purposes.

Good breeds of Arab horses are found both in northern and southern Mesopotamia, though they are said not to be up to the standard of the best breeds of the Nejd and Syria. The Kurdish horses are small, but are said to be strong and serviceable.

Sheep are kept in immense numbers by the Arabs. In Irak the most common breed is the *arabi* or *sheffal*, yielding a fine wool. The *awassi* breed, a cross between the *arabi* and the coarse-fleeced *karadi* sheep of the hill country, is found in the plains of Upper Mesopotamia.

Goats are chiefly kept by the hill tribes. The common type is the mohair, which yields a fine silky wool of considerable commercial value.

Cattle are found in the plains, chiefly in the better-watered grazing grounds near the rivers. They are used for ploughing, irrigation, and draught work, as well as for their milk and hides. The hill cattle are generally small. Buffaloes are characteristic of the marshes, where they are kept in great numbers, and form the main wealth of the inhabitants. In parts of Mosul buffaloes are used for agricultural work.

Donkeys are very common in Irak. The ordinary

breed (black or dark brown) is much used for transport and other labour. A large white riding donkey is also bred.

There is very little mule-breeding among the Arabs, the mules found in the plains coming for the most part from the hill country of Persia and Kurdistan. In some districts mules are used for work in the fields.

The supply of fodder for cattle in Mesopotamia presents considerable difficulties, as the grass which is found in early spring soon dries up in the hot weather. The problem of feeding their flocks and herds is at the root of the nomadic habit of the Arab, who solve it by migration to the submontane districts. Amongst the settled tribes green barley, rice, straw, millet, and dates are used as food for cattle. Lucerne is grown to a small extent in the neighbourhood of Basra, and flourishes in the climate of Mesopotamia; it is deserving of a much wider cultivation, both on account of its value as a forage crop and also because, being a leguminous crop, it would prove beneficial to the soil. If Mesopotamia is to become the home of a settled population, early attention should be given to devising a means to provide fodder in the hot weather, especially for sheep.

(*c*) *Land Tenure*

In Mesopotamia, nominally, at any rate, the same system of land tenure was in force as exists throughout the Turkish Empire; that is to say, all lands and buildings were divided into one of five classes of property according to their situation and the use to which they were put. The whole system of land tenure in Turkey has been dealt with in *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, and all that is necessary here is to refer to the incidence of that system in Mesopotamia.

In the immediate vicinity of towns like Basra, and to a less degree in provincial centres like Amara, the Turkish system of land tenure was effective. Beyond these limits Mesopotamia is still a tribal country; that is to say, the tribes claim a prescriptive right to the

occupation of large areas, cultivated or uncultivated, the latter being the undisturbed haunt of nomadic tribes, or of the nomadic sections of half-settled tribes. Almost the whole of the vilayets of Basra and Baghdad are apportioned in this manner. Theoretically the Turks ignored tribal claims; in practice they were forced to acknowledge them wherever the tribes were grouped into large and powerful units, as was the case on the River Tigris. In such cases they found it impossible to lease lands to any but the tribal sheikhs. The sheikh thus occupied much more than his nominal possession as tenant holding from the State. He was the representative of a corporate right, which the State could not disregard. Where the tribes were split into many sections, as was the case more especially upon the Euphrates, the Turkish Government attempted to set aside their tribal right to certain specified lands. The result was acute discontent, which kept the Euphrates valley in a constant state of disturbance, and recently had reduced ordered government there to a mere pretence. On the Tigris, however, there has been a certain amount of assimilation of cultivators belonging to other tribes, a fact which suggests the possibility of a gradual assimilation of the Arab tribes in Mesopotamia.

A very considerable portion of Mesopotamia (it is said, as much as one-third of the cultivable area) was owned by the late Sultan Abdul Hamid; this estate was known as the Da'irat es-Saniyeh, and was managed by a committee in Baghdad. By degrees the most prosperous portions of Mesopotamia had been by some means or other acquired by the late Sultan; and in 1904 the Saniyeh enlarged its activities by acquiring the whole stock and assets of the Oman Ottoman branch of the Ministry of Marine, and beginning to trade on the Tigris. The activities of the Saniyeh were not, however, popular in Turkey; and it is stated that the fact that Abdul Hamid had become possessed of so much of Mesopotamia had much to do with his downfall. After he had been deposed, the property forming the Da'irat es-Saniyeh was transferred to the

Ministry of Finance, and was nominally administered as State property for the benefit of the Exchequer.

(3) Minerals

Little information is available with regard to the minerals of Mesopotamia. Lack of means of transport, insecurity, and other causes have combined to hinder their exploitation; and the deposits which have been worked have been dealt with by more or less primitive methods. Scientific examination of mineral fields has only been carried out in a very few districts, and the statements as to the existence of oil are largely based upon conclusions arrived at from a knowledge of the general geological structure of Mesopotamia, supported by the uncertain evidence of surface indications of oil or bitumen in different places. In these circumstances it is impossible to do more than indicate the regions in which minerals are reported to exist.

There is apparently a good deal of *borax* in the desert north-west of Baghdad.

Building-stone is rare in Irak. It is reported that below Baghdad stone is found only at Samawa, and at the Jebel Sinam, about 30 miles south-west of Basra. Limestone can be quarried at Hit, and accessories for building, such as sand, shingle, and lime, can be obtained on the edges of the desert. In Upper Mesopotamia the principal quarries are those in the hills near Mosul, where a hard limestone and a soft marble are obtained. Building-stone can be found in the Euphrates valley between Feheme and Ana, and farther north at Deir ez-Zor and Kishla Maden. Basalt is common in the hill country south of Diarbekr, and in parts of the northern Jezireh plain. Lime, plaster, and marble are found in Kurdistan along the Turko-Persian borderland.

Coal is worked at Nasale, near Kifri, and there is said to be a good deal in the hills near Halebja, south-east of Suleimanie.

North of Mosul deposits of coal exist over a fairly wide area. They are reported in the Dohuk district, at Harbol and Sheranis, north of Zakho, and farther east, in the country north of Amadia. The quantity in the neighbourhood of Harbol is said to be large, but the quality is at present poor.

Brown coal has been noticed in the neighbourhood of Mardin.

Copper is reported from the Shemdinan and Oramar districts of central Kurdistan, and also in the Dohuk district, south-west of Amadia.

Gold was worked in the past in the Bohtan valley, but the enterprise was abandoned for want of transport.

Gypsum of poor quality abounds along the Persian foothills from the Persian Gulf to the neighbourhood of Kirkuk, and is also found on the edge of the Arabian Desert, where the deposits have been worked to a small extent.

Iron ore is found in the Sergusa hills, to the north of Amadia; it used to be worked, but the mine was abandoned owing to insecurity. It is said that there are large quantities of the ore. Other deposits are reported east of Amadia and in the Dohuk district. Iron is also found in the Bohtan valley.

Lead occurs in the neighbourhood of Amadia, and in the valleys of the Bohtan and Zab. It is said that there are also valuable deposits in the hills south and south-west of Diarbekr.

Oil and Bitumen.[1]—There are extensive belts of country in Mesopotamia where the presence of oil is known or suspected, but the examination of those belts is still very incomplete. Thorough geological examination and testing have been carried out by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company near Shushtar in Arabistan, and there seems to have been careful inspection of the country round Kasr-i-Shirin, on the Persian side of the fron-

[1] The history of the oil concessions in Mesopotamia 1889-1915 is summarized above, p. 34.

tier near Khanikin. So far as such investigation goes, the results are said to be promising. Elsewhere there has been thorough examination only at a few scattered points. The petroliferous areas may be conveniently considered in three main belts:—

(*a*) *The belt between Kirkuk and the Persian Gulf.*—This belt, extending north-westwards to Kirkuk from the Gulf, is certainly petroliferous in some parts, and may be in others also. One large section (the Shushtar—Ahwaz—Ramuz district) falls outside the boundaries of Mesopotamia, and is dealt with in *Persia*, No. 75 of this series. Exploitation work has been done in the Kirkuk—Mendali—Kasr-i-Shirin area, north of Baghdad, and though production has not been attempted on any scale in this region, some experts are inclined to think that it may prove richer than the Shushtar area. It lies on the line of the caravan route, between Baghdad and Kermanshah, and is also easily accessible from Mosul.

Down to the outbreak of war, the wells on the Turkish side of the frontier had not been exploited by modern methods. The springs were apparently owned by the Turkish Government, and were leased to contractors. The oil was collected in skins from pits and was carried by donkeys to the refineries. There are stills at Kirkup, Tuza Khurmatli, and Mandali. The yield has so far been very small; the Kirkuk wells, in 1910, were producing only about 130 gallons per day, and those at Tuza Khurmatli about 150. The refined oil was used, according to quality, for illumination, lubrication, or as a specific for mange.

(*b*) *The Middle Tigris belt.*—This belt extends up the river from the Fatha gorge in the Jebel Hamrin almost to Mosul. At present oil is worked only at Kaiyara (Guyara), about 50 miles south of Mosul by river and 40 miles by road. There are oil oozings in the warm springs of Hammam Ali (15 miles south of Mosul), and at El-Hadhr, and at the Fethah gorge. It is possible that the whole line of the Hamrin hills is petroliferous. The economic prospects of this area are

quite uncertain; and in 1910 the output of a primitive refinery at Kaiyara was insignificant.

(*c*) *The Euphrates belt.*—A petroliferous area extends along the river from a few miles south of Hit to some distance above Deir ez-Zor. The economic prospects here, too, are quite uncertain. Hitherto the only important exploitation of this area has been at Hit. Before the war there were five bitumen springs in this neighbourhood. In 1909 these were stated to be capable of an output of 2,000 donkey-loads a day, but the actual production was probably considerably less. Owing to lack of transport the bitumen was used locally only, chiefly for pitching boats, bridges, &c. There is now a refinery and petroleum store at Hit.

Orpiment was at one time mined in the Julamuk region, but the enterprise was abandoned owing to lack of transport.

Ozokerit is said to be obtainable in large quantities at Gulraman in the Dohuk district.

Potash is found in the deserts.

Salt is produced by evaporation from numerous saltfields covering large areas both in Irak and in upper Mesopotamia. The inhabitants of the country districts are allowed to collect what salt they need for their own use, but the supply of salt for the town markets is in the hands of the Public Debt Administration. There is also a group of saltfields in central Kurdistan, on the lower Bohtan. Rock salt is found at Taza Khurmali, south of Kirkuk.

Tin is reported from the Shemdinan and Oramar districts of central Kurdistan.

(4) Manufactures

The manufactures of Mesopotamia are few and of a primitive kind. They fall into two main categories; first, those which are incidental to the simple existence of the pastoral or agricultural Arab; and secondly, those which are designed to meet the love of ease and ostentation which is very strongly developed in the Persian; and is to a less extent a characteristic of the town-

dwelling Arab. In the former category may be placed the milling, tanning, cloth-making, boat-building, and brick-making industries, in the latter the manufacture of silk goods, metal-working and the production of *araq*.

With the exception of a military cloth factory belonging to the Turkish Government at Baghdad, Mesopotamia has no manufacturing industries in which steam is used; indeed the only other steam machinery devoted to industry is that used in the Government flour-mill, the ice factory at Baghdad, and the wool presses at Baghdad, Basra, Kut, and Amara. The chief manufactures and handicrafts are as follows:—

Boat-building is carried on at many places on the two rivers, notably at Kale Sale, Shatra el-Muntifik, Nasrie, Suk esh-Sheyukh, and Hit; at Hit a branch of the bitumen industry is the caulking of boats.

Distilling is done on a small scale at Qarareh, on the Tigris near Baghdad. The spirit produced is called *araq*, and is obtained from dates, other ingredients being aniseed, mastic, cardamoms, and orange-peel. Some distilling is also done at Hilla, but the produce is said to be inferior.

Metal-working in gold, silver, and copper is carried on in all the principal towns of Mesopotamia, the Sabian gold and silversmiths of Suk esh-Sheyukh, Amara, and Shatra el-Muntifik being the best. At Amara a speciality is made of inlaying silver with antimony, while Kerbela is chiefly engaged in filigree work and the engraving of mother-of-pearl.

Pottery and brick-making.—Earthenware drinking vessels and water coolers are made at Baghdad and tiles at Baghdad, Kerbela, and Kasimain. Rough bricks are made all over Mesopotamia, and are either used unburnt or burnt in rough wooden kilns. Sir John Jackson found the native method of making bricks to be the best and cheapest when his firm was constructing the Hindie barrage.

Silk and other textiles.—Seventy years ago the cultivation of the silkworm was one of the most important

industries in Irak, but the industry suffered from a long period of depression, and only in recent years has a revival taken place. The most important centre of the cultivation of silkworms is Bakuba, and before the war broke out the cultivation of mulberry trees in that district was extending. The quality of the eggs and cocoons produced is very high.

The weaving of silk is carried on at Baghdad and Mosul. The silk fabrics of Baghdad are famous for their beauty of colouring and workmanship, the best known manufacture being the *ezar*, a silk cloak largely worn by native women, and the *abas*, an Arab cloak made either of silk or wool and embroidered with silk or gold. The latter are made at several places besides Baghdad, notably at Kerbela, Nejef, Amara, Suk esh-Sheyukh, and Kurna. The reeling of silk is primitive, and the silk is badly yarned. Some silk weaving is also done at Kazimain. Woollen rugs and coarse carpets are manufactured at Kut, Samawa, and Amara. Other textiles are manufactured in large quantities at Baghdad. These include men's garments, jackets, veils, shawls, belts, and handkerchiefs, all of fine cotton, wool, or silk, and in addition coarse cotton cloth for the use of the poorer classes, and canvas for tents.

Tanning is one of the most solid industries of the country. There are forty tanneries near Muadhdem (a suburb of Baghdad), and others at Kazimain and Mosul. The chief raw materials used are sheep and goat skins, buffalo, ox and cow hides, and fox, otter, and stone-marten skins. The industry is in a primitive state, the skins are badly handled, and the leather is only roughly tanned. It is used locally in the manufacture of boots and shoes, and is also exported to Europe. The industry suffers from the want of good tannin.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

(*a*) *Towns*

Amara, on the left bank of the Tigris, 92½ miles above Kurna, is only of importance as a centre for the collection and shipment of cattle and native produce, consisting chiefly of wheat, rice, barley, sesame, wool, ghi, skins and hides. The population was estimated in 1915 at about 28,000 (mostly Arabs). No statistics of the trade of the town are available. Along the whole river frontage runs an embankment faced with brick, alongside which steamers can lie in a depth of from 13½ feet of water at high and 6½ feet at low water seasons. There are no facilities for dealing with cargo. The manufactures of the town consist of Arab cloaks, rugs, and silverware. The town possesses a telegraph office, and is at present the terminus of the metre-gauge railway from Basra.

Baghdad lies on the Tigris, 448 miles by river above Kurna. The population, which is very mixed, is estimated at 200,000; the Jews form the largest racial group (about 55,000), and the Arabs come next (about 39,000). Before the war the town was connected by telegraph with Basra, Mosul, Kermanshah and Teheran, and with Aleppo, *via* Feluja and Deir ez-Zor. The town lies on both sides of the river and a bridge of boats 240 yards long connects the two parts of the town. This bridge consists of 24 pontoons moored to both banks and to buoys in the river; a section of three boats can be swung down-stream to let vessels through. The whole bridge is removed during very high floods. The regular mooring-place for steamers is on the left bank of the river below the bridge, but a wharf about 200 yards long has recently been constructed on the right bank near the railway station, with which it is connected by a single line of track. This wharf

is equipped with two travelling cranes. The depth of the river at low water is from 12 to 15 feet.

The streets of the town are narrow and ill-kept; in the better parts there are houses of considerable size, but in the poorer parts the houses are low and are built of unburnt brick. The water supply is taken from the Tigris, and is unfiltered, and there is no modern drainage. Electric light has only been installed since the military occupation of the town by the British army. A horse tramway runs to the north-western suburb of Kazimain.

Baghdad is the chief religious centre in Mesopotamia of the Sunni sect of Mohammedans, and is visited by Sunni Mussulmans from regions as remote as Afghanistan and India. It is also visited by pilgrims from Persia on their way to the shrines at Kerbela and Nejef. It could therefore be used as a starting-point for the commercial penetration of Persia and India.

Industrially and commercially, Baghdad is the chief town of Irak and the centre of the trade of Lower Mesopotamia. There are 116 flour-mills worked by horses, besides the steam-driven army mill, formerly owned by the Turkish Government, a cloth factory, an ice factory, wool presses, and tanneries, and the manufacture of silk, cotton, and woollen goods, and canvas, and of earthenware and copper goods is carried on. Baghdad is the centre of the export trade from central Mesopotamia, and receives large quantities of goods sent down-stream from Mosul, or by caravan from Kermanshah in Persia. It is also a distributing centre for the whole of Irak and for Persia *via* Khanikin. The value of the Persian transit trade may be gathered from the table on the next page, compiled from the Consular Reports :—

Year.	Exports to Persia.	Imports from Persia.
	£	£
1904	836,949	224,469
1905	745,674	165,032
1906	1,014,336	294,857
1907	1,240,445	230,679
1909	1,259,138	321,662
1910	1,433,201	280,188
1911	1,236,691	206,699
1912	962,833	302,087

The important trade of the town is in the hands of Jews, Arab merchants being chiefly concerned with retail business. In 1914 there were only 8 European business houses of importance in the town; of these 6 were English, 1 German, and 1 Austrian. Statistics are given below (Appendix, Tables I and II) showing the total export and import trade of Baghdad, with the destination or origin of the goods, and the percentage of trade done by the countries principally concerned.

Basra has been described above, in the section on ports (p. 64).

Kirkuk lies on the main route from Baghdad to Mosul, 187 miles north of Baghdad. The population is probably 20,000, and is very mixed, Kurds forming the largest portion. The town is a centre of the cultivation of corn and fruit, and there are numerous flour-mills. It is also the centre of a sheep-rearing district. The chief exports are corn, fruit, gall-nuts, oil, and wood. The chief imports are cotton goods, Kirkuk being the distributing centre for Kurdistan.

Kut el-Amara, on the left bank of the Tigris, 284 miles above Kurna, has a population of about 6,000 Arabs. Before the war, the town was the centre of a considerable grain traffic, corn from the Euphrates country being brought up by way of the Shatt el-Hai for distribution in the neighbourhood, as the local crop was not usually sufficient. Large grain stores were owned by the Da'irat es-Saniyeh. Woollen rugs and

coarse carpets are manufactured. The town is at present the eastern terminus of the metre-gauge railway, which has been built by the British army of occupation down-stream from Baghdad. It possesses a telegraph office. The depth of the river at low water is about 5 ft.; there are no facilities for handling cargo.

Mosul lies on the right bank of the Tigris, some 230 miles north-west of Baghdad. The population is variously estimated at from 70,000 to 90,000, nearly all Mohammedans. The town possesses a post-office and telegraph. The river, which is about 675 yards broad, is crossed by a bridge of boats. The streets are narrow, undrained lanes, mostly unpaved. The houses are built of sun-dried bricks or of local stone set in gypsum cement. The town is reported to be unsanitary.

There are about 200 flour-mills in Mosul, and the town is the centre of trade in corn, fruits, sheep and goats. A considerable amount of weaving is done on hand-looms, other industries being shoemaking, tanning, and metal-working. Mosul is a centre of trade (1) from Beirut on the Mediterranean by rail to Aleppo and thence by mule, camel, or caravan; (2) from the Persian Gulf by river steamer to Baghdad and thence by land; (3) from Samsun on the Black Sea by mule or waggon transport to Diarbekr and thence by raft down the Tigris; (4) from and to Persia *via* Erbil and Rowanduz. The following statistics are taken from the Consular Reports:—

IMPORTS

——	1906.	1907.	1909.	1910.	1911.
From the—	£	£	£	£	£
United Kingdom	58,079	56,230	42,140	37,850	43,015
India	17,914	16,350	32,900	35,800	38,850
Other countries..	34,387	35,830	45,720	43,890	53,825
Other parts of Turkey	26,525	24,890	26,550	24,400	29,250
Total ..	136,905	133,300	147,310	141,940	164,940

EXPORTS

——	1906.	1907.	1909.	1910.	1911.
To the—	£	£	£	£	£
United Kingdom	184,916	195,400	164,300	176,500	163,500
India	40,000	42,000	35,000	30,000	25,000
Other countries..	51,103	52,690	50,040	49,980	43,480
Other parts of Turkey	211,478	218,220	322,500	352,950	111,350
Total ..	487,497	508,310	571,840	609,430	343,330

The chief imports are cotton goods, iron and copper, carpets and gunnies.

At present the trade of Mosul suffers from the drawbacks of its geographical situation, to which are added the insecurity of the districts through which caravans must pass, especially on the routes between Baghdad and Aleppo. In consequence there is hardly any direct dealing with Europe. The building of the Baghdad Railway will no doubt stimulate the trade of Mosul and remove the chief obstacle to its commercial development.

Suleimanie is situated 60 miles east by north of Kirkuk, on the Turkish side of the Turko-Persian frontier. No accurate estimate of the population is available. The town consists of about 2,500 houses. It was formerly a large centre of trade with Persia, but in recent years the trade has diminished, partly owing to an imposition of 15 per cent. Customs duty. An important local industry is the manufacture of firearms, especially rifles; about 9,000 are manufactured per annum. Shoemaking and saddlery are also important occupations.

The following list gives the remaining towns of any importance:—

——	Situation.	Estimated Population.	Communications.	Industries, &c.
Ana ...	On the Euphrates, 119 miles above Hit, 192 miles below Deir	About 15,000 Sunni Arabs	1. Caravan routes (*a*) Baghdad-Aleppo route (*b*) Track to Mosul across the desert 2. River Euphrates 3. Telegraph	Cultivation of cereals, fruit, dates. Export of wool, butter, dates.
Birijik ...	On the Euphrates, about 15 miles above the railway bridge at Jerablus	About 10,000 mixed Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, and Jews	1. River Euphrates 2. Land routes to Aleppo, Diarbekr, &c. 3. Telegraph	Cultivation of wheat and barley. Trade in olive oil, grapes, butter and sheep. Boat-building.
Erbil ...	48 miles east by south of Mosul	About 25,000, mostly Kurds	1. Caravan routes (*a*) Mosul-Baghdad (*b*) Mosul-Rowanduz 2. Projected terminus of branch line of Baghdad Railway from Mosul	Cultivation of quantities of wheat and barley, rice and fruit; export to Baghdad *via* the Tigris.
Hilla ...	On the Hilla branch of the Euphrates, 11 miles below the bifurcation at Hindie	About 30,000, mostly Shiah Arabs	1. Land routes to Baghdad and up and down the river 2. River Euphrates 3. Telegraph and Post-office	Wheat, barley, rice, and animals of all kinds. Large bazaar, 120 grain stores. Manufacture of saddles.
Kerbela	On the Huseiniyeh Canal, 20 miles west of the Hindie branch of the Euphrates, on the edge of the Syrian desert	About 50,000 (¾ Persian, the rest Shiah Arabs)	1. Routes to Hilla, Baghdad and Nejef 2. Post-office and Telegraph	A centre of pilgrimage for Shiah Moslems. Imports, piece-goods, carpets, candles, spices, coffee, and tea. Exports, dates, hides, wool and consecrated articles.
Mardin	About 50 miles south-south-east of Diarbekr	About 30,000 Kurds, Arabs, Armenians, and Jacobites	Routes to Diarbekr, Nisibin, &c.	Agriculture; wheat, barley, sesame, rice, vegetables, some cotton and wool weaving.

—	Situation.	Estimated Population.	Communications.	Industries, &c.
Nejef ...	About 7 miles south by west of Kufeh on Lower Euphrates	Over 30,000 (⅔ Arabs, remainder Persians); all Shiah Mohammedans	Routes to Kerbela and Hilla for Baghdad, and to Basra Horse tramway to Kufeh Post-office and Telegraph	The tomb of Ali is the richest and most splendid of the Shiah holy places, and the town is a pilgrimage centre for Shiahs of all Moslem countries. Imports, Manchester goods, sugar, spices, hardware. Exports, skins and wool. Manufactures, Abas cloaks.
Samawa	On the Euphrates, 71 miles by river above Nasrie	About 10,000 Arabs	1. River Euphrates 2. Land routes to Hilla, Nejef and Basra 3. Telegraph and Post-office	A centre of the trade in wheat, barley, rice, and vegetables. Skins are also exported. Imports, Manchester goods, sugar, indigo, and coffee. Manufacture of woollen carpets.
Sukesh-Sheyukh	On the Euphrates, 63 miles by river above Kurna	About 12,000, mostly Arabs	1. River Euphrates 2. Land routes to Basra 3. Telegraph and Post-office	Manufacture of Abas cloaks, boat-building, metal-work.
Urfa	On the northern edge of the Harran plain, north by east of Birijik	About 40,000 Kurds, Turks, and Armenians	1. Many routes to Syrian towns, and to Mosul and Diarbekr 2. Telegraph	An important point of transit trade east and west. Wheat cultivated largely. No industries.

(*b*) *British Interests*

The interests of Great Britain and India in the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia originated with the East India Company, which from the middle of the 17th century onwards possessed established commercial interests there. In the latter part of the 18th century the Pasha of Baghdad was on more than one occasion glad to have the help of the vessels of the East India Company to protect him against the Arabs and others.

The rights of British vessels to navigate the Tigris and Euphrates had, however, never been clearly defined, and had been the subject of controversy between London and Constantinople. In recent times there have been persistent efforts on the part of the Turkish Government to whittle down such rights as were possessed by treaty, agreement, or custom by Great Britain and her subjects.[1] These attempts were due partly to a general desire to limit the interests of Great Britain in the trade of Mesopotamia, but partly also to the increase in importance of the trade done on the rivers by the Turkish Hamadie Company, which was owned by the Turkish Civil List. From a British point of view, the question became suddenly extremely urgent when the Baghdad Railway Convention gave the concessionnaires the right to construct harbours at Baghdad and Basra and on the Persian Gulf as an integral part of the railway scheme. It was clear that the control of these harbours, when built, would mean the control of the rivers, and probably the ultimate exclusion of Great Britain from the trade of Mesopotamia.

Ultimately, in 1913, negotiations were entered into in London between representatives of the British and Turkish Governments, the outcome of which was the grant by the Turkish Government of a concession to Lord Inchcape (the Chairman of the British India

[1] The history of the navigation controversy down to 1913 is dealt with in detail above, p. 28.

Steam Navigation Company, and therefore the representative of the strongest interest in British trade in Mesopotamia). Its principal terms were as follows:—

1. Lord Inchcape was granted

(*a*) The exclusive right of navigation by steamers and the like (with or without barges in tow) on the Tigris from Kurna to Mosul, on the Euphrates from Kurna to Meskene, on the Shatt el-Arab, and on their navigable tributaries and canals, for a period of 60 years in the first instance, and thereafter for successive periods of 10 years unless and until determined by the Turkish Government by 5 years' notice.

(*b*) The right to carry out dredging and conservancy works over the waters included in the concession (provided that such works should not interfere with irrigation), and to make the regulations necessary for the proper control of navigation. The Turkish Government on its part undertook not to permit the use of the rivers for irrigation to the prejudice of navigation.

2. The concession was without prejudice to the rights of Lynch Brothers,[1] which were to remain unimpaired.

3. Lord Inchcape undertook to form a company under Ottoman law to exercise the rights granted by the concession, the Turkish Government and Lord Inchcape having each the right to nominate half of the directors of the Company, and the shares of the Company to be held approximately equally by the representatives of English and Turkish interests.[2]

4. The Company was to take over the vessels of the Turkish Government (the Hamadie Company) engaged in the trade of the Tigris and Euphrates,

[1] For the history of this firm, see above, p. 30.

[2] In the Anglo-German Convention initialled in London, June 15, 1914, His Majesty's Government undertook not to oppose the acquisition by the Baghdad Railway Company of 40 per cent. of the share capital to be allotted to Turkish interests, i.e., 20 per cent. of the whole capital of the Company.

together with that Company's lands, buildings, plant, &c.

The rights of Lynch Brothers which the concession confirmed and acknowledged were the following :—

(*a*) The right to run two steamboats, each towing not more than two barges, under the British flag on the Tigris, Euphrates, and Shatt el-Arab, with a further boat flying the British flag in reserve to replace either of the above vessels if out of service.

(*b*) The right to run one steamboat, also with barges in tow, on the rivers under the Ottoman flag.

(*c*) *Methods of Economic Penetration*

The struggle between German and British trade in Mesopotamia is particularly instructive and interesting, for it was of the nature of a duel between the commercial methods of the two countries, since England for more than a hundred years had had a practical monopoly of the sea-borne trade of Mesopotamia.

Germany's interest in the commercial development of Turkey dates back so far as 1888, when M. Kaulla, acting on behalf of the Württembergische Vereinsbank and the Deutsche Bank, obtained the concession over the railway from Haidar-Pasha to Ismidt with the right to extend it to Angora (300 miles). This was the beginning of a process which culminated in 1903 in the grant to German interests of the Baghdad Railway Concession. So far as Mesopotamia was concerned, however, it was not till 1906 that German activities made themselves seriously felt. At that time European trade with Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf was carried almost entirely in British bottoms. The Consular returns show that, excluding Turkish sailing vessels, out of the 233 vessels from European waters which entered Basra in 1904 and 308 in 1905, vessels flying the British flag numbered 210 and 283 respectively, the majority of the remainder being French.

In April 1906 the Hamburg-Amerika Steamship Company announced its intention of running a service

between Europe and the Persian Gulf. At that date German trade with Basra was worth annually about £145,000, as against British and Indian trade of a value of about £3,000,000. The first steamer arrived in the Gulf in August, 1906, and at the same time an agent was installed at Bushire. The first noticeable effect was the shipment of Belgian sugar from Antwerp by the Hamburg-Amerika line at a freight rate of 20*s.* per ton. In consequence the British lines, which had previously charged 37*s.* per ton of 15 cwt., had to reduce their rate.

Partly owing to the regularity of their sailings, the German line began to attract trade from the British almost at once; and it was stated in 1907 that though the outward trade was run at a loss the Germans were making progress with cargo for Europe. German commercial travellers soon began to appear at Baghdad, and were without doubt welcomed, as it was felt that the British lines had abused the monopoly which they held, and moreover German goods were proving popular in a market where cheapness is of more importance than quality.

The most important branch of British trade in Mesopotamia has for many years been the trade in Manchester goods. In 1907 the Germans attacked this trade, first by making Manchester a port of call, and secondly by introducing a German traveller for an Anglo-German firm with instructions to push his German goods first, only offering his British goods as a last resort. Every effort was made by the German agent to the Hamburg-Amerika Company to conceal the amount of trade which was being done.

The result of the first year's working was that Germany had certainly made a loss, but that three of the British lines engaged in the trade had reduced their rates from 30*s.* to 20*s.* per 40 cubic feet of space.[1]

[1]As an illustration of the effect of German competition, it is remarkable that in 1907 the freight for general cargo carried in a British ship from Manchester and from Antwerp, both in the same bottom, was respectively £1 15*s.* 2*d.* per ton from the British port and £1 per ton from the Belgian port.

Nevertheless the German line was still disposed to cut rates, and was more liberal in the matter of weights. Within the country their methods of advertising were admitted to be superior to the British, and they were beginning to make headway with German imitations of Manchester goods.

By the end of the year 1907-8 it was seen that the homeward cargo carried in German bottoms had doubled, and that they had captured practically the whole of the continental trade to Mesopotamia.

The result of three years' trading showed that the Hamburg-Amerika line was prepared to face a loss over an extended period, provided that they could claim a vested interest in the trade of the Gulf, and it was upon that basis that they began to take an interest in the buoying of the Shatt el-Arab and the navigation of the Euphrates.

By the autumn of 1913, in spite of the fact that the respective tonnages of British (or Indian) and German vessels entering and clearing at Basra showed a preponderance in favour of British lines of not less than 5 to 1, it was clear that the German line was getting stronger. In spite of organized effort to combat the increase of the German trade in Belgian sugar, more than 50 per cent. of the imports of sugar arrived in German bottoms. The German line had secured a portion of the import of Manchester goods and was constantly shipping produce from the Gulf to London and Red Sea ports. Baghdad Jews were beginning to do business in Hamburg and elsewhere in Germany; and it was stated that the German line had bought up some of the vessels of the Strick line, one of the most important in the trade of the Gulf.

By the end of 1913 the position had become so serious to British shipping interests that the shipping lines concerned came to an agreement with the Hamburg-Amerika line in defence of their own interests. The terms included (*a*) an agreement on freight rates from Europe to the Gulf, and (*b*) an agreement that German lines should not load at English ports. Information

goes to show that these terms were practically dictated to the British lines as to beaten enemies. This was admitted by Lord Inchcape in a letter to the India Office dated December 29, 1913, in which he wrote: "If the British lines had not come to terms with the Hamburg-Amerika line, it would have been impossible for them to maintain a position in the trade."

It may well be asked by what methods a single German line had been able in barely seven years to bring about this result. The usual reply of "German subsidies" is insufficient, for the French Government has for many years heavily subsidised the Messageries Maritimes line to Australia, and yet British lines have made perfectly successful headway against it. The German line began operations with everything against it. It had no large contracts to support it. The British lines, on the other hand, had the assistance of large Manchester freight contracts, a large Marseilles sugar-carrying trade, the carrying trade with India, the mail contract, and a highly profitable pilgrim traffic.

Sir George Lloyd's report attributes the German success to State organization of production and transit, and in particular to the so-called "through rate system." The methods pursued are as follows:—

During the early years of the invasion of any area a direct subsidy is given by the German Government to the German line sufficient to enable it to cut rates and underquote its competitors throughout the area. It can thus draw away traffic from competing lines, and also flood the invaded markets with cheap German goods. The line works in connection with a trading house established in the invaded area. This house arranges for the distribution and sale of cargoes which come unconsigned, and collects export by means of a low rate of return freight. The object of all this is to persuade the competing lines to enter into a rate agreement. As soon as this has been secured, the German direct subsidy is replaced by an indirect subsidy system, known as the "through-rate system," which is

designed to enable shipping companies ostensibly to observe their rate agreement, but in practice to under-quote their rivals whenever they choose. As the outcome of a scientific organization of land and sea transit, through-rates can be quoted for the whole journey: and, if necessary, a reduction is made on the freight charges over that part of the journey which is not affected by the agreement (e.g., on the railway charges for conveying the goods to the port of loading). If there is any loss on the working out of the transaction as a whole it is apportioned, as between the State Railways and the Shipping Company, to that part of the transit which can carry it without injury. Thus, while competing lines have to work to a fixed rate, the German rate is flexible, and can be adjusted to suit the requirements of the situation from time to time.

Similarly, the "through-rate system" can be used by the Germans to circumvent the agreement not to load at English ports. The London merchant is offered through terms from London to Basra by the agent of a line allied to the Hamburg-Amerika line, and ships of that line collect cargo in the port of London, and transport it to Hamburg or Antwerp for trans-shipment. The London merchant will benefit by a lower rate of freight, but he is providing the Germans with the means of ultimately substituting German-made goods for his own commodities.

It will thus be seen that the "through-rate system," worked in conjunction with rate agreements, is the chief weapon of the German competitive policy, and it follows that every effort should be concentrated on refusing to make rate agreements with German lines, even if as an alternative a subsidy of the British lines engaged in the trade over a period of years should become a necessity.

In a report made to the Advisory Committee on Commercial Intelligence of the Board of Trade, after a visit to Mesopotamia in 1907, Sir George Lloyd pointed out various other methods by which the Ger-

mans had secured trade. These may be summarized as follows:—

(1) The Germans realised the fact that the main demand in the East was for cheap goods of low quality.

(2) They closely studied native habits and language, and made personal acquaintance with their customers, so that they could safely offer longer credits than their rivals.

(3) They were willing to deal in any and every article, to take small orders, and to have new patterns made to please customers.

(4) They obtained more elaborate show-cases and ranges of samples than the English.

(5) They quoted in local currency, written in Arabic, and made full use of the natural aptitude of the Armenian and Jew for commercial transactions.

(6) They were able, whatever the reason, to offer lower rates of freight by German ships than British merchants could offer by British lines.

Sir George Lloyd also suggested the following reasons for the failure of British firms to cope with foreign competition:—

(1) The British traders, satisfied with the profits which they were making in the cotton trade, and in the export of native products, would not take up small lines of new business, or experiment in the introduction of cheap goods at a small margin of profit.

(2) British merchandise was imitated shamelessly and openly.

(3) The British shipper and importer, whose dealings were mainly with Baghdad, appeared not to recognise fully that the volume of trade in Baghdad was largely at the mercy of the prevailing influences in Basra. Latterly, however, there had been a tendency on the part of the consignors to despatch wares to Basra for sale there in the event of a favourable market, or for despatch to Baghdad, if expedient.

(4) British firms overlooked the fact that cheaper Continental manufactures would not be easy to dislodge

if they acquired a footing in Mesopotamia, and might in time compete with British wares in Persia also.

(5) Dealers in the Baghdad market complained that English manufacturers would not send samples of cotton clothing to meet the demand for gaudy designs and colouring.

Sir George Lloyd recommended that British merchants should strengthen their position by more general trading, setting aside for a few years a portion of their profits for the purpose of the trade in hardware, fancy goods, and quincaillerie. They should insist upon cheap, low-class goods being manufactured for them, and, wherever possible, should co-operate in keeping the supply of country produce for export in British hands. Baghdad might be made an almost exclusively British market if the trading were all-round trading instead of being based, as formerly, on Manchester goods alone. Travellers should be sent out to report on local requirements, and catalogues printed in Arabic should be circulated. The experience gained by selling small quantities of cheap goods in this market would be very valuable as enabling firms to obtain extensive knowledge of the methods, currency, demands, &c., of the market, and to get in touch with the small traders. Fraudulent imitation might be prevented by some system of standard trade-mark. Advertisements should be printed in Arabic, in bright colours, with sketches of Eastern subjects in illustration of articles on sale. Every business communication should be in a language suitable to the country dealt with. Attention should be paid to the Constantinople market. The native buyer from provincial towns visits Constantinople annually to buy his year's stock, and is apt to deal with large wholesale establishments maintained by Germans, because he does not know his way about while in the capital, and finds it easier to buy all his supplies under one roof. Facilities should be given to buyers to see samples before they place their orders. Finally, British transport communications with the Persian Gulf should be maintained in an effective and satisfactory condition.

High rates for ocean and river freight have handicapped British trade in the past.

(2) Foreign

The external trade of Mesopotamia through the port of Basra for the period 1904-1913, as shown by the figures given in the Consular Reports, was as follows:—

Year.	Exports.	Imports.	Excess Exports.	Excess Imports.
	£	£	£	£
1904	1,305,781	1,260,709	45,072	—
1905	1,504,795	1,387,589	117,206	—
1906	1,644,220	1,511,545	132,675	—
1907	1,970,315	1,879,565	90,750	—
1908	1,783,972	2,411,568	—	627,596
1909	1,504,004	2,360,102	—	856,098
1910	1,668,624	2,634,596	—	965,972
1911	2,525,847	2,855,677	—	329,830
1912	3,246,560	2,637,809	608,751	—
1913	1,939,259	3,899,273	—	1,960,014

These figures, however, do not represent the volume of the foreign trade of Mesopotamia, for they do not take into account (*a*) the import and export trade of northern Mesopotamia with Europe, which normally enters or leaves Mesopotamia by Aleppo, Diarbekr, or Samsun, and the trade with Egypt and Arabia in live-stock across the Syrian Desert: no returns of this trade which would be of any value as a guide are obtainable; (*b*) the considerable trade between Mesopotamia and Persia *via* Khanikin and Kermanshah, some particulars of which are given on p. 90, under the trade of Baghdad. It is not claimed that the figures are either accurate or reliable; for instance, the method of arriving at the value of the import of cotton goods was altered in 1908, and from that date onwards these goods are priced 30 per cent. higher. As cotton goods normally form over 40 per cent. of the imports, the

alteration has an important bearing on the returns, but owing to the inefficiency of the Turkish Customs House system at Basra, it was impossible to obtain accurate returns there of the volume of trade, and the figures given were to a large extent obtained from private sources. Furthermore, any examination of the conditions of foreign trade in Mesopotamia and the important Persian transit trade is rendered difficult by the absolute lack of official information. Turkish customs statistics are too inaccurate to be of much value, and the information given in the British Consular Reports for Basra is meagre. Comparative statistics as between Great Britain and her competitors are not given there at all, and the effect of German competition upon British trade is not discussed, though this has been the great subject of interest and discussion among politicians and the local trading community from 1907 onwards. The figures given are, however, useful as showing (1) the marked development of Mesopotamian trade during the period immediately preceding the war, and (2) the impetus given to trade by the revolution of 1908, and by the entry on a large scale of Germany into the trade of the country in 1906.

In the period 1904-13, the years 1905, 1906, 1907, and 1910, were normal; 1904, 1909, and 1913, were abnormally bad, the first two owing to bad harvests or low water in the rivers, and 1913 owing to the dislocation caused by the Balkan wars; the harvest of 1911 was so exceptionally good as to affect that and the following year, and traders further benefited in 1911 by exceptionally high prices. The very large increase of imports in 1913 was due to the construction of the Baghdad Railway, which caused the imports of iron and steel goods to rise from an average of £34,000 for the period 1909-12 to £1,207,882 for 1913.

A large proportion both of the export and import trade through Basra is consigned from or destined for Baghdad, as is shown by the following figures taken from the Consular returns :—

Baghdad.	Imports	Exports.
	£	£
1906	1,856,849	847,392
1907	2,312,380	710,288
1908	1,912,360	555,802
1909	2,152,732	765,388
1910	2,736,414	853,963
1911	2,661,401	746,824
1912	2,822,817	930,760
1913	2,914,536	755,501

The Consular Reports give very few weights of imports to and exports from Baghdad, so that no accurate assessment is possible of the relation which the Baghdad trade bears to the whole trade through Basra; and it must be remembered that values of imports and exports (as compared with Basra) are affected by the high rate of river freight.

A very important quantity of the trade at Baghdad annually consists of imports to and exports from Persia *via* Khanikin. The chief imports to Persia from Turkey, as given in the trade returns for Kermanshah (almost all of which pass through Baghdad), consist of sugar, tea, cotton goods, indigo, and tobacco, of which over 75 per cent. normally come from Great Britain or India. The chief exports from Persia to Turkey are carpets, gums, silk, opium, and skins. Imports to Persia normally average about £1,000,000, and exports from Persia about £250,000.

The following table, taken from the Consular Reports, gives approximate returns of the share in the trade of Mesopotamia enjoyed by Germany, Russia, and the United States from 1906 to 1913. These are the only particulars available:—

Year.	EXPORTS[1] from Basra.			IMPORTS[1] to Basra.	
	Germany.	Russia.	United States.	Germany.	Russia.
	£	£	£	£	£
1906	100,900	—	—	108,650	—
1907	153,082	57,320	—	168,000	42,848
1908	156,019	31,706	91,165	235,530	65,676
1909	83,239	67,606	{130,499 / 116,619}	{228,700 / 228,863}	50,838
1910	{187,242 / 170,222}	78,920	{138,250 / 161,593}	315,563	51,584
1911	294,142	113,368	134,388	397,961	60,199
1912	375,760	123,842	128,940	528,415	76,658
1913	226,112	158,505	171,800	1,957,489	98,129

It will be seen that both in the export and import trade Germany made great strides during the period. The export trade consisted very largely of grain, seeds, and dates. Imports were sugar, iron and steel, cheap glassware, soap, provisions, matches, and German imitations of Manchester goods. In 1912 and 1913 the imports included material for the Baghdad Railway. The value for 1913 was probably not less than £900,000.

Russian trade also increased, but to a less extent, the exports being chiefly dates, skins, carpets, silkware, and ghi, and the imports oil, glass, wood, provisions, and furniture. The imports from the United States consist almost entirely of oil, for which no figures are available. The exports were dates, millet, liquorice, seeds, and carpets.

Other countries which have made progress in trade with Mesopotamia are Belgium, Austria, Italy, and Japan. Belgian imports came almost entirely in German bottoms, and trade was nearly all confined to sugar, and iron and steel. Austria made steady progress in wool, linen and silk goods, hosiery, hardware,

[1] Alternative figures are given in brackets.

&c. Japan was sending silk and cotton goods, tea and cheap fancy goods. Since war broke out she has largely increased her trade in the country in every direction, and will prove an important competitor in the future. The trade of France in Mesopotamia has decreased considerably, her large import of sugar having been replaced by Belgian sugar.

The bulk of the trade of Mesopotamia is still in the hands of Great Britain and India, but British trade has tended more and more to confine itself to special lines, and Germany has taken full advantage of the failure of traders to study and supply the expanding demands of a country advancing towards civilisation.

The staple trade from Great Britain was in Manchester goods, but this was being persistently and successfully attacked by Germany; only in machinery was Great Britain making really good progress against all competitors. India takes large quantities of Mesopotamian exports of dates, ghi, opium, horses, hides, &c., and supplies large quantities of cotton goods, indigo, silk, and (when the local crop fails) rice. Indian trade has suffered very much from bad packing and thefts, and from damage in transit between India and Mesopotamia.

(a) *Exports*

A list of the chief exports from Mesopotamia will be found in Table III of the Appendix (p. 130). They consist very largely of agricultural or animal products. Other important exports are carpets, gall-nuts, gums, and liquorice. Of agricultural products the most important exports are dates, cereals, seeds, and opium.

Dates.—For the period 1907-1913 the weight of the annual export of dates has been about 60,000 tons, averaging a value of over £450,000. The bulk of the export goes normally to the United Kingdom, other important markets being the United States, Russia, Egypt, Tunis, Oran, and Australia.

Cereals.—Of these the barley trade is the most important, and has in recent years exceeded the combined

trade in wheat, rice, paddy (unhusked rice), and seeds. Before the inauguration of the Hamburg-Amerika line at Basra the United Kingdom took almost the whole of the export of cereals, but in recent years a very large part has been diverted to Hamburg. Jedda is also a considerable buyer of Mesopotamian cereals. The Consular Reports give the following figures for the export of grain for the years 1911-13:—

—	1911.	1912.	1913.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
To London	90,000	92,700	20,350
Hamburg	78,000	58,000	4,800
Antwerp	2,000	9,300	—
Jedda	18,000	40,000	20,100

The trade in cereals has in the past suffered from transport difficulties, which caused great delays in getting the crops to Basra, from the lack of proper granaries for the storage of corn pending shipment, which involved heavy losses owing to the deterioration of the grain, and from the dirty condition in which grain was shipped. (*See* p. 76.)

Seeds.—There is a considerable export of many kinds of seeds, including coriander, cummin, fennel, hoortman (a kind of oat), linseed, poppy, quince, mahleb, and alfalfa. The statistics of exports of seeds from Basra represent an average annual value of £119,000 for the period 1906-1912, but the figure includes maize and millet, and the latter no doubt forms a large proportion of the total.

Opium.—The export of opium is important, and averaged £117,000 annually for the ten years ending in 1913. The opium is almost entirely in transit from Persia, and is shipped to Hong-Kong. Practically the whole trade is in British hands.

The chief animal products are live-stock, ghi, hides and skins, wool, and mohair.

Horses are all exported to India. The trade has fluctuated in the past, owing to various restrictions placed upon it from time to time, but has been steadier in recent years. The horses exported are almost entirely Arab, though there are also a few Persian and Kurdish ponies. The average of the trade is about 1,750 animals of an annual value of £50,000.

Other animals are exported *via* Syria or Erzerum, and do not appear in the Basra returns; no recent figures for this trade are available.

Ghi, a kind of clarified butter, is exported *via* Basra to Bombay, the Red Sea, and the Levant. It has practically no sale amongst Europeans. The trade is on the increase. There is also a considerable overland trade with Syria, of which no particulars are available.

Hides and Skins.—This is an important branch of trade, and the returns of exports *via* Basra do not include the whole of the trade, a good deal of which goes overland to Constantinople and Russia. Sheep and lamb, goat, fox, and stone-marten skins, and ox and cow hides, are the articles of this class most commonly dealt with at Basra. The trade in untanned skins has decreased in recent years. The skins are exported to England, France, Germany, Austria, the United States, and the Levant ports, as well as to Russia and other parts of Turkey.

Wool.—The average annual export of wool from Basra amounted for the period 1904-13 to £238,000. The wool is of three kinds. The Arab wool, clipped from the Arab sheep reared in the plains, has a crinkly staple of fine fibre and a bright appearance. Karadi wool, clipped from the Kurdish hill sheep, has a long, coarse, and hairy staple, and is chiefly used for carpets and other heavy goods. Awassi wool, clipped from sheep which are a cross between the Arab and Kurdish sheep, possesses some of the characteristics of both.

Mohair is clipped from the Angora goat. The value of the export from Basra has decreased in recent years, and averaged only £11,400 in value for

the period 1909-13 as against £28,000 for the previous five years. The export mostly goes to Great Britain, Germany, and France, and to other parts of Turkey.

Among miscellaneous exports are carpets, gall-nuts, gum tragacanth, and liquorice.

Carpets.—This branch of trade represents a value of about £52,000 annually. The import of Persian carpets from Kermanshah fell off very much between 1910-14, and the trade is now mostly in carpets manufactured in Mesopotamia. The chief buyers are the United States, Great Britain, Egypt, France, Germany, and India.

Gall-nuts are produced by the eggs deposited by the gall-fly on the oak-trees growing in the hills of northern Mesopotamia and Kurdistan, and are used in tanning. They are collected by the tribes, and are sold to dealers in Mosul and other towns in the vicinity of the hills. Their commercial value depends upon their colour; blue galls are most valued for tanning and form the bulk of the export; greens are less valued, but are exported to a small extent; whites were not exported at all until Germany took to buying them. The value of the trade is increasing, and in 1912 reached a total of £150,000, as compared with an average of £44,000 for the previous five years. Germany was the largest buyer.

Gum tragacanth is obtained from the *Astragalus*, a bush which grows in northern Persia, Kurdistan, and northern Mesopotamia. The better-class gums come from the Persian frontier and Persia, the gums obtained in northern Mesopotamia being of low quality. The collection is in the hands of the nomad or semi-nomad tribes, and the incision of the bark necessary to obtain the gum is not done scientifically, with the result that full quantity is never obtained. The export from Basra has averaged £21,000 in recent years. The bulk goes to London and Marseilles, but recently Russia has become a buyer of importance.

Liquorice.—The liquorice plant grows wild in patches all along the banks of the Euphrates, from

Meskene to Diwanie, and along the Tigris, from Mosul to Kut el-Amara. It is also found on the Khabur and Diala Rivers, and on the Shatt el-Hai. The root is dug by Arabs, and is brought to receiving stations, where it is weighed and then cured. Later it is shipped down to Basra, where it is pressed into bales for export. About 85 per cent. of the export goes to the United States. The trade, which annually amounts to about £55,000, is almost entirely in the hands of Messrs. MacAndrews & Forbes, of Baghdad and Basra.

(b) *Imports*

A list of the chief imports will be found in Table IV of the Appendix (p. 131).

Cotton.—The import consists chiefly of cotton piece-goods. The statistics seem to indicate that this branch of imports doubled between 1904 and 1913, but the impression given is not accurate, because in 1908 the basis of valuation of cotton imports for the purpose of statistics was changed, and an addition of 30 per cent. was made to the import price. Until Germany appeared in the Gulf trade, the import of cotton goods was entirely in the hands of Great Britain and India, and even immediately before the war Manchester was still providing more than ten times the amount supplied by any other country except India. Austria comes third, but usually considerably below India.

Sugar.—Down to 1905 nearly all the sugar imported came from France and Great Britain in British bottoms. After 1906 the Hamburg-Amerika line began to push Belgian sugar, which was imported from Antwerp at a freight of 20*s.*, as against 35*s.* per ton charged for French brands shipped at Marseilles, and by this means, in the space of a few years, practically captured the whole of the trade. Austrian and Belgian sugars were popular mainly because they were cheaper, but also because they were harder and less liable to injury by rough transport. The total import of sugar increased from a value of £121,000 in 1904 to £721,000 in 1913.

Iron and Steel.—This branch of trade is still comparatively unimportant, averaging in normal years only about £21,000. By 1914 the trade was almost entirely in Belgian, German, and Swedish goods, and British goods had been ousted. A large portion of the trade was in iron girders, which are largely supplanting wooden beams for building purposes in Baghdad and elsewhere; the demand for these was almost entirely supplied by Belgium. The great increase in 1913 in imports of iron and steel was mainly for use on the Baghdad Railway. Both Germany and France had, in 1914, sent representatives to study the market.

Machinery.—This branch of trade is mostly in the hands of Great Britain, though Belgium, Germany, India, France, Austria-Hungary, and the United States also contribute. In recent years the trade has included a large number of oil engines and centrifugal pumps for irrigation. In 1911 £25,000 worth of machinery came from Europe for the Government military factory at Baghdad. At Baghdad, in 1912, there were 5 ice-machines, 24 flour-mills, and 6 rice-mills, working with British machinery. A British firm had set up an engineering workshop, and had also started motor-cars and 'buses daily between Baghdad and Bakuba (31 miles). German success in sewing-machines has been considerable. There will no doubt be a large opening for trade in machinery in the near future, particularly in motor ploughs, threshing-machines, and other agricultural machinery.

Wood.—The chief import under this heading is date-boxes. At one time these came almost entirely from Bukovina, and were shipped at Fiume, but recently Sweden and Norway have begun to compete. The wood is imported in cut lengths ready to be nailed together in Basra. The transport of date-boxes was before the war falling more and more into German hands, as many as 173,000 being carried by them in 1912. A trial shipment from Mysore (State Forest Department) proved unsuccessful, as the boxes were too heavy, the workmanship was inadequate, and the

Department could neither turn out sufficiently large quantities nor compete with German freights.

For boat-building Malabar wood is chiefly used, and is imported roughly sawn into the shapes required, as sawing is very costly in Mesopotamia. Planks for other purposes came largely from Russia (Odessa wood) and India. In 1913 Russia supplied nearly all, owing to an increase in the price of Indian teak. There has been a large increase in the import of planks, due to building activity in Baghdad and elsewhere.

Poles and rafters were originally brought from Kurdistan, but the Kurd hillsides being now nearly stripped of timber, cheap Russian wood was being imported in its place. India should be able to export her wood advantageously to Mesopotamia in the native sailing-vessels which go to fetch dates.

Woollen Goods.—In 1906 a considerable impetus was given to the import of these goods owing to their introduction into Persia by the Persian pilgrims. Their use became increasingly popular in the succeeding years, and the trade was recognised as capable of great development. The chief sources of supply were the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, the three latter sending cheaper qualities at prices with which the British manufacturer could not compete. German half-mixed woollen cloth was especially popular with the poorer classes.

In 1913 Italy supplanted the United Kingdom as the greatest supplier of woollen goods.

Yarn and Twist.—Normally about 7,000 packages are imported, of the value of about £70,000, the suppliers being the United Kingdom, Germany, India, and Italy.

Gunnies, made of jute, and used for the packing of goods for mule and camel transport, are imported from India. The amount imported varies with the export of grain. The average value of the import is about £75,000. In 1911 it rose to £111,000.

Petroleum was formerly imported almost wholly from Russia, but a shortage in the supply of Russian

oil in 1906 gave American and Austrian low-grade oils a chance to get a footing; more than half the cases imported at Basra in that year were American. In 1907 American and Austro-Hungarian oils were rapidly advancing in favour at the expense of Russia. In 1909 there was still sharp competition between American, Austrian, and Russian oils; Russia sent 45,000 cases, America 35,000, and Austria 22,000. In 1910 there was a decline in the import of Austrian oil, which in the following year ceased altogether. In 1911 two oil steamers brought over American petroleum. The growing demand for oil engines and the use of oil lamps were the chief factors in the increased consumption. In 1913 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company reached the producing stage, with the result that the American imports dropped from over 150,000 cases in 1912 to 66,000 in 1914, in which year the Anglo-Persian Company provided more than 50 per cent. of the country's requirements.

Coal.—The coal imported is chiefly Welsh, but a little comes sometimes from India. The burning of bricks for the Hindie barrage led to a largely increased consumption in 1910 and 1911, and the increase of river launches and establishment of arsenal stores also led to an increased demand.

Rice is imported wholly from India. In 1909 the Mesopotamian rice crop failed, and a much larger quantity was imported than in the preceding year. The quantity imported has remained high, in spite of a large increase of export in the succeeding years. In 1913 another and more complete failure of the rice crop led to an abnormally large import. The export of rice and paddy is usually largely in excess of the import.

Coffee.—An average of 15,000 bags is annually imported, at an average cost of £53,000. The price has risen considerably of late years. A good deal is now exported to Persia, but Persian and Kurdish troubles checked this in 1913. Indian coffee has been completely driven out of the market by the cheaper

Brazilian brand, which was imported in great quantities, largely through Great Britain. A little coffee was also obtained from Germany and Arabia, and Germany also supplied some Brazilian brands. Coffee is slowly being supplanted in favour of tea.

Indigo.—The value of the average annual import for the last eight years was £20,000, but the trade has steadily decreased, that for 1906 amounting in value to £24,000, and that for 1913 to £15,000. All is imported from India, chiefly for Baghdad. The natives are beginning to prefer printed European goods to the cloths dyed at Baghdad, and synthetic dyes imported from Germany proved to be cheaper than indigo.

Aniline dyes were also imported directly and indirectly from Germany, and had entirely supplanted madder, which was formerly imported from Persia.

Matches.—Before the war Swedish matches almost had a monopoly of the market, Belgium, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Japan furnishing only small quantities. The trade was originally done through Germany, but was latterly done directly with Sweden. Persia was a considerable importer. Japan is now supplying the country with large quantities of a cheap but unsatisfactory match.

Copper was imported from the United Kingdom, India, Belgium, and France to the extent of about 8,200 bundles, value £45,000 annually. Most of it went to Baghdad to make cooking utensils. A good deal is now being imported from Japan.

Leather and Leather Goods.—The import fluctuates a good deal. France has long been established as the chief supplier of leather at Mosul. The United States, very successful at Beirut, was gradually extending her leather supplies over the north. Cheap leather for common shoes came mainly from India. China and Singapore sometimes supply buffalo hides for shoes. The United Kingdom, Belgium, and India did all the leather trade through Basra in 1909, but since that date Great Britain has rapidly lost ground. In 1913 leather supplies came from France, Belgium, the

United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary, India, Germany, and the United States.

Provisions (tinned meats, &c.) were obtained from India, the United Kingdom, and Germany. The average annual value for the six years from 1906 to 1912 was about £75,000; but the general scarcity in 1913 led to an increased import of provisions, viz., £100,000 worth.

Spices are imported wholly from India. The annual value of the import for some 11 years past has been about £27,000; there was a fall in 1913 on account of general trade depression.

Stationery.—The import of stationery, after remaining at a uniform level for four years, rose in 1907 from £20,000 to £50,000, a figure which it has not attained since, having kept an average of a little under £40,000. It was supplied by Germany and Austria-Hungary, with a little from the United Kingdom, and German imports were increasing steadily up to 1914.

Tea.—The value of the tea import steadily rose from 1904 to 1908, since which date it has remained almost stationary. India has always been the principal supplier; Russia formerly sent some, but has ceased to do so; China has recently done a considerable trade. In 1913 India sent 82½ per cent., China 17 per cent., and the remaining ½ per cent. came from Japan. The total value in 1913 was £48,986. Consumption has been steadily increasing of late years among the Arabs.

Tobacco is nearly all imported from Persia, though a very little comes from Constantinople. In 1907 the import showed a notable increase, which was not maintained in the three following years. The value of the tobacco imported in 1912 was £27,600, but in 1913 this fell to £8,970, probably on account of the insecurity of traffic and the general trade depression.

(D) FINANCE

(1) *Public Finance*

This subject is discussed in *Anatolia*, No. 59 of this series.

(2) *Currency*

Turkish currency is discussed in detail in *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, but the subject requires some notice here owing to the complication which, under the Turkish regime, was caused by the large use of Persian and, to a less extent, of Indian coinage at Basra and even at Baghdad.

Before the war the coinage both at Baghdad and Basra was based upon the Turkish lira: one Turkish lira=100 gold piastres=4,000 paras. The medjidieh (the 20-piastre piece) was reckoned officially as worth 19 gold piastres, and was chiefly used in payment of customs duties and other taxes. The par exchange to sterling was 110 Turkish lira=£100 sterling. Banking accounts were kept in liras (100 piastres=1 lira), but for business transactions the number of piastres in the lira varied, 103½ being usually reckoned in wholesale transactions and 108 in retail.

Small coins were very scarce, and their use was practically confined to revenue purposes, so that it was necessary to employ the silver and copper coinage of other countries in giving change in bazaar purchases, although such coins were nominally prohibited. The foreign coins chiefly used were the Persian kran, the Indian rupee, and the sovereign, the rates of which were fixed weekly according to supply and demand.

At Basra the Persian coinage was even more in use than at Baghdad, and Indian silver was also current, though occasionally impounded under the regulations. Certain fictitious coins were also used as units of computation in particular classes of transactions, with a view to lessening the inconvenience caused by fluctuations in the value of actual coins.

Since the British occupation Indian currency has been established in the country, the exchange of the lira being provisionally fixed at Rs. 13–18, the Turkish coinage being accepted in payment of revenue. All liras received were kept in deposit, as there were obvious objections to permitting Turkish coins to circulate; and at the present time the circulation of Indian coins and notes is on much the same footing in the occupied part of Mesopotamia as in India. Indian notes have been absorbed in large quantities, the rate of exchange is maintained at a regular level, and merchants are thereby enabled to work on a narrower margin of profit. New notes are put into circulation as frequently as possible, and every effort is made to meet promptly a demand for notes or cash when it arises. Merchants are in the habit of sending their remittances by means of notes, and at one time notes were at 1 per cent. premium at Amara. Every effort is made to provide sufficient quantities of small change by issuing packets of mixed change as part of rupee payments.

The wide use of the Persian kran, coupled with the wide fluctuations of its exchange value, have been a source of embarrassment to trade in the past, and it is important that means should be found of steadying the exchange, in view of the importance to Mesopotamia of the Persian markets.

(3) *Banking*

Before the outbreak of war, the only banks of importance established in Mesopotamia were the Imperial Ottoman Bank, with branches at Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra, and the Eastern Bank, which had recently opened a branch at Baghdad. Banks were indeed scarcely used for the purpose of trade, and their place was partially filled by *saraps*. These, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, were mere money-changers, but they acted as private bankers, taking charge of cash or securities, against which the customer could draw by chit. Trade credit was carried on also by means of

commission houses, which collected orders from all quarters, taking payment from the traders by means of a deposit with the order and by a Kompiala bond for the balance, the bonds being redeemed by instalments. The Kompiala bond, which is a promissory note payable at date, could be discounted at rates of from 6 to 12 per cent., and was a good security in certain hands. The Imperial Ottoman Bank, for example, could put in motion the legal machinery to protest and recover; in some other hands the bond might be a source of expense.

At the present time (1918) there are three large banks represented in Mesopotamia, viz., the Imperial Ottoman Bank, with branches at Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul; the Eastern Bank, with branches at Basra, Amara, and Baghdad; and the Imperial Bank of Persia, also with branches or agents at Basra, Amara, and Baghdad. The development of Mesopotamia after the war should create opportunities for a wide employment of capital in banking business of the trading kind. Agriculture in particular is in especial need of financial support. It has hitherto been an established practice for the cultivator to borrow money on the security of his crop before it has matured, giving a Kompiala, bearing a high rate of interest, as security. There is probably a good opening for the introduction of some system of agricultural banks on recognised lines, and this question should engage the early attention of those concerned with the government of the country.

(E) GENERAL REMARKS

The future economic possibilities of Mesopotamia have formed the subject of the following reports made to the Governments of either Great Britain or India in recent years:—

(*a*) Report upon the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Mesopotamia, by Sir George Lloyd, published in 1908.

(*b*) Report on the Development of Mesopotamia, with special reference to the Regeneration of the River Systems, by Sir George Buchanan, K.C.I.E, M.Inst.C.E., published in 1917.

(*c*) The Prospects of British Trade in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, by R. E. Holland and J. H. Wilson, published in 1917.

(*d*) Report on the Future Development of the Port of Basra and its communications by Land and Water, by Sir George Buchanan, K.C.I.E., M.Inst.C.E., published in 1917.

These reports have dealt at considerable length with various aspects of the problems involved, and summaries of some of the conclusions arrived at have already been given.

The future of Mesopotamia depends upon four conditions:—

(1) Security of administration, and a sympathetic attitude on the part of the Government to the economic needs of the country.

(2) The increase of the cultivable area by the creation of a system of irrigation capable of expansion as the needs of the population require.

(3) The capacity of the inhabitants to undertake the heavy work which the proper development of the country will involve.

(4) The improvement of means of communication.

Of these conditions the first may be assumed, and the question of the improvement of means of communications has been dealt with under the headings of navigation and railways. The economic capacity of the inhabitants is at present an unknown factor, but the conclusions arrived at by competent observers (see pp. 42, 68) are supported by the following extracts from a report on the prosperity of the Euphrates which appeared in the *Times* of May 1, 1918 :—

During the summer we have been at work on the irrigation scheme connected with the Hindieh barrage. The barrage, which was designed by Sir William Willcocks and constructed by Sir John Jackson's firm, was finished before the war, but the Turk neglected to profit by it. The canalisation work connected with it was left incomplete, and the area to be cultivated was never brought under irrigation.

This year nearly a hundred canals on the Hilleh branch, which had fallen into disuse, have been dug out, 300,000 acres have been brought under cultivation, and there is promise of the greatest harvest in the memory of man, possibly the greatest since the days of Nebuchadnezzar.

But the Shatt el-Hilleh developments are only part of the scheme. For several years the land on both banks of the Hindieh branch below the barrage down to Kifil has been out of cultivation, as the canals provided in the Willcocks scheme to irrigate that area were neglected. We were not long in getting to work at them. In May, as soon as the Tigris operations were completed, we began to open posts on the Euphrates. The work on the canals was started early in June; they were finished by the end of October, and the ground they irrigate is now under cultivation.

Needless to say, the Arab cultivators welcome the new régime. Their property, which has lain fallow for years, will become rich and profitable. All the summer and autumn they were busy getting their water channels clear. Below the barrage some 14,000 Arabs were engaged in making the new canals and clearing the old ones. Nearly every able-bodied man in the district is working for us.

The Arabs are an eminently sensible people. The Turks, when they evacuated the district, were for destroying the Hindieh barrage, but the tribesmen preserved it. The Arab knew the Turk would do nothing for him, and he would not pay him revenue if he could help it; but the collection of revenue on the Euphrates no longer calls for an armed force. Paying taxes has become an investment. For there is no cultivator in

the world who will not lend a hand at getting water into his own fields. The Arabs appreciate the art of irrigation, though they do not excel in it; and we have come to them on the Euphrates as fertilisers of the soil.

The cardinal question in relation to the future of Mesopotamia is the development of irrigation.[1] At the time Sir William Willcocks was in Mesopotamia, the only evidence of the prosperity which in ancient times made the country famous were the traces of the great cities, which in the time of Herodotus studded the country, and the silt banks of countless canals, which had been used in the past to make the country from Beled to the Persian Gulf one continuous forest of verdure. From that point down-stream the greater part of the country consisted at first of nothing but bare plains of clay, ridged and furrowed with the remains of ancient irrigation channels, and destitute of all vegetation except leguminous thorn-bushes or jungles of liquorice near the rivers, with occasional belts of poplar or willow. Farther south, salt lands and marshes increased, but of cultivation or date palms there was hardly a vestige, except here and there by rivers or canals. Only along the lower reaches of the Euphrates and the Shatt el-Arab was there any appearance of prosperity. The general impression was one of blight, failure, and neglect.

The investigations of Sir William Willcocks led him to believe that, if the available water supply could be properly utilised, it would permit of the irrigation of 7 million acres of winter crops, and of summer crops 1 million acres of rice, or 3 million acres of millet, sesame, cotton, &c. It should, however, be noted that Sir William Willcocks held the view, which has been controverted by other experts, that the full development of irrigation in Mesopotamia is incompatible with

[1] For further observations on this question, see above, pp. 41, 56, 72.

navigation.[1] Whether his calculations are accurate or not, there is no doubt that, given satisfactory irrigation, it will be possible to render available for cultivation areas far in excess of the present requirements and capacity of the inhabitants.

What will be probably more difficult will be the harmonisation of the costs of irrigation and the revenue from cultivation. Upon this point the views of Rohrbach, set out in *Die Bagdadbahn*, are of interest. Assuming that the irrigation and economic development of Mesopotamia would fall to Germany, he suggested the formation of a German canal and corn-exporting company, which would undertake the irrigation of the country, charging for the water supply 10 per cent. of the value of each harvest. In order to avoid disputes with the Government, the company would arrange to substitute a fixed annual payment for the State taxes, making itself, instead of the landowners, responsible for these to the Government. It would then claim from the small owners one-fifth or one-quarter of the harvest. Plenty of tenants would in all probability be forthcoming, for corn cultivation and speculation are not new to the richer Arabs. The Sultan himself would probably be the first and largest owner, and the workers on the Baghdad Railway could be settled as colonists in suitable places along its length. Rohrbach calculated that 300,000 to 400,000 tons of corn could be raised, which would be worth from 15 to 20 millions of marks on the spot, and three times that amount in the European markets. He estimated that the company would require a capital of about 30 million marks, and that the cost of irrigation would be about 1 mark per hectare.

As regards crops, it should be easy to extend the cultivation of those already grown. But it is chiefly round

[1] "You cannot leave the waters of the rivers in their channels and irrigate the country with them. For navigation you may substitute railway transport; for the purpose of irrigation nothing can take the place of water."—*The Geographical Journal*, August 1912, p. 144.

the possibilities of Mesopotamia as a cotton-growing country that hopes have been centred. It was upon this that Germany was counting. She wished, it had been said, to make herself independent of other supplies by turning Mesopotamia into one huge cotton-field. Rohrbach quoted the case of Turkestan, whence Russia had recently imported 600,000 to 700,000 bales of cotton annually. He suggested that German companies should obtain large concessions, which they could let out in small parcels to natives. Germany, it was thought, should look to Mesopotamia for cotton if her own colonies failed her, and in 1912 the Baghdad Railway Company was reported to be already encouraging cotton-growing in the north.

Mr. S. P. Foaden, late of the Khedivial Agricultural Society, gives the following as the climatic advantages which Mesopotamia possesses for cotton growing:—

(1) The length of the growing season—six or seven months of high and rising temperature. Both Egyptian and American cotton suffer from an excess of cold during the period.
(2) No sudden fall of temperature during the period.
(3) A fall of temperature after growth is completed, which helps to ripen the fruit.
(4) The absence of summer rain.
(5) Mesopotamian cotton would receive the greatest moisture at the time when moisture is most needed, viz., from March to June.

Mesopotamia is, it is true, hotter and drier than most cotton-producing countries, but not more so than Upper Egypt, where cotton is now successfully grown.

The soil of Mesopotamia contains a good proportion of phosphorus, potash, and nitrogen, but a very large percentage of lime (12 to 14·03 per cent.), the effect of which on cotton-growing cannot be satisfactorily foretold, although cotton is cultivated in some parts of America where the percentage is higher. The soil, a deep loam of a light nature, not retentive of

water, but needing a plentiful supply, is precisely the kind most suitable for cotton.

Cotton-growing in Egypt brings in 7 to 8 per cent., but in Egypt there is good communication and a teeming population. Returns in Mesopotamia would be slower, and the labour supply is much more limited. It is also considerably cheaper, but the natives would expect to receive a proportion of the crop.

Other directions in which expansion has been suggested are—

(1) In the natural products of the country, i.e., gall-nuts, liquorice, and gum tragacanth.
(2) In the export of dried fruits.
(3) In the trade in wool. It must be remembered that sheep-farming is the natural occupation of the Arabs, and is to-day the principal source of livelihood of the nomad and semi-nomad tribes, and irrigation schemes must be conceived so as to conserve for afforestation and pasturage large areas in addition to those under cultivation. The possibilities of sheep-farming in Mesopotamia are prodigious, since not only the wool but also the skins are known and approved in European markets, and the quality could doubtless be improved considerably if expert knowledge were available.

Under the head of industries small development is to be looked for until much more is known about the mineral resources of Mesopotamia than is known to-day, and the country will remain for a long time essentially agricultural.

APPENDIX

TABLE I.—EXPORTS TO PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES FROM BAGHDAD DURING THE YEARS 1909–13.

—	1909.		1910.		1911.		1912.		1913.	
	Value.	Percentage of Total Value.	Value.	Percentage of Total Value.	Value.	Percentage of Total Value.	Value.	Percentage of Total Value.	Value.	Percentage of Total Value.
	£		£		£		£		£	
United Kingdom	255,744	33·4	330,361	38·6	284,347	38·6	285,620	30·7	246,001	32·6
United States	135,946	17·7	155,049	18·1	95,520	12·3	120,646	13	139,223	18·4
France	117,540	15·3	132,131	15·4	113,539	15·2	222,825	24	146,532	19·4
China	104,029	13·5	61,540	..	81,773	10·9	5,744	..	60,182	..
Turkey	45,469	..	63,379	..	62,022	..	..	..	..	..
India	35,400		25,938	..	32,906	..	159,441	17·1	30,491	..
Germany	28,644	..	30,441	..	36,915	..	88,239	..	46,997	..
Egypt	23,880	..	20,390	..	16,291	..	30,057	..	4,176	..
Austria-Hungary	13,684	..	14,591	..	11,200	.	16,792	..	20,694	..
Netherlands	3,469	..	3,969	..	1,916	..	1,396	..	3,254	..
Belgium	941	..	3,977	..	10,395	..		..	23,610	..
Other countries	642	..	13,097	..	—	..	—	..	34,341	..
Total	765,388	.	853,963	..	746,824	..	930,760	..	755,501	..

TABLE II.

IMPORTS FROM PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES TO BAGHDAD DURING THE YEARS 1908–1913.

	1908.		1909.		1910.		1911.		1912.		1913.	
	Value.	Percentage of total value.	Value.	Percentage of total value.	Value.	Percentage of total value.	Value.	Percentage of total value.	Value.	Percentage of total value.	Value.	Percentage of total value.
	£		£		£		£		£		£	
United Kingdom ..	931,424	48·1	1,201,316	55·8	1,317,762	48·5	1,199,597	45·1	1,415,288	50·1	1,314,138	45·1
India, China, Japan	465,163	24·0	461,668	21·0	664,147	24·2	740,565	27·8	666,135	23·6	572,761	19·6
Germany	49,484	..	36,705	..	53,705	..	91,060	..	115,725	..	144,115	..
Austria-Hungary ..	97,666	..	123,312	..	180,011	..	232,391	..	206,801	..	264,234	..
Belgium	81,756	..	109,764	..	211,835	..	183,921	..	176,806	..	328,719	..
France..	184,416	..	120,199	..	203,284	..	72,998	..	64,005	..	82,176	..
China	—	..	—	..	—	..	6,960	..	40,760	..	37,263	..
Russia.. ..	14,085	..	26,334	..	13,260	..	9,122	..	34,885	..	20,496	..
Turkey	36,396	..	36,868	..	54,510	..	46,187	..	34,540	..	32,313	..
Japan	—	..	—	..	—	..	—	..	7,382	..	4,739	..
Sweden	—	..	3,315	..	18,924	..	10,975	..	5,021	..	21,911	..
Egypt	—	..	—	..	—	..	—	..	3,921	..	—	..
Netherlands	1,753	..	623	..	255	..	230	..	3,610	..	7,801	..
Italy	3,445	..	7,673	..	1,900	..	15,242	..	300	..	29,341	..
United States.. ..	1,685	..	215	..	806	..	6,864	..	9,262	..	8,045	..
Other countries ..	45,087	..	24,740	..	16,015	..	45,289	..	38,376	..	45,984	..
Total	1,912,360	..	2,152,732	..	2,736,414	..	2,661,401	..	2,822,817	..	2,914,036	..

Statistics of the import of India, China, and Japan are not given separately before 1911.

TABLE III.—PRINCIPAL EXPORTS FROM BASRA.

—	1904.	1905.	1906.	1907.	1908.	1909.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Barley.. ..	217,719	226,062	192,737	426,079	370,977	82,788	220,954	772,025	1,118,490	362,690
Carpets ..	48,300	41,338	37,325	33,480	34,230	86,520	80,384	76,224	35,008	47,530
Dates	312,767	345,184	436,512	438,410	385,617	414,700	423,233	456,795	471,119	582,074
Gall-nuts ..	49,813	51,727	49,538	36,090	33,106	33,287	47,600	71,056	152,219	66,393
Ghi	25,717	33,273	25,371	30,226	12,022	31,617	25,409	86,230	54,038	59,933
Gum	30,732	30,716	40,016	17,408	24,623	20,844	17,368	27,536	26,432	19,528
Hair and Mohair..	34,976	32,296	32,360	22,608	20,032	13,736	11,064	10,480	11,928	12,072
Hides and Skins .	54,822	62,512	65,059	46,590	31,488	56,574	54,258	53,070	46,056	57,594
Horses.. ..	53,640	49,764	43,525	66,700	55,425	51,075	53,075	36,500	35,325	43,725
Liquorice Root ..	23,659	48,957	27,477	43,337	25,932	48,778	47,476	44,530	13,052	36,521
Opium.. ..	107,200	111,100	110,700	151,600	90,900	128,800	125,300	117,500	97,600	137,500
Rice	12,755	8,525	8,589	23,950	20,370	19,285	12,584	17,589	16,684	128
Paddy.. ..	—	—	44,490	91,658	65,598	30,375	65,823	109,501	324,980	19,122
Seeds	87,588	114,272	116,573	83,910	190,039	106,173	82,629	97,290	156,614	37,990
Wheat.. ..	40,683	76,163	106,675	208,647	241,093	11,531	66,907	195,339	243,054	10,009
Wool	182,502	243,696	250,273	182,364	123,368	288,022	253,651	246,449	303,030	310,744
Other articles ..	22,908	29,210	57,000	67,258	59,152	79,839	80,909	107,733	140,931	135,706
Total ..	1,305,781	1,504,795	1,644,220	1,970,315	1,783,972	1,504,004	1,668,624	2,525,847	3,246,560	1,939,259

TABLE IV.—PRINCIPAL IMPORTS INTO BASRA.

——	1904.	1905.	1906.	1907.	1908.	1909.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Cotton goods	504,300	631,700	592,700	781,200	1,065,925	1,079,400	1,104,810	1,128,470	1,028,195	745,955
Woollen goods	25,920	26,760	34,020	40,020	46,080	54,400	60,720	90,080	107,920	79,360
Coal	20,954	19,614	26,306	21,822	36,778	30,575	46,805	45,032	52,974	39,904
Coffee	51,152	52,393	57,263	50,340	45,696	53,456	54,911	72,688	58,540	33,080
Copper	27,172	29,444	33,136	29,364	48,912	48,342	50,526	51,540	47,778	54,168
Gunnies	58,128	73,548	82,314	84,950	86,862	65,816	83,134	111,027	95,784	76,992
Indigo	22,025	20,050	24,500	21,600	23,600	19,900	20,250	21,150	19,875	15,575
Iron and steel goods ..	19,539	15,472	17,480	17,427	15,907	23,734	39,923	54,677	20,325	1,207,882
Petroleum..	15,369	15,920	36,075	25,074	51,773	26,119	27,100	13,769	57,530	91,484
Machinery	11,108	11,284	13,764	11,916	15,140	24,590	47,439	59.275	64,830	96,873
Matches	18,639	18,540	25,392	26,367	20,352	14,373	21,315	22,368	20,838	16,878
Provisions..	46,434	44,292	47,706	53,058	102,456	71,937	68,439	74,886	80,385	100,562
Rice	14,662	13,441	9,992	6,205	4,470	20,446	25,680	24,608	18,792	126,371
Soap	11,500	10,006	10,448	10,288	11,796	11,342	11,754	11,856	12,460	9,158
Spices	27,326	27,120	26,502	28,579	28,915	28,951	28,330	27,668	26,888	19,791
Stationery..	23,440	23,296	20,433	51,506	39,150	33,510	38,172	41,310	38,154	30,360
Loaf sugar	77,274	84.521	110,145	67,090	115,969	58,486	221,382	361,196	230,195	240,100
Crushed sugar	44,012	43,666	58,885	184,324	179,284	300,654	227,631	172,961	62,032	480,999
Tea	16,890	18,172	20,732	25,401	28,512	22,609	22,752	24,431	23,846	12,404
Tobacco	24,415	20,500	23,160	32,745	25,610	21,630	29,240	28,255	27,600	8,970
Wood—										
For date-boxes	54,311	39,361	55,511	66,317	116,741	91,240	123,734	120,589	148,160	48,354
Building, &c.	6,970	7,709	27,322	29,274	54,657	37,658	22,342	33,337	70,092	86,911
Yarn and Twist	33,440	32.530	31,310	53,860	65,680	63,860	70,310	70,520	73,980	70,600
Other goods	105,729	108,250	126,449	160,838	181,303	157,074	187,897	193,984	250,636	206,542
Total	1,260,709	1,387,589	1,511,545	1,879,565	2,411,568	2,360,102	2,634,596	2,855,677	2,637,809	3,899,273

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MAPS

The map on the scale of 1 : 2,000,000, in one sheet, published by the Royal Geographical Society (1910), is the best general map of Mesopotamia.

The following sheets of the map on the scale of 1 : 1,000,000 (G.S.G.S. 2555), published by the Geographical Section of the General Staff, cover Mesopotamia: Tiflis (K. 38), Erzerum (J. 37), Tabriz (J. 38), Esh Sham (I. 37), Baghdad (I. 38), Tehran (I. 39), Basra (H. 38), Bushire (H. 39).

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FRENCH INDO-CHINA

T T U 7

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1920

EDITORIAL NOTE

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

French Indo-China, which is situated in the south-eastern corner of Asia, comprises the colony of Cochin-China and the protectorates of Tongking, Annam, Cambodia, and the parts of Laos which lie for the most part east of the River Mekong—practically the whole of the old Annamite empire—together with the leased Chinese territory of Kwang-chow-wan, which is situated on the east side of the Leichow peninsula in the province of Kwang-tung.

The area of the whole is estimated at 260,000 square miles, apportioned as follows:

	sq. miles.
Cochin-China . . .	20,000
Annam	52,000
Cambodia . . .	45,000
Tongking . . .	46,000
Laos	97,000

With the exception of Kwang-chow-wan (see below, p. 10), all this territory lies between latitudes 8° 36′ and 23° 25′ north and longitudes 100° and 109° 30′ east. It is bounded on the north by the Chinese provinces of Kwang-tung, Kwang-si, and Yun-nan; on the north-west by Burma; on the west by Siam; on the south-west by the Gulf of Siam; and on the east by the China Sea. The northern boundary between Indo-China and China is conventional, coinciding with no decided ethnographical division, but follows in the main a mountain range, cutting across the courses of the

Song-koi (Red River) and various of its tributaries. Between Burma and French Indo-China the boundary is defined by the *thalweg* of the Mekong. From here to the sea the entire western boundary marches with Siam, following the watershed of the Mekong on the right bank to the confluence of the River Nam-huong (19° 45′ N.), and then the right bank of the Mekong as far as Pakmoun (15° 18′ N.). From this point the only natural barrier is the comparatively low Dang-rek (or Denrmong) range.

The boundaries between the British Shan States of Burma, Siam, and French Laos are in the main marked by the convenient natural line of the Mekong valley rather than by ethnographical distinctions, but the boundary runs considerably to the west of this river between 20° north latitude and the confluence with the Nam-huong. Indo-China and Siam are nowhere separated by any serious natural barrier; and the frontier has been the subject of frequent rearrangement.

(2) Surface, Coast, and River System

Surface

The configuration of the country is determined by two rivers—the Mekong and the Song-koi or Red River—and by the mountain system, which is an offshoot of the great Chinese group of Yun-nan, and spreads in irregular formations over Tongking and Upper Laos, being continued in a long narrow chain down the whole length of Annam, closely adhering to the curve of the coast. The highest point (10,300 ft.) is reached near Lao-kai in Tongking, though several parts of the Annamese chain rise above 6,000 ft.

In Tongking the provinces of Lang-son, That-ke, and Kao-bang in the north-east belong to the basin of the

Si-kiang, or West River, which flows into the sea below Canton; the province of Mon-kay on the east forms a little basin of its own; but the greater part of Tongking consists of the basin of the Song-koi or Red River and its tributaries. Its valley and large delta form the most fertile and populous part of Tongking, the rest of which is for the most part wild and mountainous.

The Annamite chain, which forms the boundary between Annam and Laos, sends out mountainous spurs to the sea, and these divide the country into provinces. The range feeds a number of short rivers which have formed a narrow strip of fertile alluvial plain bordering the coast from the Tongking delta southwards. The river valleys and mountain passes admit of communication between the various provinces of Annam and the coast.

Upper Laos is a tangle of mountain ranges, through the west of which the Mekong winds. In the centre is the large plateau of Tran-ninh, which, if more accessible, might be an important health resort.

In Lower Laos the Annamite chain slopes more gently down to the Mekong, except in the region of the Bòloven plateau north-east of Attopeu. There are rich tracts of country, but they are undeveloped. There are two large plateaux on the west of the chain in southern Annam, the Darlak and the Lang-biang, the latter of which is approached by railway and is destined to be an important sanatorium.

Coast

Indo-China has approximately 1,500 miles of coast. Its outline is that of a large S, and, except in the delta lands, it is generally rocky. The northern part of the coast of Tongking is screened by numerous islands and contains the sheltered bays of Tien-yen, Along, and

Hon-gay, the latter of which contains the natural harbour of Port Courbet. South of this is the Red River delta, flat and harbourless, the ports being high up the rivers. Of these Hai-fong, about 20 miles from the mouth of one of the branches, is the most important, serving as port to Hanoi, the capital of Indo-China. Kwang-yen, Thai-binh, and Nam-dinh are smaller ports accessible only to vessels of shallow draught.

The northern part of the coast of Annam, though rich and populous, is deficient in harbours, but the more barren and rocky southern section abounds in fine bays and sheltered anchorages.

The deltaic coast of Cochin-China is deeply channelled by the branches of the Mekong delta, but is lacking in coastal harbours. The port of Saigon lies 34 miles from the sea on the Saigon, a tributary of the Donnai river. Cambodia has a short coast-line without harbours of importance, and depends on the Mekong for its communication with the sea.

River System

The two most important river systems are those of the *Red River* and the *Mekong*, the former being the main artery of Tongking. It is navigable for river steamers from its mouth to Yen-bai (about 220 miles) at all seasons, and to Lao-kai (about 300 miles) during the high-water season; it is further navigable for junks to Man-hao, in Yun-nan, about 55 miles within the boundaries of China. Its utility, however, is marred by rapids, shoals, and shifting sand-banks. From December to May it is at its lowest level, after which it rises rapidly (from 16 to 20 ft. at Hanoi), frequently washing away its banks. As a consequence the delta lands have to be protected by extensive embankments. Its chief tributaries—the Black and Clear rivers, both of which rise in China and join the main stream near

Vietry, a few miles above the delta—are only navigable for about 56 miles.

The rest of Indo-China lies within the basin of the Mekong, which rises in Tibet and flows through the gorges of Yun-nan before reaching the borders of Upper Laos. It is subject to heavy floods in the wet season, and some of its rapids are only negotiable for a short period of the year. Its extreme limit of navigation is Tang-ho in Siam (about 1,450 miles from its mouth), but, as a rule, it is only navigable for sampans and junks above Vien-tiane (18° N.). From here to the sea it has long reaches navigable for launches, with intervals in which rapids interfere with what would otherwise be an ideal means of communication between central Indo-China and the Gulf of Siam. Its last 270 miles, from Kratie to the sea, are navigable at all seasons by steamers At low-water period the tide is felt as far as Pnom-penh, but in the high-water period, which begins in May and reaches its maximum in October, the river rises 26 to 33 ft. at this point and to a great height farther up. At Pnom-penh the Mekong is joined by the Bras du Lac, which comes in from the Great Lake (Tonle-sap) in Cambodia. This lake receives much of the flood water of the Mekong and at flood time actually quadruples its area, covering 770 square miles. The area uncovered at low-water season is highly fertile. At Pnom-penh the delta begins, and this, which includes the Vaiko, Donnai, and Saigon, forms a labyrinth of navigable waterways, the chief of which is the channel leading to the great port of Saigon. The low-lying districts at the mouth of the Mekong are subject to extensive floods in the wet season. The Mekong has a number of small tributaries on both banks, the most important being the Se-moun, which joins it on the right bank at Pak-moun.

Cambodia to a great extent, and Cochin-China almost entirely, consist of flat alluvial lands formed by the Mekong system, intersected by waterways, extremely fertile and producing heavy crops of rice which support a large population.

(3) Climate

The climate of Indo-China varies considerably with the latitude and altitude of the different parts, but an excessively hot summer is common to the whole. In the south there are two seasons, the wet and the dry, corresponding with the monsoons, though in the low-lying country the heat is great all the year round and for the most part humid and exceedingly trying for Europeans. The north-east monsoon blows from about the middle of October to the middle of April, and during this period, the dry season, the temperature remains almost steady, between 78·8° and 80·6° F. (26–27° C.) by day and 68° F. (20° C.) by night. From mid-April to mid-October, the wet season, the monsoon blows from the south-west; and the temperature rises to between 80·6° and 84·2° F. (27–29° C.), at which it remains day and night with little variation. April and May are the hottest months, with a temperature from 86° to 93° F. (30–34° C.).

In Tongking and northern Annam the summer is very hot, with frequent storms and heavy rain. The winter from November to February is dry and pleasant; while from February to April the climate is cool and damp, with much fine rain and mist in the Red River delta. In Tongking the wind blows steadily from the south-east from May to October; and the temperature rises above 83° F. (28·3° C.), frequently reaching 95° F. (35° C.) and more. In Annam, June, July, and August are a dry season, the thermometer varying between 86° and 95° F. (30° and 35° C.), with comparative coolness

at night. The north-east monsoon brings rain in September; and this is also the month of typhoons. The mountainous country in the interior has a cooler and drier climate.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

The hot, moist climate of southern Indo-China is extremely trying for Europeans. Depression and anaemia are the direct results of the enervating conditions. Tongking is more habitable, owing to its wholesome winter season. Dysentery, malaria, cholera, and small-pox are prevalent throughout the whole region, but may be avoided by proper sanitary precautions. The forests and jungles of the interior are unhealthy.

(5) Race and Language

The natural attractions of the river deltas and the fertile coastlands have drawn to them invading races from India, China, and Tibet, who have either absorbed the natives or driven them into the wretched and unhealthy inland districts. Of these invading races the most important are the following:

The *Cambodians*, who claim a Khmer origin and an Indian civilization, overran the country bordering on the lower Mekong and the Great Lake in the early Middle Ages, their most prosperous era being between the sixth and twelfth centuries.

The *Hindus* established two colonies at the beginning of the Christian era—one in the south-eastern corner of Indo-China (the Champa), and the other on the lower Mekong. They were both absorbed, though a few survivors still retain their national characteristics under the name of Chams.

The *Thais*, from the borders of Tibet, northern Yun-nan and Upper Burma, spread into Tongking and

Laos, where they still form a large portion of the mountain population.

The *Annamese*, a Mongol type, are said to have come from southern China about the second century B. C. They gradually overran all the fertile lands of Tongking and Annam, and spread into Cochin-China and Cambodia. They now represent about four-fifths of the total population of Indo-China. They are, as a whole, industrious and comparatively energetic, good agriculturists, clever workmen, intelligent, and quick learners. Their language is akin to Chinese; and the Chinese written character is in general use.

The *Chinese*, who followed the Annamese invaders and for a long time dominated them, are now scattered throughout Indo-China, where their superior commercial aptitude has given them command of the trade and minor industries.

A continual stream of immigrants strongly imbued with Chinese influences is constantly filtering down into Indo-China, including the Mans from Fu-kien and Hu-nan, the Meos from Upper Kwei-chow, the Lolos from Sze-chwan and Upper Yun-nan, and the Nungs from southern China. They have settled where they could find congenial conditions of climate and soil, and have for the most part mingled peaceably with the other inhabitants. The official European language is French, but intercourse has hitherto depended very much on the help of interpreters.

(6) Population

Distribution and Density

No census of the population has been taken except in Cochin-China, and we are dependent upon estimates which vary considerably. The official estimate for 1914 was 16,645,638, made up as follows:

Cochin-China	3,050,785
Annam	5,200,000
Cambodia	1,634,252
Tongking	6,119,724
Laos	640,877

The lowest estimate brings the total down to 10,000,000.

The distribution of this population is very unequal. The fertile delta lands, the borders of certain rivers, the region of the Great Lakes, and the northern half of the Annamese coast are more or less thickly populated; the forest and mountain regions of the interior are for the most part uninhabited.

The European population, mainly French, was 23,700, including military, in 1914.

Towns and Villages

In Tongking the Red River (Song-koi) delta is a teeming district with several large towns and innumerable villages. Hanoi with its suburbs, at the head of the delta, has 150,000 inhabitants. It is the capital of Indo-China, and has a large modern town laid out by the French beside the native city. Hai-fong, the port of Hanoi, situated on one of the arms of the Red River, is a busy commercial town with 25,000 inhabitants. Nam-dinh, in the southern part of the delta, is a flourishing native town with 50,000 inhabitants.

In Annam the capital, Hué, has about 60,000 inhabitants. It lies about 9 miles from the sea, and has an indifferent harbour. Tourane (7,000 inhabitants), in a beautiful and well-sheltered bay, is a second-class port with a considerable trade. Fai-fo (Wang-nam), near Tourane, is a busy centre of Chinese trade.

In Cochin-China the delta lands at the mouth of the Mekong are densely populated, with thriving towns connected by a network of waterways. The capital, Saigon, is a beautiful modern town with about 100,000

inhabitants, and, though 40 miles from the sea, has a harbour of great commercial and naval importance. The neighbouring town of Cholon (population, 170,000) is purely commercial and mainly Chinese. Other towns of considerable population in the delta are My-tho (27,000), Sadek (15,000), and Vinh-long; Bien-hoa (20,000) at the head of navigation of the Donnai river, and Baria (30,000) in the south-eastern corner of the province.

In Cambodia the capital, Pnom-penh, at the junction of the Mekong and the Bras du Lac, has a population of about 60,000. The banks of the Mekong and the borders of the Great Lake are the most populous parts of the rest of the province.

Laos is thinly inhabited, with few towns of importance. Vien-tiane, the administrative centre, has about 10,000 inhabitants; and Luang-Prabang, in Upper Laos, has 12,000. For the rest, the province contains rich tracts of country, but is undeveloped.

Movement

In the absence of statistics it is difficult to speak of the movements of the population. The capital towns, such as Hanoi, Saigon, and Hué, especially Hanoi, have grown rapidly during the French occupation. Parts of Annam have suffered from time to time from the ravages of famine caused by disastrous storms and drought, and the consequent failure of the rice harvest; but the French have done much to remove these dangers by irrigation works and improved communications.

KWANG-CHOW-WAN

The leased territory of Kwang-chow-wan is regarded as part of French Indo-China. Its position is approximately in 21° 5′ north latitude and 110° 40′ east

longitude, on the eastern side of the Leichow peninsula, which projects from the province of Kwang-tung towards the island of Hainan. Its area is 190 square miles, or 325 including the bay of Kwang-chow-wan with the islands which enclose it and the mouth of the Matshe river. The land boundaries are purely conventional, being defined by agreement with the Chinese Government, who leased the territory to the French in 1898 for a period of 99 years. It lies close to the main trade route between Europe and China, and is the best harbour in this part of the Kwang-tung coast. The French occupied it as a possible naval base, but at present it is unprovided with quays, docks, or harbour facilities. The approach, which is covered by the islands of Tan-hai and Nau-chow, consists of a deep channel interrupted by a bar with only $3\frac{3}{4}$ fathoms of water at low tide. In the bay is a secure anchorage between the 5-fathom contours. The bay is a continuation of the estuary of the Matshe river, which provides a fine inner anchorage up to three miles from the mouth. The surrounding country is poor.

The climate is very similar to that of Tongking.

There are about 189,000 Chinese inhabitants, distributed over some 800 villages and a few small towns. The latter include Chi-khom, a junk port on the Matshe river, Po-tao on the east, and Fort Bayard and the French town of Kwang-chow-wan at the mouth of the river. The foreign residents are mainly the French officials and garrison.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Summary

Fifth Century. The Khmer dynasty in Cambodia.
Ninth Century (end). Angkor founded.
968. Annamese dynasty set up in Annam.
Twelfth Century. Conquest of Cochin-China and South Annam by Cambodia.
Fourteenth Century. Fall of the Khmer dynasty.
1428. Restoration of Annamese dynasty after an interlude of Chinese rule.
Fifteenth Century. Abandonment of Angkor.
1568. South Annam becomes a separate principality as Cochin-China.
Sixteenth Century. Portuguese and Dutch reach Cambodia.
Seventeenth Century. Southern Annamese encroach on Cochin-China.
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Struggle between Siamese and Annamese in Cambodia.
Eighteenth Century (end). Rebellion in Cochin-China.
1787. Treaty between France and Cochin-China.
1801. Gia-long establishes himself in Tongking.
1846. Annamese evacuate Cambodia.
1858. Franco-Spanish fleet at Tourane.
1862. Treaty between Cochin-China and France and Spain.
1863. French Treaty with Cambodia.
1867. Franco-Siamese Treaty.
1873. Garnier seizes Hanoi. The Black Flags.
1874. Franco-Annamese Treaties.
1880. Annam accepts position of Chinese tributary.
1882. Rivière's expedition.
1883. Death of Rivière. Capture of Son-tai.
1884–5. Franco-Chinese imbroglio.
1885. Treaty of Tientsin. Revolt of Annamese Government.
1891. De Lanessan Governor-General.
1893. French ultimatum to Siam. Treaty and Convention with Siam. British intervention.

1895. Franco-Chinese Convention.
1896. Joint declaration by Great Britain and France.
1904. } Franco-Siamese Treaties.
1907. }

(1) From Early Times to the Middle of the Nineteenth Century

CAMBODIA

The Khmer country, Cambodia, is mentioned in Chinese records from an early date. Some centuries before the Christian era, Brahmanism and the Sanscrit language were imported there from the east coast of India, and by the fifth century A. D. the Indian influence had become marked. The Khmer nation were prominent at this period, and native dynasties ruled for many centuries. The city of Angkor was founded at the close of the ninth century, and shortly afterwards Buddhism began to rival the official religion—Brahmanism. Cochin-China and South Annam were conquered in the twelfth century, and war was waged against the peoples in the west of Cambodia; but soon afterwards the decline of the Khmer power began, and the Thai races of Siam were able to throw off the Khmer yoke about the beginning of the fourteenth century. Constant aggression by the Thais led to internal dissension and the abandonment of Angkor in the fifteenth century.

The western nations appeared on the scene in the sixteenth century, when the Portuguese obtained a footing in Cambodia. They were followed by the Dutch; but after the middle of the seventeenth century there was little European influence until the arrival of the French.

About the beginning of the seventeenth century the Nguyen rulers of South Annam began to encroach on

Cochin-China, and during that century and the eighteenth Cambodia, which was governed by two kings supported respectively by Siam and Annam, became a field for the conflicts of its two powerful neighbours. The Cambodian provinces of Battambang and Siemrap were annexed by Siam at the close of the eighteenth century, and the rivalry of the two Powers was concluded after a long war by a treaty of 1846, under which the protégé of Siam was placed on the throne, and the Annamese evacuated Cambodia.

ANNAM, TONGKING, AND COCHIN-CHINA

Up to the tenth century of our era the rulers of the countries now known as Annam and Tongking appear to have been of Chinese descent, and the peoples they governed were mainly Chams, whose civilization was Hindu, and Annamese, who are held to have come originally from South China. In 968 the Chinese domination was displaced and an Annamese dynasty was founded. Though for a short time at the beginning of the fifteenth century Chinese rule was restored, an Annamese dynasty resumed the sovereignty in 1428 and endured until the end of the eighteenth century. During the greater part of these four hundred years the titular sovereigns were puppets, and the real control remained in the hands of the Trinh family in Tongking, and of the Nguyen family in South Annam, which in 1568 became a separate principality known as Cochin-China. Here towards the close of the eighteenth century there was a rebellion which overthrew the Nguyen, and one of the members of this family, Gia-long, sent the missionary Bishop Pigneau de Béhaine to France to invoke assistance for the purpose of regaining control of the country.

French Treaty of 1787.—At Versailles on November 28, 1787, Bishop Pigneau, on behalf of Gia-long,

concluded a treaty with Louis XIV, in which Tourane and the islands of Pulo-Condore were ceded to France in return for specified military assistance to replace Gia-long on the throne of Cochin-China. This treaty also established an alliance between the two countries, under which Cochin-China was bound to assist France in wars against other Powers, while the help of France could be invoked by the King of Cochin-China only in the case of aggression.

(2) From the Middle of the Nineteenth Century

Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1862.—The successors of Gia-long were antagonistic to the French influence, and persecutions of the Christian missionaries and converts followed. These led in the reign of Tu-duc in 1858 to the arrival at Tourane of a Franco-Spanish fleet. After the capture of that town Saigon was stormed, and Rigault de Genouilly made it his base of operations; but his inadequate forces confined him to the defensive, and he was soon blockaded by an Annamese general. Admiral Charnier arrived at Saigon with reinforcements in February 1861, the Annamese were driven off, and My-tho was taken. A revolt against Tu-duc in Tongking and the stoppage of the rice supplies from Cochin-China obliged him to submit and to conclude a treaty (June 5, 1862) with France and Spain, by which three provinces of Cochin-China were ceded and other concessions accorded to France. Spain obtained little more than freedom for Christian propaganda and a share in the indemnity of four millions of dollars which was exacted from Annam.

Treaty with Cambodia, 1863.—In 1863 Doudart Lagrée was sent by Admiral La Grandière, who had been appointed Governor of Cochin-China, to the Court of King Norodom of Cambodia, to counteract the Siamese influence in that country. As a result of his efforts,

Cambodia accepted the protectorate of France in a treaty signed at Houdong on August 11, 1863. Under La Grandière the exploration of the Mekong was undertaken by Garnier, and to put an end to covert opposition and hostility encouraged by the Annamese governors, the three provinces of Cochin-China, which had been left to Annam by the treaty of 1862, were annexed by a proclamation of June 25, 1867. Soon afterwards (July 15, 1867) a treaty was concluded at Paris between France and Siam 'to regulate the political position and limits' of Cambodia, and by this Siam renounced the right to tribute, and recognized the French protectorate in return for the two provinces of Battambang and Angkor.

French Penetration of Tongking.—Tongking was loosely united to Annam until 1801, when Gia-long brought it definitely under his sway. After the treaty of 1862 the French turned their attention to this province, which was reported to be rich in minerals. A French trader, Jean Dupuis, attempted to make use of the Red River (Song-koi) route to Yun-nan to convey military stores to the Chinese authorities who were fighting the Taiping rebels, and Captain Senez was sent from Saigon to open it to French trade. Dupuis forced his way through in face of the opposition of the Tongkingese authorities, and on his return to Hanoi an order was issued calling upon him to leave the country. He refused to do so, and Garnier was sent to Hanoi with a detachment to arrange matters. The latter sided entirely with Dupuis, and, the Tongkingese refusing to treat with him except on the subject of Dupuis' expulsion, he attacked the citadel of Hanoi, carried it by assault, and established himself there (November 1873). Reinforcements were called for from Saigon, and in the meantime small detachments captured the five important strongholds of the delta. The Tongkingese

now invoked the assistance of Liu Yung-fu (Lu Vinh-phuoc), the leader of the Chinese rebels known as 'Black Flags', who infested the Tongking border. The Black Flags attacked at once, and in the opening fights Garnier was killed. The Saigon authorities, who had not bargained for a policy of aggression, sent M. Philastre to apologize to the King of Annam, and the French detachments were withdrawn from three of the delta strongholds.

Franco-Annamese Treaty of 1874.—Negotiations which had been carried on fitfully with the Court of Hué since the annexation of the three provinces by La Grandière in 1867 were now taken in hand seriously to regularize the situation, and the result was the treaty of March 15, 1874, which took the place of that of 1862. By this Annam at last recognized the annexation of 1867, and in return France abandoned the unpaid balance of indemnity due from 1862—some £220,000. Military and naval assistance was given by France to Annam to put down brigandage on the Chinese border and piracy along the coasts of Tongking, and personnel and material were promised to enable Annam to reorganize her fleet and army, re-establish order in the administration, create customs and revenue services, and direct works of public utility. Annam renounced the power to conclude political alliances with other States, but retained the right to contract treaties of commerce after giving notice to France. Fuller protection was accorded to the Christian religion, and converts were relieved from political disabilities. A treaty of commerce followed on August 31, 1874, by which certain ports and the Red River to the Chinese frontier were opened to trade.

The Comte de Rochehouart brought the political treaty, in which France recognized the sovereignty of the King of Annam and 'his entire independence

vis-à-vis any foreign Power whatsoever', to the notice of the Chinese Government, and received a reply mentioning that Annam had been for long a tributary of China, but raising no objection to the terms of the treaty. Later, however, on September 24, 1881, the Marquis Tsêng informed M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire that the Chinese Government were unable to recognize the Treaty of 1874.

The Chinese Suzerainty of Annam.—For some years the situation so remained, French interests and prestige having suffered severely by the death of Garnier and the withdrawal of the French troops in Tongking. The Garnier aggression had turned the Annamese Court towards China, which had for centuries exercised a nominal suzerainty over Annam; the tribute remissions were now sent more regularly to Peking; and in 1880 the King dispatched a special mission bearing a letter in which the position of tributary was emphasized. China accepted the responsibility by publishing the King's letter in the *Peking Gazette*.

French Conquest of Tongking.—In 1882 the Governor of Cochin-China, Le Myre de Vilers, sent Henri Rivière with a small force to open up the Song-koi route to Yun-nan. He, like Garnier, found the Tongkingese intractable, stormed the Hanoi citadel, and went on to capture the other towns in the delta. Once more the Black Flags were called in, and again, like Garnier, Rivière fell a victim in one of the early encounters (May 1883). This event led Jules Ferry to decide on a forward policy; but at first the outlying garrisons were withdrawn, except from Nam-dinh and Hai-fong; and Hanoi was beleaguered by the Black Flags. Efforts made by Admiral Courbet and General Bouet were by no means successful, and the Commissary-General Harmand went to Hué, supported by Courbet, to bring pressure to bear upon the Annamese Court.

Tu-duc's successor was hostile, and Hué was stormed. Harmand concluded a treaty (August 25, 1883), in which Annam accepted the French protectorate, another province was annexed to Cochin-China, and the French were authorized to take military measures in Tongking. Bouet now again advanced against Son-tai, though the Chinese representative at Paris protested, and after one unsuccessful attempt the place was captured on December 16, 1883.

Franco-Chinese Imbroglio, 1884–5.—In this campaign the French were fighting against Chinese troops. There had been negotiations at Peking since November 1882; but no progress was made till the spring of 1884, when the Tientsin Viceroy, Li Hung-chang, intimated to the French Admiral, who had arrived at Shanghai with a squadron, that he would be glad to consider the situation with Captain Fournier, a French naval officer known to him. In this way a preliminary convention was concluded by Li and Fournier (May 11, 1884), by which China agreed to evacuate Tongking and to respect the Franco-Annamese treaties, while France engaged to respect the Chinese frontiers on the south and to pay regard to the prestige of China in the treaty which France was about to conclude with Annam. In the month following (June 6, 1884) another treaty signed by M. Patenôtre at Hué confirmed and extended the French protectorate over Tongking and Annam, altered some of the territorial arrangements of the Harmand Treaty of 1883, which had not been found satisfactory, and replaced the treaties of 1874; but in view of the discontent aroused it was not set in force for some years. Concurrently the Governor of Indo-China, M. Thomson, negotiated a convention with King Norodom, confirming and completing the treaty of August 11, 1863, strengthening the French position, and abolishing slavery, in Cambodia.

Unfortunately, a serious misunderstanding arose in connexion with the execution of the Li-Fournier Convention of May 11, 1884. A supplementary agreement fixed the dates for the evacuation of certain places in Tongking by the Chinese troops, but when the French commander proceeded to act upon it, it was found that the Chinese military authorities had not received corresponding instructions, and a collision occurred in which the French were worsted. A period of hostility followed between France and China, which was ended by a protocol signed at Paris (April 4, 1885) through the good offices of Sir Robert Hart. The effect of this protocol was to confirm the Fournier Convention, and it was followed by a treaty executed at Tientsin (June 9, 1885), in which China undertook to respect the 'treaties, conventions, and arrangements', present and future, concluded between France and Annam. Two later conventions (June 26, 1887) delimited the China-Tongking frontier and established the existing commercial relations between Tongking and China.

Pacification of Tongking.—For some years, till 1891, the French proceeded generally with the conquest and annexation of Tongking and Annam under cover of the 1884 treaty. When Hué was occupied in July 1885, the Annamese Government revolted. The revolt was suppressed, the new king fled, and civil war ensued in Annam. Tongking also rose, and the disorders tempted the Black Flags and Tongkingese rebels to devastate the country. The occupation of Tongking became a prolonged struggle with numerous bands of dacoits, which extended through the years 1885 to 1890, and cost the French a serious expenditure. Trade was almost at an end, and the French were gradually driven to the Red River delta, where they held the chief towns only. From Hanoi itself the Governor-General could see the smoke of the villages burned by the bandits.

With the arrival of M. de Lanessan as Governor-General in April 1891 a new era began. Heretofore the French had proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the Tongkingese and Annamese were two distinct peoples, and that the former were the oppressed vassals of the latter. De Lanessan ascertained that the way to peace in Tongking lay through the Court at Hué, and he concluded an agreement which reassured the King, who had been afraid of annexation. The King issued a proclamation which had the immediate effect of stopping all disorders except those conducted by the Black Flag pirates. In a couple of years these also were overcome, and the pirate chiefs made their submission.

French Disputes with Siam.—On the Chinese frontier agreements were concluded with Marshal Su, the Chinese commander, for co-operation in the suppression of piracy; but there were difficulties on the Siamese frontier. Friction arose between the French agents and Siamese troops, and after the death of Inspector Grosqurin (June 5, 1893), the French Government occupied Stung-treng and Khong. Redress was demanded at Bangkok and refused. After an ultimatum which was not complied with, French gunboats forced the passage to Bangkok, and a second ultimatum was presented. This called for (1) the occupation of Chantaboun by the French until Siam evacuated the left bank of the Mekong; (2) the interdiction to Siam to maintain troops at Battambang, Siemrap, and generally within 15½ miles of the right bank of the Mekong; (3) or to have armed boats on the Tonle-sap.

This ultimatum was executed immediately. The Siamese evacuated the left bank of the Mekong, and the King of Luang-Prabang submitted with alacrity to the French, who took possession of Laos. By a treaty

and convention concluded by Le Myre de Vilers at Bangkok on October 3, 1893, Siam renounced all claim to territory on the left bank of the Mekong or to the islands in the river; undertook to maintain no troops or fortified posts in the provinces of Battambang and Siemrap and in a strip, 25 kilometres wide, along the right bank of the Mekong; and agreed that France should continue in the occupation of Chantaboun until the terms of the treaty and convention were executed.

British Intervention and the Franco-British Déclaration of 1896.—The British Government took a serious view of the dispute between France and Siam. Negotiations were opened at Paris and a memorandum was signed on July 31, 1893, by Lord Dufferin and M. Develle, in which both Powers recognized the necessity of constituting a neutral zone between their possessions on the upper Mekong, and agreed that the limits of this zone should be determined later. A Franco-British Commission sat for this purpose at Paris, but was unable to attain its end through want of precise knowledge of the political boundaries and physical conformation of the territories in question; it was mutually agreed to suspend action until technical agents of both countries should have made investigations on the spot. However, a convention between France and China, concluded at Peking on June 20, 1895, again brought the question sharply to the front. By an earlier convention of March 1, 1894, Great Britain had agreed to leave to China two small States, Mung Lem and Kiang Hung, over which the King of Ava and the Emperor of China had exercised suzerain rights concurrently, with the proviso that no portion of them should be alienated to any other Power without previous agreement with Great Britain. Kiang Hung lies astride the Mekong, and by the French Convention the portion of it on the left bank was assigned to France.

Before the transaction was completed the British Minister at Peking protested; and eventually compensation was accorded to Great Britain by China for the breach of treaty, while, by a joint declaration of January 15, 1896, Great Britain and France agreed that the *thalweg* of the Mekong should be the boundary between the possessions or spheres of influence of the two Powers as far as the Chinese frontier.

Franco-Siamese Treaties of 1904 *and* 1907.—A new Franco-Siamese treaty of February 13, 1904, modified that of 1893: Chantaboun was evacuated and the neutral zone along the Mekong was renounced in return for Bassak, Melupré, the district of Dan-Sai (comprising that portion of Luang Prabang on the right bank of the Mekong), and the maritime district of Kratt. By a further convention of March 23, 1907, Siam gave up Battambang, Siemrap, and Sisophon, and received in return Kratt and Dan-Sai, which were ceded in 1904.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

The religion of the Annamites, who comprise about four-fifths of the population, appears on the surface to be a pale reflection of the religious doctrines and ceremonies prevalent in China. Ten centuries of domination by China have no doubt left a deep impression; but the mass of the population has not been affected so much as the official and learned classes, who by virtue of their studies in classical Chinese have imbibed the philosophy of Confucius. The chief manifestations, however, of the religious life of the people consist in ancestor-worship, spirit-worship, and respect for the dead, combined with an external aspect of Buddhism.

In every native house—even the poorest—a space is reserved for ancestral worship, and an altar is there erected for the domestic rites, which, as a rule, are performed by the eldest son, and are similar to those observed in China. The beings, objects, and phenomena of nature to which special spirits are attributed by the Annamites are innumerable. Every wood—and indeed almost every old tree—harbours a particular divinity. Every mountain, hill, and stream has its good or evil spirit. Natural phenomena, such as clouds, thunder, wind, rain, &c., have been deified, as well as the sun, moon, and stars. Amongst animals the worship of the tiger is widespread.

In Cambodia and Laos the religion is Buddhism, with traces of Brahmanism in Court circles. Temples and numerous monks or priests are to be found in

every village in Cambodia. The monks lead a life of self-control and restraint, and they are respected and regarded with affection by the people. Spirit-worship is prevalent.

In Laos temples are not so numerous as in Cambodia; the priests are more ignorant, and in practice Buddhism is reduced to external signs of deference to the priests and sacred places. The propitiation of evil spirits is the dominant characteristic of religious life in these backward regions.

Roman Catholic missions have been established in Indo-China since 1660, and central Tongking is still the field of labour of a body of Spanish missionaries. Elsewhere French missionaries have numerous stations.

(2) Political

Government and Administration

The Governor-General is the supreme administrative and military authority, and he is assisted by a Superior Council created in its present form in 1898. It corresponds to a Legislative Council, and is composed of the Governor-General as president, the military and naval Commanders-in-Chief, the Secretary-General of Indo-China, the Governor of Cochin-China, the Residents Superior of Tongking, Annam, Cambodia, and Laos, the heads of departments of the Government-General, the President of the Colonial Council of Cochin-China, the presidents of the various Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture, two high native officials, and the Chief of Cabinet of the Governor-General, who acts as Secretary to the Council.

The Superior Council at present numbers thirty-two members. It must meet once a year, but not necessarily at the same place, although Hanoi is considered the seat of government. It considers the budgets prepared for each of the five divisions of Indo-China as well as

the General Budget, and advises on any legislation or important measures which may be in contemplation.

For the better disposal of business there are four committees of the council dealing with the following branches of administration: (1) military and naval affairs, public works, railways, and commerce; (2) legislative and administrative organization; (3) budgets; (4) financial matters.

When not in session the council delegates its functions to a permanent commission of thirteen members.

Cochin-China is a French colony, and is represented in France by a deputy elected by the French citizens. It is directly administered by a Governor, assisted by a Privy Council. The Colonial Council, elected partly by the French population and partly by natives, votes on the budget.

Tongking, Annam, and Cambodia are protectorates, of which the chief French official is designated Resident Superior. He is assisted by a Protectorate Council, composed of the heads of departments and delegates of the Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture.

Laos is directly administered by a Resident Superior, who exercises a general supervision over the native officials by whom the work of administration is carried on, with the assistance of a limited number of French officers.

The Resident Superior is the representative in his division of the Governor-General, with whom he corresponds. He carries out the execution of the laws and decrees, he maintains public order, and the personnel of the local administration is placed directly under his orders. In 1897 the direct control of the Residents Superior in Tongking and Annam was strengthened by the abolition of the functions of the native Viceroy in Tongking and the transformation of the *Co-mat* (Secret Council) of the King of Annam into a Council of

Ministries, whose decisions require the approval of the Resident Superior before they can be executed.

Tongking is now in fact a protectorate in name only.

Kwang-chow-wan, the territory leased from China, is administered by French officers working in close co-operation with the local officials.

Justice

In Cochin-China justice is administered in French courts by French judges. There are five magistrates (*juges de paix*), nine Courts of First Instance at different centres, and a branch of the Court of Appeal for Indo-China sitting at Saigon. The judges of the Courts of First Instance also exercise the functions of magistrates. There are, in addition, four criminal courts. Natives are not allowed to sit as judges.

French law is applied, modified by decrees where natives are solely concerned. In civil cases, local laws and customs are, to a certain extent, taken into consideration.

In Tongking, French judges with extensive powers sit at Hanoi, Hai-fong, and Nam-dinh. The Resident of each province exercises the jurisdiction of a magistrate, but he takes cognizance only of cases in which Europeans, French subjects, and foreigners are concerned. An appeal lies to the Court of Appeal for Indo-China, which sits at Hanoi.

Natives have their cases adjudicated by local officials in accordance with the native law and the ancient complicated system of procedure. When the evidence is recorded, the papers are remitted to different departments in Hanoi, according to the nature of the case, and judgement is given by officials therein, subject to the approval of the Resident Superior.

In Annam there exists a similar system.

In Cambodia and Laos, where the French Residents

likewise sit as judges in serious cases, the native courts enjoy a greater measure of independence.

Throughout Indo-China, Europeans can only be tried for serious criminal offences by French judges at specified centres.

Army and Police

In normal pre-war times the military forces numbered about 25,000, of whom half were natives. The country is policed by natives, supervised by French officers.

(3) EDUCATIONAL

The study of Chinese characters and classical literature, which prevailed in Tongking, Annam, and Cochin-China before the arrival of the French, is still maintained. Instruction is given in primitive native schools by retired officials, or by scholars who have failed to pass the higher examinations, in return for a pittance, supplemented by presents from their pupils.

When a child has mastered 500 or 600 characters, he may continue his studies at one of the Government schools which have been instituted in all the principal centres. There are three grades of such schools, and the teachers are paid by the State. In the second and third grades, a French education is imparted by European professors and by native teachers trained for the purpose. From these schools are recruited the interpreters and French-speaking Annamites in Government service.

A system of Roman characters has been invented for the Annamite language, and this is extensively used in the higher-grade schools.

In Cambodia, where there exists a language with an alphabet and native characters, instruction in reading and writing is almost universal. This is given by the

priests in the temples. In addition there are Government schools where French is taught.

In Laos a similar education prevails, but it is not so widespread.

The École Française d'Extrême Orient occupies itself chiefly in archaeological studies, the search for and care of ancient monuments, and the study of the languages of Indo-China and neighbouring countries.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The natives of Indo-China have accepted with apparent placidity the rule of the French, though disturbances have occurred from time to time in Annam and Tongking which show that discontent and unrest are at work beneath the surface. A recrudescence of revolutionary movement took place in Annam in 1917, but it has never been and is unlikely to be at any time so serious as to give the French authorities much trouble. Incidents on the Franco-Chinese frontier are constantly happening, owing to the predatory expeditions of 'brigands' from Chinese territory, or to the disarmament by the French authorities of Chinese refugees; but a more or less satisfactory settlement of such affairs is usually arrived at with China or with the Chinese officials of Yun-nan.

French Indo-China has been increasing in prosperity from year to year since 1898, but has by no means attained the full extent of economic development which is possible. This is evident if a comparison is made with the independent kingdom of Siam, which possesses a climate, productions, and a race of people analogous to those of Indo-China. Both as regards revenue and total trade, Siam, in proportion to her population, can claim considerable superiority.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) Internal

The main lines of communication of northern Indo-China radiate from the capital Hanoi. They run north-west up the valley of the Red River into Yun-nan; north-east to Lang-son and thence following the basin of the Si-kiang into Kwang-si; east down the delta of the Red River to the port of Hai-fong; and south along the western side of the same delta to the border of Annam. From this point the eastern line follows the coast down the whole length of Annam, sending off transverse lines at intervals across the Annamese chain into Laos and Cambodia. Cochin-China in the south is reached by this coastal route, which continues through Saigon to My-tho and Sadek on the Mekong. In Cochin-China, Cambodia, and Laos the Mekong and its branches form the main artery of communication, to which are added numerous canals and waterways, and several good roads which radiate from Saigon and Pnom-penh.

(*a*) *Roads and Paths*

The roads previous to French occupation were little better than tracks, sometimes suitable for carts, but more often only fit for foot or equestrian traffic. The French have made good roads of many of these tracks, and have built a network of military roads in the north suitable for wheeled traffic. Some of these in the more populous districts are destined to carry tramway lines. The work of extension, maintenance, and improvement goes on steadily from year to year.

Tongking.—In Tongking all the principal towns are connected by carriage-roads, which form a network in the Red River delta. In the mountainous regions of the north-west, however, rough tracks and bridle-paths are still the only means of communication.

The statistics for 1914 show that out of 5,515 miles of roads in Tongking 465 miles were metalled, the width of the metalling varying from 6½ to 23 ft.

Annam.—The roads from Hanoi to Lang-son and Ninh-binh are part of the old mandarin road which runs south along the coast of Annam, linking up Tongking and Cochin-China. This road crosses the Annamese frontier at Bim-son and follows the coast, passing through all the important towns of Annam. In the populous districts it has been rebuilt and is maintained in good order; in parts of southern Annam it is still a mere path. The total length of the mandarin road in Annam is about 900 miles, of which 382 were metalled in 1914, and 122 were still in the condition of pathways. Other roads totalled about 1,450 miles, of which 140 were metalled. There are a number of transverse roads leading from the mandarin road into interior Annam or crossing the Annamese chain at favourable points into Laos and Cambodia, but only one or two of these are fit for wheeled traffic along their whole length.

Cochin-China.—In Cochin-China road communications have been specially developed in the eastern parts of the colony, water communications in the west. In 1914 the returns showed a total of 1,710 miles of metalled roads, and 1,026 miles of unmetalled. The mandarin road along the coast of Annam is continued in Cochin-China through Baria to Saigon, whence good roads run in all directions.

Cambodia.—Of the numerous roads in Cambodia only portions amounting to about 400 miles were metalled in

1914. The most important is that leading from Saigon by Tay-ninh to Pnom-penh and on to Battambang, Sisophon, and the Siamese frontier, in all about 400 miles. It is suitable for motors almost as far as Sisophon, and about 186 miles in Cambodia were metalled in 1915. A steam ferry crosses the Mekong at Ba-nam; elsewhere this route is served by bridges. There is a metalled road from Pnom-penh to the port of Ha-tien (122 miles) by way of Kampot, and another from Pnom-penh to Chaodok in Cochin-China.

Laos.—Road-making in Laos is still in its infancy and only short stretches have been metalled. Along the Mekong there are occasional stretches of road to supplement water communications.

The chief obstacles to road transport in Indo-China are the numerous rivers and canals. These are gradually being surmounted by the erection of temporary wooden bridges and permanent structures in reinforced concrete. Much permanent bridging has already been completed in Tongking, and in Annam in 1914 the programme of construction included thirty-four bridges with a total length of 5,828 ft. Where no bridges exist ferries have been established.

Native road-transport consists of the small but sturdy native horses and mules for riding and pack-transport, coolie porters, and wheelbarrows. Palanquins and rickshaws are available in the neighbourhood of towns. Ox-carts are largely used in Cambodia, and elephants occasionally in Cambodia and Laos. The Europeans have added carriages and motors where suitable roads exist, but make use of the native means elsewhere.

(*b*) *Rivers and Canals*

The Red River System.—The main features of the Red River system, which includes practically all the

navigable waterways of Tongking, have been already described (p. 4). Further details may be considered in two divisions: (i) the river above Hanoi, (ii) the river below Hanoi, and the delta.

(i) From its source in Yun-nan as far as Yen-bai in Tongking the Red River flows in a confined channel: from Yen-bai onwards it is bordered by an ever-widening alluvial plain. The river is subject to a great rise between the months of June and October, due to the melting of snows in the mountains and to the heavy rains of the season. In 1913 the difference between high-water and low-water levels was 38 ft.—the maximum up to that date; in 1891 the difference was only 3½ ft. Navigability is impaired in the low-water season by rocks above Yen-bai and by shifting sand-banks below, so that the light-draught river steamers can only reach Lao-kai (about 300 miles up-stream) from July 1 to October 15; Yen-bai (about 220 miles upstream) being their terminus for the rest of the year. Junks, however, are able to reach Lao-kai and even Man-hao in Yun-nan (55 miles farther up-stream) at all seasons. The river is 656 ft. wide at Lao-kai.

The volume of traffic on the river can be gauged by the following figures:

At Hanoi in 1913 3,500 river vessels[1] and 20,000 junks entered and cleared. The Chinese Maritime Customs returns at Meng-tse in Yun-nan give 3,151 junks (of 4,069 aggregate tonnage) entered and cleared in 1914. The junk traffic with China has decreased considerably since the opening of the Hanoi–Yun-nan-fu Railway, the figures for 1905 showing 10,342 junks with a tonnage of 31,708. The time occupied by the voyage up-stream from Hai-fong to Lao-kai is 5 days (there

[1] *Chaloupes*, a word used in the French returns in a comprehensive sense, including launches, barges, and large sailing-boats, but always distinct from the Chinese junks and sampans

is no travelling by night) for steamers; from Hanoi to Lao-kai 2 months for junks.

The Red River receives two large tributaries in the neighbourhood of Vietry, about midway between Hanoi and Yen-bai, viz. the Clear River on the left bank and the Black River on the right. Both are liable to extensive rises in the high-water season, during which they are both navigable for about 56 miles from Vietry, the former up to Tuyen-kwang and the latter to Cho-bo.

In the low-water season the Clear River is navigable to Phu-doan only.

(ii) One arm of the delta leaves the Red River about 20 miles above Hanoi, but the main network spreads out lower down, forming a complex system of waterways supplemented by canals and reinforced on the north by the River Thai-binh with its numerous mouths. Unlike the Red River, the Thai-binh is not subject to heavy floods, and its depth varies little except from the tides. It is navigable for vessels of 13 to 14 ft. draught. But the inland traffic in the waterways of the delta is carried on chiefly by launches, river steamers, junks, and sampans, and almost all the waterways are navigable for these at all seasons.

Hanoi, Hai-fong, and Nam-dinh are the chief centres of this river traffic. There are regular steamer services between the most important towns of the delta, and up the Clear River and the Black River as far as these are navigable.

Of the many mouths of the delta rivers the majority are impeded by shoals. The Kwa-dai, one of the deepest, only admits vessels of 9 ft. draught at high-water springs; but there is plenty of water within the bar and this is used as a route to Hanoi. The Kwa-kam, formerly the main outlet and leading to Hai-fong, has now shoaled so much that only light-draught

vessels can use it, and the main outlet is now through the Kwa-nam-trieu.

Annam.—The rivers in Annam are for the most part dry in the dry season and torrents during the rains. The most important is the Song-ka, but it is only navigable for 10 miles from the mouth, and the bar only admits vessels of 10 ft. draught at high tide. There are, however, numerous short stretches of natural waterways (said to total 1,490 miles) and about 370 miles of canals which are navigable for junks and sampans at all seasons.

The Mekong System.—The remaining waterways of Indo-China are comprised in the Mekong system, of which a general outline is given above, p. 5. For further details it may be conveniently divided into three parts: (i) from the northern boundary of Indo-China to Kratie in Cambodia; (ii) from Kratie to the delta; (iii) the delta system.

(i) In the high-water season (July to November) the Mekong, swollen by the melting of mountain snows and by the seasonal rains, assumes enormous volume. In the low-water season it shrinks to relative insignificance. In general the length from Vientiane (about 900 miles from the sea) to Kratie (270 miles from the sea) is always navigable for vessels of about 3 ft. draught in a series of reaches which are separated by stretches of difficult and sometimes impracticable rapids. Launches can reach Luang-Prabang (250 miles above Vien-tiane) in the high-water season, but as a rule this stretch is only practicable for junks and sampans. The main navigable reach is from Vien-tiane to Kemmarat, below which to Pak-moun are 75 miles broken by rapids and only navigable by shallow launches from May to August and from October to January. After this is the Bassak Reach, ending in the formidable rapids of Khon, which have, however, been

circumvented by four miles of railway crossing Khon Island. The third reach, known as the Stung-treng, extends to the rapids of Sambor-Sambok, through which there is said to be a deep channel. About 10 shallow-draught launches of the Messageries Fluviales ply on these reaches, and a vast number of native boats. The only navigable tributary is the Se-moun, on the right bank, which can be used by launches for a very limited period of the year from Pak-moun to Ubon in Siam, above which place the channel is encumbered by rocks.

(ii) From Kratie (270 miles from the sea) the Mekong is navigable at all seasons for steamers of the Messageries Fluviales de Cochin-Chine, and forms the main artery of communication in Cambodia. It is joined at Pnom-penh (170 miles from the sea) on the right bank by the important branch leading to the Great Lake, which is itself fed by a number of small rivers. In the dry season this branch is navigable for steamers only as far as Kompong-chnang (62 miles); but in the high-water season (July to December) steamers can pass through the lake and on to Bak-prea, a distance of 170 miles, and for short distances up the principal rivers which flow into the lake. Sampans circulate freely at all seasons. The total length of waterways navigable for steamers in Cambodia in the high-water season is computed to be 735 miles. The number of river vessels (from 50 to 850 tons) registered at Pnom-penh is 64, and in addition twelve steamers of the Messageries Fluviales make regular journeys from Saigon through the Cambodian waterways. Cargo-boats from Singapore and Manila also come up to Pnom-penh.

(iii) At Pnom-penh the Mekong divides into the Upper Branch (Tien-kang) and the Lower Branch (the Bassak), both of which split up nearer the coast into a number of arms, forming the western side of the Cochin-China

delta. The eastern part of the delta is formed by the many mouths of the Vaiko and the Donnai rivers.

This delta region, which comprises the greater part of Cochin-China, is a great network of rivers linked by innumerable canals. The Mekong branches, the Vaiko and the Donnai (up to a point 6 miles below Bien-hoa), are all navigable for river craft. It is calculated that there are altogether 1,084 miles of navigable waterways of primary importance, with another 1,055 miles of secondary canals, which connect all the river branches and the principal towns.

Considerable sums are being spent annually on the maintenance and improvement of the canals and creeks, and the list of first-class waterways is continually growing. In 1913 there were 208 steamboats on the inland waters; the junks are numbered by thousands. The river traffic returns at Saigon for 1913 were 1,375 vessels with an aggregate tonnage of 244,721 tons.

There are seven main mouths of the Mekong, having 7 to 10 ft. of water on the bars at low-water springs, with a rise of 10 to 12 ft. at spring tides. The depths increase inside the bars, but navigation is only safe for those with local knowledge. The northern or Kwa-tieu mouth, leading to My-tho, is the only one in general use. In the eastern part of the delta the Song-ngo Bay, on the east side of Kan-gio Point, is the entrance of the main channel to Saigon (see p. 45).

(*c*) *Railways*

Railway System in general.—The railway system of Indo-China may be said to date from 1898. Two short strips of narrow-gauge lines in Tongking and Cochin-China were all that existed before that year, when M. Doumer's programme was accepted by the French Government and a loan of 200 million francs was sanctioned for the carrying out of the most

urgent part of it. M. Doumer's ambition was to establish a great railway junction at Hanoi, from which lines would radiate north-west to Lao-kai and Yun-nan-fu, north-east to Lang-son and the border of Kwang-si, east to Hai-fong, and south to Saigon. From the trunk line, Hanoi–Saigon, branches were to be pushed out west through the mountains into Laos. The Saigon–My-tho line was to be reconstructed and extended to Vinh-long and Kan-tho, and further a line was to be built from Saigon to Pnom-penh in Cambodia and eventually extended to Battambang and linked up with the Siamese railways. A large part of this programme has either been completed already or is actually in process of being carried out, viz.:

(1) Hanoi to Hai-fong, 64 miles.
(2) Hanoi to Lao-kai, 184 miles.
(3) Lao-kai to Yun-nan-fu, 288 miles.

Built under an eighty-year concession from the Chinese Government and opened in 1910. It passes through very difficult country and is much exposed to landslips. Serious interruptions have occurred almost every year since it has been open to traffic.

(4) Hanoi to Lang-son, Dong-dang, and Nam-kwam on the frontier of Kwang-si, 104 miles.
(5) Hanoi to Vinh, 202 miles.
(6) Kwang-tri to Tourane, 109 miles.

(5) and (6) are sections of the Hanoi–Saigon trunk. Of the intervening space between Vinh and Kwang-tri (about 190 miles) it appears that all but 46 miles from Dong-hoi northwards was practically completed in 1914.

(7) Nha-trang to Saigon with branch to Ksom-gon, 278 miles.

Parts of the branch line are still under con-

struction. The intervening sections (about 330 miles) between Tourane and Nha-trang, which would complete the Hanoi–Saigon trunk, are under consideration.

(8) Saigon to My-tho, 44 miles.

The total in 1914 was 1,273 miles in actual use, with an additional 154 under construction.

Details of Construction.—All the Indo-Chinese railways are single lines of metre gauge. Steam traction is used, and the fuel consists of coal briquettes and in some cases of wood. On the Hai-fong–Yun-nan-fu Railway there are several important bridges in the Tongking section, viz. over the Tam-bak (295 feet), over the Lai-vu (413 feet), over the Tai-binh (1,252 feet), the celebrated Pont Doumer over the Red River at Hanoi (5,518 feet), over the Clear River (971 feet), and over the Nam-ti river at Lao-kai (394 feet); there is also a viaduct at Hanoi 2,940 feet long. In the Yun-nan section the construction was extremely difficult, involving 155 tunnels and numerous bridges, galleries, and viaducts. The construction of the other railways did not involve many important engineering works. There are two tunnels and some small viaducts between Hué and Tourane, but otherwise there is nothing especial to note. The gradients as a whole are moderate, except in Yun-nan, where the line rises 3,600 feet in 38 miles with gradients in places of 1 in 40.

Tramways.—The French have built a number of tramways in populous districts:

(*a*) In the neighbourhood of Hanoi, with a total length of 15 miles. The receipts for January–August 1914 were at the rate of £686 per mile per annum.

(*b*) From Kam-giang to Phu-ninh-giang, length 26½ miles. The receipts for 1913 were £139 per mile.

(*c*) At Tourane, from the Ilot de l'Observatoire to Fai-fo, length 16½ miles. The receipts for 1913 were £51 per mile.

(*d*) In the neighbourhood of Saigon, length 26½ miles. The receipts for 1913 were £1,200 per mile.

Relation to Government.—The capital for the construction of the Hai-fong–Yun-nan-fu Railway was found by (1) a French syndicate known as La Société de construction des chemins de fer de l'Indo-Chine, (2) the Compagnie des chemins de fer de l'Indo-Chine et du Yun-nan, (3) the Government of Indo-China, and (4) the French Government. The management is controlled by the Indo-Chinese Government through the Compagnie des chemins de fer de l'Indo-Chine et du Yun-nan. The remaining railways are exploited directly by the Indo-Chinese Government. There are no foreign railway concessions.

Finance.—The following figures will give some indication of the capital, gross earnings, and profits the various of lines:

Miles open in 1914.	*Railway.*	*Capital expended.*	*Gross earnings 1913.*	*Profit or loss 1913.*
		£	£	£
536	Hai-fong–Yun-nan-fu	9,230,060	312,043	+ 92,445
104	Hanoi–Nam-kwan	1,641,376	35,198	+ 7,910
202	Hanoi–Vinh	1,740,000	58,133	
109	Kwang-tri–Tourane	1,260,000	12,898	— 8,514
278	Nha-trang–Saigon	2,560,000	35,074	+ 14,191
44	Saigon–My-tho	465,362	33,117	
Totals 1,273		16,896,798	486,463	+106,032

The aggregate profits of all the railways rose steadily from £24,419 in 1909 to the above figure in 1913.

They were well maintained in 1914, but fell considerably in 1915 owing to the effects of the war.

Tariffs.—Though merchants complain that the tariffs on the Indo-Chinese lines are so high as to hamper trade, in comparison with those of other French colonial railways they appear to be moderate.

On the Hai-fong–Yun-nan-fu Railway they are graded according to four zones, the third and fourth zones being more costly owing to the difficulties of the country. Passenger tariffs on this line vary from $12\frac{1}{2}$ centimes per km. to $16\frac{1}{4}$ for first class, from $8\frac{3}{4}$ c. to $11\frac{1}{4}$ for second class, from 5 c. to $6\frac{1}{4}$ for third class, and from $1\frac{3}{4}$ c. to 2 for fourth class. On the northern group of the Indo-Chinese railways, Hanoi–Nam-kwan and Hanoi-Vinh, which are under direct Government control, the passenger tariffs for the four classes are $17\frac{1}{2}$ c., $8\frac{3}{4}$ c., 5 c., and $1\frac{3}{4}$ to $1\frac{1}{2}$ c. per km.

The tariffs for goods vary widely according to the distances traversed and the nature of the article carried, but statistics published in 1910 showed that the average cost per ton per km. was 11·4 c. on the Hai-fong–Yun-nan-fu Railway, 10 c. on the Hanoi–Nam-kwan, and 3·8 c. on the Hanoi–Vinh. The remaining railways conform more or less closely to the Hanoi–Vinh group.

Adequacy to Economic Needs.—The railways at present are fully capable of meeting economic demands. Indeed it is only the Hai-fong–Yun-nan-fu and Saigon–My-tho lines which are really remunerative. The completion of the general system, however, would doubtless bring an expansion of trade, and the following projects are under consideration:

Surveys have been made for a line from Saigon to Pnom-penh and on to Battambang and the Siamese frontier, to link up eventually with the Siamese railways at Bangkok; a line from Kwang-tri in Annam

to Savanakhet on the Mekong; and a line on the right bank of the Mekong from Savanakhet to Kompong-chnang in Cambodia.

There are, besides, various schemes for railway extension in China, e. g. to continue the Yun-nan-fu Railway northwards to the Yangtse and the province of Sze-chwan, and eventually to link it up with the North China systems; and to connect Kwang-chow-wan and Tongking by a line through Nan-ning to the Hanoi–Nam-kwan railway.

(*d*) *Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones*

An efficient postal service under French supervision has been established throughout Indo-China. In 1914 there were 8,719 miles of telegraph wires and 376 telegraph offices. Urban and inter-urban telephone service is installed in the most important districts.

(2) External

(*a*) *Overland and River Routes*

The external communications of Indo-China by road, river, and railway are of limited scope, and have been for the most part already enumerated as continuations of some of the main lines of internal communication. They are concerned with China and Siam, principally the former, and with regard to China the provinces of Kwang-si and Yun-nan are chiefly affected.

Kwang-si.—The old mandarin road crosses the border of Tongking and Kwang-si at Nam-kwan and runs thence to Lung-chow and Nanning, two treaty ports on the Tso-kiang and Yu-kiang (West River). This road is kept in good order in Tongking, and even in China it is undergoing improvement and can now be used for wheeled traffic most of the way to Lung-chow. A certain amount of river traffic in sampans and rafts crosses the border in this region on the upper waters

of the Tso-kiang, which divide into two rivers just above Lung-chow. One of these rivers passes Kao-bang, and the other, the Red River, passes Nam-kwan and is navigable for sampans as far as Na-cham. An extension of the Hanoi–Nam-kwan Railway by way of Lung-chow to Nanning, from which point the Tso-kiang is navigable for launch traffic, would open the rich basin of the Tso-kiang to French trade, but hitherto the Chinese Government has obstructed all plans in this direction. Lung-chow is about 18 miles from the Tongking frontier, and Nanning about 95 miles from Lung-chow.

Yun-nan.—The mountain roads leading from Tongking and Laos into Yun-nan are mere tracks suitable for mule traffic. That leading from Lao-kai to Meng-tse (112 miles) and Yun-nan-fu (290 miles) is now largely superseded by the railway. The path from Upper Laos leads into Yun-nan farther west, passing the treaty port of Sze-mao, a centre of the cotton and tea trades. The distance from Muong-sing, near the border of Laos, to Yun-nan-fu is 360 miles, a journey of 18 to 20 days for caravans.

The only navigable water-route into Yun-nan is by the Red River, and that is only practicable for junks as far as Man-hao, 55 miles above Lao-kai.

The only good medium of communication between Indo-China and Yun-nan is the railway which runs from Hai-fong to Yun-nan-fu. At mile 112½ from Lao-kai it reaches Pi-che-tchai, the station nearest Meng-tse, and a branch line is being built from this point to Meng-tse (7 miles) and to the tin mines at Kochiu (about 34 miles). The chief articles of export carried by it from China are metals, cunao, hides, and tea. In 1915 it carried 1,848,746 passengers and 197,464 tons of goods. The contemplated extensions of the line north into Sze-chwan, and onwards to join the Manchurian systems, would give it very great importance both

political and economic, and would immensely increase the trade of Hanoi and Hai-fong. The journey from Hanoi to Lao-kai occupies 12 hours; and that from Hanoi to Yun-nan-fu about 47 hours, no travelling being done at night.

Siam.—The main line of communication between Indo-China and Siam is the road which runs from Pnom-penh through Battambang and Sisophon to the Siamese frontier and on to Bangkok. The distance from the frontier to Bangkok is about 135 miles as the crow flies.

The Se-moun river admits of launch traffic for a limited period of the year from Pak-moun to Ubon, a distance of about 50 miles.

(*b*) *Ports*

In the long coast-line of Indo-China there are numerous small harbours used by junks and coastwise traders, but there are only two first-class ports, Hai-fong and Saigon, both in delta country and situated some distance from the open sea. At both of these towns the dock and wharfage accommodation is undergoing extensions and improvements.

Hai-fong is 22 miles from the sea, but vessels can come up the channel at low water if they do not draw more than 24 ft. The main wharf has a frontage of 600 yds.; there is 27 ft. of water alongside at low tide, and there are four berths for ocean steamers. There are, besides, five secondary wharves, and quays for river boats, as well as a patent slip, 130 ft. long, with lifting power of 400 tons, and a floating dock (200 ft. long and 73 ft. wide at entrance) with lifting power of 1,500 tons. The shipbuilding firm of Marty has workshops here, where vessels of over 300 tons capacity are built and repairs to ships and machinery can be effected. There are eight large warehouses.

Outside this port, in the bay of Along, ships can anchor in safe shelter.

Saigon ranks among French ports between Boulogne and Bordeaux in importance. It lies up the Saigon river, a branch of the Donnai, 40 miles from Cap St. Jacques. The entrance to the channel is on the east side of Kan-gio Point. Besides valuable naval equipment, it has quays 1,128 yds. long, with a depth alongside ranging from 19 to 32 ft.; several wharves, that of the Messageries Maritimes being 437 yds. long; two dry docks, the largest being 545 ft. long and 68 ft. wide at entrance; a floating dock (400 ft. by 66 ft.) capable of lifting 1,000 tons; a slip (167 ft. by 10 ft.); several large warehouses; and other facilities for shipping. The Government machine shops are capable of doing all kinds of work, and the ship-building shops of the Messageries Fluviales also undertake heavy repairs.

Of the secondary harbours the most important are Tourane, Hon-gay Bay, and Ben-thuy. *Tourane*, in the centre of the Annam coast, is situated in a large bay, which is sheltered on the sea side by the peninsula of Tien-cha. The bay, however, is shallow and ships have to lie at the entrance of the anchorage, which is connected with the harbour by a dredged channel only 10 ft. in depth. There is a wharf 200 ft. long in the Tourane river.

Hon-gay Bay (or *Port Courbet*) is the port of the Hon-gay coal-mines, and has a large traffic in coal-boats. It is approached by a channel 16 ft. deep, and has two wharves (260 ft. and 230 ft. long) with a depth of 24 ft. alongside.

Ben-thuy is a harbour in northern Annam, 10 miles from the mouth of the River Song-ka, and is accessible to vessels of 10-ft. draught at high tides.

Navigation in general in the Indo-Chinese waters is

affected by the monsoons (see p. 6), and is rendered difficult by the frequent typhoons and storms during the summer months, and especially in September.

(c) *Shipping*

The total sea-going traffic of Indo-China in 1914 consisted of 4,389 ships, with an aggregate tonnage of 4,741,504 tons, entered and cleared. Of these, 2,102 (tonnage 56,264) were junks, mainly Chinese. The number of ships sailing under the French flag was 624 (tonnage 1,441,343), and of the remainder British, Japanese, and Norwegian shipping formed the chief part. By far the largest portion of the total trade was done with Hongkong, Singapore, Chinese ports, Siam, and the Dutch East Indies. American shipping showed a remarkable increase in the returns for 1915.

At Hai-fong in 1914, 700 vessels (tonnage 951,643) entered and cleared, carrying goods amounting to 504,698 tons, of which the French lines, Messageries Maritimes and Chargeurs Réunis, carried 64,164 tons. At Saigon in 1913, 1,322 vessels (tonnage 2,979,726) entered and cleared in external trade. At Hon-gay in 1913, 231 vessels (tonnage 301,845) entered and cleared, presumably in the coal trade.

There are regular services from Saigon to Hai-fong, Shanghai and other Chinese ports, Yokohama, Manila, and Singapore, and to Europe by the Messageries Maritimes, the Chargeurs Réunis, the Peninsular and Oriental, and (before the war) the Norddeutscher Lloyd. There is also a large traffic by cargo boats of various nationalities with the ports of China, Siam, the Dutch East Indies, and the Straits Settlements.

Coastwise Traffic.—The coastwise traffic carried on by steamers, junks, and sailing-boats is very considerable, but as it is usually included with river traffic in the general returns the exact figures are not easily assessed.

The returns for Hai-fong in 1914 showed that 30,117 tons of exports and imports were carried in the coastwise trade; the coastwise traffic of Hon-gay amounted to 3,701 boats (tonnage 269,659), and that of Ben-thuy to 1,237 boats (tonnage 72,650).

The coast trade of Saigon is very active; figures for 1913 give 814 steamers and sailing ships (tonnage 916,349) and 4,683 junks (tonnage 80,373) entered and cleared.

A regular coastal service by the Messageries Maritimes and the Chargeurs Réunis plies between Hai-fong and Saigon, calling at Tourane and sometimes at Nha-trang and Kwi-nhon; junks and small steamers traffic between the various ports along the coasts of Tongking, Annam, and Cochin-China; and launches ply between the ports of Tongking and North Annam. The Messageries Maritimes have a coastwise service in the Gulf of Siam between Saigon, Ha-tien, Chantaboun, and Bangkok.

(*d*) *Telegraphic and Wireless Communications*

There are wireless stations at: (1) Bachmai, close to Hanoi, open to the public, normal range 1,000 nautical miles; (2) Kien-an, 1 mile south-west of the Observatory at Hai-fong, open to the public, normal range 350 nautical miles; (3) Tourane, normal range about 300 miles; (4) Cap St. Jacques, open to the public, normal range 2,800 miles; (5) Kwang-chow-wan, normal range 500 nautical miles. They are all controlled by the Government of Indo-China. Cables are laid from Saigon to Singapore, Pulo-Condore Islands and Pontianak, Hongkong, Tourane, and Hai-fong; and from Tourane to Amoy, Hongkong, and Manila. It is proposed to lay a cable from Hai-fong to Macao.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

The Annamese, who form about four-fifths of the population, are intelligent, industrious, and docile. From an industrial point of view they are superior to all the neighbouring races, and can easily be taught to deal with machinery. Unfortunately, they rarely attach themselves to an employer, but leave without any consideration for the work in progress, as soon as they have amassed enough savings. Though eager for gain they are not speculative or enterprising in their undertakings, and they are hostile to all innovations which do not offer a material and immediately appreciable result. They require close supervision in their work, as their chief aim is to get the maximum of profit by the minimum of labour. As agriculturists, however, they are indefatigable workers, and their careful methods enable them to exploit the more unfertile districts. Many of them are skilled and artistic workers in embroidery, carving, jewellery, and similar crafts.

In the large towns industrial schools have been established, and the pupils supply the factories, business houses, and plantations with the native labour which is indispensable in a country where Europeans cannot be employed on manual work. On the other hand, the natives have no factories of their own, but work at home, or at most two or three together in a small workshop. Formerly the workers belonged to guilds; these were suppressed in 1841, but the various trades continued to a great extent to live in definite groups.

The great number of Chinese immigrants in the country is remarkable, and even more striking is their importance. They form an essentially temporary part

of the population, as they always aim at returning eventually to their own country. Yet they have monopolized all the small trades, some of the larger trades, and various industries. They lend money at high rates to the natives at seed-time, and in some parts of the country half the rice swamps are in the hands of Chinese mortgagors. In the agricultural districts of Cochin China and Cambodia, and also in the mines in the north of Tongking, Chinese have been brought in in large numbers to reinforce the native labourers. In general, the Chinese work harder, but they are more exacting than the Annamites. They form very closely knit colonies, and in the large towns they live in special quarters.

The average wages paid to coolies are 20–30 cents a day, in Cochin China 30–40 cents. Skilled workers, such as masons, carpenters, &c., get 30 cents to 1 piastre a day. The rates of pay for the Chinese are slightly higher. Women coolies get 15 cents, children 8–10 cents. Chauffeur mechanics, who are almost all Chinese, get 58–70 piastres a month. They all find their own food. Although such wages appear low, native labour is not really much cheaper than labour in Europe, except on piece-work, if the quality and quantity of work done is taken into consideration.

(2) Agriculture

(*a*) *Products of Commercial Value*

Vegetable Products.—Rice is by far the largest product of the country, and not only satisfies the requirements of the population, but provides a large proportion of the exports. Cotton is grown in large quantities in Cochin-China and Cambodia, and also gives good results in Laos. Tea, of which there are a certain number of plantations in the highlands of Tongking and Annam,

grows wild in Upper Laos. Other cultures are rubber, sugar-cane, coffee, ground-nuts, beans, pepper, sesame, jute, indigo, and tobacco, besides gums and vegetable oil, and medicinal plants such as cinnamon, cardamoms, and areca-nut.

Rice. The delta lands of Tongking and Cochin-China, the borders of the Cambodian lakes, and the coastal regions of Annam are the only parts of Indo-China which are really cultivated, and these are almost entirely under rice. The extent of the rice lands in 1911 in Cochin-China and Tongking was estimated at about 3,400,000 acres in the former and at 2,000,000 acres in the latter. The land under this culture might be considerably extended in Cochin-China, Cambodia, and Laos, and to a less degree in Annam and Tongking; but it is not easy to persuade the Annamese to move from their homes, especially to the higher lands, where new ground might be broken.

Two rice crops are obtained yearly in Tongking and North Annam; two sometimes in Central Annam; and one only in South Indo-China. Statistics for 1915 show that 1,373,239 tons were exported from Indo-China, of which Cochin-China contributed about 1,000,000 and Tongking about 230,000. The largest amount exported in any year was 1,428,121 tons in 1914.

Other cereals are grown to a very limited extent and are consumed locally, maize alone (chiefly grown in Tongking) providing a surplus for exportation. In 1915 the export of this grain amounted to 62,989 tons; the largest export for any year was 133,273 tons in 1913.

Other Crops. The export of pepper, which is grown in Cambodia and Cochin-China, amounted to 4,243 tons in 1915; of cotton, grown in small quantities everywhere, to 3,740 tons (highest export, 9,893 tons in 1913); of sugar-cane from Annam to 5,506 tons; of tea from Annam and Tongking to 947 tons; of coffee from

Tongking to 357 tons ; and of rubber, most successful in Cochin-China, to about 375 tons. All these cultures might be profitably developed with a view to the European market, especially Cambodian cotton, which is of high quality, rubber, and beans and sesamum for their oil-products. There is an abundance of rushes for matting in Cochin-China, and experiments prove that ramie grass and jute could be cultivated, but at present little progress has been made with them.

The cultivation of *vegetables* and *fruit* is very general, and almost all the European growths have been successfully acclimatized. In 1915 166 tons of fresh fruit and 368 tons of preserved fruit were exported.

Animals and Animal Products.—The buffalo, which is found wild in Laos, has been domesticated in the agricultural districts, and the zebu bull is used for transport purposes. Stock-rearing flourishes in a few districts, and there is an indigenous race of horses, of small size but excellent. Attempts to acclimatize the Arab horse and sheep from Aden and China have not been successful. Pigs thrive everywhere. The rivers and the Cambodian lakes abound in fish, and dried and salted fish from them and from the coasts form an important item of export trade. The silk-worm may be said to be indigenous in Tongking, where there are several thousand acres of mulberry-trees. Varieties of mosquitoes, ants, and leeches combine to make the forests bordering on the Mekong impracticable, and peculiar species of grubs and caterpillars destroy the cotton and coffee plantations of Cochin-China.

Large tracts of the upland country of Indo-China offer favourable conditions for stock-rearing, especially the plateaux and certain provinces in Annam, Upper Tongking, parts of the Mekong valley, and Cambodia ; and there is no doubt that an important industry might

be developed, though at present the number of cattle is not large in proportion to the population of the country.

The Government statistics for 1916 give the following numbers of existing stock :

Oxen.	*Cows.*	*Calves.*	*Buffalo-species.*	*Pigs.*
634,526	523,553	289,939	1,583,712	2,662,534

Cambodia and Laos have the largest proportion of the bovine species, the buffaloes being largely used for agricultural purposes and for cartage. Horse-breeding flourishes in Gia-dinh (Cochin-China), Phu-yen (Annam), and in Tongking. A small number of sheep are grazed in Cochin-China and in the Bao-lak districts in Tongking. Pigs are kept everywhere, but Tongking has the largest number.

The export trade, which is capable of expansion, amounted in 1915 to 15,954 head of cattle (the highest number, 33,799, was reached in 1911) and 57,346 pigs.

Poultry are kept everywhere. Besides supplying local needs, they are likely to become a considerable article of export.

Sericulture is very general throughout Indo-China, but hitherto the methods of the natives have been quite unscientific and the quality of the raw silk poor. The country, however, is very suitable for this culture, and improved methods to which the French are paying attention should give important results. The export of raw silk in 1915 was 55 tons, the highest amount of any year being 100 tons in 1910.

(*b*) *Methods of Cultivation*

The French have done, and are doing, much to regularize and extend production by irrigation and drainage schemes destined to combat the drought and floods which have proved disastrous in the past ; and they are endeavouring to improve the primitive methods

of cultivation employed by the natives. The land is divided up into very small holdings, and the natives are very conservative in their habits and adhere to the implements used by their ancestors; but the French are gradually showing them the value of more modern methods, and the Annamese are intelligent and capable of being taught. In the delta lands the natives have relied chiefly on the alluvial deposits of the floods to enrich the soil, with the help of any organic manures that are available. The French colonists are experimenting with chemical manures, and are introducing the natives to their use.

Irrigation.—Considerable irrigation and drainage works have been undertaken by the French to regulate the supply of water from the rivers for agricultural purposes. This has been especially the case in the Tongking delta lands, where some 750 miles of embankments protect the low-lying lands from the Red River floods in the season.

In the province of Bak-giang (Tongking) the Kep canal makes the water of the Song-thuong available in the dry season for a large area of rice land; and in the same province a system of sluices permits the irrigation or drainage of a large area between the Song-ka and Song-thuong. Drainage and irrigation in the Kim-son district of the province of Ninh-binh (Tongking) have made two crops of rice possible instead of one. The reclamation by drainage of the Plaine des Joncs in Cochin-China was an important work, but there is a vast amount of work still to be done in these directions throughout Indo-China.

(*c*) *Forestry*

The total forest area of Indo-China has been roughly estimated at about 60 million acres, containing all kinds of tropical growths. In Tongking and Cochin-China

much harm has been done by unscientific exploitation, but there still remain fine forest areas in the hilly parts of Cambodia, Laos, and southern Annam, which should prove valuable when the difficulties of labour and transport are overcome and proper attention is given to their development. At present the actual yield of forest products can hardly be estimated, only the export figures in a few cases being available. Those for the year 1915 are given below in brackets, where possible.

A considerable amount of timber is cut and floated in rafts down the Mekong and dealt with in the saw-mills which form a prominent industry in Cambodia. Bamboo canes, teak (2,000 tons), and hard woods for marqueterie, &c., and timber for building purposes are produced to meet general requirements, but a very much larger export trade might be developed, if full advantage were taken of the great demand for woods of all sorts in China. Moreover, the bamboo, which is already used in numerous industries from building to the manufacture of hats, is likely to prove valuable in the paper-making industry also. The coco-nut palm and pine-apple plant are found in the southern regions of Indo-China, and coco-nut oil (280 tons), fibre, and copra (7,864 tons) are produced from the former. Other forest products are gums of various kinds, lacquer and oils (1,542 tons), benzoin, resin, *cundo* roots (7,334 tons), castor-oil (500 tons), cardamoms and amomums (440 tons), cinnamon (380 tons), areca-nut, and *palétuvier* bark for tanning. For many of these there is a growing demand in the European market.

(*d*) *Land Tenure*

The tenure of the land is either in the hands of the natives who pay a tax as rent to the State, or in the hands of French colonists, who have received concessions amounting in 1909 to a total of considerably over

1,000,000 acres. The concessionaires lease the land to natives, providing them with the necessary materials for agriculture and receiving in return a percentage of the products.

(3) Fisheries

The fishing industry occupies a large population in Indo-China, the chief centres being the Gulf of Tongking, the south coast of Annam, and the lakes of Cambodia. An immense bank covering 18,500 sq. miles of the Gulf of Tongking, with an average depth of 98 ft., is the fishing-ground for 50,000 individuals in Tongking and Annam, but the surplus production of fish comes from the south, mainly from Cambodia, as is shown by the returns of the export trade. In 1914 fish products, chiefly dried and salted fish, were exported from Saigon to Hongkong, Singapore, and Siam to the value of £668,000. The salting and drying of fish, which are large industries in Cambodia, Cochin-China, and Annam, are mainly in the hands of Chinese and Annamites. The manufacture of fish-oils for the European market is capable of development.

(4) Minerals

There is no doubt that the mineral resources of Indo-China are considerable; but, except in Tonkin, they have hitherto been neglected, owing largely to deficiency of communication and transport. The mining concessions in 1913 were distributed in the following proportions: Tongking 26 units, Annam 3·3, Laos 0·8, Cambodia 0·7, Cochin-China 0·3. Concessions are not granted to foreigners.

Coal.—Tongking is rich in coal deposits, which are mined in the provinces of Kwang-yen, Hai-duong, Thai-nguyen, and Nam-dinh. By far the most important coal-fields are those at Hon-gay in Kwang-yen. They cover

54,000 acres, in which nine principal seams are worked by 5,400 Annamese and Chinese coolies under the superintendence of 60 whites. The coal is of anthracitic nature, and much of it is mixed with bituminous coal from Japan and made up into briquettes. It is used in all the industries of Indo-China. The production in 1913 amounted to 371,145 tons, of which 220,195 tons were exported, and in 1915 to about 600,000 tons, or about 80 per cent. of the total production of Indo-China. The mines are connected by tramway with the coal wharves of Hon-gay Bay (see p. 45).

The coal-fields of the island of Kebao, north-east of Hon-gay, cover an area of 61,000 acres. They had been neglected for some years, but in 1913 were being exploited to the extent of 13,322 tons and are likely to be of importance in the future. They are served by Port Wallut harbour.

Two coal-fields near Dong-trieu, in the province of Hai-duong, have an area of 3,140 and 1,792 acres respectively, and produced 61,500 tons of anthracite in 1913. They are served by river transport.

In Central Annam there is an important coal-field near Nong-son on the Tourane river, covering 7,500 acres; it produced 13,000 tons of anthracite in 1913. The field is served by barges on the Tourane river.

Iron.—Rich deposits of iron ore, mainly hematitic, are reported in Indo-China, though little or nothing has been done as yet towards exploiting them. The most important are in the Pnom-deck in Cambodia, at Kwang-tri in Annam, and at Thai-nguyen, Yen-the, and Mo-ksat (near Kao-bang) in Tongking. The deposit of Ku-van (Thai-nguyen) is being worked in a rudimentary fashion and 100 natives are employed; there is also a primitive foundry there. The development of the iron industry in Tongking is worthy of attention.

Tin and *tungsten* are mined in seven concessions in

the province of Kao-bang (Tongking), which produced 197 tons in 1913.

Zinc.—There were nine concessions for zinc-mines in Tongking in 1913, producing 33,438 tons, one-third of which was mined at Trang-da, Tuyen-kwang, on the Clear River. A modern installation for calcining zinc in Tongking is contemplated.

Other minerals.—*Antimony* is found on the frontier near Mon-kay (882 tons exported in 1911), and *manganese* at Dong-trieu (450 tons exported in 1913). *Copper* has been found near Vien-tiane and Savanakhet in Laos, and lead at Lang-son and Mon-kay in Tongking. Traces of *gold* have been seen in many parts in Laos and Annam, and a claim of 2,500 acres is being worked at Bong-mieu (Kwang-nam, Annam), which employs 440 coolies and produced 3,857 oz. of gold in 1913.

Statistics are not available as to the depth of the various mines or the extent of undeveloped mineral resources.

Mention should be made of the *calcareous deposits* in Tongking, particularly on the Ile des Deux Song near Kwang-yen, which are used in the manufacture of cement, and of *plastic clays* and *kaolin* used in pottery and porcelain manufacture. *Granite* is quarried at Gia-dinh, Long-ksuyen, and Chao-dok; and *laterite* at Bien-hwa in Cochin-China.

The supply of coolies for the mines has been sufficient hitherto, but the large number of additional workers, which the growth of the coal-mines bids fair to require, may prove difficult to find.

(5) Manufactures

The Annamese are industrious and clever craftsmen, and the French have found them apt workmen in the various manufactures which they have introduced. The native manufacturing industries are chiefly weaving,

mat-making, pottery, paper-making, wood-carving, incrustation of woodwork, and the making of furniture, all of which are carried on by individuals and on a small scale. The French have introduced a number of modern manufactures, and have set up well-appointed factories for them.

Machinery and Metals.—Metals are not at present manufactured on a large scale. Machine shops and shipbuilding establishments exist at Hai-fong and Saigon (see pp. 44, 45), and shops for boat-building and motor repairs at Kan-tho in Cochin-China. There are important railway machine shops at Gia-lam, near Hanoi.

Textiles.—Silk-spinning and weaving are carried on in large factories at Thai-binh and Nam-dinh in Tongking, at Binh-dinh in Annam, and at various places in Cochin-China. The considerable matting industry at Phat-diem and Thai-binh has suffered severely during the war. The textile industries are capable of further extension in connexion with the development of cotton and silk culture. At present there are only a few mills dealing with raw cotton at Khsach-kandal in Cambodia.

Miscellaneous.—The principal factories are located in Tongking and Cochin-China. In Tongking the chief manufactures are those of briquettes at the coal-fields at Hon-gay; cement at Hai-fong; distillery products at Hanoi, Hai-fong, and Nam-dinh; tiles, bricks, and pottery at Hanoi and Dap-kau. There are, besides, breweries, printing works, tobacco factories, match factories, tanneries, and ice factories at Hanoi and Hai-fong; a button factory at Hanoi; a soap factory at Hai-fong; paper-mills at Dap-kau; potteries at Ba-trang, and porcelain and faience works at Mao-khe (Hai-duong) and Mon-kay. In Cochin-China, Saigon and Cholon have saw-mills, distilleries, breweries, tile

and brick-works, and a match factory; and there are saw-mills, dye-works, and brick-works in other parts.

There are nine rice-mills at Cholon and Saigon, each capable of turning out from 450 to 900 tons of rice a day, and other rice-mills are established at My-tho and Rach-gia in Cochin-China.

The tanning and paper-making industries would acquire considerable importance if improved methods were adopted.

Sugar-refining is practised to a limited extent in Cochin-China.

The manufacture of salt from salt-pans on the coasts of Annam and Tongking and at Baria and Bak-lieu in Cochin-China has attained considerable importance and is capable of further extension.

In Cambodia there are numerous saw-mills which deal with the timber coming down the Mekong in rafts. These are situated near Chlong and at various points on the river, and there are a number at Pnom-penh. Pottery is made at Kompong-chnang.

In Annam there is a match factory at Ben-thuy, and an ice factory and perfumery at Hué.

There are no manufacturing industries of any account in Laos, owing to the undeveloped state of the country.

(6) Power

Electric lighting and power stations have been erected at Hai-fong and Hanoi in Tongking, and at Saigon and My-tho in Cochin-China. Little use seems to have been made as yet of the water-power of the large rivers for generating electricity, but there is a power station at Chuy-chanver in Cambodia, on the right bank of the Mekong, which is used by saw-mills, and it is proposed to use a fall in the Canal Principal in Thanh-hoa to generate electric power for irrigation works.

(7) State Control of Natural Resources

The administration of the countries which compose Indo-China is entrusted to the Residents Superior, who are answerable to the Governor-General. Assisted by Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture, these provincial governors exercise a wide control over the natural resources of the country. Concessions are made by them to colonists for agricultural purposes; and the concessionaires are responsible for the exploitation of the land by native labour, paying a percentage of the profits to the State and rewarding the natives by a proportion of the produce. These concessions in 1909 amounted to more than 1,000,000 acres. Much of the cultivated ground has long been in the hands of the natives, whose possession is not as a rule disturbed, and the State has exercised very little control over these lands. But the large tracts of forest and undeveloped country, more especially in the mountainous regions, are assigned, as occasion arises, to prospective colonists by the Government, which can exercise a thorough control over their development. Moreover, the development of communications and of irrigation and protective works is in the hands of the State, which is thus able to regulate the exploitation of important areas. Mining concessions are granted by the Government, and all applications are carefully scrutinized. The State has founded several permanent institutions for scientific research in agriculture and forestry, and every assistance is given to the colonists.

The chief error in the past has been a too exclusive concentration on the cultivation of rice, to the neglect of the many other possibilities of the country. Under a wise administration and with a more liberal allotment of capital it should be possible in future to exploit in a profitable manner the great and varied

resources in forestry, minerals, and agriculture which Indo-China undoubtedly possesses.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

The internal trade of Indo-China in 1915 was valued at £8,646,432, the average for the five years 1910–14 having been £8,239,294.

(*a*) *Principal Branches of Trade*

The principal articles of trade in 1915 were: rice and maize; flour; preserved foods; cheese, butter, eggs; cattle and meat; fish products, dried, salted, and fresh fish; vegetables and fruit; alcohol, wine, and beer; salt, sugar, pepper; medicinal plants, areca-nut, cinnamon, amomums and cardamoms; tea, tobacco, copra, opium; *cunao*; bean oil; manure; petrol; coal; common wood and hard wood; cotton, silk, cotton thread, silk tissues, clothing, sacks, and mats; pottery, glass, paper, metalwork, furniture; matches; engineering materials; sand, flint, lime, cement, bricks, and tiles; raw and prepared hides.

The chief of these in order of value are fish products, rice, silk tissues, coal, pottery, opium, and matches.

(*b*) *Towns, Markets, and Fairs*

The chief markets and centres of exchange are:

Tongking. Hai-fong and Hanoi for general trade; Nam-dinh for rice; Bac-ninh for embroideries; Dap-kau, Hai-duong, Hung-yen, Ninh-binh, Son-tay, Phu-lang-thuong, and Lang-son for local industrial and agricultural products.

Annam. Hué, Tourane, Vinh, Thanh-hoa, Kwi-nhon, Binh-dinh, and Fai-fo.

Cochin-China. Saigon and Cholon for rice and general trade; Baria for salt; My-tho, Sadek, Bien-hoa, Vinh-long for rice and local trade.

Cambodia. Pnom-penh, a busy commercial town; Kratie, a port on the Mekong; Kampot, a market for pepper; Battambang, an agricultural centre.

Laos. Vien-tiane, Luang-Prabang, Savanakhet, Attopeu, Bassak, and Pak-se are all markets for local trade. At certain times of the year temporary markets or fairs are set up at convenient places along the Mekong.

(c) *Organizations to promote Commerce*

There is a Director-General of Agriculture, Forests, and Commerce for Indo-China: and there are Chambers of Commerce at Saigon, Hanoi, and Hai-fong, and a United Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture of Annam and Cambodia at Tourane.

(d) *Foreign Firms*

American or European firms operating directly in Indo-China are very few, being limited to the Standard Oil Co., the Eastern Telegraph Co., and a few banks and agencies in Hanoi, Hai-fong, and Saigon. The Chinese, however, are well represented, notably in Laos, where they frequently transact business for the European houses established at the seaports.

(2) Foreign

(a) *Exports*

Quantities and Values.—The value of the exports of Indo-China in 1915 totalled £11,449,572, of which goods to the value of £2,426,088 went to France and her colonies, and the remainder, to the value of £9,023,484, to foreign countries.

The following table shows the principal articles of export in 1915:

Description.	*Amount.*	*Value.* £
Amomums and cardamoms	969,812 lb.	
Antimony	630 tons	
Block tin		1,117,752[1]
Cattle	15,954 head	
Cement	39,787 tons	
Cinnamon	949,615 lb.	
Coal	450,999 tons	390,572
Coffee	800,498 lb.	
Copra	7,864 tons	
Cotton, ginned and raw	3,740 tons	
Cotton thread	3,948,921 lb.	494,720
Cunao	7,423 tons	
Essence of *badian* (star anise)	164,455 lb.	
Fish, dried, salted, &c.	30,715 tons	459,736
Gum and stick-lac	221,103 lb.	
Hides	2,908 tons	465,250
Maize	62,989 tons	302,348
Pepper	9,504,120 lb.	155,200
Rice	1,373,239 tons	7,518,560
Rubber	830,480 lb.	
Silk	121,787 lb.	
Sugar	5,506 tons	
Tea	2,127,948 lb.	
Zinc	33,102 tons	172,132

The following statistics show the fluctuations of the more important articles of export trade:

Description.	*Amount in* 1913.	*Average Amount for Years* 1910–14.
Cotton thread	3,774,529 lb.	3,501,157 lb.
Fish, dried, &c.	31,730 tons	30,240 tons
Hides	4,132 tons	3,204 tons
Maize	133,273 tons	89,319 tons
Pepper	9,212,670 lb.	8,564,313 lb.
Rice	1,286,804 tons	1,130,183 tons

The export of coal shows a steady annual increase: that of zinc was 5,370 tons higher in 1915 than in 1913, the year which showed the highest total previously.

Countries of Destination. — Less than one-quarter of the total exports in 1915 went to France and her colonies. The remainder was distributed in the following proportions: to Hongkong, 112 units; Singapore, 41; Dutch East Indies, 28; Philip-

[1] Mostly in transit from Yun-nan.

pines, 17; China, 13; England, 5; Japan, 3; Siam, 2; America, 1.

In nearly every case the goods are sea-borne, being shipped from Hai-fong, Saigon, and the minor ports (see p. 45). A certain number, however, are carried by the Hai-fong–Yun-nan-fu Railway and by junks on the Red River into Yun-nan and by road from the railhead at Nam-kwan into Kwang-si. Laos trades chiefly with Siam and China.

(*b*) *Imports*

Quantities and Values.—The value of the imports in 1915 totalled £6,483,789, of which goods to the value of £1,880,743 came from France and her colonies and the remainder from foreign countries. There was a fall of nearly £2,000,000 as compared with 1914, due almost entirely to a reduction of about 50 per cent. in the imports from France and her colonies owing to the war.

The following table shows the principal articles of import in 1915:

Description.	*Amount.*	*Value.* £
Block tin		1,126,452[1]
Bottles	1,494 tons	
Cotton, ginned	3,173 tons	
Cotton goods		651,348
Cotton thread	3,492½ tons	656,412
Flour	6,390 tons	
Jute sacks		346,776
Metals, manufactured		306,740
Metals, unworked		404,808
Opium from India		247,748
Petrol	38,152 tons	342,662
Porcelain, Chinese and Japanese		193,000
Silk goods		498,840
Sugar	5,990 tons	
Tea	974 tons	
Thread—flax, hemp, ramie, and jute	576 tons	
Tobacco		135,053
Wine	1,220,685 galls.	

[1] Mainly from Yun-nan for re-export.

Countries of Origin.—More than two-thirds of the imports in 1915 came from countries other than France and her colonies. The chief countries were the following, the relative proportions of their trade being indicated by the following figures:

Hongkong, 55 units; Singapore, 23½; China, 19½; England, 4½; Dutch East Indies, 3; America, 2; Japan, 2; British India, 2.

Flour came from America and Australia; sugar from Hongkong and Singapore; petrol from America and the Dutch East Indies; unworked metals from England; cotton goods from Japan, *via* Hongkong; silk goods from China.

Most of the trade was sea-borne, the chief exception being the goods sent from Yun-nan and from Kwang-si.

(*c*) *Customs and Tariffs*

The tariff of the Customs Union of Indo-China is substantially the same as that of France, heavy import duties being levied on foreign goods. As each individual class of goods has its own special rate, it is difficult to give a general idea of the duties exacted; but a comparative table of the *ad valorem* rates for all classes of goods shows 34 per cent. to have been the average rate for France in 1903.

French goods pay no import duty in Indo-China, and goods exported to France are exempt from export duty, with the exception of sugar, which is regulated by special legislation, and of various other colonial products (e. g. coffee, cocoa, tea, vanilla, pepper), which pay half the duty applicable to similar foreign products according to the minimum tariff. Goods from French colonies pay no duty.

Some authorities complain, apparently with justification, that the numerous duties constitute a hindrance to the proper development of the natural resources

and commerce of the country. This has been particularly detrimental to Laos, according to Captain de Reinach, who wrote in 1911:

'Malheureusement, les droits de sortie, comme les taxes locales, sont exorbitants, et le port de Saigon se ferme par la douane, à l'entrée comme à la sortie. La vallée du Mékong, ouverte en droit, est en réalité fermée par une barrière douanière. C'est là une grave faute dont on ne peut prévoir les conséquences.'[1]

(*d*) *Commercial Treaties*

By a treaty signed at Tientsin on June 9, 1885, the French obtained favoured treatment for specified articles of commerce between Tongking and the treaty ports in Yun-nan and Kwang-si. This took the form of a reduction of one-fifth of the 5 per cent. *ad valorem* duty on imports into China and of one-third of the similar duty on exports from China, as well as exemption from the transit tax levied at the frontiers on the carts or animals carrying the merchandise. In addition a number of articles in the nature of money, food, clothing, and personal effects destined solely for the use of the travellers were permitted to pass free of tax. At the same time the traffic in gunpowder, arms, saltpetre, sulphur, lead, spelter, salt, and immoral publications was forbidden.

A modification of this treaty, dated June 26, 1887, reduced the 5 per cent. duty on the same articles by three-tenths in the case of imports and by four-tenths in the case of exports.

(D) FINANCE

(1) *Public Finance*

By a law of 1878 a General Budget was created for French Indo-China to deal with such expenditure as

[1] *Le Laos*, p. 353. Cf. the remarks on the *régime douanier* at pp. 92–3 of the Lyons Fair Handbook. *L'Indo-Chine* (1914).

was of common interest to the whole country. There are separate budgets for each of the States and the Provinces, and municipalities also have their own budgets. The General Budget is supported by the revenue from the Government monopolies, excise, and other indirect contributions, the customs duties, with the exception of those levied for the benefit of the Chambers of Commerce or the municipalities, and the posts, telegraphs, and railways in all the States. Besides maintaining these services the General Budget provides for the military and judicial services, public works, and other works relating to the whole of the Union. It may receive subsidies from the Home Government or be called upon to make contributions. For 1918 the revenue and expenditure of the General Budget balanced at 47,166,050 piastres.

The Local Budgets are supported by the revenue raised in each State, with the exception of the heads allotted to the General Budget, the municipalities, or the Chambers of Commerce. The greater part of the revenue is derived from direct taxation. The Local Budgets for 1918 balanced at the following figures:

	Piastres.
Cochin-China	8,582,900
Annam	5,047,173
Cambodia	6,120,600[1]
Tongking	10,231,676
Laos	1,747,800
Kwang-chow-wan	469,960

The cost of the Laos administration is borne by Cochin-China (to the extent of six-thirteenths), Tongking and Annam (five-thirteenths), and Cambodia (two-thirteenths).

[1] Including 525,000 piastres allowed for the civil list of the King and princes.

The detailed figures for the General Budget for 1909 (the latest available) were as follows:

Revenue.	*Piastres.*
Customs	8,208,542·68
Indirect contributions and excise	21,445,366·24
Registration, lands	1,576,684·10
Posts, telegraphs, and telephones	818,209·50
Railways	1,431,334·60
Forests	716,808·36
Interest on capital	506,292·56
Contributions from Local Budgets	1,047,282·37
Various	137,690·16
Extraordinary receipts	1,690,012·76
	37,578,223·33

Expenditure.	*Piastres.*
Government and finance	401,659·56
Agricultural inspection	159,585·36
Military	5,701,742·70
Naval	103,650·20
Judicial and police	1,022,326·86
Treasury	662,113·57
Customs and excise	9,648,453·95
Posts and telegraphs	1,947,780·78
Forest and geographical services	520,278·30
Public works	4,221,884·48
Railway	1,587,159·37
Education, sanitation, &c.	364,462·63
Subsidies and premiums :	
Mercantile marine	1,172,869·12
Transport	764,063·22
Various	2,077,417·70
Debts repayable by annual instalments	6,071,114·63
	36,526,562·43 [1]

[1] This is the total as given in the *Statistiques des Finances des Colonies françaises*, 1902–11. The actual addition of the figures, however, comes to 36,426,562·43.

The figures for the four chief Local Budgets in the same year were as follows:

COCHIN-CHINA.

Revenue.	*Piastres.*
Direct contributions	4,645,784·88
Lands, property register, &c.	40,256·77
Rents	96,599·50
Various	654,329·31
Former receipts	12,408·51
	5,449,378·97

Expenditure.	*Piastres.*
Administration, police, &c.	1,536,485·18
Education and poor relief	746,451·30
Treasury	175,000·00
Property register, &c.	412,193·99
Public works	634,461·71
Commerce, agriculture, and industry	113,686·44
Transport	508,469·47
Various	1,322,730·07
	5,449,478·16

CAMBODIA.

Revenue.	*Piastres.*
Produits sur rôles et assimilés	2,064,345·33
Rents	385,699·33
Various	410,043·53
Former receipts	6,128·21
	2,866,216·40

Expenditure.	*Piastres.*
Administration, police, &c.	1,451,410·18
Education and medical service	191,085·33
Property register	46,928·18
Treasury	208,634·66
Public works	245,522·43
Port and fleet	57,750·31
Printing	19,622·66
Agriculture and commerce	44,028·89
Transport	147,130·66
Various	239,445·13
	2,651,558·43

ANNAM.

Revenue.	*Piastres.*
Direct contributions, licences, &c.	2,710,414·32
Various	208,779·78
Levy on reserve funds	195,833·33
	3,115,027·43

Expenditure.	*Piastres.*
Court, Royal Family, and native administration	928,999·92
Administration, police, &c.	1,005,517·04
Education and medical services	173,935·27
Treasury	75,000·00
Public works	259,655·75
Agriculture	92,872·65
Transport	114,976·71
Various	112,971·87
Extraordinary	267,368·35
	3,031,297·56

TONGKING.

Revenue.	*Piastres.*
Direct contributions	130,336·93
Annamite taxes	4,961,288·26
Rents, market dues, &c.	582,993·19
Recettes d'ordre	2,759,988·65
Various	444,292·30
Levy on reserve fund	1,023,061·46
	9,901,960·79

Expenditure.	*Piastres.*
Administration, police, &c.	2,772,014·91
Education and medical services	597,995·89
Treasury	209,300·00
Public works and property register	709,063·57
Commerce, industry, and agriculture	303,332·21
Annamite administration	165,808·18
General	1,506,073·92
Debts due	485,679·32
Transports	397,744·56
	7,147,012·56

The financial situation in the colony is very satisfactory. At the end of 1912 the Reserve Fund of the General Budget amounted to 9,616,715 piastres, while those of the Local Budgets amounted to 4,948,700. In both cases this represented a very considerable advance on previous years.

(2) *Currency*

The coinage of French Indo-China is as follows:

Silver pieces. The piastre, $\frac{1}{2}$-piastre, $\frac{1}{5}$-piastre, and $\frac{1}{10}$-piastre. The piastre weighs 27 grammes and the fractional coins are in proportion; the piastre and $\frac{1}{2}$-piastre are 900 fine, but since 1898 the $\frac{1}{5}$- and $\frac{1}{10}$-piastre have been only 835 fine. The exchange value of the piastre fluctuates, but it is usually rather less than 2*s.* (frs. 2·50).

Bronze coins. There are two bronze coins, one of a 100th part of a piastre in value and the other of a 375th part.

Paper currency as issued by the Banque de l'Indo-Chine is readily accepted.

Native currency. Bars of silver and iron and small canoe-shaped pieces of copper are in use in certain parts of the colony.

(3) *Banking*

The State Bank is the Banque de l'Indo-Chine, which has branches at Hanoi, Hai-fong, Tourane, Saigon, and Pnom-penh. There are, besides, at Haifong and Saigon, branches of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, and of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China.

Advances are made to agriculturists by the Banque de l'Indo-Chine on the harvest prospects at the rate of 8 per cent.; but difficulty has been found in arranging

a security for the loans. In Cochin-China the bank is protected against loss by the colony, which receives 2 per cent. of the interest in return.

(4) *Foreign Capital*

Foreign capital does not directly play a conspicuous part in the development of Indo-China. The Chinese residents, however, are largely interested in certain industries, especially in the milling of rice; in Laos they are very active as middlemen, and are said to exploit the natives unfairly. The exploitation of the mineral resources of the country is an important field for investment, but foreigners are not permitted to own mines. German companies, however, before the war were large purchasers of the minerals obtained, and indirectly influenced the mining industry to a great extent. For other fields of investment see above, p. 60.

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MAPS

French Indo-China is shown on Indo-China, scale 1 in. = 32 miles, published in 1893 under the direction of Col. H. R. Thuillier, Surveyor-General of India; and on two maps issued by the Naval Staff Intelligence Division, viz.: (1) Indo-China, scale 1 : 4,000,000 (orographical); (2) Kwangchowwan, scale 1 : 1,000,000.

HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 77

FRENCH POSSESSIONS IN INDIA

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EDITORIAL NOTE

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

Position and Frontiers (General)

The French Possessions in India (*Établissements français de l'Inde*) consist of five small detached territories, namely, Pondicherry, Karikal, Yanaon, Mahé, and Chandernagor, with a total population, in 1915 (according to the French census), of 266,828.[1]

Pondicherry is the chief settlement (area 115 square miles), the capital of which, Pondicherry Town, is the seat of the governor of all the Possessions. It is situated on the east (Coromandel) coast, 122 miles by rail, and 105 miles by road, south-south-west of Madras. It comprises one main tract of land containing Pondicherry, Oulgaret, and Villenour, two other fairly important enclaves, one (Bahour) on the River Ponnaiyar, and one on the Pambear and Gingee, and besides these four to the north, one to the west, and five to the south. All these lie along the coast and extend to a distance of some 18 miles inland. They are surrounded by the British district of South Arcot.

Karikal (area 53 square miles) is also on the Coromandel coast, about 90 miles south of Pondicherry. It consists of a single tract stretching along the east coast between Tranquebar and Nagore (both outside French territory) for a distance of some 10½ miles direct, and inland to an extreme distance of 9 miles. It is bordered by the British district of Tanjore.

[1] Another estimate gives the following figures: Pondicherry, 173,000; Karikal, 60,000; Yanaon, 5,116; Mahé, 10,689; Chandernagor, 28 016; total, 276,821.

Yanaon[1] (area 5 square miles) is near the east coast, in the delta of the Godavari, and about 370 miles in a direct line north-east of Pondicherry. It lies 5½ miles south of Coringa, a closed port.

Mahé (area 26 square miles) is on the west (Malabar) coast, nearly due west of Pondicherry. It consists of the town of Mahé on the left bank of the river of that name, and a detached portion of territory called Nalutara, on the right bank, containing the four *aldées* (big villages) of Chambara, Chalakara, Palour, and Pandaquel.

Chandernagor (area 4 square miles) is on the Hooghly river, 22 miles by rail above Calcutta.

The area of the whole of these possessions is equal to the department of the Seine.

There are also certain small plots (*loges*) elsewhere than in French territory over which the French Government claim to exercise certain rights of jurisdiction. Thus at Masulipatam two tracts of about 1,300 square yards and a village known as Francepett (i. e. 'French village') are owned by the French Government. At Calicut there is a similar tract of six acres. At Balasor, in the district of that name in Bengal, there is a *loge* of thirty-eight acres; at Ghoorpuda of two roods. There are other *loges* at Cossimbazar (Kasimbazar), at Dacca, at Patna, and at Jugdea (Yougdea) in Tippera, and a factory at Surat. French jurisdiction is practically non-existent in these places.

Population (General)

The census of 1911 showed that of 395 Europeans resident at Pondicherry 373 were French, and of 83 Europeans at Karikal 81 were French, and that of 1,136 Eurasians at Pondicherry 1,021 were French Eurasians. Of 46,070 Indian natives at Pondicherry

[1] Spelt 'Yanam' in the *Imperial Gazetteer*.

36,688 were French subjects, and of 19,546 Indian natives at Karikal 16,908 were French subjects. Chandernagor is so closely connected with Calcutta that it is natural to find that of 610 Europeans only 102 were French, and that of 24,593 natives only 9,900 were French subjects. At the date of the 1911 census the whole number of Europeans other than French in the 'Establishments' was 542. There were only three Germans—two men and one woman.

PONDICHERRY

Surface and River System

The whole region is low, sandy, and alluvial, intersected by deltaic channels of the Gingee, Ponnaiyar, and other streams, and interspersed with 57 lagoons, the largest of which, the Lake of Oussoudou, 5½ miles from Pondicherry Town, has a surface of nearly 20,000 acres. All the rivers are navigable for about 16 miles from their mouths, thanks to a series of barrages, but this is only for four months in the year, and for flat-bottomed boats. The chief river is the Gingee, which receives on its right bank the waters of the Pambear and Coudouvear; before receiving the waters of the latter, it breaks into two mouths, the Ariancoupom and Chounambar. Farther south is the Maltar, whose lower waters are in British territory, and still farther south the Ponnaiyar. These rivers are liable to inundation, especially the Ponnaiyar.

Climate

As elsewhere in India the year may be divided into three seasons—the cold weather (October to February), the hot weather (March to June), and the rains. The rainy season sets in with the south-west monsoon, and the north-east monsoon prevails during the cold-weather

period and early part of the hot season. In the hot season the mean temperature in day-time ranges from 88° F. (31° C.) to 104° F. (40° C.), and at night from 81° F. (27° C.) to 84° F. (29° C.); during the day the hot 'land wind' (*neruppu-kattu*) makes itself felt. In the cool season the day temperature is usually from 77° F. (25° C.) to 90° F. (32° C.) and the night temperature from 55° F. (13° C.) to 68° F. (20° C.). Both monsoons bring rain to the district, and July–August and October–December are rainy months, but the south-west monsoon is weakened and dried by its passage over southern India, and the annual rainfall does not as a rule greatly exceed 50 inches, while severe droughts are not uncommon. Cyclones occur most usually at the changes of the monsoons; but Pondicherry is less frequently visited by them than Madras.

Sanitary Conditions

The chief diseases are cholera (practically this affects only the natives), marsh fevers in certain places, elephantiasis, diabetes, and dysentery.

Race

The inhabitants of Pondicherry and Karikal are mostly Tamils, belonging to the Dravidian stock. The Tamil language is spoken by about 160,000 people in the French Possessions. Five newspapers in Tamil are printed in Pondicherry.

The progeny of the original European settlers (largely Portuguese) and low-caste women, are called Topas. They often live like Indians, and differ only in their costume. The birth-rate is lower among them than in other sections of the community.

Population

Distribution, &c.—The latest estimate of population was made in 1915. The figures then given were: [1]

Pondicherry	47,185
Oulgaret	24,345
Villenour	18,392
Tiroubouvane	18,382
Bahour	18,048
Nettapacom	13,527
Modeliarpeth	15,740
Ariancoupom	10,868
Total	166,487

This represents a decrease of 6,420 since 1911, and 7,969 since 1901. In Pondicherry the birth-rate per thousand was 34·5 in 1915, and the death-rate 38·8.

The population of mixed descent for the whole of the 'Establishments' in 1911 was 1,198; nearly all in Pondicherry. The French population numbered 373 in Pondicherry out of a total of 598 in the whole of French India, of whom 429 were born in India.

Towns and Villages.—Pondicherry Town (lat. 11° 56′ N., long. 79° 50′ E.) is divided by a canal into two unequal divisions: White Town, occupying 15 acres to the east, and Black Town, occupying 40 acres to the west. The town is well supplied with water, principally from artesian wells at Mudrapalaiyam (3½ miles south-west), and is lighted by electricity. It is without a drainage system. Besides Pondicherry Town there are some 93 larger villages (*aldées*) and 141 lesser villages.

[1] But see note on p. 1.

KARIKAL

Surface, Coasts, and River System

The territory of Karikal consists of a single tract stretching along the east coast from the River Nandalar to the River Vettar. It is a low, fertile country, alluvial and deltaic, and particularly rich in 'humus', so that it is very productive, especially of rice. It is watered by eight distributaries of the River Cauveri, as well as certain artificial canals constructed in very remote times. The artesian borings show a greater degree of salt, indicating that the sea has penetrated more than in Pondicherry.

The coast is low in this neighbourhood, with only a few fishing villages along it. The only port is Karikal on the River Arasalar, one of the branches of the Cauveri. The rivers are barred, and can be navigated from the sea only after heavy rains have sufficiently swollen their streams, when cargo may be landed in flat-bottomed boats.

Climate and Sanitary Conditions

What is said about Pondicherry applies to Karikal.

Race

The population are Tamils, and have the same characteristics as the inhabitants of Pondicherry (see p. 4).

Population

Distribution, &c.—The estimate of population in 1915 was as follows:

Karikal	18,806
Tirnoular	10,583
Grande Aldée	7,961
Neravy	6,184
Nedouncadou	7,305
Cotchery	6,028
	56,867

This shows a decline of 2,954 since 1911; the census of that year showed a small increase over that of 1901; previously the population had greatly decreased —in 1883 it was 93,055. Nevertheless, with a population of 1,128 per square mile, it is more densely inhabited than almost any part of Tanjore. The French population in 1911 was 81.

Towns and Villages.—The town of Karikal (i.e. Kāraikkal, 'fish-pass') is situated (lat. 10° 55′ N., long. 79° 51′ E.) on the north bank of the Arasalar river, about 1½ miles from its mouth. The commune has a population of 18,806, of whom about half are actually in the town. It is the terminus of a line from Paralam on the Tanjore district railway. It is unfortunate that the line is not continued to the shore, since the facilities of the port would be greatly increased by such an extension, and especial stimulus would be given to the growing trade in ground-nuts. The Standard Oil Company of America has stores and tanks here, and uses Karikal as a distributing centre for this part of India.

The territory is divided into six communes, and contains 110 villages.

YANAON

Surface and River System

Yanaon is a town and small tract bounded on the south by the Godavari river, and on the north and east by one of its distributaries, the Coringa. It is an enclave in the British district of Godavari, and lies in a deltaic region.

The mouth of the Godavari is blocked; approach to Yanaon is made by the River Coringa. A canal connecting these two mouths is on the borders of the French territory. Water for irrigation is supplied free of cost from the British canal which passes by Yanaon.

Climate

The dry season is from the beginning of November to the middle of June; the rainy season from the middle of June to the beginning of November. The Godavari overflows its banks between July and September. The south-west monsoon blows from June to September, the north-east monsoon from October to February. Between May and July a west wind often blows. The temperature ranges from 68° F. (20° C.) to 79° F. (26° C.) in November, December, and January; from 80° F. (27° C.) to 97° F. (36° C.) in February, March, and April; from 97° F. (36° C.) to 107·5° F. (42° C.) in May and June; and from 83° F. (28° C.) to 93° F. (34° C.) for the rest of the year. The country is greatly exposed to cyclones.

Race

The inhabitants are Telugu, and speak the Telugu language, the most widely diffused of any in southern India. They are an enterprising people, good farmers, and, when they have the opportunity, skilful seamen. There are five Brahman castes in this district, two Kshatriya, one Vaisya, eleven Sudras, besides more than thirty inferior industrial castes, and a great number of mixed castes.

Population

The estimate of 1915 gives the number of the population as 5,011; this is an increase of 544 since 1911, but there had been an almost exactly equal decrease since 1891, when the population was 5,005.

MAHÉ

Surface and River System

The territory of Mahé, on the west coast, between Calicut and Tellicherry, and about four miles south-east of the latter town, lies within the British district

of Malabar. It is an undulating tract between the coast and the low calcareous hills, outliers of the western Ghats, that rise behind it. The surface is uneven and in parts rocky. It is covered with luxuriant vegetation, mostly coco-nut palm, which is economically the most important tree. The territory consists of two parts—the little town of Mahé, which lies on the left bank of the river of that name and is used by the French Government as a coaling-station; and the isolated district of Nalutara on the other bank, containing the four villages (*aldées*) of Chambara, Chalakara, Palour, and Pandaquel.

The bar of the River Mahé is dangerous, except in very smooth water, and there are rocks off the mouth of the river on both sides. During the dry season the channel leading into the river is only 20 yards wide. Above the bar small craft can navigate the river for about 7½ miles from the mouth.

Climate

The climate is damp, but, on the whole, healthy, Mahé and Chandernagor being superior in this respect to other French colonies in India. The temperature is uniform: the normal range does not exceed 71° F. (22° C.)–86° F. (30° C.), the mean temperature is about 80° F. (27° C.). Rainfall is heavy and unfailing. The south-west monsoon begins in May; the rains break in June and continue, with the monsoon, to the end of September, and three-quarters of the total annual precipitation (which averages probably about 120 inches) occurs during these four months.

Race

The bulk of the inhabitants are Malayalams, and speak a language closely allied to Tamil. There are a considerable number of rich Mussulmans in Mahé, called Maplais or Maplots. Among the castes there is

one peculiar to Mahé, viz. the Nayas (indigenous aristocracy), a Sudra caste.

Population

The estimate of 1915 gives the population as 10,819. This is an increase on the figures of 1911, which were 10,425, and the figures of 1901, which were 10,298.

CHANDERNAGOR

Chandernagor is a town, with a small surrounding territory, on the right bank of the Hooghly, 22 miles by rail above Calcutta and immediately below Chinsura. It is little more than a 'quiet suburban town', with little trade by river and little external trade of any kind.

The River Hooghly, which at Calcutta has a depth of nearly five fathoms, is never more than 10 ft. deep in front of Chandernagor, and in that quarter is becoming silted up by the alluvial deposits of the Ganges.

Climate

The climate is favourable, the heat being tempered by the trees. The rainy season is from June to the middle of October, and the rains are torrential in August. The average temperature is 88° F. (31° C.); the maximum (in May) is 99° F. (37° C.).

Race

The inhabitants are chiefly Bengali, and speak Bengali and Hindustani. There are also a certain number of Gaurs.

Population

The estimate of the population was 27,644 in 1915, an increase on the figures of 1911, which were 25,325. The French population numbered 102 in that year, and there were 508 Europeans other than French, nearly all of whom were British.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Table

1664	Establishment of 'La Compagnie des Indes Orientales'.
1673 (?)	First settlement at Chandernagor.
1674	François Martin lands at Pondicherry and obtains permission to build a factory.
1675	A small fortification built at Pondicherry.
1676 (?)	Chandernagor slightly fortified.
1688	Formal grant of site of Chandernagor.
1693	Pondicherry captured by the Dutch.
1697	Treaty of Ryswyck.
1699	Pondicherry restored to France under the treaty.
1721	Factory established at Mahé.
1725–6	Mahé seized and occupied by the French, with certain small dependencies.
1731	Dupleix assumes charge of Chandernagor.
1739	Grant of Karikal by Chanda Sahib.
1742	Dupleix assumes charge of Pondicherry (January).
1748	Successful defence of Pondicherry.
1749	Grant of 81 additional villages near Karikal by Chanda Sahib.
1750–2	Occupation and formal cession of Yanaon.
1754	Recall of Dupleix.
1757	Chandernagor captured by English; French settlers dispersed.
1759	Demolition of Chandernagor.
1760	Karikal and Mahé taken by English; battle of Wandiwash and siege of Pondicherry.
1761	Pondicherry capitulates; subsequent demolition.
1763	Peace of Paris.
1778	The settlements again taken by English.
1783	Treaty of Versailles; settlements restored to French.
1793	The settlements again taken by English.

1802 Peace of Amiens; settlements ordered to be restored, but retained by Lord Wellesley.
1803 Renewal of war; restoration of settlements cancelled.
1814–15 Treaties closing the Napoleonic wars.
1816–17 Actual restoration for the last time of the settlements to the French, as on January 1, 1792.[1]

(1) Domestic

The first serious step towards acquiring for France a share in the commerce of India was taken in 1664, when Colbert established the 'Compagnie des Indes Orientales'. The institution then founded never attained success as a commercial company. The complicated history of the French East India Company and of French enterprise in India is, on the whole, a story of failure. It may be studied in ample detail in the French works specified in the list of authorities (p. 56).

The two principal French settlements, namely Pondicherry and Chandernagor, originated almost simultaneously. About 1673 (the exact date is uncertain [2]) some French traders settled at Chandernagor on the Hooghly, twenty-two miles north of Calcutta, which was founded in 1690. The site of the French settlement was acquired permanently in 1688. In January 1674, François Martin, leading a party of refugees expelled by the Dutch from St. Thomé near Madras and from Masulipatam farther north on the same coast, landed at Pondicherry, where he established a trading station with the consent of the local authorities. Slight fortifications were erected both at

[1] But the *loge* at Calicut was not given up until Feb. 1, 1819 (Aitchison, vol. x, 4th ed., no. lxxxii, p. 252). The limits of Mahé were not finally determined until Nov. 14, 1853, when the French withdrew certain claims (Aitchison, ibid., no. lxxxiii, p. 252).

[2] Weber (p. 171) gives the date positively as 1673. The *Imperial Gazetteer* gives 1672 or 1676.

Pondicherry and at Chandernagor in or about 1675 and 1676. A small foreign town gradually grew up at Pondicherry. About 1685 the French Company suffered acute financial distress, and could not help the Indian settlements.

In 1693 the capture of Pondicherry by the Dutch destroyed French influence for the time being. Holland retained the settlement until 1699, when it was restored to France in accordance with the Treaty of Ryswyck (1697). Chandernagor continued to be an insignificant little place, until Dupleix took charge as Administrator. In the course of ten years (1731–41) he built two thousand houses and largely developed trade. The result was that in 1757 Clive was justified in describing Chandernagor as 'a large, rich, and thriving colony'. In March of that year, three months before the battle of Plassey, Clive and Admiral Watson captured the town. As a matter of policy, the French settlers were exiled; and in 1759 the buildings, public and private, were demolished.

On January 13, 1742, Dupleix assumed office as Governor of Pondicherry and the French Possessions in India. The energy which had transformed Chandernagor was transferred to the new field and effected extensive improvements. Dupleix successfully defended the town in 1748 against an English fleet. His story belongs to general history. Here it is sufficient to say that his ambitious policy was disapproved and reversed by the French Government, and that he was recalled in 1754. In 1761 Eyre Coote took Pondicherry after a prolonged siege. A little later the town was deliberately destroyed, so that, as Orme remarks, 'not a roof was left standing in this once fair and flourishing city'.

It is needless to follow the fortunes of the minor settlements, namely Mahé, acquired in 1725–6; Karikal, acquired in 1739; and Yanaon, acquired in 1750–2.

Their fate followed that of Pondicherry, but they never suffered much material injury in warfare.

The modern history of the Possessions dates from the Peace of Paris in 1763, which restored them to France. Various accessions of territory which had been annexed from time to time were then cut off; and the Possessions were given back to France with boundaries substantially the same as those existing to-day. Restrictions on fortification were imposed, which remain in force.

In course of time both Chandernagor and Pondicherry were rebuilt. Chandernagor never recovered from the disaster of 1757, and has continued to be merely 'a quiet suburban town with little external trade'. Pondicherry has prospered. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Lord Valentia considered it to be second only to Calcutta.

The Possessions frequently changed hands during the Anglo-French wars. They were occupied by the British in 1778, 1793, and 1803, but were not injured.[1] They were restored to France by the treaties of 1783, 1814 and 1815, and finally handed over in 1816 and 1817.

Since the close of the Napoleonic wars the Possessions can hardly be said to have a history. Pondicherry became a well-planned, handsome town with good buildings, and has attained considerable prosperity in a quiet way. In 1880 it was made a municipality, with a mayor and a town council of eighteen members. Mahé is described as 'a decaying place'. In 1837 Yanaon was laid waste by a hurricane and inundation

[1] Lord Wellesley declined to hand over the French Possessions in accordance with the Peace of Amiens in 1802, which he did not expect to last. From 1803 they were legally British, but occupation by the Indian Government had been continuous from 1793.

from the sea. In 1884 serious floods in the Pondicherry territory rendered 30,000 people homeless. The boundaries of Chandernagor were rectified in 1853.

(2) Foreign Relations

Communications with foreign Powers are ordinarily conducted through the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But, portions of Pondicherry territory being mixed up in a most inconvenient way with the British district of South Arcot, the Magistrate-Collector or District Officer of that jurisdiction is necessarily invested with powers, as Special Agent, to deal directly with the French authorities for the settlement of questions concerning crime and extradition, land customs, excise, and kindred matters, which are often extremely troublesome. A British Consular Agent, usually an officer of the Indian army, is accredited to the French authorities and stationed at Pondicherry, his appointment being arranged by communication between the Foreign Office in London and the French Foreign Office.[1]

[1] Mutual extradition under judicial proceedings of all kinds is regulated by Article IX of the Convention dated March 7, 1815 (Aitchison, vol. i, 4th ed., no. lxxxiii, p. 259). Even fugitive debtors may be claimed.

CONVENTIONS AND AGREEMENTS

The Conventions and Agreements still operative in whole or in part as to June 1, 1906, are printed in Aitchison, *Treaties, &c.*, ed. 4 (1909), vol. i, nos. lxxxiii–xc, pp. 255–86. Nos. lxxxvii, lxxxviii, and lxxxix are reprinted ibid., vol. x, pp. 257–68. The essential points are exhibited in tabular form on the following page.

TABLE OF CONVENTIONS AND AGREEMENTS

Serial No.	*Aitchison, vol. I.*	*Date.*	*Parties.*	*Subject.*
1. Convention . .	lxxxiii, p. 255 .	March 7, 1815	Great Britain, France	Chiefly salt and opium; the arrangements made concerning both being superseded by Serial Nos. 2, 3, 4. Article 7, which secures the French the right of exporting 18,000 *maunds* of saltpetre yearly, seems to be still in force. (N.B. 1 *maund* = 82 lb.) Art. 8 forbids fortification and the maintenance of troops except so far as may be 'necessary for purposes of police'. It also secures safe residence in India for French subjects. Art. 9 deals with extradition; see note to section on Foreign Relations (p. 15).
2. Convention .	lxxxiv, p. 261 .	May 13, 1818.	Governments of Madras and Pondicherry	Stops French manufacture of salt, giving yearly compensation of 4,000 star pagodas (= 14,000 rupees). Art. 8 provides for necessary supply of salt to the French.
3. Convention .	lxxxv, p. 263 .	June 1, 1837 .	Ditto	Renews No. 2 indefinitely, subject to twelve months' notice.
4. Convention .	lxxxvi, p. 265 .	July 12, 1839.	Govt. of India and Administrator of Chandernagor on behalf of France	Modifies No. 1, and stops official direct supply of salt to Chandernagor, the inhabitants being left free to buy taxed salt; gives yearly compensation of 20,000 rupees for loss of salt revenue.
5. Agreement (*arrangement*)	lxxxvii, p. 268.	March 31,1853	Great Britain, France, Govt. of India and *Chef de Service* of Chandernagor on behalf of France	Revision of boundaries of Chandernagor.
6. Convention . .	lxxxviii, p. 278	July 16, 1884.	Ditto	Rescinds Art. VI of No. 1 permitting French to buy yearly 300 *maunds* of opium, and gives 3,000 rupees yearly as compensation.
7. Opium Convention	lxxxix, p. 279.	December 27, 1893	Govt. of India and Principal Administrator of Chandernagor on behalf of France	Renews No. 6 for 5 years from January 1, 1894, and gives 2,000 rupees yearly as extra compensation for confiscated opium.
8. Opium Convention	xc, p. 283 . .	March 18,1905	Govt. of India and Administrator of Chandernagor on behalf of France	Renews No. 7 for 2 years as from January 1, 1905.

No information of later date is obtainable.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

The Indian population of all the settlements, which is almost wholly Hindu, enjoys the free exercise of its religion. The Europeans and Eurasians, or persons of mixed descent, are almost without exception Roman Catholics. Pondicherry is the seat of a *Préfet apostolique* or vicar-general for the French Possessions, and of an archbishop, who has suffragan bishops at Mysore, Coimbatore, Kumbakonam in the Tanjore district, and Malacca. The town also is the head-quarters of the French foreign missions. The bulk of the inhabitants are Sivaists in religion.

The caste system is the determining feature of native life in Pondicherry, as elsewhere in India. There are five Brahmanic castes in Pondicherry and Karikal, but the bulk of the population are Sudras. Of these there are enumerated eleven castes, twelve secondary castes, and eighteen low castes. But with a large number of these castes the name merely shows professional occupation and often includes people who have no connexion with one another and who are of different social status. Women of high caste do not show themselves in the street; those that appear there are either pariahs or belong to low castes. Under French rule caste distinctions tend to become ignored to some extent. The franchise is given to all irrespective of colour, caste, or creed.

The Christians are, as a rule, drawn from the lowest castes. They keep up the caste system to a considerable

extent, and in their churches a special part is assigned to the pariahs.

The Mohammedans number about one-twentieth of the whole population of the 'Establishments'. They are either *pattanis*, i. e. descendants of the original invaders, or (more frequently) *choulias* whose ancestors were forcibly converted to Islamism.

(2) Political

The Governor of Pondicherry is, and always has been, except during the brief period of Lally's tenure of office as Commissary of the King (1758–61), the civil and military head of the French Possessions in India. The central administration at Pondicherry is constructed on lines suitable for a much more extensive territory.

Many departmental chiefs exist, severally supervising the Departments of Marine, Justice, Treasury, &c. In accordance with French usage, the officials are numerous and modestly paid. In 1845 the salary of the Governor was Rs. 1,400 a month, but no other official drew more than 400. The present rates of pay do not differ widely, but exact details are not available in England. Republican institutions have been transplanted from the West.

The Governor is assisted by a *Conseil Général*, dating in its present form from 1879, and composed of 28 members, representing all the Possessions, and elected by universal suffrage. Pondicherry is represented by 12 members, Chandernagor by 4, Karikal by 8, and Mahé and Yanaon by 2 each. The combined Possessions elect a Deputy and a Senator to represent them in the Chambers at Paris.

The Pondicherry territory is divided into eight communes (as in 1916), each managed by a communal or municipal board, on which native Indians are entitled to occupy a certain number of seats. The

communal council for the capital, the only town in the territory, is composed of a mayor and 18 members.

The judicial establishment comprises civil and criminal courts of first instance and a court of appeal. The Government at Pondicherry is controlled to a considerable extent by the Chambers in Paris.

The local affairs of Chandernagor are conducted by an Administrator or a *Chef de Service* subordinate to the Governor at Pondicherry. The Administrator is responsible for the Farasdanga *loge* at Balasor.

The Karikal territory, which includes 110 villages, is divided into three communes, each of which has a mayor and elected council. In the town of Karikal half of the seats are reserved for Europeans or their descendants. The settlement is in charge of an Administrator. Mahé is managed by a departmental head called *Chef de Service.* Yanaon is in charge of an Administrator. Although the population but slightly exceeds 5,000, the Administrator, who is head of the magistracy, the criminal court, and the police, has a council of 6 members to assist him in his work, besides a communal council of 12 members.

(3) Military Organization

The military force is insignificant, and is kept up for police purposes only.

(4) Public Education

Public instruction is controlled by a departmental head (*Chef de Service*) at Pondicherry. The college of the *Missions Étrangères* at Pondicherry provides secondary, English, upper primary, and '*cours normal*' teaching in the *Collège Colonial.* The Calvé College, an undenominational establishment open alike to Europeans and natives, which is affiliated to Madras University, offers primary and upper primary instruc-

tion up to the standard for matriculation in that University. Facilities for studying law and medicine exist; and in 1908 a course in arts and industry was instituted. The *Collège Colonial* has a staff consisting of a sub-director, four professors, five assistant professors, five assistant masters, four *instituteurs*, and a professor of English; and the *Collège Calvé* (for superior primary and primary teaching) a sub-director, six *maîtres d'anglais*, and seventeen *instituteurs*. There are also three primary schools in the town; and for primary instruction in all the settlements there are ninety-six male and female teachers of French and one hundred and four of native languages, under an *inspecteur primaire*. There are also a large number of private schools. The total number of pupils is estimated at about 16,000.

The chief institution in Chandernagor is the *Collège Dupleix*, formerly called St. Mary's Institution, founded in 1882, and under the direct control of the French administration. In 1914 it had six *instituteurs*, fourteen *maîtres d'anglais*, and one teacher of Sanskrit. The minor settlements possess good churches and school buildings and provide primary instruction. Karikal offers secondary and 'complementary' courses. There are two free schools in Yanaon, one for boys and one for girls, and three boys' schools and one girls' school in Mahé. A considerable public library exists at Pondicherry.

Two botanic gardens, the *Parc Colonial*, dating from 1827, and the *Jardin d'Acclimatation*, dating from 1861, have been established at Pondicherry for scientific experiments in agriculture and horticulture.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) Internal

(*a*) *Roads*

The French Possessions in India are so widely scattered in British territory that the means of communication are not capable of separate treatment. Pondicherry is on the main road from Cuddalore to Madras, and is 12 miles north of Cuddalore. The road from Cuddalore to Pondicherry and two roads from Pondicherry to Tindivanam, on the way to Madras, are metalled and bridged, and are practicable for wheeled traffic at all seasons of the year. Roads, chiefly (if not entirely) unmetalled, traverse the French territory in all directions. The best of them is the road by Villenour to Valudavour. Karikal, Yanaon, and Chandernagor are also served by British roads. Mahé is on the coast road running north from Beypore to Tellicherry; and a long wooden bridge, maintained by the Malabar District Board, gives access to British territory on the right bank of the River Mahé.

(*b*) *Rivers and Canals*

Pondicherry.—The river system is complicated by the circumstance that the 69,000 acres of superficial area in the Pondicherry district are scattered over a total superficial area of about 173,000 acres, and that the 92 French villages are not contiguous. The French territory consists of a series of enclaves, of

which the most important, comprising Pondicherry, Oulgaret, and Villenour, stretches along the upper bank of the River Pambear. Two others of the larger enclaves border on the rivers Ponnaiyar and Pambear, and the main stream of the Gingee. A canal from the Gingee traverses nearly the whole of the territory of Villenour, and is continued to the lagoon of Souttoukeny, twice crossing British territory and connecting with the Gingee at Moutiampett. The Villenour canal was made in 1828–9. It is 5·76 kilometres in length, and the bottom width is 2 metres. It passes under a weir of the large tank of Oussoudou by a 3-metre arch. The Souttoukeny canal was constructed in 1833. The bottom width is 4 metres, and the side slopes 1 to 1½ metres.

Karikal.—The Arasalar, and the canals which connect its various mouths, are navigable for small boats.

Chandernagor.—The Hooghly is navigable for boats and river steamers up to and beyond Chandernagor, but not for sea-going ships, even of small tonnage.

(*c*) *Railways*

Pondicherry Railway.—A railway runs from Pondicherry to Villupuram, a junction on the South Indian Railway. The length of the line in French territory is 12·633 kilometres (7·85 miles) out of a total length of 24 miles. The gauge is 1 metre. For the construction of these 7·85 miles of railway, a concession was granted in 1878 to the Pondicherry Railway Company, with facilities for sub-concessions. The French Government gave a subsidy of 1,264,375 francs, in return for which the company pays one-half of the net profits to Government. On the expiry of the concession (June 18, 1978), the railway will become the property of the State.

Statistics of traffic are not available until 1903. In that year the number of whole-distance passengers

was 291,780; and the figures show a steady increase until 1909, when the number was 415,673. The figures for 1910 were slightly lower (409,826). The figures for passenger-kilometres increased from 2,865,369 in 1903 to 3,982,567 in 1910. The goods traffic has been much more variable. In 1903 the railway carried 91,317 tons of merchandise over the whole length of its line; in 1904, 1905, and 1906 there was a rapid decline, and the figures for 1906 are 54,535 tons. The years 1907–10 show a still more rapid recovery, and the railway carried 96,398 tons over its whole length in 1910. The figures in ton-kilometres vary from 954,302 in 1903 to 591,627 in 1906, and 1,223,080 in 1910.

Capital and Income.—Besides the issue of bonds to the amount of 1,264,375 francs for the Government subsidy, the Pondicherry Railway Company has a capital of £10,000 in £5 shares (£3 10*s.* paid up). The expenses of construction were 955,495 francs. The receipts, expenditure, and profits show considerable variations from year to year. From 1898 to 1902 the annual profits gradually increased from 11,115 francs to 24,412 francs, and rose to 73,910 francs in 1903. The decrease in goods traffic then brought about a reduction in the profits, which fell to 40,976 francs in 1906. The recovery was complete by 1910, when the total receipts were 162,733 francs, the total expenses 89,906 francs, and the profits 72,827 francs. In 1912, after the payment of one-half of the net profits to the Government, the company paid a dividend of 30 per cent. for the year, and carried over a balance of £825.

Karikal.—A railway, which is the property of the French Government but is worked by the South Indian Railway, runs from Karikal to Paralam, a distance of 23 kilometres (about 14$\frac{2}{3}$ miles). The agreement with the South Indian Railway Company is terminable at a year's notice. The expenses of con-

struction were 1,201,840 francs. The line was opened for traffic in 1898. The traffic returns show extraordinary variations:

	Tons carried the whole distance.	*Ton-kilometres.*
1903	56,464	617,899
1904	8,779	197,902
1905	11,603	185,789
1906	56,282	360,690
1907	12,439	243,545
1908	11,068	266,024
1909	13,551	411,767
1910	11,253	267,480

Chandernagor is served by the East Indian Railway, which has a station just outside the French territory. Similarly, *Mahé* is served by the line from Calicut to Cannanore, which passes close to it. *Yanaon* suffers from a lack of railway facilities.

Proposals to develop the railway system in French India have frequently been made. The favourite project has been a coast line from Pondicherry to Cuddalore, *via* Bahour. It has been under the consideration of the French Government for the last quarter of a century. The scheme was abandoned in 1897, but revived in 1904; in 1905 it was sanctioned by the Senate, and funds were voted. The railway has, however, not been built. The cost of construction would be very considerable, and it seems to be generally agreed that there would be very little goods traffic on a line from Pondicherry to Cuddalore. There are difficulties of loading at Cuddalore, and there has been a tendency to transfer traffic from Cuddalore to Negapatam.

(*d*) *Posts and Telegraphs*

The postal service is organized in accordance with a convention between the French and British Govern-

ments. The telegraphic service is entirely in the control of the Government of British India, and is part of the Indian telegraphic system. Until 1906, telegrams from Pondicherry to Cuddalore were sent *via* Madras, but there is now a direct connexion. No wireless installation is known to exist.

(2) External

(*a*) *Ports*

(i) *Accommodation, &c.*

Pondicherry has no real harbour. In the dry season the Gingee is cut off from the sea, and becomes an unhealthy marsh. An iron screw-pile pier for landing and discharging cargo extends about 1,090 ft. seawards from near the lighthouse. Ships' boats can land at it during the fine season, and it is connected by rail with the Pondicherry railway station, so that wagons can be loaded and unloaded on the pier and the adjacent foreshore. The pier has been extended and improved in the last few years. The open roadstead is described as being one of the best on the coast, and as being superior to that of Madras in lying to windward for the larger portion of the year, in having less surf, and in possessing a river. The general anchorage is in from six to seven fathoms of water; but from October to December, when bad weather may be expected, it is desirable to anchor about half a mile farther out in eight to nine fathoms. The two roadsteads are known as 'la petite rade' and 'la grande rade'. Landing in ships' boats is not possible except at the pier in fine weather.

Karikal.—The town of Karikal is more than a mile inland. The rivers in the vicinity are all barred streams; but, after the rains, flat-bottomed boats, of which there is a well-organized service, can be used

to land cargo. Lading and unlading is carried on with little difficulty in the Arasalar river, but the bar is very dangerous in October, November, and December. A proposal for improving the bar of the Tiroumalarajanar, one of the numerous branches of the Cauveri, by building a bridge with regulating sluices at Manamutty, has recently been approved by the French and British Governments. There is a good anchorage at Karikal, in from five to six fathoms of water.

Yanaon.—There is no port or anchorage at Yanaon. The territory lies at the bifurcation of the rivers Godavari and Coringa, and extends along their banks, but the mouths of both rivers are obstructed by sand-banks. The Coringa, however, has a deep bed which, at spring tides, admits vessels of 200 tons.

Mahé.—The town is on the south side of the Mahé river mouth; and the French territory extends along the beach in a southerly direction for a little over half a mile, and in a northerly direction to the middle of the river. Rocks extend out from both sides of the river entrance as far as the two-fathoms contour line. During the dry season, the channel leading into the river is near the south bank, and does not exceed 20 yds. in width. The bar is dangerous except in smooth water. There is a harbour available for small native craft familiar with the locality. The anchorage is in five fathoms, about $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles from the shore.

Chandernagor.—Direct communication with the sea is forbidden by the treaty which regulates the relations of the French establishments to British India.

(ii) *Adequacy to economic needs*

There can be no question about the inadequacy of the shipping facilities of the French settlements in India. The absence of a satisfactory port for French India has frequently been deplored by French writers;

and proposals have been made for improvements at Mahé, Karikal, and Pondicherry. The most important suggestion is the construction of a new port at Pondicherry, at the mouth of the Ariancoupom, where it is protected by the Île des Cocotiers. M. Henri Deloncle, writing in M. Rambaud's *La France Coloniale* (1893), asserts that the construction of this harbour would make Pondicherry one of the greatest commercial centres in India, and that the technical difficulties are not serious, being only of a kind which has not prevented the success of similar enterprises at Colombo and Madras. He says:

> From the rice of the [Coromandel] coast to the cotton of Tinnevelly in the south of the peninsula, all products for exportation would converge to the one point in [the bay of] Bengal where the goods could be embarked from a quay at any season of the year. Madras and Calcutta would compete in conditions of insurmountable inferiority. It has been calculated that in ten years the cost would be covered by the dues; and the dues would not be burdensome, because the construction of quays would reduce the expenses of carriage and of boat-hire, and would diminish the waste that is unavoidable in connexion with the chelingues [small flat-bottomed boats]. Further, the rapidity of loading at a quay would lessen, by a half or two-thirds, the time spent in loading and unloading; and freights would consequently fall about 10 to 15 per cent.

No ambitious scheme of this character has got beyond the stage of general discussion; the improvements made in recent years have been very slight, and the whole system is still dependent upon the primitive device of surf-boats. The British Consular Report for 1903 referred to the need of steam-tugs and lighters, but these have not been supplied.

(*b*) *Shipping Lines.*

The British India Steam Navigation Co.'s steamers sailing between Madras and Negapatam provide a weekly service to Pondicherry, and their steamers sailing between Bombay and Calcutta a fortnightly

service. The Asiatic Steam Navigation Co. and the Messageries Maritimes also have a regular service to Pondicherry, and the British India Steam Navigation Co. and the Asiatic Steam Navigation Co. to Karikal. The Clan, City, and other lines send steamers, as required, for the ground-nut trade. These lines provide communication with the French colonies of Réunion, Mayotte, Madagascar, and Indo-China, and also with the Straits Settlements (Penang and Singapore), British India, Ceylon, and European ports. The coasting trade from Pondicherry, which was almost entirely controlled by the British India Steam Navigation Co., has become nearly extinct, owing to the competition of the railways, which provide better and cheaper facilities, and tap all the coasting ports.

Tonnage.—In 1911, 1912, and 1913, the numbers of steam vessels of all nationalities engaged in foreign trade which entered the port of Pondicherry were, respectively, 212, 219, and 195. The effect of the war is seen in the reduction of the number in 1914 to 147. The tonnage figures for the four years are, respectively, 542,192, 574,615, 429,815, and 394,794. The average tonnage of vessels entering and clearing Pondicherry has not varied greatly in the last twenty-five years. An overwhelming proportion of these vessels were of British nationality—169 in 1911, 175 in 1912, 154 in 1913, and 111 in 1914, with tonnages 456,377, 484,818, 350,677, and 320,695 respectively. The figures for French vessels for the four years are: 1911, 28 vessels (43,309 tons); 1912, 26 vessels (37,544 tons); 1913, 26 vessels (39,110 tons); 1914, 25 vessels (45,480 tons). Two German vessels entered Pondicherry in each of the years 1911–13 and one in 1914 (tonnage 6,940, 6,435, 6,245, and 2,121 respectively). The numbers for Austro-Hungarian vessels were: 1911, 2 (tonnage, 5,579); 1912, 4 (tonnage, 10,915); 1913, 5 (tonnage,

14,816); and 1914, 2 (tonnage, 5,586). Other nationalities represented in the list of steamers entering are Greece, Italy, Holland, Denmark, Russia, and Norway.

The foreign trade of Karikal is dependent upon British lines. In 1912, 102 British vessels (tonnage, 200,398) entered and cleared; in 1913, 107 (tonnage, 196,051); in 1914, 98 (tonnage, 154,160).

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

The inhabitants are as a rule frugal, polite, patient, and hard-working. Their manners are simple; they work assiduously in the fields, and have taken readily to the new industries introduced into the country. They have good memories; their leading faults are lust and mendacity, and their reputation for cleanliness is not great.

The principal emigration is that of coolies from the colony going to the French colonies of Réunion and the Antilles. The regulation of this is organized under a convention concluded with England in 1861. Official agents of the French Government superintend the recruiting and dispatch of the coolies to their destination and their eventual repatriation at the termination of their contracts.

(2) Agriculture

(*a*) *Products of commercial value*

Pondicherry.—The flora is extremely varied, and the land, being alluvial, is very fertile and suited to bearing a great number of crops. The chief authorities have not differentiated the products of the separate territories, so that the list given here may be taken as that of the French Indian establishments generally rather than of Pondicherry in particular.

The timber-trees include teak, sandal-wood, aloe-wood or calambac, and iron-wood. There is a large variety of fruit-trees, including coco-nuts, bananas, pomegranates, mangoes, guavas, tamarinds, dates, oranges, and citrons. These trees are only partially included in statistics of land under cultivation (about 4,250 acres in the Pondicherry district). The most important is the coco-nut tree, which is often grown on the margins of cultivated lands and on the borders of roads and canals. The roads leading out of Pondicherry, and especially the road to Villenour, are richly lined with coco-nut trees, tamarind trees, tulip trees, and acacias. The areca or betel-nut palm, which yields the betel or areca nut of commerce, is also grown in the Pondicherry and Karikal districts. The nut, mixed with lime and the leaf of the piper betel, is in very wide use as a masticatory. It is also employed for medicinal purposes; and a strong decoction of the nut is used in dyeing.

Infinitely more valuable than all the trees of the district is the *Arachis hypogæa*, a shrub somewhat similar in appearance to the dwarf garden pea, but more bushy. It produces the ground-nuts, which, when pressed, yield an oil which is used for the same purposes as olive and almond oil. The nuts are exported in large quantities to France, where the product is sold and exported as olive oil. The French are successful in treating ground-nut oil so as to make it indistinguishable from olive oil. In India, it is also used for lamps, and yields a more brilliant and more durable light than an equal quantity of olive oil. The leaf is used as food for cattle. The growth of the ground-nut industry, which developed about 1877, has brought into use large tracts of sandy desert. On average land the yield of ground-nuts is from 1,500 to 1,600 kilos (about 1½ tons) of unshelled nuts per acre, producing

from 800 to 1,000 kilos (16 cwt. to 1 ton) of clean kernels.

The chief products of the soil are rice, peas, lentils, vetches, onions, and other vegetables, betel, indigo, sugar-cane, bananas, and other fruits, coco-nuts, ground-nuts, and oleaginous grains. There is also a small cultivation of tobacco and cotton. Gums are obtained from the *Acacia arabica*, spices from the white pepper, cinnamon, and cloves. Spirits are derived from sago; and arrack and *callou* are distilled from the coco-nut. Rice furnishes the fundamental food of the inhabitants; there are thirty varieties, of which the most esteemed is *samba*. Among other crops are castor-oil plant, sesame, *bajra* millet, and the opium poppy. Bamboo is found generally through the territories. European vegetables grow as well as tropical.

Agricultural conditions are influenced by the circumstance that the territory of Pondicherry is as a rule only slightly above sea-level; the territory of Karikal and Yanaon never rises beyond 33 ft.; the territory of Mahé rises to 165 ft. The area under cultivation is between a half and two-thirds of the whole; it varies from year to year with climatic conditions and with the demand for individual products. When the rains are favourable, there is a small increase in the total cultivated acreage; and rice and vegetables (and, since the outbreak of war, indigo) are grown on lands which in bad years are used for less important products. Land which is completely irrigated (i. e. about three-fifths of the total land under cultivation) is largely used for rice. Twenty years ago, nearly half (in the Karikal district, nine-tenths) of the cultivated land was devoted to rice, but this proportion has greatly decreased. In the four communes of Pondicherry, between 1909 and 1913, about a quarter of the land under cultivation was used for rice, and over a third for peas, lentils,

and other vegetables. The most productive crops (in weight of produce per acre) are indigo, vegetables, rice (*nelly*), small grains, and tobacco; the least productive are cotton, sugar-cane, and betel.

The fauna is not extensive and has no very special characteristics. The white ant does great destruction among the crops, especially in Mahé. Of domestic animals horses are rare; oxen are used for nearly all purposes of transport.

Karikal.—For the general description, see under Pondicherry (pp. 29–32). Rice is grown extensively, and coco-nuts on the higher ground. Cotton grows wild, but is not cultivated. Indigo and ground-nuts could be developed. No sugar, coffee, cocoa, tea, or tobacco is grown; they would demand too much care and expense. In the seventy years between 1824 and 1894 the ground under cultivation increased from 22,540 acres to 24,827 acres.

There is practically no pasture in the territory. Oxen for work are imported from British India. In 1897 the census of the chief domestic animals was as follows:

Oxen	14,460
Buffaloes	10,035
Sheep	6,500
Goats	9,840

The skins and horns of animals slaughtered are sold to be worked in the province of Mazavaram.

Yanaon.—The principal crop is rice, but the land is cultivated much less than it was. The number of acres cultivated in 1850 was 3,582, in 1860 3,891, in 1870 4,312, but in 1900 only 1,537.

About 2,370 acres are devoted to stock-raising. There are in the country about 1,500 head (oxen, buffaloes, cows, and sheep).

Mahé.—About 3,630 acres are devoted to rice, but not enough is produced for the inhabitants, who have to import for their needs. About 9,850 acres are devoted

to fruit-trees, of which the coco-nut is most important, others cultivated being the areca, banana, and latania. Cotton, sago, vanilla, and cocoa are planted to some extent. The soil of the four *aldées* is extremely fertile. Pepper is planted at the foot of the fruit-trees. There are magnificent specimens of the *Caryota urens* (sago-palm), which furnishes an inferior kind of sago. No ground is specially set apart for pasturage.

Chandernagor.—The land is full of trees, the chief being coco-nut palm, date-palm, areca, and various fruit-trees. There is a large quantity of bamboo.

(*b*) *Irrigation*

The plains in the Pondicherry district are covered with an immense number of tanks, which are filled as the streams come down from the hills in flood. The superfluous water is thus utilized before it can reach the coast; and, except for a flood which invariably occurs at the end of October, flooding is rare. The tanks are not placed on any marked drainage line, but on ordinary sloping ground. They are made in V shape, the point of the V being down the line of the slope and the arms inclining up the slope. The water in the tanks is sufficient not only for purposes of irrigation but also for maintaining the level of wells, so that they are available when the rivers are dry. The Ponnaiyar and the Gingee rivers are the principal drainage lines of the Pondicherry district. The Ponnaiyar is 400–500 metres wide, and the discharge varies from zero to 3,655 cubic metres in flood. The land between the Ponnaiyar and the Maltar is irrigated by water-courses from the Ponnaiyar. There is an elaborate system of artesian wells in the alluvial deposits near the coast. Boring was begun in 1877, and has been continued successfully ever since. The water is drinkable, and is excellent for industrial and

agricultural purposes. For many years it was supplied only to the European town; but a new waterworks scheme, completed about 1913, now ensures a good water-supply to all parts of Pondicherry.

Karikal has an inadequate system of irrigation from the deltaic streams of the Cauveri; and there are also artesian wells in the district which supply drinking water. A new water-supply is being provided for the town by the construction of a reservoir and hydraulic pumping station on the River Arasalar, at a village about seven miles from Karikal.

Yanaon receives a gratuitous supply of water for purposes of irrigation from a British canal.

The whole system of irrigation in French India is antiquated and inadequate. The complexity of the geographical situation of these enclaves no doubt adds to the difficulties of the situation. The French Governor, in a public speech in 1898, insisted on the necessity of new irrigation works; and the British Consular Report for 1904 mentions that in the drought of that year the tanks in the Pondicherry district were almost all dry. Sir George Forrest, in his *Cities of India*, calls attention to the fact that the water-buckets are still raised by men working with their feet—the system described in the Pentateuch as existing in Egypt, 'where thou wateredst it with thy foot'.

(*c*) *Forestry*

No figures are available for the area devoted to the bushes and trees which yield some of the most valuable products of the French colonies in India.

(*d*) *Land-tenure*

The French Government originally considered that it had succeeded to the proprietary rights of the 'indigenous sovereigns' in the land, and that the domain of the State covered the whole area of French territory in India. It did not admit the existence of individual property, but only of individual possession, enjoyed by privilege, and subject, under penalty of eviction, to certain obligations. A second series of possessory rights was admitted in the case of what are known as *aldées de concession*—lands, the dues payable from which had been granted to individuals by concessions made between 1785 and 1788. In 1854 the French Government renounced its proprietary rights in lands rented and cultivated by natives, and acknowledged the ownership of the actual occupiers, whatever their title, provided that they continued to pay the regulation taxes. Failure to meet this obligation may involve the forfeiture both of the products and of the land itself, but, apart from this condition, the definite ownership of the land by the cultivator has been admitted since 1854, and the change has been beneficial to the agricultural development of the colonies. An attempt made in 1893 to commute the privileges held by individuals in the *aldées de concession* was unsuccessful, and the imposts on these lands are still payable to the holders of the concessions.

Transfers of property are made in accordance with French law, and sales of land are invalid without an official registration.

Public Works.—The State retains the ownership of all military works and buildings, and has the right of taking, without the payment of an indemnity, land necessary for irrigation, the construction of canals, or other works of public utility.

(3) Fisheries

There are fisheries at Pondicherry, Karikal, Chandernagor, and Mahé. No figures are available with regard to them except those which are given under Exports (p. 44).

(4) Minerals

A large deposit of lignite which was discovered at Bahour in 1882 extends to Arranganour (3 kilometres east of Bahour) and Javalacoupom (8 kilometres north-east of Bahour), and consists of a compact mass occupying about 4,000 hectares (roughly 10,000 acres), and estimated to contain some 250,000,000 tons. The calorific power is only 0·66 of that of Cardiff coal, and it is therefore of little value for export, but it is 1·52 of that of *filas* wood, the best local combustible. A company was formed to work the deposit, the products of which find a market at Pondicherry.

The regulations with regard to mines were made by a decree of November 7, 1884, following the lines of the regulations made in 1883 for New Caledonia. By that decree, the Council of Mines can authorize borings without the consent of the proprietor of the land. A proprietor can prospect on notifying the authorities. In either case, there is a tax of 40 centimes per hectare. Concessions on Government land are granted by the Governor in Council after consultation with the Council of Mines. The tax is 50 centimes per hectare. The regulations are of little importance, as the only mines are the lignite deposits above-mentioned.

(5) Manufactures

Textile and Chemical.—The principal industries at Pondicherry are cotton-spinning and mechanical weaving. The establishment of mills for cotton-spinning

was the result of suggestions made by the Governor of Pondicherry between 1826 and 1828. The manufacture was successful for many years, but the competition of British and Belgian cloths in the market of Senegal dealt a very serious blow to it, and for some years after 1873 the three spinning mills were all closed. The French Government then offered bounties for the export of the cotton fabrics dyed blue with indigo, known as *guinées*, which are the principal products of the mills; and there has been a remarkable development in recent years. In 1893 there were three mills, with some 20,000 spindles, under the management of the *Société Savana*; in 1906 a fourth mill had been established; and in 1913 there were five mills with 71,233 spindles and 1,622 weaving frames, employing 6,190 inside workers and 1,189 outside workers. There are several indigo manufactories and dyeworks, chiefly connected with the trade in *guinées*; the water supplied to the town is believed to be specially suitable for the blue dye used for these fabrics. A quarter of a century ago there were about 100 indigo factories and some 50 dyeworks, but the demand for indigo has been greatly diminished by the introduction of aniline dyes, which have not only destroyed the export trade, but were, before the war, imported for local use. Since 1914 there has been a temporary revival in the production of dyes from natural indigo. Pondicherry also possesses two well-equipped ironworks and foundries, some oil-works, tanneries, and brickworks, and a distillery. The distillery makes very cheap liquor, and the Government of Madras has, in consequence, found it necessary to create a low-duty area for arrack all round the French settlements; the liquor made in this area is slightly coloured as a check upon its introduction beyond the bounds prescribed for the lower duty. In this way it has been possible to arrest a decline of

British revenue which was noticeable about 1897–8. The oil industry has decayed in the last forty years, owing to competition with the Malabar coast and Ceylon; but, until about 1877, the commerce of Pondicherry was chiefly in indigo and coco-nut oil.

Among other industrial establishments are a bone-mill, an ice-factory, and a factory for the manufacture of cocotine, a substitute for *ghi*.

Native Industries.—The native population engage in a large number of industries, including the manufacture of palm juice and its products, crude wax, mats, baskets, ropes, glass, nautical fittings, sailcloth, children's toys, soaps, jute cloth, *guinées*, &c., and of articles made from tortoise-shell, the horns of the zebu and buffalo, and mother-of-pearl. Hand-weaving has largely died out, but the Patnulkarans, a Gujarati caste of weavers, still make a zephyr fabric, which is used locally, and is also exported to Singapore.

Indian families in Pondicherry make pottery, which is exported by little vessels (called *dhonys*) to Singapore, Colombo, and the Straits. In the villages of Moutalpett and Nellitope Indians make good loin-cloths of silk and cotton. They are clever also at goldsmith's work, iron-work, jewels, and embroidery. Lace and embroidery are made by Hindu and Creole girls under the superintendence of the Sisters of St. Joseph of Cluny.

The principal manufactures of Karikal are bricks and pottery, both on a small scale. Since 1907, Karikal has been a petroleum depot of the Standard Oil Co., which obtained a concession for the construction of oil tanks in that year.

The industries of Mahé, which is a decaying town, are of no economic importance. Chandernagor is a pleasant residential town. The *loges* (see above, p. 2) are of political rather than commercial value.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

The area is so small that the domestic commerce is very insignificant; and no figures are available. A large proportion of the products of the soil is consumed in the district. The only markets are the towns of Pondicherry, Karikal, Yanaon, Mahé, and Chandernagor. A Chamber of Commerce was established in 1879 at Pondicherry, which is the only market of any importance in French India. The Chamber is elected by the leading merchants. The commerce is very largely in the hands of French houses, many of them of old standing. The bank is the French Bank of Indo-China. The most important foreign companies are the British India Steam Navigation Co. and the Standard Oil Co.

(2) Foreign

Two sets of figures are available for the foreign trade of the French colonies in India—the French official returns and the British official statistics of Indian seaborne trade. The French figures are in francs, and relate to calendar years; the British figures are given, at different periods, in francs, in rupees, and in pounds sterling, and are for the Indian financial year (April 1–March 31). When allowances are made for these differences, a comparison shows that in some years the two sets of figures are approximately the same, but that in others there are large variations. The totals of the two sets of figures for nineteen years—British from 1895–96 to 1913–14, and French from 1895 to 1913—differ by, in round numbers, £753,000 out of £23,500,000. The discrepancy is very largely traceable to the years when the British figures are given

in rupees. It must be remembered that three months of 1895 are included in the French figures and not in the British, and that three months of 1914 are included in the British figures and not in the French. The returns may be taken as approximately correct, but their significance is diminished by the absence of any figures for imports or exports by land. These have greatly increased in recent years, but no statistics are available except the returns of goods traffic on the Pondicherry railway.

The sea-borne trade of the French colonies in India has varied very considerably in the last sixty years:

Year.	*Total sea-borne trade of French India.*
	Francs.
1857	48,033,060
1860	32,313,940
1870	19,085,332
1880	33,411,714
1890	21,737,002
1895	18,406,163
1900	14,743,370
1903	37,378,613
1905	33,542,204
1909	39,874,352
1910	45,842,544
1911	46,156,588
1912	46,249,989
1913	54,557,240
1914	41,849,140
1915	27,342,548

The French colonies in India had a very prosperous period about 1857–8. The years from 1860 to 1871 witnessed a decrease in trade, owing to the competition of Ceylon and the Malabar coast; this ruined the export of coco-nut oil, which had represented a large proportion of the trade of Pondicherry. From 1872 the prosperity of the colonies began to revive, and the

development of the trade in ground-nuts led to a recovery. Another period of bad trade began about 1890, and continued, with some variations, until 1900. The years 1901–4 were prosperous; there was a slight decline in 1905, 1906, and 1907, and from 1908 to 1914 the colonies participated in the general expansion of Indian sea-borne trade and had a larger foreign trade than at any other time in their history. The increase was very marked in the year before the outbreak of war, and is attributable to prices obtained, for it is not reflected either in the quantities exported or in the tonnage figures. The value of sea-borne trade in 1913 exceeded that of 1912 by 8,307,251 francs, but the total of tonnage entering and clearing in 1913 was less than that of 1912 by 297,039 tons. The price of ground-nuts, the most important export, was very high in 1913.

The sea-borne trade of the French establishments in India shows a very large excess of exports over imports:

	Imports. (*Value in francs.*)	*Exports.* (*Value in francs.*)
1860	6,318,235	25,995,705
1870	5,253,409	13,831,923
1880	7,970,068	25,441,646
1890	4,637,956	17,099,046
1900	4,029,536	10,713,834
1905	6,356,207	27,185,997
1910	8,376,531	37,446,013
1911	8,618,302	37,988,286
1912	9,031,780	37,218,209
1913	10,837,115	43,720,095
1914	7,545,629	34,403,511

Average for the five years 1909–13: imports, 9,281,358 francs; exports, 37,344,778 francs.

This excess has always been characteristic of French India; so long ago as 1716 the imports of the French

colonies in India were valued at 3,780,000 livres, and the exports at 6,868,000 livres. It is, in proportion, much greater than the excess of exports over imports in the foreign sea-borne trade of British India. The average for British India for the five years 1909–10 to 1913–14 shows an import value of £101,113,000, and an export value of £149,487,000 for merchandise (excluding treasure and gold). The proportion of imports to exports in French India for 1909–13 is, therefore, roughly 1 to 4, and in British India for 1909–10—1913–14 is, roughly, 2 to 3. The difference is, at all events in part, attributable to the modest standard of living which prevails among the French officials and merchants. The overplus of exports arises from foreign trade; in the rapidly decreasing coasting trade, the balance is sometimes the other way, e. g. in 1904–5, when the statistics of the coasting trade showed an import value of 3,374,436 francs, against exports of 1,349,480 francs. The figures of imports and exports for the coasting trade are very variable.

The figures of re-exports are insignificant. In 1914, of a total export valued at 34,303,511 francs, goods to the value of 48,025 francs were re-exported from the French colonies in India.

(*a*) *Exports*

Quantities and Values.—The most valuable export is that of *ground-nuts*. Between 1879, when the trade began to develop, and 1885, the export of ground-nuts increased from under 3,000,000 francs in value to about 14,000,000 francs. The value in 1913 was 29,269,170 francs, and the total quantity exported was 107,238 tons. The value in 1914 was 23,909,514 francs. The export is made in two forms, (*a*) stripped nuts and (*b*) nuts in husks. The price per ton of stripped

ground-nuts is about 25 per cent. higher than is obtained for unshelled nuts, but the latter, owing to their bulk, have generally to pay almost double freight. The proportion of nuts exported in shells depends largely upon the supply of decorticating machines, which has sometimes been quite insufficient to keep pace with the expansion of the trade. The average number of tons of ground-nuts in husks exported from Pondicherry in the five years 1909–13 was 9,667·5, but the numbers in individual years varied from 8·21 tons in 1909 to 18,890·72 tons in 1911. In 1913 the export value of ground-nuts in husks was 2·5 per cent. of the total, but a supply of decorticating machines, manufactured locally, reduced the proportion in 1914 to 0·9 per cent. of the total. The price of ground-nuts varies very considerably from year to year. In the years 1909–13 the price of stripped ground-nuts varied from 30 to 40 rupees per French candy of 240 kilogrammes (i. e. from 8*s.* 4*d.* to 11*s.* 1⅓*d.* per cwt.). In the beginning of 1914 it was 52*s.* per candy, and in the end of the year fell rapidly,[1] after the outbreak of war, to 26*s.* 8*d.* per candy (about 5*s.* 7*d.* per cwt.). Pondicherry is now a great emporium for ground-nuts, grown not only in French but also in British India, and especially in Tanjore. Special facilities in connexion with ground-nuts are given for the Pondicherry market by the Bank of Indo-China; and commercial houses in French Indo-China prefer Pondicherry to British ports.

Next in importance to ground-nuts is the export of *cotton fabrics*, the value of which was 7,165,720 francs in 1906, 7,341,367 francs in 1913, and 6,365,182 francs

[1] This remarkable fall in the price of ground-nuts after the outbreak of war was peculiar to Pondicherry, which relies mainly on the French market. The price in British India fell only from 11*s.* 8½*d.* per cwt. in 1913–14 to 11*s.* 0⅔*d.* in 1914–15.

in 1914. The quantity exported in 1913 amounted to 2,412,915 kilogrammes (over 2,412 tons). The average number of bales exported from Pondicherry in the five years 1909–13 was 8,175 bales of *guinées* (dyed fabrics) and 5,164 bales of other cotton fabrics. The export of cotton fabrics has remained approximately constant in the last decade. The figures for the export of *cotton thread* have been more variable, falling, for example, from a value of 2,685,360 francs in 1906 to 617,507 francs in 1907, owing partly to Japanese competition in the East, and partly to the growth of transit by land. But more recent years have shown a recovery; the value was 2,318,860 francs in 1913, 1,654,560 francs in 1914, and in 1915 cotton thread was an exception to the general decline, and increased in value to 2,549,250 francs. The quantity exported in 1913 was 1,017 tons.

The exports of ground-nuts and cotton fabrics are made almost entirely from Pondicherry, those from Karikal being insignificant. Two other important exports—*rice* and *fish*—are made from both ports, and there is a small export of fish from Mahé and Chandernagore. The export of rice has increased in value from 7,619 francs in 1906 and 10,266 francs in 1907 to 1,848,053 francs in 1913, and 1,232,266 francs in 1914; it is made chiefly from Karikal, which exported an average of 7,132 bags in the years 1909–13, against an average of 63 from Pondicherry. The quantity of rice exported from French India in 1913 was 6,981 tons. The export of salt fish rose in value from 24,018 francs in 1906 to 104,208 francs in 1907, owing to a large demand from Colombo and the Straits Settlements. The value in 1913 was 80,149 francs, and the quantity 356 tons. The average number of bags of dried fish exported from Pondicherry in 1909–13 was 959, and from Karikal 144. The figures for

the export of fish vary considerably from year to year.

Bone-powder, for chemical manure, rose in value from 34,935 francs in 1906 to 78,672 francs in 1907, owing to the establishment of a new bone-works factory, and had a value of 101,926 francs in 1913 and 180,117 francs in 1914. The quantity exported in 1913 was 721 tons. A larger demand for *cocotine* (a substitute for *ghi*) in Indian markets increased the value of this export from 12,024 francs in 1906 to 37,241 francs in 1913. In 1913, 41 tons of cocotine were exported. The Karikal export of *pottery* increased from 2,872 francs in 1906 to 11,733 francs in 1907, owing to a demand in Ceylon, and reached a value of 19,542 francs in 1913. The average number of articles of earthenware exported from Karikal in 1909–13 was 230,864.

Ground-nut oil, which in 1907 had a value of 285,703 francs, had fallen by 1913 to 25,814 francs; and ground-nut oilcakes, which had a value of 980,956 francs in 1906 and 600,922 francs in 1907, had decreased to 125,226 francs in 1913. The explanation of the decline is stated by the French Colonial Office to be the difficulty of transport to Pondicherry from the localities of production. There is a similar decline in *oil of sesame*, the export of which increased from 54,998 francs in 1906 to 97,059 francs in 1907, owing to a demand in the Straits Settlements, and had fallen to 23,324 francs in 1913, and in sesame oilcake (52,370 francs in 1907 and 5,102 francs in 1913). The export of *indigo*, the value of which was 25,008 francs in 1906, rose, owing to a sudden demand in European markets, to 53,732 francs in 1907 (when an opportunity occurred for getting rid of old stocks), but fell to 2,834 francs in 1913. The export of *skins and hides*, the value of which fell in

1907 to about half of the figures (2,313,937 francs) for 1906, owing to financial crises in Europe and America, has not recovered. The value for 1913 was 976,201 francs. The average number of bales of hides exported from Pondicherry in 1909–13 was 494.

There are small exports of coco-nuts (the transit of which is largely effected by land), tamarinds, onions, tannin, and dyes, castor oil, coco-nut oil, chillies, coffee, coriander, *gingili*, and metal work. The last mentioned is a developing industry, and the export in 1915 reached a value of 170,832 francs.

Countries of Destination.—In 1887, of a total export value of 21,416,214 francs, goods to the value of 10,427,760 francs were destined for France, and to the value of 664,476 francs for the French colonies; in 1904, of a total export value of £1,102,000, goods to the value of £435,000 were destined for France and the French colonies. The figures for 1913 and 1914 are as follows:

	Total value of exports.	To France.	To French colonies.	To other destinations.
	Francs.	*Francs.*	*Francs.*	*Francs.*
1913	43,720,095	27,487,768	2,818,372	13,413,955
1914	34,303,511	22,953,256	2,575,893	8,774,362

The exports to French destinations were, therefore, over one-half in 1887, considerably under one-half in 1904, over two-thirds in 1913, and over three-quarters in 1914. This large proportion of French trade depends upon the tendency of French ports to absorb the two staple products of the French colonies in India. In 1913, of a total export of 107,238 tons of ground-nuts, 88,792 tons were destined for France; and, in the same year, of 2,412,915 kilogrammes of cotton fabrics exported, 1,590,915 kilogrammes were destined for France and French possessions. The value of these quantities of ground-nuts (24,304,130 francs) and of

cotton fabrics (4,018,704 francs) amounts to 28,322,834 francs out of the total export value of 30,306,140 francs to French destinations. The most important items in the remaining 1,983,306 francs of goods exported to France and French colonies in 1913 are 465 tons of bone powder (value 60,384 francs) and skins and hides (value 881,021 francs) to France, and the whole export of cocotine (value 37,241 francs) and liquors (value 36,721 francs) to the French colonies. The liquors were imported from France and re-exported to other French colonies.

Apart from French destinations, the export trade of French India is almost entirely with Great Britain and the British colonies. Of the non-French exports, valued at 13,413,955 francs in 1913 and 8,774,362 francs in 1914, over 10,750,000 francs in 1913 and the whole amount (with the trivial exception of 712,038 francs) in 1914 represent trade with the British Empire. The exports to Great Britain are small; in 1913 they amounted to 62,970 francs, of which 43,272 francs represent 17 tons of cotton. There has hitherto been no market for French ground-nuts in Great Britain, but just before the outbreak of war efforts were made in this direction, and trial shipments were made to Liverpool and Hull. British colonies in 1913 imported from French India 8,634 tons of ground-nuts (value 2,380,568 francs); 803 tons of cotton fabrics (value 3,273,379 francs); the whole export of rice (6,981 tons, value 1,848,053 francs); the whole export of dried fish (356 tons, value 80,149 francs); 607 tons of cotton thread (value 1,356,331 francs); 269 cattle (value 72,626 francs), and other smaller imports.

Germany in 1913 imported from French India 2,515 tons of ground-nuts (value 676,184 francs), and manufactured goods to the value of 7,665 francs; Italy, 6,274 tons of ground-nuts (value 1,636,776 francs);

and Belgium, 1,023 tons of ground-nuts (value 271,512 francs), and manufactured goods to the value of 4,750 francs.

(*b*) *Imports*

Quantities and Values.—The imports, as has been said, are of much less importance than the exports; the average value of imports in 1909–13 was about one-quarter of the exports. The largest branches of import trade are in cotton, areca nuts, and petroleum, which in 1914 accounted for 4,869,196 francs out of a total import value of 7,545,629 francs. The value of the import of cotton in 1914 was 2,116,472 francs; the import is practically confined to Pondicherry, which received in the years 1909–13 an average number of 10,480 bales of cotton per annum. Areca nuts to the value of 1,741,809 francs were imported in 1914; the average number of tons imported into Pondicherry in 1909–13 was 479·8, and into Karikal 1,986. The import of petroleum is confined to Karikal, which is a depot for the surrounding districts. The Standard Oil Company stores large quantities of petrol at Karikal. The value of the petrol imported at Karikal in 1914 was 1,010,915 francs, and the average number of gallons imported in 1909–13 was 1,280,175. Smaller imports include wines, spirits, and other liquors (value in 1913, 352,470 francs); coal (value in 1914, 112,500 francs); cotton thread (value in 1914, 333,283 francs); jute bags (value in 1914, 489,114 francs), and grain (value in 1914, 189,685 francs).

Countries of Origin.—Unlike the export trade, a very large proportion of the import trade is with the British Empire, and a small proportion with France and French possessions. In 1887, of a total import value of 5,945,459 francs, goods to the value of 577,681

francs were imported from France, and to the value of 440,391 francs from French colonies. In 1913, of a total import value of 10,837,115 francs, goods to the value of 8,903,611 francs were imported from the British Empire; in 1914 the figures were, respectively, 7,545,629 francs (total) and 6,095,552 francs (goods from the British Empire). In 1913 goods were imported from France to the value of 414,772 francs (largely in articles of food and clothing); from the French colonies to the value of 71,451 francs (almost entirely vegetable products); from Germany to the value of 46,075 francs; from America to the value of 1,394,526 francs (chiefly oil); and from Belgium to the value of 6,680 francs (manufactured goods). The imports from the British Isles amounted to only 55,654 francs. The large imports from the British colonies consisted chiefly in vegetable products to the value of 6,821,477 francs (including 1,547,599 francs for areca nuts and 874,867 francs for grain), and in manufactured goods to the value of 1,491,589 francs.

The imports from Germany in 1913 were cheese, synthetic indigo, wine, brandy, rum, gin, hollands, beer, whisky, salt of magnesia, and pack-thread. Two-thirds of the total consists of synthetic indigo (the value being 30,627 francs). These figures do not, of course, include German goods which reach the French colonies by land from British India; for these no statistics are available, but a statement of German and Austrian imports in French colonies (*Bulletin de l'Office Colonial*, February 1915) states that they consist of small quantities of glass, crockery, cutlery, and rubber.

The foreign trade is almost entirely at Pondicherry, which, as has been said, is the only real market. The trade at Karikal is about one-ninth of the total sea-borne trade, and the trade at Yanaon and at Mahé is insignificant.

Customs and Tariffs.—Pondicherry is, with certain exceptions, a free port. Port dues are very low, and are not payable by ships trading with India and Ceylon. There have been, for many years, customs duties on arrack, tobacco, and snuff, on rum manufactured to the east of the Cape of Good Hope or in the Antilles, and on liquors distilled from coco-nuts, palms, sugar-cane, and rice. In 1904 a small duty was levied on all wines and spirits entering Pondicherry, but it has not affected the quantities imported. The customs and tariffs at Karikal, Yanaon, and Mahé are similar to those in force at Pondicherry. All articles of export and import trade passing by land from British India to French India are liable to duties on the scale of the province in which the French establishments lie; but, by a convention of 1817, all live stock and provisions actually required for consumption by the French inhabitants are allowed to pass the frontier duty free. Grain grown in British India for export to the British Empire is free of duty at Pondicherry, and considerable amounts of such grain are exported. Goods originating in the French establishments in India are given a preference by the import tariff in France. In 1901 the Government of British India consented, on certain conditions, that postal packages for Pondicherry, forwarded by steamer from the French colonies *via* Cuddalore, might pass through British territory without being inspected or paying customs duties.

(*c*) *Commercial Treaties*

In 1815 a convention between Great Britain and France regulated the supply of salt, opium, and saltpetre to the French establishments in India. The right to purchase salt manufactured in French India was farmed to the British Government, the French retaining a quantity sufficient for domestic purposes.

In 1818 this convention was modified by an agreement by which the manufacture of salt in the French establishments ceased, and an annual sum of 4,000 star pagodas (Rs. 14,000) became payable to the French Government as an indemnification to the proprietors of salt pans. The British Government undertook to sell, at prime cost, to the French Government sufficient salt for domestic purposes in the French establishments, and the French Government agreed to re-sell this salt at the prices prevailing in the adjoining British territory. This convention is still in existence, but in 1839 the French settlement at Chandernagor renounced its right to a supply of salt in consideration of an annual payment of Rs. 20,000, and agreed to give every facility for the sale of British salt at Chandernagor and to assist the British Government in obtaining the proper revenue from salt. There is no duty payable on the import of salt into Chandernagor.

The convention of 1815 reserved to the French settlements a right of purchasing a quantity of opium at an average price. This right has been commuted for an annual payment of Rs. 3,000 and of an additional Rs. 2,000 for help in the suppression of smuggling. The production of opium and trade in opium are now forbidden in French India.

By the Treaty of 1815, French subjects are allowed to trade in British India, and arrangements were made for the mutual surrender of debtors. (See also Table on p. 16.)

(D) FINANCE

(1) Public Finance

The actual budget figures are not available for any year later than 1907. From 1899 to 1907 there was an annual excess of income over expenditure, varying from 10,103 fr. (£404) in 1899 to 216,788 fr. (£8,671) in 1902, except in 1905, when there was a deficit of 32,337 fr. (£1,293). The budget estimates for 1908 and 1909 were made to balance exactly. The figures for the years 1900–7 are as follows:

		£			£
1900.	Receipts	73,052.	1904.	Receipts	100,440.
	Expenses	72,648.		Expenses	95,869.
1901.	Receipts	93,672.	1905.	Receipts	99,527.
	Expenses	90,518.		Expenses	100,820.
1902.	Receipts	88,456.	1906.	Receipts	99,848.
	Expenses	79,784.		Expenses	98,252.
1903.	Receipts	91,270.	1907.	Receipts	105,177.
	Expenses	83,957.		Expenses	102,264.

The principal items under Income are Indirect and Direct Taxes. The product of Indirect Taxes increased steadily, except for a decrease in 1905, from £38,883 in 1900 to £65,715 in 1907. The estimate for 1909 was £62,966. Direct Taxes produce between £16,000 and £17,000 a year. From 1901 to 1907 the colony received a subvention, varying from £8,171 in 1901 to £1,966 in 1907. The estimated subvention for each of the years 1908 and 1909 was £9,917. On the expenditure side the principal items are the expenses of the administrative offices, the largest single item being for Education (£9,718 in 1901 and £11,491 (estimated) for 1909).

Public Loans.—A Government loan of £46,680 at $3\frac{4}{5}$ per cent. was contracted in 1894 for the Paralam-

Karikal railway, to be repaid in 1919; £23,634 had been repaid by the end of 1909. A further Government loan, of £2,960 at $3\frac{4}{5}$ per cent., for the same purpose, was contracted in 1900, also to be repaid in 1919, and £1,257 had been repaid by the end of 1909. A Government loan of £175,200 was contracted in 1906 at $3\frac{4}{5}$ per cent., repayable in 1932, for the construction of a railway from Tiroupapouliour to Pondicherry, the improvement of the port of Karikal, and the improvement of the water-supply at Pondicherry and Chandernagor. Of this loan £16,512 had been repaid by the end of 1909. These moneys have all been borrowed from funds belonging to the French Government.

The municipalities of Pondicherry and of La Grande-Aldée (Karikal) have contracted loans of £2,560 and £450 respectively for local improvements; the rates of interest are respectively 5 per cent. and 4 per cent.

(2) Currency

The currency is in rupees. The value of the rupee used to be fixed annually, but in 1893 the Government of British India took steps to restrict the coinage in order to give the rupee a settled value, and from 1899 to 1914 it was, with very slight variations, equivalent to 1*s.* 4*d.* The rupee, as in British India, is divided into 16 annas, and each anna into 12 pies, but there is also a division in the French establishments into 8 *fanons* of 24 *caches* each. The value of money, other than the rupee and its subdivisions, is determined by weight.

(3) Banking

The Bank of Indo-China has the same privileges in French India as in Indo-China. It is authorized to issue bank-notes of small value for circulation in the

colony. The Pondicherry branch of the Bank of Indo-China is responsible, over the whole area of French India, for all banking operations, including discount and advances on assignment of crops and on the security of merchandise. It is under the supervision of the Colonial Secretary. The Bank of Madras is closely associated with the Bank of Indo-China in loan operations and other commercial business, and drafts are sent to France through the Bank of Madras.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The whole survey of economic and industrial conditions in the French establishments in India illustrates the insuperable difficulties arising from the geographical situation of these scattered territories. French proprietors hold small tongues of land; roads are often British, while the ditches which border on them are French; the irrigation of French soil frequently depends on a British lake; sometimes land is held by French and British owners by an arrangement which allots a number of twelfth parts to each nation; none of the larger lakes lies wholly in French territory; and even the sea-coast is not continuously in French possession, for the mouth of the Maltar River is British.

This condition of things makes the collection of customs and excise very difficult; it facilitates crime; and it puts a great obstacle in the way of proper irrigation. Moreover, the development of means of communication, both internal and external, and of industry and commerce must be hampered and retarded while these conditions remain.

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Most of Pondicherry is covered by the quarter-inch Degree sheet 58 M, Provisional Issue, 1915, and the whole by the old quarter-inch Atlas sheets ;

Karikal is covered by the quarter-inch Degree sheets 58 M and N, published in 1915 and 1916 ;

Mahé is covered by the quarter-inch Degree sheet 49 M, published in 1913, by the half-inch sheet 49 M, N.E., and by the one-inch sheets 49 M/9–10 ;

Yanaon is covered by the old quarter-inch Atlas sheet 94 ;

Chandernagor is covered by the quarter-inch Degree sheet 79 B.

An outline map on the scale 1 : 275,000 showing the French Possessions in India was issued by the Naval Staff Intelligence Division in connexion with this series.

HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 80

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1920

EDITORIAL NOTE

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

Portuguese Timor, which occupies the northern half of the island of Timor, lies between 8° 30′ and 9° 30′ south latitude and 125° and 126° 30′ east longitude. The area of the main portion is about 6,325 square miles, and that of the Ocussi enclave, a territory belonging to Portugal on the northern coast of Dutch Timor, about 950 square miles. The island of Kambing, off the northern coast, also belongs to Portugal; its area is 55 square miles. The total area of the colony is thus approximately 7,330 square miles.

The boundary between Dutch and Portuguese territory is formed by a line drawn between the mouth of the Biku and the Talas, on the north and south respectively, which at its central portion makes a decided bend eastward. The boundaries of the enclave are lines running roughly north-east and south-west from the mouths of the Besi and the Meto respectively.

Fuller details will be found in *Dutch Timor*, No. 86 of this series.

(2) Surface, Coast, and Rivers

Surface

The mountains of Portuguese Timor, which are very bare and rugged, do not for the most part rise to more than 6,000–7,000 ft., though Ramelau, the highest point, reaches 9,000–10,000 ft. The soil is in parts rich, and lends itself to cultivation, but, partly owing to the porous character of the limestone of which

a great part of the country is composed, and partly to the erosive action of water, there is a large extent of sterile land. In many regions the want of water also proves a hindrance to cultivation. There are a few small shallow lakes, and in some places the lower courses of the rivers are swampy.

Coast

The seaboard of Portuguese Timor is some 500 miles in length, not including the Ocussi enclave (about 35 miles).

The mountains run parallel to the coast-line, and often come close to the sea, but there are, especially on the south side, places where the shore is low and sandy. The northern coast is more indented than the southern, which has only shallow bays.

Both coasts are lined by coral reefs, but there are places where ships may safely approach within a moderate distance. The only port of any account is that of Dili (Dilly). There are other bays which afford anchorage and shelter, during some winds, on the north coast; the south coast offers no shelter during the south-east monsoon, and is seldom visited.

Rivers

The rivers are short and unimportant, none of them being navigable except for small boats at their mouths. They all flow north and south from the main mountain axis, and have rapid courses. Owing to the porous quality of the soil, they are of little use for irrigation.

(3) Climate

There are two seasons, that of the south-east monsoon, from May to November, and that of the north-west monsoon during the rest of the year. During the south-east monsoon, practically no rain falls in the north, but the north-west monsoon is accompanied

by violent rainstorms. No figures, however, exist for the rainfall of Portuguese Timor.

The hottest regions are the coastal plains, where the average temperature is about 80°–100° F. (26°–38° C.). Daily variations are considerable, especially at the beginning of the south-east monsoon. Portuguese Timor appears to be rather cooler than Dutch Timor.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

The low marshy ground of the coast is very unhealthy, and malaria is common, but conditions in the interior are better. Above 2,000 ft. there are no marshes, and above 3,000 ft. no mosquitoes. On the other hand, above 2,000 ft. the European is attacked by hill diarrhoea; and it appears from a recent Portuguese report that the natives also suffer from ailments of a dysenteric kind, which sometimes carry them off in large numbers. The lack of good drinking-water and the unclean habits of the people doubtless conduce to this sort of disorder. A few regions of the island, particularly towards the east, are said to be possible for colonization on a small scale by whites, but even this is uncertain.

(5) Race and Language

The natives of Portuguese Timor are wholly Belonese, and it has been suggested that their dark skin and shaggy curly hair are due to predominance of the Papuan element. Besides the natives there is a number of Portuguese, Chinese, and Arabs.

There is a great diversity of language. Over a considerable area Tetum is spoken, and it is generally used for official purposes. But a large number of other languages or dialects is known; and it frequently happens that the inhabitants of neighbouring 'kingdoms', separated by no natural boundary, speak different languages.

(6) Population

The population of Portuguese Timor was returned in 1915 as 377,815 (201,121 males and 176,694 females), with an average density of about 55 to the square mile.

The only town of importance is the capital and port, Dili (Dilly); otherwise it seems that the inhabitants live in small *kampongs* of about ten houses. In the Ocussi enclave, however, the *kampongs* are said to be larger. These settlements are usually situated in places difficult of access, owing to the general insecurity and the hostile relations obtaining between the numerous 'kingdoms' into which the natives are divided.

As to increase or decrease, it is impossible, owing to the extreme uncertainty of the figures, to say more than that there is an impression that the native population is gradually dwindling in numbers.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Summary

c. 1516. First mention of Timor.
1520. Supposed foundation of Lifau.
1521. Visit by a ship of Magalhães' expedition.
1618. Dutch settlement at Kupang. Capital moved to Dili.
c. 1700. Portuguese Governor appointed.
1769. Lifau besieged by ' Black Portuguese '.
1851. First agreement to settle the boundary. Cession of Larantuca to the Dutch.
1859. Treaty of Lisbon (April 20).
1893. Further agreements (June 10, July 1).
1899. Boundary defined.
1904. Later treaty.
1913. Appointment of M. Lardy as arbitrator.
1914. Arbitration award.

(1) Early History

The eastern portion of the island of Timor is the last fragment remaining to Portugal of her once extensive possessions in the Malay Archipelago. The western portion of the island belongs to Holland. Timor does not seem to have been considered at any time to be of great importance, and there are very few references to it in the writings of the older historians. The first mention is probably that by Duarte Barbosa, who wrote about 1516, and the information he gives is very scanty. It was at that time under its own pagan chiefs of Malay origin, and its principal product was sandalwood. Garcia da Orta, writing in 1563, says that Timor produced sandalwood in abundance, but

not the red kind. The best yellow sort was found. Ambergris also was collected in small quantities.[1]

The Portuguese obtained power in the island in the course of the sixteenth century. As the farthest east of the Lesser Sunda Islands, they no doubt regarded it as a useful port of call on their way to the Moluccas, which were of great value owing to their monopoly of the clove-trade.

The next recorded visit to Timor and the neighbouring island of Solor is that of Magalhães' expedition after the disasters in the Philippines in 1521. The *Victoria* (according to João de Barros, writing *c.* 1560) was guided by information given by a Portuguese named João de Campos to the island of Banda to obtain mace, and afterwards to Timor to obtain sandalwood. After leaving Banda they passed by Timor (apparently without landing), intending to pass through the Solor Channel (apparently the Flores Straits), and thence to sail straight across the Indian Ocean to Madagascar. This passing visit gives no information as to Timor, but it is evident that the island was well known to the Portuguese at that time.

Lifau in the western part of the island is stated by later writers to have become the capital of the Portuguese settlement so early as 1520. The Portuguese, however, do not appear to have occupied the interior, which has continued throughout to be almost independent. Except for their contest with Spain regarding the Moluccas, the Portuguese were supreme in the Eastern Archipelago until the later part of the sixteenth century, when the Dutch began to assert themselves. Here, as in some other places, clerical rule was very powerful, and was rather strengthened than otherwise under the Spanish regime (1580–1640).

[1] This agrees with J. H. van Linschoten, *Voyage ... to the East Indies* (1596), Hakluyt Society, LXX, LXXI, 1885.

The Dutch established themselves at Kupang (Koepang) in the western portion of the island in 1618, being aided by the civil war which broke out between the civil Portuguese government and the clerical elements, whose authority had become very great. After the fall of Kupang, the Portuguese capital was ultimately transferred to the port of Dili (Dilly) in the eastern part of the island. Attempts were made to recover Kupang with the assistance of the so-called Black Portuguese or Christians, who were mainly of native blood; but, owing chiefly to internal discords, these met with no success. A Portuguese Governor was for the first time appointed towards the end of the seventeenth century, and continued a struggle against these combined difficulties. This struggle went on through the eighteenth century, and in 1769 the Black Portuguese laid siege to Lifau. The Governor burnt the town down and retired to Dili. From this time forward, with the exception of a nominal sovereignty in the Ocussi enclave, the Dutch held the whole of the western and the Portuguese the eastern part of Timor; and in spite of occasional outbreaks of hostilities, this arrangement has continued till the present day. No definite frontier, however, was laid down until the middle of the nineteenth century.

(2) Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

In 1851 the Governments of Portugal and the Netherlands determined to settle their dispute, and commissioners were appointed with this object. Lopes de Lima, representing Portugal, entered into an agreement (1854) by which he obtained a satisfactory frontier in exchange for the cession of certain Portuguese rights outside the island of Timor in addition to the payment of a sum of money. These rights consisted of the sovereignty over certain other islands in the Lesser

Sunda Archipelago, which included the Solor group and Flores. While awaiting sanction, Lopes de Lima anticipated it and actually made over these outlying dependencies to the Dutch. This cession included Larantuca on the eastern extremity of Flores Island, the earliest Portuguese settlement in this archipelago; and great resentment was aroused in Portugal. Lopes de Lima was held to have exceeded his authority. He was put under arrest and the arrangement was repudiated. On April 20, 1859, however, a treaty [1] was signed at Lisbon, and various so-called native 'kingdoms' were named as being on one side or other of the border. The Ocussi enclave remained Portuguese and the Mancatar territory Dutch. But the boundary was not surveyed, as neither the Dutch nor the Portuguese possessed sufficient authority in the interior to carry out a survey. This so-called settlement was therefore ineffective, the tribes on each side of the border continuing to assert their rights to territories on the other side.

A new agreement was come to on June 10, 1893, followed by a Declaration of July 1, 1893, the agreement providing for an Expert Commission to make proposals which should form the basis of a further Convention, with the intention of securing a clearly marked boundary and readjustment of various enclaves.[2] The Declaration provided for mutual rights of pre-emption. After the boundary had been thus defined, another treaty, in which certain enclaves were exchanged by the two Powers, was made in 1902. This again gave rise to disputes owing to differences of interpretation, and in 1913 these differences were submitted to the arbitration of M. Lardy, a Swiss member of

[1] See *State Papers*, vol. 50 (1859–60), pp. 1166–8, and G. G. Wilson, *The Hague Arbitration Cases*, p. 443.

[2] *State Papers*, vol. 85 (1892–3), pp. 394–6.

the Hague Court of Arbitration. His decision was given on June 25, 1914, and the boundaries are believed to have been laid down in accordance therewith. Under this arbitration all enclaves are abolished with the exception of that of Ocussi, which remains in Portuguese possession, and whose boundaries are now for the first time clearly laid down. Mancatar is transferred to Portugal, and Noemuti, Tahakai, and Tamiroe Ailala go to Holland.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

Portuguese Timor forms part of the Catholic diocese of Macao, but since the Portuguese Revolution of 1908 the Church has been disestablished. The natives are mostly pagan, though sometimes professing Christianity. Fetishism is prevalent, and the spirits of ancestors, as well as the moon, the sun, the earth, and a deity called Maromatu, are invoked. Sacred places (*Uma-Luli*), supposed to be inhabited by a supernatural presence and presided over by a *Dako-Luli*, are found throughout the country; access to them is strictly forbidden to foreigners.

(2) Political

Timor (with Solor) was under the Governor of Macao from 1833 till 1896, when a separate governor was appointed.

(3) Educational

Primary education is given in schools (classified as regional, municipal, and missionary) at Alas; Baucau; Viqueque and Barique; Manatuto, Soubada, and Laleia; Suro; and Liquiçá. Instruction in all these is given in Portuguese and in the vernacular. The total number of pupils in 1915 was 806. There are also teachers (mostly missionaries) at Dili, Bidau, Lahane, Aipelo, and Laduta.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) INTERNAL

(*a*) *Roads and Tracks*

THERE do not appear to be any properly constructed roads in Portuguese Timor, apart from beaten highways and native tracks. The map in the *Anuario Colonial*, 1916, shows a road along the north coast of the colony from Dili, the capital, westwards to Maubára. Another road starts from Lacló, on the river of the same name, runs north to Manatuto and thence eastwards to Vemasse and Baucau, where it strikes inwards to Venilale. These are the only roads indicated. The *Atlas Colonial Português* (1914) shows no roads whatever. In any case the clayey surface of the lowlands, as affected by the scourging rains and torrential rivers of the wet season, makes the character of these 'natural' roads very uncertain. Landslides occur frequently; the natives say that 'the land of Timor is always falling'.

(*b*) *Rivers*

The rivers flowing to the north and south coasts from the high land of the interior are little more than trickles of water in the dry season, and become torrents during the rains. They are thus of no use as means of communication.

There are no railways.

(*c*) *Posts and Telephones*

The postal service is mainly with the outside world. In 1915 the number of letters received was 26,149, and

the number dispatched 14,949, the bulk of the correspondence coming from and going to Europe, Asia, Australia, and Oceania, and the other Portuguese colonies. Receipts exceeded expenditure by 141 *escudos*.[1]

There is telephonic communication between Dili and the various military stations and posts.

(2) External

(*a*) *Ports and Anchorages*

The only port of any account is on the north coast at *Dili*, where a natural harbour affords room for about a dozen vessels. Two coral reefs act as a breakwater, and there is one passage between the end of a reef and the coast at the west and another passage towards the east. The western is the larger and the principal entrance to the port; a lighthouse stands on the west point of the bay. In both passages the channel is well buoyed. The anchorage has a depth of 8 to 10 fathoms, while the tidal rise and fall is 1·8 metres. A pier opposite the customs-house has a depth of 8 fathoms at its end, but, owing to a structural defect, is available for boats only; however, landing is easy anywhere on the shore. The town has a supply of good drinking-water.

During 1915, ocean-going steamships to the number of 59 entered the harbour; of these 45 were Dutch from the Dutch islands and 13 English from English ports, while the single Portuguese vessel also came from an English port. The aggregate tonnage of these vessels was 91,154, the Portuguese ship being of 207 tons. They disembarked 627 passengers and 2,092 tons of merchandise, the latter worth about 324,123 escudos. These vessels, excluding the Portuguese ship, embarked in the course of the year 728 passengers at Dili, and

[1] The nominal value of the *escudo* is 4*s*. 5¼*d*.

took from the colony 3,248 tons of merchandise, worth about 512,140 *escudos*.

The coasting trade is almost entirely confined to Portuguese ships, and all the steam vessels in the trade are Portuguese. In 1915, of the 340 coasting ships (including 17 steamships) which entered Dili, all were Portuguese except 30 sailing-vessels from the Dutch islands. These vessels landed 361 passengers and 2,489 tons of goods, valued at 261,000 *escudos*. There sailed in the same year 329 ships in the coasting trade, 16 being steamships and 30 Dutch sailing-vessels for the Dutch islands. They carried in all 500 passengers and 698 tons of merchandise, worth about 194,550 *escudos*.

In the same year 1 French and 4 English warships visited the port.

Some places which have small bays or anchorages are treated as ports, though in bad weather landing at these is impracticable. To this class belong, on the north coast, *Batugadé*, *Maubára*, *Liquiçá*, *Manatuto*, *Baucau*, and *Lautem*, with *Ocussi* in the detached district of that name, and on the south coast *Suai* and *Ventano*. The latter, however, are much exposed to storms, and on that account are little visited.

(*b*) *Shipping Lines*

Apart from the various ships which visit the port of Dili, a regular service is supplied in normal times by one Dutch and one British steamship company. The boats of the *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij* call twice a month and link the colony with the neighbouring islands. By this means a connexion can be made at Batavia or Surabaya with the vessels of the *Rotterdamsche Lloyd* or the *Stoomvaart Maatschappij Nederland*, which arrive weekly at these ports and take it in turn to call at Lisbon. These vessels, however,

take passengers only for Portugal, so that goods destined for Lisbon must go to Hamburg or Amsterdam for trans-shipment to Lisbon. This is obviously a serious handicap. Connexion with Japan and China is afforded by the boats of the *Eastern and Australian Steamship Company*, which call at Dili on their outward and inward journey between Sydney and Yokohama every three months.

The one official steamer of the colony, the *Dilly*, makes two trips a month to ports east and west of Dili, carrying cargo and passengers.

It will be clear from what has been said that the steamship connexions with the outer world are not favourable to Portuguese interests. The difficulties, the delays, the loss in trans-shipment, and the heavy charges for freight, all tend to weaken the commercial ties between the colony and the mother country.

(c) *Telegraphic Communications*

Portuguese Timor is not directly linked up with any cable or wireless system. Telegrams must be conveyed by one of the visiting steamers to Macassar, 96 hours distant, or Surabaya, just as far away, or Port Darwin in Australia, a journey of 36 hours, whence messages can be transmitted by cable. The delays and other disadvantages incident to such means of communication are obvious.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

The Portuguese in the colony are officials, commercial agents, or agriculturists. Trading is largely in the hands of the Arabs and Chinese. The natives, who find it easy to satisfy their own simple needs in food and clothing, and are averse from working for others,

are described as idle. There appears to be a certain amount of compulsory labour on terms similar to those existing in other Portuguese colonies, but the quantity available and the results obtained cannot be ascertained. It has been proposed to introduce Chinese labourers, which would indicate that the efforts to secure native labour have been disappointing. There is a constant demand for porters, because of the deplorable state of the roads.

(2) Agriculture

(*a*) *Products of Commercial Value*

Vegetable Products.—The natives support themselves mainly by agriculture, for there is little game to be hunted, and the climatic conditions limit the amount of pasture. *Maize* is the principal crop, but is grown merely in sufficient quantity to satisfy native needs, and on that account the plough is neither necessary nor known. It has recently been introduced, but apparently not for native use. Other products, less widespread, are *rice*, *millet*, *sugar-cane*, *manioc*, *sweet-potatoes*, some *corn*, *beans*, and *potatoes*, while there are several varieties of tropical and semi-tropical *fruits*, including the bread-fruit and the banana. The cultivation of rice is conducted by a system of irrigation, the irrigated land being churned into mud by driving buffaloes across it.

On the hill slopes grow *coffee*, *tea*, and *tobacco*, and the first of these is commercially by far the most important. It is said to be of the very best quality, and is grown specially in the hilly part of the north coast between the 'kingdom' of Motael behind Dili and the River Lois to the west. The Government has shown itself anxious to develop the coffee industry, not only by increasing the number of its own plantations, but

also by constraining the natives to adopt a more systematic method of cultivation. The results of its efforts have not been very satisfactory. A report of 1910, however, affirms that by that time the State coffee plantations were not unsuccessful.

Cocoa first appeared as an article of export in 1910. There was a decline in 1912, but in 1913 the amount and value exported were three times as great as in the first year. Its future may, therefore, be regarded as promising.

The *coco-nut palm* is a feature of the flat southern coast, and is another object of the Government's interest. Copra, in fluctuating quantities, is prepared for export.

In 1906 *cotton* was said to take first place among the cultivated plants of Timor, where in the districts of Dili and Ermera alone more than 60 hectares were under this plant. No cotton, however, appears among the exports, so that all the produce is presumably put to local use in the manufacture of clothing. The plant, like tobacco, is said to grow wild in the colony.

In addition to the State plantations there were five private companies operating plantations in the colony. Of these the chief was the Companhia Commercial e Agricola de Timor, which in 1907 had 12,500 acres under cultivation, mostly in the Ermera district. On these were grown coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco, and coco-nuts, while experiments were being made in the cultivation of cocoa and rubber plants. The estates of the other companies were not on such a large scale, and their products were confined to coffee, cocoa, and coco-nuts. But all agricultural enterprises must reckon with the fact that there is little soil in the colony which lends itself to cultivation, and that what little there is alternates with stretches of poor or sterile land.

Live-stock.—Among the animals the most useful are *buffaloes*, *horses*, and *swine*. The buffalo is the principal working animal. The horse is a small pony, very hardy and sure-footed, which is prized in the Straits Settlements and in China, but is not now exported to the same extent as formerly. The number of cattle is not great, for the long dry season withers up all green stuff, except in the mountains and along the streams, to which places the natives are obliged at that time to drive their stock for pasturage.

There are great swarms of wild bees, from which the natives procure *honey* and *wax*, which is exported.

(*b*) *Forestry*

As the dry season, from May to November, is nearly twice as long as the wet season, while the latter is marked by heavy storms as well as rains, the climatic conditions are not favourable to the usual dense and lofty timber growth of the tropics. Instead, there are thickets of low wood and grassy savannahs, interspersed with trees, which, as well as the shrubs, are generally of Australian type. The commonest and most valuable of the trees is the *sandalwood*, but this species has been somewhat recklessly exploited for export. It is most numerous in the western part of the colony, namely, in the districts of Alas and Manu-Fai on the south coast, the hilly region round Bubo Naro and the Ocussi enclave on the north coast. Other trees are the *eucalyptus*, on hill and plain, the *casuarina*, or Australian oak, by the river courses, and the *bamboo*. *Rosewood* and *teak* are also said to occur.

(c) *Land Tenure*

Concessions and transfers of land in Timor are regulated by a special decree of December 5, 1910. This provision was made necessary by the remoteness of the colony from the mother country and the consequent delay in referring such matters to the home authorities. The Governor is made solely responsible for all grants of land on a quit-rent (*aforamento*) tenure, and for transfers of property up to 2,500 hectares in extent. Those who receive grants are bound to show that their concessions are being put to proper use—if agricultural land, that it is being put under crop in specified proportions; if pastoral land, that it is being sufficiently stocked; and if for building purposes, that buildings to a certain value are erected. For failure to comply with these conditions a fine is imposed, and for continued failure the unimproved land may be confiscated.

Foreigners applying for land must prove that they are domiciled in the colony, and make a declaration that they submit to Portuguese law in all that relates to the concession. District governors are empowered to make grants of unoccupied land up to 100 hectares, under certain conditions, to Portuguese subjects or foreigners taking up residence in the colony. These grants, too, must be made good by proper use.

The transfer of landed property from natives to other persons is not permitted without the express sanction of the Governor. But to establish a right to his property, the native occupier must cultivate or build upon at least half its area, and must have possessed it for a certain term of years, or have acquired it by legal transfer.

(3) Fisheries

The seas round the colony do not furnish many fish, but there is an abundance of zoophytes, molluscs, and crustaceans. Thus there is some fishing for *coral* and the *pearl-oyster*. As elsewhere in the archipelago, the *trepang* or sea-cucumber is found. This is sent in a dried state to China, where it is accounted a great delicacy.

(4) Minerals

Copper and *gold* are said to be present in workable quantities, but to be unexploited for lack of capital. Copper pyrites has been found at Mount Birogue, west of Baucau, while gold occurs both in ore and river-sand in the Bibiçuso region near the centre of the colony. Farther west, in the district of Laleia, *iron* is said to exist. *Petroleum* seems to be present in some quantity, and is worked by an English company. There are wells in the Laclubar region, particularly about Pualaca, where the oil is used for lighting, and there are deposits in the district south-east of Baucau, while the presence of petroleum is indicated also at Suai and other places on the south coast. *Sulphur* springs occur at Marobo and Tiarlelo on the upper waters of the Marobo river.

(5) Manufactures

Apart from the salt-pans which the Government were said in 1907 to be working at Laga, east of Baucau, the only manufactures are those carried on by the natives for the production of articles for personal and domestic use, such as cotton *sarongs* for wear, made on bamboo looms, mats, ropes, pottery, &c., also sugar from the native sugar-cane, and some alcohol.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

(*a*) *Nature of Trade*

Trade in and with the interior is still carried on by means of barter. The natives fish up *trepang* and collect swallows' nests, which ultimately go as delicacies to China. They also collect the wild honeycomb.

(*b*) *Towns*

Dili, the principal port, is the capital of Portuguese Timor, and has about 4,000 inhabitants. Being surrounded by swamps on the land side, it has always had the reputation of being extremely unhealthy. Now, however, it is claimed that, since the swamps have been drained and an excellent water-supply provided, the health conditions of the place have been enormously improved.

The rest of the colony is divided into military districts, with their head-quarters at Ocussi, Batugadé, Liquiçá, Manatuto, Baucau, and Lautem on the north coast, and at Motael, Hatu-Lia, Bubo Naro, and Same in the western region. Subordinate posts are placed in the small towns or villages.

(2) Foreign

(*a*) *Exports*

The principal article of export is coffee, which in value is nearly worth all the others put together. Sandalwood and sandal-root come next, and then copra. Since 1910 cocoa has had a place in the list. The following table shows the quantities and values of the principal exports in 1911, 1912, and 1913:

	1911.		1912.		1913.	
	Kilo-grammes.	*Value in Escudos.*	*Kilo-grammes.*	*Value in Escudos.*	*Kilo-grammes.*	*Value in Escudos*
Bees-wax .	34,127	19,263	28,103	14,265	26,387	10,850
Buffaloes .	(no.) 421	3,530	(no.) 89	480	—	—
Buffalo horn	13,293	1,524	21,529	4,813	10,120	946
Buffalo skins	50,086	6,978	30,315	4,423	—	—
Cocoa . .	11,102	2,685	6,897	1,668	29,082	7,035
Coffee . .	1,014,973	229,166	1,448,619	341,404	1,085,311	260,246
Copra . .	900,929	58,145	625,895	44,194	566,265	45,699
Deer skins .	—	—	—	—	37,479	6,288
Horses . .	(no.) 126	1,372	—	—	—	—
Sandal-root .	548,767	53,105	131,647	13,745	566,381	77,707
Sandalwood .	326,243	56,829	78,938	13,160	341,439	47,346
Stag horn .	13,613	5,942	—	—	10,395	1,848

The values of the total exports from 1911 to 1915 were as follows:

	Total Exports.	*To Portugal.*	*Re-exports.*
	Escudos.	*Escudos.*	*Escudos.*
1911 . .	453,392	4,583	—
1912 . .	458,162	22,248	—
1913 . .	474,433	66,338	—
1914 . .	252,625	—	6,592
1915 . .	508,865	—	3,282

Two points should be noted in connexion with these figures. In the first place, it was shown by a writer in 1907 that the figures for exports were being returned at a higher rate than the actual market values. Coffee, for example, was reckoned at 16 *escudos* per *picul* of 136 lb., at a time when it was fetching only 10 *escudos* in the Dili market. Whether this criticism still holds good is not known. In the second place, though the nominal value of the *escudo* is 4*s.* 5¼*d.*, or 4½ *escudos* to the £, its exchange value has not reached that level during the present century. Its highest rate has been 5 *escudos* to the £, and during the war it fell as low as 8 *escudos* to the £.

A very small proportion of the exports goes to Portugal. The bulk of the import and export trade of the colony is done with the Dutch East Indies, and a much smaller part with Hongkong. Macassar, in Celebes, and Hongkong are the chief markets as well

as ports of transit for the colony; indeed, the Macassar market controls prices in Timor. In 1910, out of exports with a total value of 453,000 *escudos*, goods to the value of 401,000 *escudos* went to the Dutch East Indies, and goods to the value of 41,000 *escudos* to Hongkong, leaving but a small balance for Portugal and other destinations. In the same year the exports to the United Kingdom from Timor were nil.

(*b*) *Imports*

The chief imports are rice, alcohol, and textiles. The following table shows the chief articles received from Portugal in 1913:

	Escudos.
Distilled liquors	626
Fish, dried and salted	339
Manufactured tobacco	2,254
Oil	668
Preserves	4,519
Wines	10,747

The values of the total imports from 1911 to 1915 were as follows:

	Total Imports.	*From Portugal.*
	Escudos.	*Escudos.*
1911	433,977	21,983
1912	609,110	77,937
1913	655,675	28,540
1914	394,647	28,937
1915	325,300	43,467

The carriage of dutiable imports in 1915 was distributed as follows:

Portuguese Imports in Foreign Vessels.	*Foreign Imports in Foreign Vessels.*	*Foreign Imports in Portuguese Vessels.*
Escudos.	*Escudos.*	*Escudos.*
43,467	269,663	10,255

The exports to Timor from the United Kingdom in 1910 were valued at £617.

(c) *Customs and Tariffs*

In Timor, isolated among Dutch and British possessions, and in so many ways dependent on them, Portugal has had to forgo her usual protective and preferential tariffs and adapt these to the circumstances. Thus the only preferences are on wine, preserves, and pickles. Portuguese wine enters free, while that of foreign origin pays an import duty of 30 per cent. *ad valorem*. Preserves and pickles from Portuguese sources pay an *ad valorem* duty of 1 per cent., and those from other sources 6 per cent. Such preferences apply not only to Portugal itself but also to Portuguese colonies.

All duties, export and import, are on an *ad valorem* basis, and those on imports are arranged in eleven categories, ranging from 1 per cent. on preserves and pickles to 80 per cent. on guns and gunpowder and 90 per cent. on opium. Furniture pays 5 per cent., flour and dried and salted fish 6 per cent., linen, woollen, and cotton textiles 10 per cent., but cotton textiles mixed with silk pay 25 per cent., and silk itself 50 per cent. Liqueurs and beer pay a duty of 30 per cent., and brandy, whisky, and gin pay 50 per cent. These last duties constitute a further discrimination in favour of wine. Tobacco is produced locally, and foreign leaf is charged 1,800 *reis*[1] per kg., or if manufactured, twice as much.

There is a long list of duty-free imports, among which are agricultural implements, building materials, whether of wood or iron (if cleared by the builders themselves), coal, sacking, machinery, tools, instruments, and apparatus for professional or industrial use, tubing or pipes of iron, lead, zinc, and earthenware, and their appurtenances for water, gas, and sanitary purposes.

[1] 1,000 *reis* = 1 *escudo*.

There are also export duties. Coffee is charged 2,520 *reis* (at par of exchange, about 11*s.* 2*d.*) per *picul* of 136 lb., wax 1,600 *reis* per *picul*, sandalwood about half that amount, while the other products of the island pay 5 per cent. *ad valorem*.

(D) FINANCE

(1) *Public Finance*

A deficit is a normal feature of the budget of the colony, and, as in the case of some other Portuguese colonies, has to be made good by the mother country. There is, accordingly, nothing exceptional in its appearance in the financial statements for 1914–15. The budget [1] for the financial year 1913–14 was made up as follows:

Revenue.	*Escudos.*	*Expenditure.*	*Escudos.*
Land-tax and direct taxation	131,503	General administration	63,590
Indirect taxation	113,043	Justiciary ,,	5,218
Revenues from Government property and other sources	26,257	Revenue ,,	25,920
Ear-marked revenues	10,350	Ecclesiastical ,,	6,232
Subvention	250,000 [2]	Military ,,	111,521
Treasury operations	213,884	Marine ,,	16,661
		General charges	3,200
		Miscellaneous payments	83,565
		Non-recurring charges	73,942
		Extraordinary expenditure	50,677
		Treasury operations	157,929
Total	745,037	Total	598,455

For 1914–15 the accounts were summarily as follows:

Revenue.	*Escudos.*	*Expenditure.*	*Escudos.*
Land-tax and direct taxation	125,908		
Indirect taxation	97,197		
Revenue from Government property, &c.	19,346	[Details not available.]	
Ear-marked revenues	60,892		
Total (without subvention)	303,343	Total	337,457

[1] The figures are taken from the *Annuario Colonial*, 1916, pp. 169, 171.

[2] Of this subvention 200,000 *escudos* were arrears for the previous financial year.

The native 'kingdoms', until 1906, were subject to a tax, but, as this was paid only spasmodically, the form was thereafter changed to a poll-tax of 1 *pataca* (= 2*s.*) per head of the male population. How this works out is not specified.

Since the separation of the colony from Macao the latter has made an annual contribution to its revenue of 60,000 *patacas.*[1]

(2) *Banking*

The only bank is a branch of the Banco Nacional Ultramarino at Dili. For a general criticism on the methods of this bank, see *San Thomé and Principe*, No. 119 of this series, p. 35.

(E) GENERAL REMARKS

In the absence of a properly based estimate of the mineral resources of the colony, its potential value can be considered only from the agricultural point of view. Certainly its coffee is excellent, and there seems to be a promising field for the wider cultivation of cocoa and the coco-nut palm, the products of both having come into prominence in the returns of recent years. Cotton, too, seems to have possibilities, since, though not indigenous, it readily grows wild. But all economic development is delayed by the shortage of labour and capital. Under present conditions the natives will not provide the former; and the latter can scarcely be expected to come into the country while relations between the natives and the Government are so strained and uncertain, and while there is practically no system of internal communication and external communications are so limited.

[1] This item, however, does not figure specifically in the accounts of Timor.

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EDITORIAL NOTE

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

The possessions of the Portuguese in India, known to them as the 'State of India', fall into three main divisions, all on the west coast: Goa, Damão (or Daman), and Diu.

Goa is a territory with an area of 1,301 square miles, lying between the Western Ghats and the sea, with an extreme length of 62 miles from north to south and an extreme breadth of 40 miles. It is situated about 250 miles south by east of Bombay, roughly midway between the southern extremity of India and the Gulf of Cambay. On the north it marches with the state of Savant Vadi, on the east with the British districts of Belgaum and North Kanara, on the south with North Kanara. The northern frontier is the River Terekhol, the south the hilly country of Polem.

The territory is divided into the Old and the New Conquests (*Velhas* and *Novas Conquistas*). The Old Conquests include (1) Ilhas, i. e. the islands between the estuaries of the Mandavi and Juari, especially the island of Goa; (2) the coastal provinces of Bardez and Salsette, respectively north and south of the islands; (3) the island of Anjediv, 5 miles south-west of Karwar and about 2 miles from the mainland. The New Conquests include the province of Pernem in the extreme north of the territory; the rest lie east and south of the Old Conquests, being divided into the provinces of Sanquelim, Ponda, Sanguem, Quepem,

Canacona, and the military district of Satari. These divisions are known as *concelhos*.

Damão (or *Daman*), with an area of a little over 148 square miles, is situated within the British district of Thana in Bombay Presidency (Gujarat), about 100 miles north of Bombay city, at the east side of the entrance of the Gulf of Cambay.

The territory consists of three detached portions: (1) Damão proper, divided by the Damanganga River into the *parganas* of Naer or Damão Grande (Great Damão) and Calana Pavori or Damão Pequeno (Little Damão); (2) Dadra, a very small enclave; (3) the *pargana* of Nagar Haveli, which constitutes the bulk of Damão territory (112 square miles). These last two portions are separated from Damão by a strip of British territory 5–7 miles wide, through which passes the Bombay, Baroda, and Central India Railway, with a station, Daman Road. The territory is bounded on the north by the Bhagwan River and on the south by the Kalem. Damão and Nagar Haveli form two *concelhos*.

Diu is an island separated from the southern extremity of the peninsula of Kathiawar (Bombay Presidency) by a narrow swampy boat-channel. It lies 5 miles west of Nawabandar, and measures 7 miles from east to west, its extreme breadth being 2 miles from north to south. The total area of the territory is about 20¼ square miles. This includes, in addition to Diu island, (1) the village of Gogola (Gogla) on the mainland opposite Diu town, with a tract outside about 1¼ mile in length; (2) the fort of Simbor, on an islet 14 miles from Diu town.

(2) Surface, Coasts, Rivers, and Islands

Goa.—The surface of Goa slopes steeply in the east, more gradually near the coast, from the heights of the Western Ghats (Sahyadri Mountains), which throw

off numerous spurs and subsidiary ridges across the territory. The chief heights (3,400–3,800 ft.) are in the mountainous plateau of Satari. The mass of Sidnato in Ponda divides the two marked depressions of the Juari and Mandavi basins. The southern heights do not exceed 2,020 ft. The Ghats resemble an elevated sea-coast with promontories and spurs, like the fjord-coast of Norway.

Below the mountains the country is wooded and broken up, a region of steppe with short grass; then for about 20 miles from the coast there is a well-cultivated belt in the centre of the country, marked by very few hills and those of but low elevation. In the north Pernem is hilly, in the south in Canacona the Ghats approach nearer the sea. The plains of the Old Conquests are of recent formation. In the south of the New Conquests are small irregular valleys and narrow plains, descending unsymmetrically to the sea. The country is drained entirely into the Arabian Sea, many streams taking their rise either within or at no great distance outside the territory. Along the banks of the rivers are many marshes.

The chief towns and the densest rural population are found in the lower parts of the basins of these streams, where there is the greatest extent of cultivable land, and where the rivers, being navigable, serve as important means of communication. The fact that the Ghats in this part are not of great height and can be crossed at many points made Goa in earlier times a natural outlet for the Deccan, and it has been thought (by Silva Telles, for instance) that the ancient importance of Goa depended to a great extent upon this; but the export trade of the interior is not greatly attracted to a coast that suffers so much from the monsoon as does the Malabar coast.

The soil is chiefly argillaceous, but also contains light sand and more or less decayed vegetable matter; in many parts it is gravelly or stony, and its fertility varies in different localities.

The coast of Goa, generally speaking, consists of sandy bays fringed with coco-nut trees, separated by several rocky capes. The flattest part is between Colla Bay and the Sal River, where there is low, cultivated land with small hills.

The mouths of the Mandavi and Juari, separated by Cabo Point at the extreme west end of Goa Island (Tissuadi), form the two harbours of Aguada (Panjim) to the north and Marmagão to the south. Outside the river estuaries there are two bays which afford protection against the north-east wind—Colla Bay, 14 miles north of the Sal River, and Canacona Bay, $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles north of the Talpona.

The rivers of Goa are all navigable for small craft; and the channels between the Juari and Mandavi give a good system of intercommunication. There are but few bridges; more will be required if the number of secondary roads is to be increased.

Damão.—In Damão the only hills are in the *pargana* of Nagar Haveli, and do not exceed 800 ft. in height. The principal range forms the southern boundary of the Portuguese possessions. Most of the soil is alluvial; it is fertile, and its forests are famous.

The coast-line is very limited in comparison with the size of the territory, extending about 6 miles from the mouth of the Kalem to that of the Bhagwan. Only small boats can enter the mouths of these two rivers; but the Damanganga (or Sandalcalo), at the mouth of which is the town of Damão, provides indifferent anchorage, and is navigable for small boats up to Calacaxigão, about 3 miles from its mouth. The coast is low.

In Damão the only important river is the Damanganga. There are no bridges over the rivers in Nagar Haveli, but the want would be felt only in the rainy season, and the expense of erecting them would not be warranted by the circumstances of the province.

Diu.—The island of Diu has hills about 100 feet high. Coco-nut groves are scattered about the island. Its marshes render it unhealthy; the land is rather barren, and water is scarce. Rain-water is collected in cisterns.

The southern face of the island is a sandstone cliff, with deep water below it; the channel separating the island from the mainland becomes at its eastern end the harbour of Diu.

Anjediv.—The island of Anjediv is about three-quarters of a mile long, with an area of rather more than half a square mile. Its seaward side is abrupt, barren, and rocky, and the island rises at some points to 200–300 ft. The landward side slopes more gently and is sheltered and fertile; and on this side there is a good but little-used anchorage. The island is unhealthy; the buildings have fallen into decay; the population declined from 527 in 1872 to 50 in 1900.

The two islands of *St. George* (west and east), lying off Cape Ramas, are nearly connected at low water by a narrow neck of shingle and rock. Together they are 1½ miles in length.

(3) Climate

Goa.—The climate of Goa, hot though it is, is regarded as less unsuitable for Europeans than that of any Portuguese colony except Macao, and is certainly healthier than that of Diu. The transition from the cool to the hot season takes place in March; and the highest mean maximum temperature for any month is

90° F. (32° C.) in April and May. In May the south-west monsoon begins to set in; and in June and July the monsoon rains are heaviest. They slacken in August; but in the period June–August 80·74 inches out of a total average rainfall of 100·06 inches are recorded at Marmagão. The heavy rains may cause partial inundations in some districts, e. g. the valley of the Sal, but great floods are rare. On the other hand, the rains seldom fail so completely as to cause distress. The south-west monsoon, which at its height prevents coastwise navigation, usually weakens sufficiently to permit the general resumption thereof about the middle of August, though not in Aguada Bay (cf. p. 30). The temperature and rains decrease in September and October, in which month, at the turn of the seasons, mists on the mountains are prevalent. Normally the north-east monsoon, known from its direction as *terral*, begins in November; it usually blows from sunset till morning. The lowest mean minimum temperature, 70°–71° F. (21° C.), is recorded in December–February, a period which is practically or wholly rainless. The August rains are thought to have especially valuable qualities for the palm-trees; during the rains of the second half of May the *serodio* crop of rice (see p. 36) is sown.

Damão.—The seasonal variations in Damão are much the same as those in Goa, the rainy and dry periods being practically identical. The prevailing winds in the dry season are in the morning ESE. to NNE., in the afternoon NW. to WNW.; during the rainy season they are SSW. to W. Nagar Haveli seems to be more healthy than Damão proper.

Diu.—The climate of Diu is hot, dry, and trying; and the place is made unhealthy by marshes and bad sanitation.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

The accounts of the healthiness of Portuguese territory in India differ considerably. The most general causes of disease are bad housing, insufficient water-supply, poor drainage, and the existence of marsh-land. On the whole it may be said that, in Goa, Salsette and the New Conquests are healthy, but that along the margins of some of the rivers the conditions are unfavourable. Old Goa suffered so much from intermittent fever and plague that it became necessary to transfer the seat of government to Panjim (see p. 10). The climate in Damão is said to be generally healthy, but one reformer advocates the demolition of the walls both of this city and of Diu in order that breezes may more easily circulate in the streets of the town. Diu is the least healthy part of all; the marsh through which the channel flows that separates the island from the mainland propagates fever; and tuberculosis has devastated the village of the Deres (see p. 8).

The diseases that prevail in these countries are remittent and intermittent fever, diarrhœa, dysentery, measles, small-pox, and occasionally plague and cholera. There was a serious visitation of plague in Damão in 1896–7.

There were in 1904 three hospitals with 2,631 in-patients, as well as three military hospitals, in Goa, Damão, and Diu.

(5) Race and Language

The information supplied by Portuguese authorities on the native inhabitants is singularly scanty and inadequate. The native race of Goa is a branch of the Mahrattas. Damão, just at the north of the

Mahratta country, has a certain infusion of Gujaratis, who are largely nomadic. Diu has a large proportion of Gujaratis among its scanty population, including the traders of that race who are called Banyans; the word is a functional designation, and is applicable to a number of castes of diverse origin, customs, and social status. It is used generally of any Hindus engaged in trading. The lowest element in the Diu population is called *Deres*. The other elements in the population include Parsees and Mohammedans and a great number of 'descendants', that is, persons whose ancestry includes a European of either sex.

The two main languages spoken are Marathi and Gujarati. The latter is spoken not only by the Hindu, but also by the Parsee inhabitants. The Marathi spoken in Goa is the Konkani dialect; as spoken in Goa, it has some admixture of Portuguese words. Gujarati is written in a script resembling the Nagari alphabet. Portuguese is the official language, and is spoken in the towns and by educated people. Twelve or more periodicals are issued by natives in the Portuguese language. There are a few public libraries, including one of some merit at Panjim.

In general the natives of Goa are hospitable, courteous, and intelligent, though not progressive. Woman, however, has little chance of development. She is dependent in turn upon her father, husband, and sons; and, although suttee has been formally abolished, it has really only been commuted to perpetual isolation. The Portuguese give every protection to a widow who does remarry. In 1900 widows and widowers formed 12·6 per cent. of the population. Among the natives not many remain unmarried.

(6) Population

Distribution

According to official returns (which are not always mutually reconcilable) the population of Portuguese India in 1910 was 548,472, of which Goa had 486,752, Damão, 47,550, and Diu, 14,170. The population of the Old Conquests was greatly in excess of that of the New Conquests, the largest figures being those of Salsette, 119,038, and Bardez, 111,192. The density of population ranges from less than 64 per square mile in Sanguem, and 105 in Satari, to 1,003 in Ilhas, and nearly 1,280 in Bardez. Sanguem owes its low population to its marsh-land and small supplies, though it has a good soil and might be made productive. Ponda is more thickly populated than the other provinces of the New Conquests, and with its fertile soil and good supply of springs and the more industrious nature of its inhabitants, partakes of the characteristics of the Old Conquests.

The following figures, which show the relations of natives to other population, are taken from the census of 1900. These give the Asiatics as 531,330, the Europeans as 246, the Africans and their descendants as 212, and leave 10 unaccounted for. Of this population 521,397 were Portuguese subjects, 10,394 British, 3 French, 3 Italian, and 1 German.

Movement

Taking the territory as a whole, the population is increasing. In 1900 the figures given were for Goa, 475,513; for Damão, 41,671; for Diu, 14,614; so that in the following ten years there was an increase in Goa of 11,239, in Damão an increase of 5,879, and in Diu a decrease of 444. Statistics published for 1913

showed that in that year the births exceeded the deaths by 1,846. The only *concelhos* in which there was a decrease were Satari and Damão.

Towns

Goa.—The only towns of any size are in the Old Conquests. *Old Goa* is for the most part ruined and overgrown with trees, but contains the shrine of St. Francis Xavier, which gives the town such importance as it still possesses. At the periodical exposition of his relics the place is thronged; in 1859 there were said to be 200,000 pilgrims in the place, and in 1878 between 30,000 and 40,000. There are also three convents. The small population is very poor.

Panjim[1] (or New Goa; population 9,325 in 1900) is the seat of Government. It includes the old city within its municipal bounds, as well as the suburb of Ribandar, which lies between them and is the place of residence of the officials and richer men. It lies about three miles above the mouth of the river in a picturesque situation, and has wide streets with good houses and several handsome public buildings. The site has in great part been reclaimed from marsh, and is not altogether healthy. In the poorer houses cattle and human inhabitants live together; and there is no separation of quarters for Europeans and natives. Panjim suffers from great scarcity of water; the drainage system is inadequate; and piles of refuse rot along the sea-shore.

Marmagão[2] (Mormugão) is the name of the port at the eastern extremity of the peninsula of that name in Salsette province, five miles south of Panjim and on the left bank of the Juari River. About 1684–1712 various preparations were made to transfer the capital

[1] See also below, p. 29. [2] See also below, p. 28.

from Goa to Marmagão; this step was alternately ordained and countermanded, and now the Government buildings are in ruins. The site is healthy.

Margão (population 12,216 in 1900), in Salsette province, lies in a fine plain on the Sal River, about 16 miles south-east of Panjim; it is a modern town with rectangular streets, and has a number of good buildings. It is a station on the West of India Portuguese Railway. Unfortunately its drainage is not good, and its water-supply is unsatisfactory, coming from surface wells.

Mapuça (population 10,733 in 1900) is the chief town of Bardez district, about eight miles north of Panjim. It is a commercial centre of some importance, and possesses a public library and other institutions. It contains a church founded in 1594, dedicated to Our Lady of Miracles, whose festival is celebrated not only by Christians but by Hindus; a great fair is held on this occasion. The same censures may be passed on its drainage and water-supply as on those of the other towns mentioned, with additional strictures on the big manure-heaps that abound in it.

Damão[1].—In Damão the chief town, which gives its name to the province, is at the mouth of the Damanganga and is situated on both banks. It has two forts (in one of which are the Governor's palace and Government buildings), private residences, and ecclesiastical buildings. The whole population is Christian. The chief town of Nagar Haveli used to be Dadra; it is now Paço d'Arcos (formerly Silvassa). About four miles from this is Naroli, a small centre of commerce, to which native products are brought.

Diu[2].—The town of Diu, with its fortress and citadel at the east of the island, presents an imposing appear-

[1] See also below, p. 30.

[2] See also below, p. 30.

ance with its massive walls. It used to be very flourishing, having a population of 50,000, but has greatly declined in prosperity.

Villages

Goa.—In Goa there are 407 villages, of which 134 are in the Old Conquests. In the less cultivated parts the population is concentrated in small villages; thus among the provinces of the New Conquests Satari, which has the smallest population (17,982), has most villages (85).

Damão.—Some of the population of Damão consists of nomadic Gujaratis. Such Parsees as live in Nagar Haveli do not as a rule reside there permanently, but have their homes in Damão; they act in Nagar Haveli as lessors of land, usurers (*saucares*), and traders in agricultural produce.

Diu.—There are on the island three large villages. The fort of Simbor, to the east of Diu, along the coast of Kathiawar, has a population of about 1,900; but this is a fluctuating population composed of fishermen and strangers who are only there for a few months in the year.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Summary

1510. Old Goa taken by d'Albuquerque.
1535. Fort built at Diu.
1538. First siege of Diu.
1543. Salsette and Bardez acquired by Portugal.
1546. Second siege of Diu.
1559. Damão and Dadra captured by the Portuguese.
1759. Seat of government moved from old Goa to Panjim (New Goa).
1780. Nagar Haveli ceded to Portugal by the Mahrattas.
1843. Government formally established at Panjim.

The Portuguese possessions in India consist now of three detached territories lying embedded in the Bombay Presidency of British India. It is somewhat misleading to describe them, as is sometimes done, as the surviving fragments of a colonial empire. Even in their palmiest days the Portuguese only administered a very small area, and their influence extended but little beyond the ground their arms commanded. They have ruled the island of Goa for over 400 years, but generally they preferred to occupy commercial centres commanded by their fleets and to look for their income to the receipts from the customs. On the whole the relations of Portuguese India with British India have remained friendly.

Goa.—Of the Old Conquests (see p. 1), Goa proper was conquered by Albuquerque in 1510, and Salsette and Bardez were obtained in 1543. The New Conquests were acquired in the general scramble at the end of the eighteenth century.

Within historical times the town of Goa has occupied three sites. There are no remains of the first Goa, which was captured from the Hindus by the Mohammedans in 1479. The Mohammedans founded the second Goa, which was taken from them by Albuquerque in 1510; it lies five miles north of the first. It began to decline early in the seventeenth century with the long-drawn-out Dutch war, when its outlying colonies were taken and its commerce seriously crippled. While enemies attacked it from without, epidemics of unexampled violence, due largely to the neglect of simple sanitary precautions, ravaged it within. For many years the appearance of wealth was maintained, but towards the end of the century, when the incursions of the Mahrattas (though they never attacked Goa itself) added to the general misery, the marks of decay were unmistakable. In 1684 the Viceroy, supported by the votes of the leading inhabitants, proposed to abandon the city and found a new one on the Marmagão peninsula. The Home Government agreed, but there arose a sharp division of opinion in Goa, headed by the priests in opposition to the hierarchy.[1] After several changes of opinion and an expenditure of £25,000, the idea was dropped. Driven away, however, by its unhealthiness, the inhabitants continued to forsake the place; and the Count of Sandomil (Viceroy 1732–41) reopened the question and suggested another site on the Mandavi, near the second Goa. In 1759 the Viceroy moved thither. The expulsion of the Jesuits (who were traders as well as religious) was the final blow to the second Goa; and in 1775 the population of the city, which had been estimated at about 200,000 early in

[1] See *O Oriente Portuguez*, vol. vii, p. 34. The Count of Alvor (Viceroy 1681–6) is said to have found his position so difficult that he placed the emblems of his office on the body of St. Francis Xavier, trusting that the saint would find a way out.

the seventeenth, and at 30,000 early in the eighteenth century, had sunk to 1,600 souls. The Home Government pressed the rebuilding of the old city, but the facts were too strong, and the officials and *fidalgos*, when ordered to repeople Goa, obeyed by living there during the day, and joining their families in healthier surroundings at night. During the French wars the Home Government paid little attention to India; and the change of site to New Goa became firmly established. It was formally accepted by Portugal in 1843.

Damão proper, with Dadra, was captured by the Portuguese in 1559. Nagar Haveli was ceded to them by the Mahrattas in 1780.

In the island of *Diu* the Portuguese first got a footing in 1535. The interest of Diu to the Portuguese centres in the two great sieges it endured in 1538 and 1546 and the important battle won by D. João de Castro that terminated the second.

On the island of *Anjediv* stood the first fort the Portuguese built in India, and it has its corner in English history. The troops sent to receive the cession of Bombay were encamped here and lost very heavily while waiting on the dilatory proceedings of the Portuguese authorities.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

Difference of race goes with the differences of the four main classes (*varna*), Brahmans, Kshatriyas (Charados), Vaisyas, and Sudras, under which the Indian castes are grouped. It is a tenable theory that the conquering, fair-skinned people, when they first came in contact with the conquered black aborigines, though they despised them, took wives from among them. At a later period they closed their ranks to further intermarriage; and the amount of intermarriage had been greatest in the lowest degrees of the social scale. Thus we find, as we should expect to do, among the Mahrattas of the Brahman class a type differing widely from the Sudras. The bulk of the Goanese are Sudras, members of the lowest of the four classes, showing a far larger amount of Dravidian blood.

There is now no intermarriage between the various castes; the offspring of such a union is a *pariah*, and has no caste. There are forty castes and sub-castes in Portuguese India. Caste distinctions are retained for social purposes; and even native Christians adhere to them, claiming to be Brahmans, Charados, Vaisyas, or Sudras. The Portuguese laws take no account of caste or religion in regard to admission to any public office; but, except as a doctrine of political rights, this idea of equality does not prevail. There is one caste of Sudras, found in Satari and Nagar Haveli, of a very uncivilized character.

About one-half of the people are Christian—the result not of recent Christian missions, but of their evangelization in the sixteenth century. This has meant a very considerable modification of manners and customs on the part of the Christian portion of the population. European dress is largely adopted. It is said that Christianity has not improved the industry of the inhabitants; they have caught the Mediterranean love of festivals and religious services. Nevertheless many of the Christian natives have distinguished themselves in high posts.

Observance of the rules of that congeries of religious systems which we vaguely call Hinduism varies very much. Thus there are Rajputs in Damão, who claim to be the representatives of the second class, the Charados, the military caste; they eat flesh and drink spirituous liquors, and neglect many of the precepts of their caste. The rules that they are most scrupulous in observing are (1) that they should not kill cows, and (2) that widows should not re-marry. This last rule is a considerable check on the growth of Hindu populations, especially as it is coupled with child-marriage. The nominal bride is often a widow before she is really married, and is secluded for the rest of her life even from her relatives.

The population is almost equally divided between Roman Catholics, who are 49·3 per cent., and Hindus, who are 49 per cent., the former largely predominating in the Old Conquests, the latter in the New. Of the other religions (in 1900) there were 8,431 Mohammedans, 417 Parsees, 143 Jains, 2 Buddhists, and 13 Protestants.

The only Hindu temples remaining in all Goa are those in the New Conquests. In the Old Conquests every means, from wholesale bribery on the one hand to terror on the other, had been used in the sixteenth

century to spread the orthodox faith, with the result that over 90 per cent. of the whole population professes the Christian religion; but the memory of the old social order remains so far potent that the old caste distinctions are still remembered and govern marriage arrangements.

Religious orders are now abolished; and Church and State were separated in 1911. Persecution for religious reasons is a thing of the distant past; and it would make the old inquisitors turn in their graves to learn that succession to the headship of Hindu shrines is a subject of investigation and decision by the Portuguese civil courts.[1]

(2) Political

The three detached territories, Goa, Damão, and Diu, are all under the Governor-General in Goa, who is appointed from Europe for a period of five years. Partial local self-government was introduced in 1914.

The powers of the Governor-General are circumscribed both by his warrant of appointment and also by the councils, whose assistance he must invoke, especially in financial matters. The most important council includes the chief ecclesiastical, civil, and legal officials; and there are five other standing councils dealing with different departments. With regard to local government, there are in the Old Conquests three municipalities; the rest of the area, together with that of the New Conquests, is divided into parishes. The parish is the unit of administration, and in each there is a local council presided over by a magistrate called a *regedor*, who directs the local police, supervises liquor shops, &c. The parish councils work in subordination to the district councils, of which there are three in the Old

[1] See decree dated February 9, 1901, in *O Oriente Portuguez*, vol. iii, p. 441.

Conquests and seven in the New. To each district the Governor-General nominates an official who has certain duties connected with public safety and health, and is also the tax collector.

The Governors of Damão and Diu are subordinate to the Governor-General. The apparatus of local government is the same as that in Goa.

Goa, Damão, and Diu, with Mozambique, Macao, and Timor, form a judicial district. This district is divided into *comarcas*, which are further divided into *julgados*, each of which contains a certain number of parishes. The *regedor* already mentioned has certain civil and magisterial duties in petty cases; and from his decisions an appeal lies to the officer in charge of the *julgado*, who again is subordinate to the judge of the *comarca*, whose duty it is to go on tour in the area subordinate to him. From his decision, in important cases, an appeal lies to the Goa High Court (*Tribunal da Relação*). This court consists of a chief and four judges; and from their decision, in certain cases, a further appeal lies to the Supreme Court in Portugal. Judges of the High Court and *comarcas* are Europeans; those of the subordinate courts are natives of the country.

(3) Military Organization

After a mutiny in 1871 the native troops were disbanded and have not been revived as a distinct organization. In 1895 there was trouble with the European troops, who refused to obey orders and embark for Mozambique; this trouble was settled with difficulty. There were further disturbances in 1901 and 1911, in which some of the civil population joined. The present force consists of a company of infantry and a few artillery (Europeans), and five companies of native troops. There are also some civil police.

(4) Public Education

About the beginning of the present century the state of education was reported to be very unsatisfactory. School buildings were generally few, small, dirty, and unsuitable, and little attempt was made to acquaint the natives with the language, history, &c. of the ruling power. In 1900 only 10 per cent. of the total population was literate. Recently, it is said, some progress has been made.

At Panjim there is a national college or lyceum, which professes to give instruction in Portuguese language and literature; French, English, Latin, and Marathi; elementary mathematics, science, and philosophy; drawing; the principles of political economy and civil government. There is also a school of commerce at Panjim, and there are several other secondary schools. There are municipal lyceums at Margão and Mapuça. A medico-surgical college at Panjim is under State supervision. Official public instruction consists of primary education of two grades, elementary and complementary, separate or united, according to the numbers and needs of the school-going population in the different localities. There are also schools under the authority of the Roman Catholic Church. In all, the returns for 1914–15 show a total of 142 schools in Portuguese India with 9,546 pupils (6,066 boys and 3,480 girls). In 1908 there were only 101 schools, of which 84 were Portuguese, 7 Marathi, and 10 Gujarati.

NOTE ON THE VILLAGE COMMUNITIES

It is fortunate for the historical student that the record of the customs of the Goa villages was made in 1526, but the effect on the villages themselves has been

disastrous. The record became part of the law of the land, and as such was liable to interpretation like any other law. Had there been no record, the villages might perhaps have been allowed to work out their own future; and, by escaping the eye of the jurist trained in the canon law, the peculiarities which he would consider anomalies would not have invited interference. The confiscation of the rent-free grants to village servants in 1541 was but one of many exactions; and it is significant that in 1735 the Governor had to determine that ecclesiastics could not collect 'alms' (*esmolas*) for the Church by either imprisoning the villagers or distraining their goods.

By the record of 1526 the Gawnkars were the sole administrators of the village; and, as they had to submit to continual demands either from the State or the Church, and had no power to sell land, they were compelled to sell fractional shares of the profits, in order to pay their way at all. An ineffectual attempt to prevent these sales was made by the Viceroy in 1604. It is impossible to see on what basis these fractional shares were calculated. In northern India either the *bigha* or the rupee is the unit; in the former case the shares are either *biswas* ($\frac{1}{20}$th) or *biswansis* ($\frac{1}{400}$th); in the latter, *annas* ($\frac{1}{16}$th) or *pice* ($\frac{1}{192}$nd). In Goa there was no uniformity; the number of *tanga* shares varied in each village. The account of these *tanga* shares given in *Oriente Conquistado* (vol. i, p. 171) is too childish to quote. Other authorities either do not refer to the question or say frankly they are ignorant of how the number of shares was originally determined. It would almost seem as if shares in certain definite things and not in the whole village were sold, as some papers mention *tangas de gutega* and *tangas de raxi* (the latter to include *recamo*, *vantem*,

serodio, &c.), but the meaning of these words is obscure.

The Khuntakars, as the purchasers of fractional shares were called, had no voice in the management of the villages; and a long and bitter struggle began between them and the Gawnkars, a struggle to which the Kulacharis (holders of land on perpetual rent or on lease) were not parties, though they eventually profited by the result. The rights of collection were sold annually by auction to the highest bidder among the Gawnkars; the position of bailiff (*sacador*) was similarly sold to the lowest bidder without such distinction. Down to 1735 the Khuntakars, as such, had no rights at all; but thirty years later they and the Gawnkars were admitted to the auctions on equal terms. Still it was not till the middle of the nineteenth century that the Khuntakars were allowed a share in the management of the village. Matters had been reduced by that time to an absurdity. Thus there was a village owned entirely by one Khuntakar, who had no voice in the management, this being in the hands of a hereditary Gawnkar who had no share in the proceeds; while in others there was a body of several hundred Gawnkars and as many Khuntakars, and any one of the former could veto any suggested arrangement. The last appearance of the Gawnkars as a body was in 1858, when they petitioned for a restoration of their former position. Their case was hopeless, and they gradually dropped out of the records; and the more recent papers contain no reference to them. From 1840 to 1897 various attempts were made to create communities out of the owners of the different rights—a very miscellaneous body, for some received an annual fixed pension, others shared in the profit and loss, while others again were

perpetual lessees. The most curious experiment was that of 1882, when a law was made to create in each village for agricultural purposes a sort of joint stock company. Some of the beneficiaries received pensions, and the rights of others were transmuted into 10-rupee shares. This law did not work, and in 1897 another was passed, allowing any village to go into liquidation, when the field boundaries were to be demarcated, a cadastral survey made, and the village lands sold off by auction.

In 1870 the communities numbered 426, of which 145 were in the Old Conquests, 281 in the New; in the New Conquests the *panchayat* or meeting composed of one or more members of each clan (*vangor*) had a more prominent position. The community undertakes various duties in regard to the maintenance of religious services, schools, roads, &c. It is responsible to the Government for territorial taxes, and makes its own levy on individual members. It is under Government supervision, and can spend no money without Government sanction.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) Internal

(*a*) *Roads*

Goa.—There are many roads in Goa, but few of importance, and they are not well kept up. The most important were made in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The best is one that starts from the village of Donna Paula and goes by Panjim and Ribandar to Old Goa. The last two miles of this are a causeway built over swamp. From Panjim an important road (21 miles) goes north; starting at Velim, a village in Bardez facing the city, it goes by Mapuça, a centre of many small roads, and Assonora to Cansarvale, where it is linked up with the good metalled road that runs through the British district of Manari. From Assonora a road runs south-east to Bicholim, whence one road goes up to the frontier, and another, passing through Sanquelim, crosses the province of Satari to Massordem. At Sanquelim a road branches south-east to the valley of the Mandavi and continues up it to Usgão, whence it goes to the Tinem Ghat and joins the high road to Dharwar; this road is incomplete, but, if properly constructed, might be of great importance by opening connexions between the port of Goa and the British provinces in the interior. In a map compiled in 1915 from surveys taken between 1884 and 1895, a good metalled road is marked from Goa to Ponda (10 miles) and for nearly another 10 miles

east of Ponda, after which it ceases to be metalled. In the south an important road runs from Panjim to São Lourenço, and then on the other side of the Juari by Margão and Canaçona to the southern frontier. Another centre of roads is Sanvordem, on the railway, whence roads run south-west and south-east to Quepem and Sanguem respectively. When the road system is developed, a great number of bridges will be wanted for roads of the second and third order.

Damão.—In Damão the roads have been badly neglected. The chief road in Damão proper is the road from Damão Pequeno to Vapi (6½ miles long), the Portuguese and British parts being almost equally divided. There is also the municipal road of Satvara running from Damão to the village of Varacunda, but this has hardly been kept up at all. In Nagar Haveli roads are almost non-existent. There was a road, four miles in length, from Paço d'Arcos to Naroli, but it has been neglected and is almost impassable. A writer in the *Boletim da Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa* (1911) presses for more roads in this district, especially from Paço d'Arcos to Cadoli and to Mandonim, with a branch from Dapara to Patti; from Naroli by Luari and Chicli to Dapara; and from Mandonim by Vansda, Corchonde, Dindonim, Ambabari, Meru, and Vagchora to Cota—a network of approximately 36 miles.

Diu.—Diu has one road from end to end of the island—from the town of Diu to Brancavara (7½ miles); from it radiate three branch roads, the longest of which measures only about half a mile. A road is projected from Gogola harbour to the frontier, 1½ miles long; this is important, as Gogola is said to be the least decadent part of the colony of Diu.

(*b*) *Rivers and Canals*

A special feature of Goa is the network of navigable channels in the lower part of the course of the Mandavi and the Juari. The Mandavi is navigable up to Usgão (about 18 miles) for vessels which do not demand more than 6 ft. of water. Its tributary, the Volvota, is navigable for 2 or 3 miles above its confluence. Its other confluents, roughly speaking, are tidal and navigable up to the places whose names they bear, viz. Gangem, Bicholim, Assonora, Tivim, and Mapuça. The Juari (Zuari) is navigable to Rachol, 11 miles above the fort of São Lourenço. Reference is made to a 'steamer-service' in connexion with the station of Sanvordem, which is even higher up, but these must be very small vessels. Ordinarily the vessels that navigate these rivers are the *patamarin* and *tona*. Only the mouths of the two rivers are navigable for big vessels. This network of navigable rivers, including their branches and tributaries, is estimated at 134 miles in length.

Of the other rivers the Terekhol is navigable for about 12 miles; big *tonas* proceed up to the *cassabé* (settlement or chief town) of Pernem; above that small *tonas* go up to Uguem; *patamarins* enter the harbour. The Chapora is navigable for big *tonas* up to Macazana, 9 miles above the mouth; small canoes proceed up to the old fort of Alorna. The Sal, into which the Betul flows at its mouth, is navigable to near Margão (about 8 miles). The Talpona is navigable for a short distance. All these rivers, except the Juari, are exposed at their mouths to the south-west monsoon, so that during the months when that wind is blowing they are not easily accessible from the sea.

A scheme is on foot for deepening the Mapuçà from the village of Aldona up to Mapuça, so that steamers

may go to that town from Panjim. The cost of this is estimated at 15,200 *escudos*, or about £3,300.

Canals.—There are no navigable canals in Goa; the only existing canals are for the purpose of irrigation. One canal would be very valuable, viz. from the mouth of the Tivim connecting the Mapuça river with the Chapora. This would add to the system of internal navigation the Chapora itself, and in a certain measure the Terekhol, which flows out only 8 miles north of it. The land that lies between is not high, and the capital expenditure necessary ought to be repaid by the economic results. The cost is estimated at 55,700 *escudos*, or about £12,000.

(*c*) *Railways*

The only railway is in Goa. It runs from Marmagão harbour to the British frontier, 4 miles west of Castle Rock, where it connects with the Southern Mahratta system. There are 12 stations, of which the chief are Marmagão, Vasco da Gama, Margão, Sanvordem, and Collem. The line is 51·10 miles long, and its gauge is 3 ft. 3⅜ in. The ruling gradient is 1 in 100, with 1 in 40 in the Ghat section, where the line reaches an altitude of 3,000 ft. The line is single for 38 miles, but for the 13 miles in the Ghats it is double. There are 15½ miles of sidings. A viaduct crosses the River Sonaulim at Dudsagor, close to the great waterfall. There are 12 tunnels.

The rolling stock consisted in 1916 of 18 locomotives, 48 carriages for travellers, 2 luggage vans, 1 horse-box, 119 covered goods wagons, 34 low-sided wagons, 9 platform wagons, 10 timber trucks, 9 brake vans, 1 travelling crane. The coaching traffic in 1916 showed an increase of 2·77 per cent. and the goods traffic 12·78 per cent. on the previous year, mainly owing to improved traffic in oil-seeds, cotton, manganese ore, and

salt. There were carried 417,744 passengers and 262,213 tons of goods.

The line, which is the property of the West of India Portuguese Railway Company, is maintained and worked by the Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway Company as part of the latter's undertaking, except as to further capital expenditure, which is provided by the Portuguese Government.

Projected Lines.—A branch line (3 ft. 3⅜ in. gauge), from Margão to Bicholim, has been sanctioned for survey with a view to developing the working of mines.

Negotiations have been opened with the British Government for a railway to link Port Karwar with Marmagão.

Some Portuguese writers strongly desire to bring a railway down to Gogola with a view to resuscitating the commerce of Diu, but there is no chance of such a line becoming remunerative.

(*d*) *Posts and Telegraphs*

The head post office of Goa is at Panjim; there are branch offices at Margão, Mapuça, Ponda, Bicholim, Chinchinim, and Pernem.

A telegraph office at Panjim is maintained by the British and Portuguese Governments jointly, and is connected with the Indian cable. For inland communications there are 12 Government telegraph stations and 12 railway telegraph stations, and a total length of line of 224 miles.

(2) External

(*a*) *Ports*

The chief ports in Goa are Marmagão and Panjim; those at Damão and Diu are much smaller.

Marmagão,[1] the terminus of the West of India Portu-

[1] See also above, p. 10.

guese Railway, lies on the left bank of the River Juari near its mouth. It is sheltered from the south-west monsoon, an advantage which is shared by no other port on that coast. The breakwater which protects the harbour is 1,500 ft. long. East of it, good anchorage may be obtained in a depth of 4 fathoms. Small vessels may anchor in 3½ fathoms farther east. The port appears adequate for its needs as a terminus of the railway, considerable improvements having been recently made in the harbour. The breakwater has been extended to its present length; and the quay, which is of the same length, is being extended. The extension was almost completed in 1916, except certain parts which have been purposely postponed. A steam suction dredger has been established to meet Lloyd's requirement. There is one 25-ton steam-crane on the quay, and several smaller ones for loading. The railway company keep a small stock of coal, and will supply British ships when possible.

Coasting steamers call daily. In 1907, 1,080 vessels, of which 874 were British, with aggregate tonnage of 312,820, entered the port. In 1912, 75 ocean-going vessels, with a tonnage of 174,020, visited the port, of which 46 were British with a tonnage of 112,076 and 23 were German with a tonnage of 46,985; the other 6 vessels (3 Austrian, 1 Swedish, 1 Norwegian, 1 Dutch) had an aggregate tonnage of 14,849. The chief exports are caju-nuts, coco-nuts, fruit, salt, manganese ore, and cotton seed; the chief imports are coal, grain, pulse, cotton fabrics, kerosene oil, paper, tobacco. A good deal of the trade is in British hands. Marmagão is about 280 miles south of Bombay, 6,060 miles from Lisbon. It is the only port in Goa possessing railway connexions.

Panjim,[1] the capital of Goa for a century and a half,

[1] See also above, p. 10.

is on the island of Tissuadi, lying on the left bank of the River Mandavi, a little above the entrance of Aguada Bay. It is only available as a harbour for half the year, despite its deep water, because of its exposure to the south-west monsoons. There is anchorage for large vessels in 9 fathoms outside the harbour, and closer inshore by Aguada Head at three-quarters of a mile in 4½ fathoms. There is a sea-wall and quay, alongside which boats can lie at all states of the tide. The channel is buoyed, and a Government pilot is obligatory. The port is connected with Marmagão by a coasting steamer which rounds Cabo Point; Indian coasting steamers call daily. The trade is insignificant, but the town contains good artisans (see pp. 32, 42). The chief export is salt; other exports are caju-nuts, coco-nuts, fruit, spice, salted fish, gum, and coir-work; the chief imports are rice, cloth, sugar, wine, tobacco, and hardware. In 1903–4 the total number of ships entered was 2,874, and cleared 2,814.

Damão,[1] on both banks of the Damanganga, is of little importance as a port. It is unwise to enter it without a pilot, but vessels up to 500 tons sometimes moor abreast the forts. Anchorage can be obtained in 5 fathoms in Damão roads about 4 miles west of the lighthouse. Damão is a good place for small vessels to make necessary repairs. Many vessels of from 500 to 900 tons burden have been built in the Damanganga.

Diu[2] harbour is formed between the mainland and the eastern end of the island. It is exposed to the east, the holding-ground is indifferent, and vessels should not anchor there in strong easterly winds. There is anchorage in 3 to 4 fathoms about 1 mile east of Gogola.

[1] See also above, p. 11.
[2] See also above, p. 11.

(*b*) *Shipping Lines*

Most of the navigation from these ports is local, and coasting steamers are almost their only visitors. The railway company states that 13 ocean-going vessels made use of the port of Marmagão in 1915, and 9 in 1916. There is no Portuguese line between the mother country and any of these ports. From Bombay steamers of the British India Company and Shepherd's Company reach Marmagão in 26 hours. In normal times vessels of the Royal Dutch and Rotterdam Lloyd Lines called regularly at Lisbon, and transhipped passengers and goods for Goa at Colombo. The Strick Line had monthly callings at Marmagão, and there were occasional callings by the Spanish Transatlantic Company, principally for cargo. The German East African Company used to call once a month on the voyage between Bombay and Africa, carrying cargo and passengers.

(*c*) *Telegraphs*

There is connexion with the Indian cable, and so communication with Lisbon, the cost of telegraphing being 55 *centavos* (about 2*s.* 5*d.*) a word. The submarine cable is laid in the Mandavi River.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

(*a*) *Supply*

The Goanese are well known as servants, and are so employed to a great extent in British India. Those who employ them are apt to make qualifications in their testimonials to character. In industry and application in the fields they differ to some extent in various parts of the country; those who live in

Ponda have the best name for diligence, but they are conservative in their methods. The same defect marks their work as artisans; they are able to supply local needs in sandal-making, but the work could be greatly improved by teaching.

(*b*) *Emigration and Immigration*

Emigration is mostly into British India and mostly from the Old Conquests. The numbers grew from 42,454 in 1906 to 47,430 in 1910. The emigrants are of various classes, most going as cooks, servants, and clerks, but some as doctors and lawyers. The money that they earn is sent back to Goa. They mostly retain Portuguese nationality, and do not naturalize themselves in British India, because they are Roman Catholics. Various causes have led to emigration in special localities. In Damão extreme poverty and a feeling that not only liberty but religious convictions were thwarted by various restrictions led to emigration into British territory. In Sanguem the locusts have made such depredations that whole families have migrated into British India.

The other chief objective of emigrants is Portuguese East Africa, where the Goanese clerk and the Banyan trader are familiar figures. From Diu some of the inhabitants migrate to East Africa, and return when they have made sufficient money.

There is little immigration. As has been seen above, there is a mere handful of Europeans in the country; in Diu there are only three. The Portuguese come to Goa either as soldiers or sailors, and do not bring their wives. There is great mixture of races, even in the army. The Europeans do not keep apart from the Asiatics, or even the Africans; their habitations are not even in different parts of the towns.

Travellers are greatly impressed with the distinction between Portuguese and British India in this respect.

Another very different kind of immigrants are the Banyans, a Gujarat caste of traders, who live in Diu, and whose ability in petty commerce is familiar alike in Asia and Africa. The Parsee usurers of Nagar Haveli have already been mentioned (p. 12).

(2) Agriculture

The condition of agriculture is not satisfactory. Considering the fertility of the soil and the possibilities of irrigation, much might still be done to develop the country. It suffers much from lack of transport. Beyond the radius of the navigable rivers there is little or none, and some parts, like Nagar Haveli, are practically devoid of means of communication; the railway serves much more to connect the British possessions of the interior with the sea than to open up Goa itself. No general figures of the agricultural output can be given, but the figures for particular districts and the table of exports serve in some degree to illustrate the actual position of affairs.

(*a*) *Products of Commercial Value.*

Vegetable.—Goa falls into three zones: the wooded slopes of the Ghats; an intervening steppe region with short grass; and the lowlands up to the sea-shore. It is the last region which contains most of the cultivated crops. On the whole the land is fertile, but it has not been adequately developed. Only one-third of the total area is under cultivation, and of this only one-tenth will bear crops all the year round; the remainder is dependent wholly on the rains.

There are fine *forests* in the New Conquests, with a

total area of 116 square miles; the best are in Pernem, Satari, Embarbacem, and Canacona. Even more extensive are the forests of Nagar Haveli, which are the property of the State. The principal timber is teak, which constitutes two-thirds of the Nagar Haveli forests; there are four varieties of this, the hardest of which is *chicatia*. Teak is much used in boat-building; the teak of Damão is better than that of Goa. The next commonest tree is that which is called *sadra* in Damão, and *mareta* in Goa (*Terminalia tomentosa*); its wood is of poor quality, but its leaves are used for feeding silk-worms and its bark for tanning fishing-nets. The jack (*Autocarpus integrifolia*) is next best to teak for its timber; it is of value also for its fruit. Other trees of valuable timber are the *jumba* (*Inga xylocarpa*); *nanon* (*Lagertroemia microcarpa*); *ker* or *pau ferro* (*Acacia catechu*, iron-wood), which is not attacked by insects; *Bassia latifolia*, the well-known Mahawa tree; *lal ker* (*Acacia sundra*), *babul* (*Acacia arabica*), and *sisso* (*Dalbergia sissoides*). The *babul* is not found much in the forests, but is usually solitary or dispersed in little groves over the plains. The *sisso* or rose-wood has suffered greatly from the reckless way in which the woodland has been treated.

Besides trees valuable for their timber, *fruit-trees* are numerous. Several kinds of palms grow in the territory, the most valuable of which are the coco-nut and the areca or betel palm. The coco-nut, which grows all along the coast and on ground not hilly nor used for rice, produces timber, fibre from its coir, leaves for thatching houses, copra, and the juice called *sura*, from which are produced a vinegar called *sirco*, a spirit called *cajulo*, and another alcoholic distillation called *finim*. A coco-nut tree can produce 94½ gallons of *sura* in a year; one palm will produce 100 coco-nuts a year, and the *sura* can be extracted every

day. The value of coco-nuts, together with copra and coir, is very considerable. In 1905–6 it amounted to 300 *contos*[1] (£66,000), but against this must be set the fact that at the same time the deficit in cereals was just double that figure. The methods, also, of cultivating coco-nut are costly, as more is taken out of the soil than is returned to it in the form of manure.

The areca-palm (chiefly grown in irrigated lands in the New Conquests) produces seeds which are eaten with the leaves of the Piper Betel and hence commonly known as betel-nuts. In Ponda the yield of the areca is 80 rupees per acre, in Ilhas 59 rupees. But the export of betel-nuts is not what it used to be. From *caju*, a valuable fruit-tree, is derived *jagra* or jaggery, the coagulated juice which serves as a rough sugar. *Caju*, of which the export is on the average valued at 27,000 *escudos* (i. e. £6,000), is very important, but the trade might be considerably developed with more careful cultivation and better means of transport.

Other varieties of palm are the Palmyra palm, from which arrack is derived; the wild palm (*Caryota urens*), which also supplies jaggery, and the date-palm (*Phoenix dactylifera*), which supplies the edible date.

Among the other chief fruit-trees is the mango, which flourishes in Ilhas (where it yields 150 rupees per acre) and Sanguem, and supplies good timber as well as fruit. The jack has already been mentioned; the fruit is appreciated by natives but not by Europeans. The tree yields dye, fibre, fruit, timber, and spirit. The banana, of which there are three varieties, is grown especially in Bardez, where it has proved profitable. The tamarind must also be mentioned; and oranges and guava grow in Sanguem.

The *bamboo* grows in all parts of the country—there

[1] The word *conto*, originally *conto de reis* (i. e. 1,000,000 *reis*), is retained for 1,000 *escudos* (i. e. *milreis*).

are five varieties of it, out of the total of 117 to be found in India—and is invaluable for the number of things made from it. It grows entirely wild, and nothing is done to stimulate or control its production. *Tobacco* is grown in various parts of the territory.

The principal crop is *rice*, of which there are 32 varieties in the territory. It is grown in lowlands near the banks of rivers, on slopes of hills (*mollas*), in stiff grounds (*dulpan* or *dulip*), and in sandy soils. There are two crops in the year—one, called *serodio*, being sown in May and reaped in September, and another, called *vangana*, sown in December and reaped in March. The latter crop is in great part irrigated from rain-water reservoirs and wells. Some lands will bear both crops, especially reclaimed dune-land, which retains its moisture till the period of the rains; but the bulk is used for *serodio* only, owing to lack of manure and proper irrigation.[1] In spite of the double crop, the yield per acre is only 40 rupees. In Satari it is only 8 rupees. It is suggested that there should be more rotation of crops, that other products which are successful in the neighbouring parts of British India should be grown instead, and that, even if rice is cultivated to its present extent, varieties of rice that require less water should be grown.

Other *cereals* are grown on the hilly and inferior tracts, especially *bajra* (spiked millet), *kodra* (eleusine), *tori* (Indian rape), *gergelim* (sesame), two kinds of bean, *mung* (the Rangoon bean), and *urd*, a pulse held in high esteem, of which the green pods are eaten as vegetables. *Nachinim* and *kulti* (horse gram) are grown in similar soils. *Chola* (chick-pea) is a very subordinate crop.

[1] In times of drought supplies of rice must be obtained, at great cost, from British territory; it is only when there is famine beyond the frontier that there is extreme distress in Goa.

In the villages are grown potatoes, radishes, yams, melons, cucumbers, and in some cases chillies, turmeric, ginger, and *brinjal* (egg-plant), which is used in curries, and eaten both by Europeans and natives when prepared in special ways.

Sugar-cane is grown in Goa, but not enough for the needs of the population. It has been argued from the analogy of similar parts of British India that sugar-cane might give 120 rupees per acre, but at present Goa imports the bulk of its sugar. *Wheat* requires a higher elevation than the cultivated lands of Portuguese India. Not enough has been done with *maize*; it will grow well in the Old Conquests and might be substituted for rice in certain parts, as it requires much less water and supplies more food for cattle. In Satari, besides the fields of cereals, there are plantations of cotton, cocoa, coffee, and cinchona. Some experiments have been made with *rubber*; there is the nucleus of a *hevea* plantation in the neighbourhood of Ponda; and individual proprietors have of late put down small experimental plots of both *hevea* and *castilloa*. It has been thought that *Hancornia speciosa* (which yields a third-grade rubber), approximating as it does so closely to *caju*, would grow wherever *caju* is found growing wild, and that it might well be planted in such places as the lower hills and table-lands of Ilhas, and in Bardez, north of the Mapuça River.

In Nagar Haveli, where at present rice and inferior cereals and vegetables are the principal products, and those grown by very rudimentary methods of cultivation, it is said that not only sugar-cane, but tobacco, *gergelim* (sesame), the castor-oil plant, wheat, hemp, flax, and millet could be grown. *Capim*, a hay-grass of these regions, might become valuable for its straw. At present, in Damão as a whole, only one-twentieth of the available land is under cultivation.

Animal.—The Portuguese authorities are vague in their description of the animals of this country. The fauna is said to be varied and the hunting abundant.

The domestic animals are horses, donkeys, goats, cattle, sheep, pigs, and domestic fowls. There is practically no cattle-breeding; and, whether for slaughter or labour, the cattle are imported. In 1906 there were imported for slaughter 8,363 head of cattle, with a total value of 66,904 *escudos* (£14,860); in the same year the goats, sheep, and pigs imported cost 7,400 *escudos* (£1,640). Also in the same year the value of the imported Indian butter was 18,000 *escudos* (£4,000). And yet the imports came from neighbouring lands enjoying no natural advantages over the Portuguese colonies, so that it would seem that enterprise in these directions would secure a legitimate reward.

(*b*) *Methods of Cultivation*

The Goanese is not a good labourer, and his work is not remunerative. As a rule he works the ground with his hands; only when the soil is very hard does he use the hoe; and the spade is unknown to him. The machinery, methods of irrigation, &c., now in use are primitive. The plough consists of a curved piece of wood, sometimes worked by hand, sometimes by oxen. It turns the earth to a depth that seldom amounts to more than 5 inches. The Old Conquests are usually better cultivated than the New.

The cultivated area does not produce sufficient to support the population. The deficit is made good by the earnings of the 25,000 to 30,000 residents who migrate to British India for work, remitting money to their families and returning to Goa when they have saved a competency.

Artificial fertilizers are unknown among the natives,

and the sanctity of the cow has hindered even the adequate use of cow-dung. Ashes, salt, and fish are the chief manures. The ashes are largely procured from the cutting down of trees and the lopping of their branches, which has proved so detrimental to the forests of the country. It may be added that agriculture suffers much from locusts and mosquitoes. The former have produced great impoverishment in Sanguem, causing the emigration of entire families into British India. The latter infest the marshy districts, especially those near the forests.

Irrigation.—In 1899, under the guidance of Governor Machado, a department of hydraulic services was created, and various schemes for irrigation, drainage, and the improvement of river navigation have been proposed, some of which (but none of great magnitude) have been carried out. The chief need has been for permanent reservoirs; at present the tanks (*lagoas*) which are constructed are filled for only a portion of the year, with the exception of very few, among which is that on the estate of the Conde de Malem. This tank measures 700 by 150 metres. Sr. Castelbranco has made a tour through the whole country, and points out the great possibilities of storage and irrigation canals that it possesses. One work of great importance has been partly executed—the irrigation canal of Paroda, through a rice-growing district. It is to be nearly 10 miles long and is to have branches that amount to another 2½ miles; it was expected that it would be nearly half finished in 1912. Eight reservoirs were to be constructed, and there is a project for a big reservoir in Sanquelim that will involve the removal of the little village of Quelim from its present site. At present the land has an elementary arrangement of dams that make a system of locks.

(c) *Forestry*

There is no scientific forestry, and the woods have suffered from the practice of *kumri* or shifting cultivation, when new land is cleared to replace old exhausted land, and *colvão*, where rights are conferred of lopping trees at a certain height. In the neighbourhood of the railway the woods have suffered material loss through the amount of timber which has had to be supplied to the company. In 1903–4 the revenue derived from forests, apart from timber supplied for State works, was £1,600, while the expenditure was £700. The forests of Nagar Haveli are not preserved, and their exact proportions are unknown.

(d) *Land Tenure*

It was stated in general terms at the beginning of the present century[1] that the condition of the agricultural classes in the Old Conquests had on the whole improved during the latter half of the nineteenth century, but that in the New Conquests there were many instances of severe oppression by the landowners and usurers (called *alcistas* in Goa and *saucares* in Damão). These latter obtain 75 per cent. of the earnings of the tenant as interest for the money that he borrows for purchase of food, seeds, cattle, and agricultural implements. The land is owned by the Government, the 'communities', other authorities (called generally *confrarias*), and private individuals. Governor Machado established a cadastral survey department because of the constant difficulties that arose between these various owners about the boundaries of their respective properties.

The communities (*communidades*) were found by the

[1] See José de Nascimento Pinheiro, *Boletim da Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa*, 1902.

Portuguese already existing, and are a very ancient institution, which may have been even earlier than the coming of the Mahrattas.[1]

Properties are small. Throughout Goa a holding of 15 or 16 acres is regarded as a good-sized farm; most are smaller. In the Old Conquests most properties are owned by private individuals; as property-holders the 'communities' come next, then other associations, and lastly the State. In the New Conquests the State owns about two-thirds, and is the owner of all land in Nagar Haveli and of a great deal in Diu.

(3) Minerals

Goa.—The territory is probably not rich in minerals, but it has been very little surveyed. The laterite which occurs in the chief geological formations of the country contains a certain amount of iron. It is found in Bardez, Satari, and Pernem, but especially in Embarbacem and Astagrar, where a great amount is extracted. More important is the extraction of manganese. In 1906 deposits of it were discovered near Marmagão, and there are six companies with about twenty mines at work.

Damão.—There are no useful minerals in Damão.

Diu.—In Diu there is clay for making tiles and other objects. Stone is extracted for building, but it is of poor consistency and easily crumbles.

Salt is the only commodity of which more is produced than is required by the inhabitants. The export is considerable; in 1911 it was valued at £7,494, in 1912 at £8,003. There are in these colonies 501 salt-works. Of these 171 are in Ilhas, 234 in Salsette, 73 in Bardez, 23 in Pernem; the number of men employed is 1,968. In Damão there

[1] For the curious history of these communities, see above, p. 20.

are 11 salt-works, employing 576 men; in Diu 8, employing 132. The total output is about 12,000 tons, and may be valued at 276,435 *escudos* (£61,430). Salt is used for salting fish (one of the other local industries); the inferior kinds serve for manure. Unfortunately the methods of production are very primitive; the salt-pans do not furnish as much as they might, and what they do produce is none too clean in appearance. Insufficient attention is paid to the channels that bring in the water.

(4) Manufactures

Manufacturing industries are few. Some cloth is woven on hand-looms for local consumption. Formerly Damão did a great trade in cotton fabrics, opium, dyeing, and weaving. There is still some weaving done by wives of Mussulman sailors; piece-goods made from a mixture of English and country twist are exported to Goa, Diu, and Portuguese East Africa. The principal industry of Damão is mat- and basket-making from palm leaves and bamboo. Its other principal industry is deep-sea fishing, chiefly on the coast of Kathiawar, the fish being cured on board. Owing to the good timber of the neighbourhood, rough agricultural implements and carts are made here.

Among other industries of the Portuguese Possessions are the extraction of vegetable oils, the distillation of various kinds of spirits, the extraction of sugar from the small amount of sugar-cane which is cultivated, and of jaggery from palms, coir-making, tile-making and pottery (especially in Damão), rough agricultural implements, and a little copper- and other metal-working. In some villages there are carpenters, iron-workers, goldsmiths, sandal-makers, and tailors. Sandal-making has developed most among these indus-

tries, and is sufficient to meet the needs of the population. The art of the goldsmiths is rudimentary, but characteristically Indian. A man is a goldsmith, not because he has any special aptitude for that work, but because all his ancestors have been goldsmiths and he belongs to the goldsmiths' caste.

The occupations of Diu were formerly dyeing and weaving, and it was of commercial importance and populous, but it has sunk to insignificance, and its chief occupation now is fishing.

(5) Power

The only waterfall capable of affording a regular supply of power is that of Dudsagor in Embarbacem, which it has been proposed to use in order to supply power for a spinning and weaving factory; but complaint is made that the amount of water is insufficient, because in British territory the stream is used for irrigation purposes.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

The towns, few in number, act as centres for their districts; in the absence of good roads across the frontier, and of any means of transport away from the railway and river estuaries, they naturally have a restricted radius. Occasionally a fair of importance, as at Mapuça, makes a town a commercial centre for a certain period in the year. Other places, like Naroli, are centres for the agricultural products of the neighbourhood.

(2) Foreign

The figures given below apply to the whole of Portuguese India, but are almost exclusively concerned with the two ports of Marmagão and Panjim and with the railway, the trade of Damão and Diu being almost negligible.

(*a*) *Exports*

Quantities.—The last years for which the figures are given completely are 1912 and 1913. A comparison of those items for which the bulk is given shows how greatly the trade fluctuates from year to year. The principal export is coco-nuts, of which the number and not the weight is given. In 1912, 34,335,635 were exported from Portuguese India; in 1913, 36,180,230. With this trade are connected copra and coir. Of the former, 309½ tons were exported in 1912, 92½ tons in 1913; of the latter, 37½ tons in 1912, 17½ tons in 1913. Of rice, 878½ tons were exported in 1912, and 4,946 tons in 1913. Dried and salted fish remained more stationary, being 1,418 tons in 1912 and 1,355 tons in 1913. Caju-nuts amounted to 1,574½ tons in 1912 and 2,070 tons in 1913. In Damão the exports are valued at about £2,700 annually.

Values.—The average annual value of exports for the years 1910–14 was 953,696 *escudos*, which, reckoning 4½ *escudos* as =£1, would represent a value of about £211,932 (but the rate of exchange varies). The total value of exports in 1913 was 1,020,402 *escudos* (£226,756), and in 1914, 898,016 *escudos* (£199,559). The principal exports in 1913 were:

Coco-nut, 498,297 *escudos* (£110,732).
Copra, 51,348 *escudos* (£11,410); with coir, 6,919 *escudos* (£1,548).
Caju-nuts, 76,924 *escudos* (£17,094).
Fruits, 69,276 *escudos* (£15,506).

Rice, 51,350 *escudos* (£11,411).
Dried and salt fish, 68,871 *escudos* (£15,305).
Salt, 39,814 *escudos* (£8,848).

The other exports included minerals and live stock. Of the exports, caju-nuts, copra, coir, salt, fruit, and fish had shown an increase ; rice was nearly stationary, coco-nuts had decreased. Most exports are free of duty, but there is a small tax on caju-nuts, coco-nuts, and minerals. The export of betel-nuts has diminished in importance.

Countries of Destination.—Most of the trade is with British India, especially Bombay. The trade with Portugal itself is very limited. In 1911 and 1912 the value of exports was estimated as follows:

To	1911. £	1912. £
British India . .	166,734	148,611
Austria-Hungary . .	2,726	160
Portugal . . .	649	137
Portuguese East Africa .	143	
Other countries . .	560	

In 1916 the shipments direct to Europe amounted to 15,266 tons.

The trade is chiefly transit. The harbour of Marmagão and the railway from Castle Rock are the channel of nearly all the imports and exports. The amount of transit trade has depended mainly on the conditions made for the working of the railway. In 1892 the Portuguese repudiated the treaty of December 26, 1878, under which freedom of commerce, navigation, and transit between the territories of Great Britain and Portugal was established. But, although the Portuguese derived some financial advantage from this step owing to the freedom from treaty obligations, it seems to have been unwise to break away from commercial co-operation with British India.

(*b*) *Imports*

Quantities.—No recent figures are available.

Values.—The value of imports averages more than three times that of exports. But the effect of this large excess, which might be expected to react unfavourably upon the financial position of the colony, is said to be counteracted in great measure by the money remitted by emigrants from Goa into British India, where they accumulate savings.

In 1910–14 the average annual value of imports was 2,880,639 *escudos* (about £640,142, reckoned on the same basis as the exports); the total for 1913 was 2,984,651 *escudos* (£663,256), and for 1914, 2,802,100 *escudos* (£622,688). The principal items in 1912 were:

	Rupees [1]	£
Grain and pulse	26,05,173	173,678
Sugar	7,23,814	48,254
Cotton fabrics	7,16,618	47,774
Stamp-paper and stamps	2,49,963	16,664
Tobacco	2,36,170	15,745
Kerosene oil	2,12,781	14,185
Live-stock (oxen)	1,88,098	12,540
Drugs	1,26,795	8,453
Wines and spirits	1,15,626	7,708
Jaggery	1,10,814	7,387
Building material, tiles, &c.	1,05,713	7,047

Countries of Origin.—The principal contributor to the imports of Portuguese India is British India, the imports from which in 1912 were Rs. 65,55,320 (£437,021). The imports from Portugal fluctuate greatly. In the same year (1912) they were Rs. 3,45,787 (£23,052), which was more than twice as much as they had been the year before. The imports from Portuguese East Africa were valued at Rs. 7,406 (£494), and from

[1] In this table the value of the rupee is taken at $\frac{1}{15}$ of the £, but it fluctuates very much for the purposes of foreign exchange.

the other colonies of Portugal at Rs. 10,461 (£697). Imports from the other countries in 1912 were as follows:

From	*Rupees*	£
United Kingdom	93,031	6,202
Germany	28,220	1,881
France	24,015	1,601
Netherlands	10,339	689
British East Africa	8,294	553
China	7,763	517
Norway	5,808	387
Other countries	3,646	243

The total showed a decrease of about two lacs of rupees compared with the year before.

Duties to the amount of about 220,000 *escudos* (£48,800) annually are levied on imports.

(D) FINANCE

(1) Public Finance

The Budget of the Portuguese colonies in India tends normally to show an expenditure somewhat in excess of the revenue:

Year.	*Receipts.* £	*Expenditure.* £	*Deficit.* £
1901–2	1,019 *contos* (229,275)	1,028 *contos* (231,300)	9 *contos* (2,025)
1902–3	957 *contos* (215,325)	1,074 *contos* (241,650)	117 *contos* (26,325)
1903–4	984 *contos* (221,400)	1,151 *contos* (258,975)	167 *contos* (37,575)
1904–5	972 *contos* (218,700)	1,110 *contos* (249,750)	138 *contos* (31,050)

1 *conto* = 1,000 *escudos* (4*s.* 6*d.*)

There was an improvement at the end of the first decade of this century, and the figures for 1909–10 were:

Receipts.	*Expenditure.* £	*Surplus.*
1,079 *contos* (242,775)	1,062 *contos* (238,950)	17 *contos* (3,825)

But the estimated revenue for 1916–17 was 1,060,398 *escudos* (£238,589 11*s.*), and the estimated expenditure

1,423,474 *escudos*[1] (£320,281 17*s.* 6*d.*), leaving an estimated deficit of 363,076 *escudos* (£81,692 6*s.* 6*d.*).

The sources of revenue are land-tax, customs, postal dues, seal and stamp duties, tobacco licences, taxes on liquor, salt, &c. The revenue from customs is pledged for the payment of interest on the construction of the railway from Marmagão.

(2) Currency and Exchange

Currency.—The coinage of the mother country was altered by a decree of the Provisional Government on May 22, 1911. The unit is now the gold *escudo*, of 100 centavos, which is equivalent to the 1-*milreis* gold piece, and is worth normally about 4*s.* 5¼*d.* (but the rate varies; the average for 1915 was 3*s.* 0¼*d.*). The *reis*, which is the thousandth part of a *milreis*, but not coined, is no longer reckoned. A *conto* is the name for 1,000 escudos. There are gold coins of 2, 5, and 10-*escudo* pieces, silver coins of 1 *escudo* (0·835 fine) and 50, 20, and 10-*centavo* pieces, bronze and nickel coins of 4, 2, 1, and ½-*centavo* pieces.

The coinage of the colony has also been altered of recent years. It used to possess a silver coinage of *xerafins* and a copper coinage of *tangas*; and, by an arrangement made in 1840, salaries were paid one-third in copper and two-thirds in silver. From then till 1878 the value of money differed greatly in Goa and British India, while in Damão and Diu British coinage circulated in preference to Portuguese. A convention was made in 1878, by which the Portuguese coinage was remodelled on the basis of what circulated in British India. There is now a silver coinage of a rupee (180 grains Troy), ½ rupee, ¼ rupee, and ⅛ rupee

[1] Ordinary expenditure, 1,403,513 *escudos*; extraordinary, 19,961 *escudos*.

(tanga). There is a copper coinage of ½ *tanga* (200 grains), ¼ *tanga*, ⅛ *tanga*, and real or $\frac{1}{12}$ *tanga*. The name *xerafin* seems to be applied to the silver coin which is worth ½ a rupee, but a *xerafin* of copper is worth ⅓ of a rupee.

The *escudo* of gold is current in all the colonies of Portugal; the English pound sterling is also current at the rate of 15 rupees or 4½ *escudos*.

Exchange.—The depreciation in the value of silver and the fall in the price of the rupee have been very disconcerting to the business men of these territories. But the difficulty would have been very much greater, if it were not that the bulk of the business is done with British India. The coins of either country can be used in the other's dominions, and the value will be subject to the same fluctuations. The difficulty is considerably increased in the foreign trade, but for that the English pound sterling is largely used. The value of the rupee was fixed at first at 400 *reis*, but this was an exaggerated estimate, and in 1910 it was fixed at 350 *reis*.

By the convention of 1878 the Governor of the Portuguese colony was given full authority to circulate paper money of the face-value of 5 rupees in copper, and 10, 20, 50, 100, and 500 rupees in silver, up to the maximum of 4 per cent. of the value of the money in circulation.

(3) Banks

There is a branch at Panjim of the Banco Nacional Ultramarino. There has also been established a system of savings-banks (*Caixa Economica Postál*); in these the depositors have the right to interest at not less than 2 per cent., nor more than 5 per cent., per annum. The present rate of interest is fixed at 3 per cent. The smallest amount that can be deposited is 4 *tangas*.

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Osorio (1571) and Maffeus (1574), two ecclesiastics, wrote histories in Latin. Albuquerque's Commentaries, compiled by his son, are valuable, but to some extent superseded by his original letters, published in 1884. Two volumes of papers elucidating these have appeared. Faria y Souza, a rhetorical Spaniard, published a history in three volumes in 1674, but there is no further similar chronicle, and recourse must be had to original documents.

The so-called *Book of the Monsoons*, published by the Lisbon Academy in 4 vols., prints records from 1598 to 1618. The India Office has manuscript copies of documents under the same title from 1616 to 1651; and in the same office there are manuscript copies of Portuguese records under the following titles:

Conselho Ultramarino . .	1614–1793
Gavetas	1511–1711
Evora and Pombal Letters .	1572–1806
Noticias da India . . .	1475–1750
Corpo chronologico . .	1500–1630

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[1] Where untouched, his history is a valuable one, but it has been much mutilated and tampered with by interested persons.

in Goa, are valuable ; and the account of Portuguese India in the Bombay portion of the Indian Gazetteer is important.

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Maps

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For Damão there is a map, on the scale of 1 : 250,000, in the Atlas Colonial Portugues of 1914 ; and sheets on the scale of 1 : 63,360, prepared from surveys between 1880 and 1895, are published by the Surveyor-General of India.

For the island of Diu the map in the Atlas Colonial Portugues is on the scale of 1 : 60,000 ; and the sheets on the scale of 1 : 63,360, published by the Surveyor-General of India, are prepared from surveys previous to 1880.

The Possessions are shown in four Naval Staff Intelligence Division Maps : (1) India (general), small scale ; (2) Damão, scale 1 : 500,000 (Ordnance Survey, Jan. 1919) ; (3) Diu, scale 1 : 125,000 (Ordnance Survey, Jan. 1919) ; (4) Goa, scale 1 : 500,000 (Ordnance Survey, Jan. 1919).

HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 57

MOHAMMEDAN HISTORY

(1) THE RISE OF ISLAM AND THE PAN-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.

(2) THE RISE OF THE TURKS AND THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT.

(3) ISLAM IN INDIA AND AFRICA.

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY H M. STATIONERY OFFICE.

1920

THE RISE OF ISLAM

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EDITORIAL NOTE

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

A. D.	
622	The *Hijrah* (the Prophet's flight to Medina).
623	Battle of Badr.
626	Siege of Medina.
629	The Prophet takes Mecca.
632	Death of the Prophet.
633	Moslem invasion of Persia.
634	Battle of Yarmuk.
635	Fall of Damascus. Moslem defeat of the Persians.
637	Fall of Jerusalem. Fall of Mada'in. Occupation of Mesopotamia.
638	Foundation of Kufah and Basra.
640	Khuzistan seized.
641	Moslem advance into Africa. Fall of Alexandria.
642	Battle of Nahawand. Fall of Tripoli.
643	Fall of Rayy.
658	First attacks on Sind.
666	Islamic force reaches Balkh.
669	Formation of province of Ifrikiyyah.
670	Expedition over the Oxus.
681	Invasion of northern Africa.
682	Death of Husain.
690	Byzantine imperial forces attack Carthage.
693	Caliphs begin to appoint Governors of Armenia.
705	Conquest of Transoxiana.
711	Moslems reach Farghanah.
712	Fall of Carmona, Seville, and Merida.
715	Invasion of Kashgar.
720	Invasion of Gaul. Battle of Toulouse.
732	Invasion of Gaul. Battle of Tours.
740	Moslems expelled from Provence.
753–5	Power of Moslems in northern Spain began to decline.
759	Moslems expelled from Narbonne.
808	Foundation of Fez.
827	Invasion of Sicily.
851	Commencement of systematic conquest of Armenia.
869–70	Malta seized by Moslems.

A. D.	
878	Fall of Syracuse.
914	Foundation of Mahdiyah.
936	Fall of the Eastern Caliphate.
969	Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt begins.
1001–26	Invasion of western Punjab.
1045	Foundation of Zirid Dynasty.
1057–85	Recovery of Spanish territories from Moslems.
1061	Robert Guiscard in Sicily.
1064	Fall of Ani (capital of Armenia).
1091	Roger Guiscard completes recovery of Sicily. He recovers Malta.
1203	Northern India under Moslem rulers.
1212	Alfonso VIII of Castile defeats Moslems at Las Navàs da Tolosa.
1250	Emperor Frederick II deports Moslems from Malta and Sicily.
1492	Final expulsion of Moslems from Spain.
1517	The Caliphate passes to the Ottoman Sultans.
1519–20	Morocco seized by Sa'dian Sherif.
1550	Fez captured by Mohammed al-Mahdi.
1552	Extinction of the Ziyanid Amirate by the Turks.
1574	Turks capture Tunis.
1590–3	Foundation of Sudanese State with capital at Timbuktu.
1603	Death of the Sherif al-Mansur.
1659	Last Sa'dian Sherif killed.
1667	Mulay Rashid reunites the Sa'dian Empire.

THE RISE OF ISLAM

§ 1. *Place, Date, and Circumstances of its Rise*

ISLAM, or the Mohammedan religion, has now lasted for a period of 1,335 lunar years, the unit of its calendar being a group of twelve lunations, without accommodation to the seasons. Its official commencement synchronizes with the year 622 A. D., when its founder

accepted an invitation from the people of Yathrib, ever since known as al-Medinah, 'the City' (of the Prophet), to undertake the government of the place—an event historically known as the *Hijrah*, i. e. emigration or flight. According to tradition, the Prophet had been promulgating his opinions publicly for some ten years; and for some three years previous to this communicating them privately in his native town, Mecca. If this be correct, the commencement of the system should be dated about the year 610. The name *Islam*, of which *Moslem* or *Muslim* is the participle, signifies in Arabic 'surrender', and (according to the Koran) was given by the patriarch Abraham to his community, the sense being surrender of the 'face', i. e. probably the person, to Allah (God). The community is sometimes called the *Hanifs*, a name which is also traced to Abraham; this has been thought to belong to a community at Harran (which existed so late as the eleventh century) called the Sabis, a word applied, according to the tradition, to the early Moslems by their neighbours. The recorded practices of this obscure sect exhibit agreement in some notable details with those of Islam.

Since Mecca has no trustworthy chronicles of its own, and has never aroused the attention of the outside world, except in connexion with the Prophet Mohammed and his system, a certain vagueness attaches to the circumstances wherein his mission arose. In Arabia there appears at the time to have been no considerable native state, but numerous settlements of tribes, while the Roman and Persian Empires had spheres of influence. Mecca appears to have been the settlement of a group of tribes in possession of a sanctuary, whither visitors brought goods which the Meccans, aided by their sacred character, conveyed to various regions. The sanctuary, thus bringing

them comparative immunity from war, enabled them also to accumulate wealth. With regard to their religion, the Koran assumes that the citizens of Mecca were polytheists, idolaters, and addicted to various practices—some of them undoubtedly immoral—of which the Prophet disapproved. It further assumes that the existence of the Jewish and Christian religious systems was known in Mecca, but that few if any there had any acquaintance with those systems. That the Prophet himself was a native, not a foreigner, appears not only from the statements of the Koran, but from the part played in his life by numerous relatives, some of whom were adherents, others opponents, while some belonged to neither group. The names whereby he designated his office correspond with the Jewish *Prophet* and the Christian *Apostle*. The Arabic word for the former is identical with the Hebrew, but clearer in meaning, owing to the preservation of the family of words to which it belongs; it signifies *bearer of a message*, and is thus synonymous with Apostle, for which an Arabic word, also belonging to a well-known family, is employed. The message, or rather series of messages, which he claimed to deliver, came from the Supreme Being. These, singly or collectively, are the *Koran* or *Qur'an* ('reading').

Mohammed's notion of a prophet, then, was that of a channel whereby the Divine Being communicates his commands to mankind; hence, in the Koran it is the Deity who speaks, often addressing to the Prophet a command to say something to his fellows. Since the unity of God is the dominant doctrine of the system, His messenger acts as His representative before the whole world; and this most important inference was accordingly drawn by Mohammed. The Government of Mecca, of whose constitution our knowledge is hazy, appears to have recognized that

Mohammed's claim involved dictatorship within the community; but the principle whereby responsibility attached to the tribe rather than to the individual prevented that Government from forcibly suppressing him so long as he was countenanced by the powerful tribe to which he belonged, while the justice of his claim was recognized by too few members of that tribe to permit of their endeavouring to enforce it on the group of tribes who shared the territory of Mecca. This enables us to some extent to understand the curious circumstance that in the Meccan period his followers, who from the point of view of civic standing were less favourably situated than he, suffered persecutions from which he himself was immune. These caused what is called the first migration—the flight of various early adherents of his system to Christian Abyssinia, with whose ruler Mohammed appears to have maintained friendly relations, though he did not put himself under that potentate's protection.

§ 2. *The Call to Medina and its Consequences*

The circumstances which led to the Prophet's receiving an invitation from the people of Yathrib to undertake the government of their city are incompletely known, but seem to be illustrated by cases in early Hellenic history, in which prophets were summoned to cure a community of the civic disease known as *stasis*, or chronic civil war. The territory called by the name Yathrib, which appears to be of Egyptian origin, was shared by two Arabian tribes which had long been involved in internecine war. With them there lived certain Jewish communities, of whose origin and history their brethren have no independent record; it is uncertain whether they were Judaized Arabs, or Israelites who had adopted Arabia as their

country, learned the Arabic language, and accommodated themselves in a variety of ways to the customs of the land. They appear to have been drawn into the tribal wars, but their importance for the commencement of Islam lies chiefly in the fact that they probably familiarized their neighbours with the notion of prophetic revelation, rendering Mohammed's claims more intelligible to them than to other pagans in Arabia. The acquaintance of the people of Yathrib with Mohammed and his system is said, doubtless with truth, to have had its beginning in pilgrimages made by natives of the place to the shrine at Mecca called the *Ka'bah* or *House of Allah*. These pilgrims on their return home propagated the system, which was presently taught more authoritatively by an agent sent thither by Mohammed. Owing to the success of their efforts in attracting adherents, both the Prophet and his Meccan followers were assured of a welcome at Medina; and, after the migration of the latter, the Prophet himself took the historic journey from which Islam dates its era. It would appear that his arrival was at first welcome to all elements of the population, including the Jews; for the Jewish system was at that time reproduced with slight modifications in that of the Arabian Prophet, which, even in its ultimate shape, closely resembles Judaism.

From the date of the migration, Mohammed's career can be more clearly traced, since from this time the chief events of the years are kept distinct. Internal dissensions arose in Yathrib (Medina) shortly after his arrival, though not on the old lines of cleavage. His relations with the Jewish tribes became more and more strained; and, whether as the consequence or the cause of this, he resolved to make advances towards the older paganism, especially by enjoining believers to turn, in prayer, towards the Meccan sanctuary, and by making

the pilgrimage thither part of his system; where he adopted Jewish institutions, he altered them, and he eventually freed himself from the neighbourhood of the Israelites by forcible means. He also had trouble with disaffected pagans, especially with chiefs jealous of the power which he had acquired; but in these cases he displayed patience and leniency. He sought to enter into friendly relations with neighbouring tribes, but seems to have made his chief object the subjugation of Mecca, towards whose Government he assumed an attitude of open hostility. An attack organized by him on a Meccan trading caravan led, in the year 2 A. H. (A.D. 624), to his first considerable battle, that of Badr. The Meccan forces are said to have been twice as numerous as those of the Moslems, but the discipline of the latter and the tactics of their commander were greatly superior; and, though the caravan originally aimed at escaped, Mohammed won a decisive victory. Attempts were made by the Meccans to avenge this defeat, culminating, in the year 5 A. H., in the siege of Medina by a hostile confederation. Owing to a variety of causes, among which the Prophet's skill as a captain and a negotiator seems to have been the chief, this attempt resulted in failure; and from that time, while the cause of Islam was progressing in Arabia partly by persuasion and partly by force of arms, the more enterprising and intelligent among the Meccans were deserting to the Prophet at Medina. For some time this migration had been a duty for converts, and Medina was growing into a vast camp. In the year 8 A.H. Mecca itself was taken by the Prophet, who seems at first to have had some idea of making it the seat of government. From this he was dissuaded, but he retained it in its rank of religious centre, thereby securing for his system an element of permanence; for, however far the political

centre shifted, the religious centre has remained unaffected by the change.

From what we know of the history and antiquities of Arabia it appears that the taking of Mecca was speedily followed by the imposition of Islam on the entire country, partly by successful wars, partly by peaceful negotiation; but, even before Mecca was captured, the Prophet had come to think of his mission as addressed to the whole world, and is said to have dispatched to all the potentates known to him a summons to accept Islam if they wished to be safe. The records of these embassies are not altogether trustworthy; it seems clear, however, that the summons was courteously received in Egypt, but in Persia with contumely; tradition makes the Byzantine Emperor treat the summons with respect, though on consideration it was rejected.

The process whereby Mohammed, once installed in authority in Medina, became ruler of all Arabia is not difficult to follow; there are parallel cases, not in Oriental history alone, of men gifted with political and strategic ability rising after a small initial success to be heads of empires. Mohammed appears to have been especially felicitous in his assessment of ability and character, both in the case of adherents and in that of enemies; he seems to have made no mistakes in the choice of agents and the assignment of offices. He also possessed the gift of inspiring his adherents with loyalty. The process whereby he obtained his first following is far less intelligible. From the beginning he claimed to work a miracle, but this was of a peculiar kind. It lay in the production of the rhymed discourses which he called *Koran* (*Qur'an*). He claimed that this was the first instruction which his countrymen had ever received, and that he himself, before he began to receive it,

had been illiterate. He also declared that the matter which he delivered was previously unknown to him, but that its correctness could be certified by an appeal to those who were in possession of 'the Book', i. e. Jews and Christians. Thirdly, he challenged his contemporaries to produce any composition which could rival his revelations. No other miracle seems to have played an important part in his career. It is perhaps surprising that during his lifetime the Koran was thought of much as we think of the sermons of a great preacher—as something living and continuous, not the limited contents of a volume. Little care was therefore at first taken to secure its preservation.

§ 3. *Theological, Moral, and Political Character of the System*

The system introduced by Mohammed seems to have differed very widely in theology from those which had previously dominated Central Arabia, since it substituted a rigid form of spiritual monotheism for a polytheism which apparently combined fetish-worship and star-worship. It also laid emphasis on the resurrection of the dead, future judgement, and future happiness and misery—doctrines which the earlier Meccans are represented as ridiculing. Of the practices which it introduced, viz. (1) prayer (involving certain ritual formalities), (2) fasting (i.e. abstention from all food, solid and liquid, from sunrise to sunset throughout the ninth month of the lunar year), (3) pilgrimage (i.e. a visit to Mecca once at least in a lifetime, with the observation of certain practices and the participation in certain rites), and (4) alms (i.e. the enforced contribution of a proportion of a man's annual produce or earnings for the benefit of the poor of the community), only the third would seem to have been taken over, with some slight modifications—and these perhaps of interpre-

tation and nomenclature rather than of procedure—from the pagan system; there may have been something analogous to the second, of which the origin is obscure, whereas the first and the fourth were decidedly innovations. These practices, together with the creed of two propositions, form the 'five pillars of Islam'.

Moral reforms of considerable importance are to be found in the abolition of infanticide, with which the pre-Islamic Arabs are charged, and the prohibition of spirituous liquor and the form of gambling which seems to have been in vogue. Some hold that the relations between the sexes were also regulated somewhat more strictly than had previously been the practice; but the Koran makes no limitation to the permissible number of concubines, and only limits the number of wives to four. Other moral reforms seem to have been recommendations rather than enactments. Thus, whereas neither the institution of slavery nor that of the blood-feud was abolished, the manumission of slaves was recommended as a pious act, constituting atonement for certain offences; and attempts were made to mitigate the evils of the blood-feud. Notice should be taken of the licence to conceal religious opinions when danger is incurred by their open profession.

The Prophet's chief political innovation was the recognition of tolerated religions. Whereas paganism was to be exterminated, communities which had as the basis of their system a sacred book revealed by some recognized prophet were to be disarmed and compelled to pay tribute to the Islamic Government, but otherwise to be safe from interference. They were to enjoy the protection of the armed Moslem community, even, according to some, in the performance of acts which Islam forbade its adherents to commit. Thus property in wine and swine is recognized in the

case of Christians, but not in that of Moslems, whose system prohibits both. Normally the Christian or the Jewish community was to be represented by its religious head, who was responsible to the Moslem Government for the payment of the tribute; interference, however, with the affairs of these protected communities could not in practice be avoided. An inference afterwards drawn by Islamic jurists, that only the testimony of Moslems can be received in Moslem courts, has proved disastrous. Its supposed ground is the charge which the Koran brings, perhaps rather against Jews than Christians, of corrupting the text of their sacred books. If, it is argued, they cannot be trusted to report God's words correctly, still less can they be trusted in the case of men.

§ 4. *Progress after the Prophet's Death*

At the Prophet's death there were still some Christian and Jewish communities in Arabia; but it was decided by his second successor that no religion save Islam was to be tolerated in the peninsula, and they were expelled. The Prophet's death was followed by numerous revolts among the Arab tribes, who disliked the five daily prayers, and still more the exaction of the tax called alms; but there appears to have been no recrudescence of pagan cults, though some of the revolts were headed by persons who claimed to be prophets similar to Mohammed. Historians naturally express surprise at the shallowness of the sentiments which the pagan deities of Arabia seem to have inspired. It might have been expected that their worship would in places have been maintained in private after it had been publicly inhibited, whereas it appears that after a very few years nothing more was remembered about them than what happened to be recorded in the Koran. As conquest pro-

ceeded, the Prophet's programme of subjugating the world and exterminating all but believers in prophetic books underwent certain modifications. It was not found possible for many centuries to deprive the Byzantine Empire and various European, Asiatic, and African states of their independence; room had to be made for the Magians or Mazdians in the system of tolerated religions; and it was found impossible to exterminate the paganism of India when Islam made progress in that quarter.

§ 5. *Origin of the Divisions*

The Prophet's death was not at once followed by a war of succession, but the fact that he had left no son and given no authoritative instructions for the appointment of a successor was destined ultimately to occasion serious trouble. The notion of a community being ruled by instruction from the Divine Being communicated through an appointed channel would seem to require the constant presence of a Prophet. At his death Mohammed left one living daughter, Fatimah, with her two infant sons. Her husband, Ali, son of Abu Talib, was the cousin of the Prophet, had been one of his earliest adherents, and had displayed conspicuous bravery in the field; he was, however, set aside in favour of the Prophet's most constant companion, Abu Bakr, father of the Prophet's young wife, A'ishah. Abu Bakr, who died after a short reign, appointed as his successor Omar, who seems to have been intellectually the most capable of the Prophet's companions; and after Omar's assassination the choice of the Moslems fell on Othman, who had married two of the Prophet's daughters and been given honourable commissions by the Prophet. Othman was presently put to death by armed rebels, who installed Ali in his place. Ali immediately found himself involved in civil

wars with parties who claimed to avenge his predecessor's death, and even with the party by which he had been enthroned; and by one of this party he was assassinated after a brief and turbulent reign. One of his rivals, the son of Mohammed's most capable opponent at Mecca, then established the first of the hereditary Islamic dynasties. The hereditary principle once established, it was natural that the Moslem world should desire a dynasty which represented the line of their Prophet rather than that of his foremost adversary. Consequently claimants belonging to the Prophet's line were constantly coming forward, the most celebrated of whom in the first Islamic century was his grandson Husain, son of Ali. Husain's death in the field in the year 61 A.H. (A.D. 683) is regarded as the greatest catastrophe that ever befell Islam.

The introduction of the hereditary principle was attended by a difficulty. According to the law of inheritance embodied in the text of the Koran, in default of a son the parents of the deceased or their representatives inherit; a daughter only gets an appointed share. Hence Fatimah (on the supposition that a prophet can have heirs, which is often denied) would not be heiress; on the other hand, her husband was excluded because his father, though the Prophet's uncle, was never a believer, and there is a maxim that unbeliever does not inherit from believer. The legal heir was in this case the Prophet's believing uncle, Abbas, who appears to have opposed the Prophet, though not very vigorously, until the latter's success was assured, when Abbas became a believer. This then is the process of reasoning whereby the claim of the Abbasids, who ousted the first hereditary dynasty, is established; but some of their supporters maintained that the sovereignty had been transmitted to this family by the representative of the first Mahdi, Mohammed, son of Ali

and 'the Hanafite woman' (another wife than Fatimah), to whom it had been transmitted by Ali, who had received it from the Prophet. This represents an endeavour to secure for the Abbasids the rights of the family of Ali. The adherents of the cause of Fatimah would naturally disallow this claim as much as the other, holding that the sovereignty belongs to one of her descendants.

The claim of the Ottoman Sultan to the succession of the Prophet is derived from that of the Abbasids, whose dynasty lasted in theory from A. D. 750, when they overthrew the first hereditary dynasty (the Umayyads), to 1517, when Egypt was conquered by the Sultan Selim I, to whom the last of the Abbasids is supposed to have transmitted his claim. Of those who acknowledge the rights of the Abbasids, many deny that claims can be thus transmitted, holding that they are inherent in the Prophet's tribe, Quraish, according to a principle inferred by jurists of the fourth Islamic century from the facts of history up to that time. Those who maintain that they belong to the Prophet's descendants through his daughter are called the *Shiah* (party of the Prophet's house). They made many disastrous attempts to assert their claims and stirred up revolts against the Sunni Caliphs. Their supreme religious chiefs were the Imams, descended from Ali, each of whom transmitted his authority to his successor. In course of time disputes arose as to the succession. One sect, the Ismailis, recognized only seven Imams, the last of whom disappeared about A. D. 770; while another (to which the majority of Shiahs belong) recognized twelve, of whom the last disappeared and remains hidden from mortal sight, but will appear again as the promised Mahdi. Shiah dynasties were established in Tabaristan (864–928), in North-west Africa (the Idrisids, 791–922),

in North Africa and Egypt (the Fatimids, 969–1171); and in 1502, under the founder of the Safavid dynasty, the Shiah faith became the national religion of Persia.

The name *Sunni*, whereby the adherents of the Abbasids and so of the Ottoman Sultan are generally, though not exclusively, designated, is derived from the word *sunnah*, 'practice' or 'law', and has the following history. The profession of faith which marks the adherent of Islam consists of two sentences, of which the first attests that Allah is the only God, the second that Mohammed is His channel of communication with mankind. Those communications in the Prophet's time took the form of revelations, either conveyed to his mind and then delivered by him to an audience, or uttered by him in trance and taken down by authorized reporters. The second article of the creed implies acceptance of these revelations as divine injunctions. Where, therefore, they abrogated an existing practice, that practice had to be abandoned, but other practices were maintained; hence some of the most characteristic institutions of Islam, e.g. circumcision, were taken on from the earliest usage of Arabia without being prescribed or confirmed by the Koran. No sufficient supplement to the occasional legislation of the Koran was provided to meet the rapid development of the Moslem community into an empire; and, since that work repeatedly enjoins obedience to the Prophet as well as to God, endeavours were made to obtain such a supplement from what could be remembered of the Prophet's sayings and doings. Simultaneously there arose a theory that the Prophet had secretly communicated to Ali and his family the necessary supplement, which in the opinion of some went far beyond jurisprudence.

The collection of traditions for this purpose appears

to have begun shortly after the Prophet's death, the chief seat of the study being Medina. In the second Islamic century codes were elaborated, largely on the basis of this supposed practice of the Prophet; in the fourth century four of these systems obtained official recognition, and a *Sunni* might follow any one of the four. Of these, that which bears the name of Abu Hanifah, or the Hanafi system, is officially recognized by the Ottoman Empire, which, however, has largely restricted its application. The codes used by the Shiah communities differ only in minor points.

§ 6. *The Expansion of Islam*

The expansion of Islam began in the continent of Asia, and proceeded simultaneously in the directions of Syria and Persia. The long struggle between the Byzantine and Persian Empires weakened the forces opposed to Islam. The fate of the Byzantine Empire in Palestine and Syria was settled by the battle of Yarmuk (A.D. 634), followed by the taking of Damascus in the next year. Homs was taken in 635; Hamah, Laodicea, and Kinnisrin in the following year; and Aleppo and Antioch shortly afterwards. The conquest of Palestine was settled by the battle of Ajnadain in 636, after which Jerusalem capitulated, while the other important towns were either taken or surrendered; the last to hold out was Caesarea, which was taken by storm in 638.

Persian Empire.—The conquest of the countries which formed the Persian Empire began in 633, when the province called Arabian Irak was invaded by a Moslem force under Khalid, and the important city of Hirah seized. This was followed in the same year by the capture of Anbar on the eastern bank of the Euphrates; but the invasion did not proceed with

uninterrupted success. The fate of the Persian Empire was determined, towards the end of 635, by the battle of Kadisiyyah, which resulted in a complete defeat of the Persian army by the Moslems, under the leadership of Sa'd Ibn Abi Wakkas. In 637 the royal city, Mada'in, fell; and in the same year Mesopotamia was occupied as far as Tekrit and Mosul. In 638 the new Moslem cities, Kufah and Basra, were founded and peopled with Arabian immigrants. In the following years the chief cities of Khuzistan were taken, Sus falling in 640. The resistance of the Persian king was finally crushed at the battle of Nahawand, in 642, followed by the fall of Rayy in 643. The provinces of Fars, Kirman, Mukran, Sijistan, Khorasan, and Azerbaijan were then successfully invaded and annexed to the Empire of the Caliphs.

Africa.—The Moslem advance into Africa began in 641, when 'Amr Ibn al-'As invaded Egypt by the route of al-'Arish. He took Alexandria in this year, and founded the city of Fustat, which in the fourth Islamic century was superseded by the neighbouring Cairo. The attempt of the Byzantines to recover Alexandria was defeated in a campaign which led to the retaking of that city by the Moslems in 646. This year should perhaps be regarded as the date of the commencement of the Moslem possession of Egypt.

The conqueror of Egypt advanced along the coast as far as Barca, while one of his officers raided the Fezzan. In 642 he took Tripoli. Under the third Caliph, in 647, preparations were made on a larger scale for the invasion of Africa, where an independent state had recently been set up by the *patricius* Gregory with Suffetula or Sbeitla for capital. Gregory was defeated by the Moslem general Abdallah ben Abi Sarh, and fell in battle; but the Moslems resolved temporarily to evacuate the province; they did not

return till 665, under the Umayyad of the Caliph Mu'awiyah. After various raids a province (Ifrikiyyah) was constituted in 669, with Ukbah Ibn Nafi as governor. A new city, Kairawan, was founded as its capital. The province extended southwards as far as Jerid, but was subject to continual raiding from the west. In 681 Ukbah planned an expedition westward on a considerable scale, with the view of gaining for Islam the whole of northern Africa; he proceeded victoriously as far as Ceuta, whence he marched southward to the Sus, and eventually reached the Atlantic. Conversions on a great scale appear to have been effected among the Berber tribes who occupied these regions, but at the death of Ukbah on the return journey in 683, little in the way of permanent subjection of the Maghrib had been achieved. Owing to the civil wars which were raging in the East, even the province of Ifrikiyyah had for a time to be abandoned. In 697, however, the occupation was resumed and further conquest begun. The last attempt made by the Byzantine Empire to recover its African possessions was in 698, when a descent was made on Carthage, which had just been conquered by the Moslems; but the place could not be permanently held owing to the arrival of a Moslem fleet. The conquest of the Maghrib was consummated by Musa ben Nusair, who was sent as governor to Kairawan in 705. He took and garrisoned Tangier, and advanced southward as far as Sijilmasa. There was, however, no considerable immigration of Arabs at this time. Small garrisons were left in various places of importance, and missionaries were dispatched to various tribes to instruct them in the doctrines and practices of Islam.[1]

Spain and France.—It was from Africa that Moslem

[1] For an account of the later developments, see § 7 below, and *Islam in Africa*, Part (3) of this book.

conquest extended to the European continent, though isolated raids had previously been made on various islands in the Mediterranean, especially on Sicily, Cyprus, and Rhodes. The invasion of Spain was commenced in 711 by Tarik, governor of Tangier, whose name is preserved in the Arabic Jebel Tarik ('mountain of Tarik'), whence the name Gibraltar is derived. An exploring party had been sent out two years before under Tarif, whose name is thought to survive in Tarifa. The advance of Tarik was exceedingly rapid; and he successively occupied Toledo (at that time the political capital), Granada, Malaga, and Elvira. Tarik was followed in 712 by the governor of Ifrikiyyah, Musa ben Nusair, who took Carmona, Seville, and Merida. A great part of the population adopted Islam, and the invaders soon reached the Pyrenees.

In A. D. 720 that mountain barrier was crossed, but a Moslem army was defeated under the walls of Toulouse. In 732 Abd al-Rahman, governor of Spain, made a fresh incursion into Gaul, burned Bordeaux, plundered Poitiers, and threatened Tours. But in the battle of Tours, fought in October 732, the Moslems sustained a crushing defeat at the hands of Charles Martel; and, though raids in Gaul continued for a time, the land beyond the Pyrenees was not destined to remain in their hands; they were expelled from Provence in 740, and from Narbonne in 759.

Meanwhile, the expulsion of the Moslems from northern Spain had begun; between 753 and 755 they had been driven south to a line stretching from Coimbra on the west to Pamplona on the east. A further stretch of territory was regained by Fernando I, King of Castile and Leon, in the years 1057 to 1064, and by Alfonso VI, King of Leon, Castile,

Galicia, and Navarre, in 1080–5. The Moslem domination in Spain received its most serious blow in 1212, when the Almohad Caliph's forces were utterly routed at the battle of Las Navas da Tolosa by Alfonso VIII of Castile, aided by other Christian princes of the peninsula. But it was not till 1492 that the capture of Granada by Ferdinand and Isabella finally emancipated the whole peninsula from the dominion of Islam.

Mediterranean.—Sicily was repeatedly raided by the Moslems of Africa, and in 827 was invaded by a considerable force sent by the Aghlabite (African Islamic) ruler of Kairawan. The conquest of the island was carried out by stages, and the fall of Syracuse in 878 brought the greater part of it into Moslem possession. In 1061 its reconquest was commenced by the Norman, Robert Guiscard, and was completed by his brother Roger, who by 1091 had obtained possession of all the Moslem strongholds.

Malta was taken by an Aghlabite fleet in 869 and 870; but it was recovered for Christendom by Roger Guiscard in 1091. In 1250 the Moslems who remained in these islands were deported to Apulia by the Emperor Frederick II.

The eastern shore of the Mediterranean passed out of Mohammedan hands after the Crusaders had conquered Jerusalem in 1099 and established a Christian kingdom in Palestine; but, when Saladin won the battle of Hittin in 1187, the collapse of the Christian power was so complete that three years later only Tyre, Tripoli, and Antioch remained in Christian hands. The Crusaders made a great effort to recover the Holy Land, but the treaty of 1192 left in their hands little territory beyond the sea-board from Acre to Jaffa. During the next fifty years, in spite of fluctuations, the Latin power increased. They ex-

tended their possessions farther inland, and Jerusalem was once more in Christian hands for a few years; but, after Baibars became Sultan of Egypt in 1260, he waged a series of successful campaigns against the Latins, and by the capture of Acre in 1291 brought the whole of Syria once again under Mohammedan rule.

Asia Minor.—Whereas the invasion of Europe from the south-west reached its limit in the eighth century, and from that time slowly receded, Islam continued to advance in other directions. In 693 the Caliphs began to appoint governors of Armenia, but the systematic conquest of the country did not begin till 851. In the following century Islam made great strides, partly through the raids of the governors of Azerbaijan, partly through the diplomatic methods employed by the Caliphs in their dealing with the Armenian princes. The capital of the Armenian kingdom, 'Ani, was taken in 1064 by the Seljuk Sultan, Alp Arslan; and the rest of Armenia was presently embodied in the empire of the Seljuks.[1]

Central Asia.—An Islamic force reached Balkh in 666; in 670 an expedition was sent across the Oxus, and remained for two years in the region of which Bokhara was the chief city. The methodical conquest of Transoxiana began in 705, and a systematic attempt was made to convert the inhabitants; by 711 the Moslem conquerors had advanced to Farghanah, the present Khanate of Khokand, and the Jaxartes was crossed. From that time Islam advanced fitfully in those parts, as also north of Azerbaijan, conversions at certain periods taking place on a large scale.

As the power of the Abbasid Caliphate declined in the ninth century, Transoxiana became independent, first under a Persian dynasty, the Sāmānids (874–999), and afterwards under a succession of Turkish rulers,

[1] Cf. *Armenia*, No. 62 of this series.

the Ilik Khans (932–1165), the Ghaznavids (962–1186), the Seljuks (1037–1194), and the Khwārizm Shāhs (1150–1231), who were finally swept away by the Mongol invasion.

India.—Attacks on Sind began in the year 658, and in the eighth century this country was temporarily occupied by the Moslems. The invasion of India did not achieve success till the time of Mahmud of Ghazni, who in seventeen invasions between the years 1001 and 1026 subdued the western districts of the Punjab. When, in the latter half of the twelfth century, his dynasty was overthrown by the Ghoris, further conquest was contemplated, and by 1203 the whole north of India from the delta of the Indus to the delta of the Ganges was under Mohammedan rulers.[1] Under successive dynasties of the Sultans of Delhi, Mohammedan rule advanced as far south as the Deccan, and under the Moghul emperors attained its greatest extension.

East Indian Islands.—Islam is said to have been introduced into Java by missionaries in the fifteenth century; and its adherents, by the sixteenth century, had become sufficiently powerful to seize the reins of government both here and in the north and some other parts of the neighbouring island of Sumatra. The progress of Islam through the other islands of the Malay Archipelago was slow, and the early history of the movement is obscure; opposition to the political domination of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century reacted in favour of the rising Mohammedan power, but even to the present day Islam is chiefly confined to the more civilized races of the Archipelago and has made but little way among the lower races.

China.—Though there is a considerable Moslem

[1] For later developments, see *Islam in India*, Part (3) of this book.

population in China, there appears at no time to have been an independent Moslem state in that country. According to the Arab historians, when in 715 Kashgar was invaded by a Moslem conqueror, the Chinese Emperor sent a deputation to obtain some information about the new religion, and in 755 the Abbasid Caliph is said to have sent a force to aid the Chinese Government against a rebel. The members of this force are thought to have formed the nucleus of the Moslem colony, which received considerable accessions to its numbers after the Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century had opened up communications between China and western Asia. After the expulsion of the Mongol dynasty from China in the latter part of the fourteenth century, the Mohammedans, cut off from communication with their co-religionists in other countries, tended to become merged into the mass of the native population, through their marriages with Chinese women and their adoption of Chinese habits and manners. There have been several Mohammedan revolts against the Chinese Government, the first in the province of Kansu in 1648; these revolts, as well as the Panthay risings in Yunnan from 1855 to 1873 and the Tungan rebellion in Shen-si and Kansu in 1864–77 and 1895–6, were suppressed by means of wholesale massacres.

§ 7. *Islam in Africa*

After the spread of Islam along the northern coast of Africa, it continued to make progress towards the south, but the stages are only recorded in exceptional cases. It appears, indeed, that the successive founders of dynasties carried Islam, either by persuasion or by force of arms, farther and farther into the interior; this is recorded, for instance, of Idris, the founder of the Idrisid dynasty. In the first two centuries of the

Hijrah the doctrines of the Kharijites, who confined the Caliphate to no particular family or tribe, won considerable favour among the African Moslems; and one of the subdivisions of that sect, called the Ibadis or Abadis, is still represented in some places. A dynasty which claimed descent from Ali, known as the Idrisid, was established near the end of the eighth century, and founded Fez in 808; another, which also claimed descent from Ali, founded Mahdiyah in 914, and in 969 got possession of Egypt, where it established a Caliphate called the Fatimid, which lasted some two centuries. By transferring its capital from Mahdiyah to Cairo it soon lost touch with the more westerly parts of northern Africa, and the history of the country from that time onwards was exceedingly troubled. In 1045 the deputy of the Fatimids at the former seat of their power declared himself independent, and founded a dynasty known as the Zirid; and the Fatimid ruler, in order to punish this proceeding, organized a fresh immigration of Arab tribes into northern Africa, who not only brought devastation on the country by their invasion, but, owing to their inability to remain constant to any sovereign, became a permanent source of disorder.

In the eleventh century an empire was founded by a religious enthusiast, with Morocco for its capital, which presently obtained control over Islamic Africa with the exception of Egypt, and even embraced Islamic Spain; but after a century it was displaced by another, also founded by an enthusiast, who took the title 'Mahdi'. This empire also had its head-quarters in Morocco. In the middle of the thirteenth century it was overthrown, and three states took its place—the Marinid, with Fez or Morocco, the Ziyanid, with Tlemsen, and the Hafsid, with Tunis, as their respective capitals. The history of northern

Africa to the end of the fifteenth century is mainly concerned with the struggles, resulting from wars of succession, between these three states and their subdivisions.

Early in the sixteenth century the Ottoman Turks began to extend their authority along the coast of North Africa, and the three provinces of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli were annexed to the Turkish Empire in 1519, 1568, and 1551 respectively. Thus the territories that had belonged to the Ziyanids and the Hafsids came under Turkish rule; but Morocco passed from the hands of the Marinids into those of the Sherifs, who claimed descent from Ali, and have remained in power down to recent times.[1]

Although religious reformers play a prominent part in the history of all Islamic countries, it is in Africa that they have had most political importance. Thus, whereas in the eastern Caliphate the successive hegemonies were established by military adventurers, in Africa the series of empires, those of the Ubaidids, Almoravids, Almohads, and afterwards the Sherifian, were founded by religious enthusiasts. The persons who, sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully, aim at founding empires are called Murabits, i. e. hermits, who win popular admiration by rigidity of doctrine and asceticism in practice. The reason for this phenomenon appears to lie mainly in the character of the population; but an additional reason is to be found in the struggle with Christian Powers, who were steadily regaining territory and menacing Islam in Africa, while particular Moslem sovereigns were allying themselves with Christian potentates in order to defeat their rivals, and employing Christian regiments in their armies. At times,

[1] For the later expansion of Islam in Africa, see below, Part (3) of this book.

too, Islamic states accepted the humiliation of being tributary to Christian kings. These fundamental violations of Islamic law formed a permanent source of discontent, which provided a following for any enthusiast who aspired to remove them.

§ 8. *Relations with Subject Peoples*

The Prophet is said to have introduced in the year 8 A. H. the principle whereby certain religious communities, whose systems were based on a sacred book, were to enjoy toleration on consideration of paying tribute[1]; they were, however, to be disarmed, and to accept a position of inferiority to the Moslems. The form taken by the tribute was theoretically a poll-tax; as, however, the collection of this was ordinarily left to the responsible heads of the communities, and the persons who paid it were largely engaged in agriculture, the distinction between this tribute and the land-tax had a tendency to be obscured, and the name, which properly signifies land-tax, was from an early period applied to the poll-tax. Though in many cases the amount to be levied was fixed by an original contract, it was often increased by the caprice of individual governors; and the condition of the subject populations was in most states subject to alternations of mildness and severity. A code supposed to go back to the second Caliph, Omar, enjoined a variety of hard and humiliating conditions, which seem rarely to have been enforced for any considerable period, though the historians often record occasions on which they were restored by Moslem rulers in response to popular clamour. The difficulty of enforcing them lay in the fact that the civil service, as it might be called, was at all times very largely recruited from persons who belonged to the Christian, Jewish, or Sabian religions;

[1] Cf. above, p. 12.

the medical profession also was very largely in their hands; and the influence which these professional men could bring to bear on the Caliphs and Sultans was too strong to be overcome by the spasmodic efforts of fanatics. Examples of Moslem rulers who compelled all their subjects to adopt Islam are rare, though some are afforded by the history of Egypt and Africa.

§ 9. *Mohammedan Law*

The great difference between Mohammedan and European law lies in the fact that the former recognizes no distinction between canon law and the law of the State. The sources of law are the Koran, the Tradition, Consensus, and Analogical Deduction. On the basis of these, codes were compiled in the second and third Islamic centuries, dealing with ritual and with civil and criminal jurisprudence; three of these systems—those of Shafi'i, Malik, and Abu Hanifah—have become the law of different Islamic communities.[1] In Sunni countries the jurists can give opinions on cases which do not appear to be provided for, but theoretically no one is competent to alter the law. The codes adopted by heretical communities, such as those of the Ithna'shari Shiahs (of Persia and India), the Zaidis (of Yemen), and the Abadis (of Oman and some places in Africa), differ very slightly in content from the Sunni codes, and the theory held about them is the same. This principle has doubtless interfered, more than any other feature, with the progress of Islam.

The influence of the *'ulamā* ('the learned' both in law and theology) has therefore been as a rule conservative or reactionary, since the existence of their profession depends on the maintenance of the ancient

[1] See above, p. 18.

system; they have ordinarily protested against the theory that all subjects of a Moslem Empire are equal, and have exercised their influence in favour of maintaining the *jihad* against non-Moslem states. The modern sect of Ahmadis, whose head-quarters are at Qadian in the Punjab, claim that their leading tenet is the duty of loyalty to the Government of which a Moslem happens to be a subject, and that the *jihad* is to be interpreted as war against the evil propensities of one's own nature. It would not be easy to find the former principle maintained in authoritative text-books of earlier times, wherein a Moslem is usually advised to migrate from *dar al-harb*, 'the hostile region' (*partes infidelium*), to Islamic territory; and this seems to be the leading maxim of the modern Senussi sect.[1] For the spiritual interpretation of the *jihad* there is some ancient authority.

The fact that the law is independent of the sovereign has at times somewhat limited the arbitrariness of a ruler. Cases occur in the chronicles wherein autocrats have submitted to trial before the tribunals or expressed approval of disobedience to their orders, when it could be shown that such orders contravened the sacred law; but such cases are likely to have been rare.

The judicial system of the Mohammedan State has generally laid down a clear distinction between the functions of (*a*) the *qadi* (cadi), and (*b*) the *mufti*.

(*a*) The *qadi* is a magistrate appointed to administer the law and pronounce sentence in cases brought before him, both criminal and civil; he is a Government official, appointed by the ruler and dismissible at will; and, as such, his decisions are often given in accordance with the custom of the country or the will of the ruler.

(*b*) The *mufti* is a jurist, who gives formal legal

[1] See *Italian Libya*, No. 127 of this series.

opinions on questions submitted to him by a magistrate or by a private individual; on the basis of such an opinion the magistrate may decide a case, or the individual may regulate his personal life. His position is much like that of a Legal Remembrancer, and in Constantinople he exercises a function similar to the highest office of the Supreme Court in the United States of America—the power of defending the Constitution. The mufti has often been like a canonist, interested only in legal speculation and living aloof from administrative details; but in other instances he regularly assists the qadi, by means of his expert knowledge of law. Under the Abbasid Empire muftis were sometimes received into the service of the State; and under the Turkish Government they were organized into a separate department, and, particularly after the conquest of Constantinople, occupied positions of great importance and influence.

Mohammed II bestowed upon the mufti of the capital the title of *Sheikh ul-Islam*, which in later times became his ordinary designation. He had the right to appoint and promote all the other muftis of the empire, and in later times he appointed the qadis also; his department included the *Fatwā-khānah*, a bureau for the promulgation of formal legal decisions, either on matters of State, such as the declaration of war or peace, the validity of a proposed legislative enactment, &c., or on matters of personal law, concerning private individuals. He had no tribunal of his own, nor any temporal authority, and took no active part in affairs; his importance arose from his being the head of the legislature and the authoritative exponent of the law, which, being of divine origin and based upon the revealed Word of God, the Koran, demanded the obedience even of the Sultan himself. Accordingly, at times the Sheikh ul-Islam has resisted the authority

of the Sultan, and has even issued a *fatwa* deposing the Sultan, as was done in the case of Selim III (1808), Abdul Aziz (1876), and Abdul Hamid II (1909).

The Sheikh ul-Islam and the Grand Vizier took rank as the two highest functionaries of the Empire, and were the only officials who were invested by the Sultan in person; but, just as he was appointed by the Sultan, so the Sheikh ul-Islam might be degraded from his high office and sent into exile. In spite of the deference paid to his opinion, he is nevertheless a functionary of the Turkish Government, dependent for his appointment and continuance in office on the goodwill of the Sultan. It would appear, therefore, that unnecessary recognition was given to the authority of the Sultan when (*a*) the Austrian Government in 1909 agreed that the president of the Curia of the 'ulamā, who control Moslem ecclesiastical affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, should, after having been appointed by the King-Emperor, receive a diploma of investiture from the Sheikh ul-Islam in Constantinople; and when (*b*) the Italian Government, in the Treaty of Lausanne (1912), agreed that the chief qadi of Libya should be nominated by the Sheikh ul-Islam at Constantinople. In both cases the misunderstanding appears to have arisen through the attribution of spiritual authority to the Sheikh ul-Islam or to the Sultan as Khalifah, through a false analogy with spiritual functions in Christendom.

The civil authority has often found itself strong enough to disregard the religious authority of the Moslem legists; and from an early period there has been in operation a customary law (*'urf*, *'āda*), which finds no sanction in the canon law; while the authoritative works of Mohammedan law represent in many respects an academic code of law, parts of which have been obsolete for centuries. There has thus arisen in several

Mohammedan countries a system of civil law different from the canon law, while pressure from outside, exerted by the European Powers, has produced many reforms of legal practice in Mohammedan countries. This has led to the decline of the power of the mufti; e. g. in the Turkish dominions there are civil tribunals which administer justice according to the Ottoman Civil Code (*Mejelle*), and are independent of the judicial organization under the Sheikh ul-Islam's department; and since the revolution of 1909 the authority of the Sheikh ul-Islam has been still further diminished. Of course, in Mohammedan countries that have come under European rule, the application of the Moslem canon law has suffered still further limitations.

§ 10. *Political Conditions*

The form of Mohammedan states has rarely got beyond that of an autocracy, though we hear occasionally of experiments in other forms of government; thus from 1460 to 1510 African Tripoli was governed by a council of notables, who, it is supposed, were elected, with a sheikh as their president. Such experiments have, however, been uncommon; and, when Islamic states have enjoyed internal tranquillity and good government, it has been due to the rise to power of a competent despot, usually the founder of a dynasty. The political philosopher of Islam, Ibn Khaldun, suggested 120 years as the normal duration of a dynasty, as he supposed that by the third generation the qualities which had secured the domination of the founder would be exhausted; and this figure, which was deduced from the data furnished by eight centuries of Islam, suits the facts reasonably well. The greater stability of the Ottoman Empire is due to special causes.

That the whole Islamic world should be under the rule of one person, the successor or substitute for the Prophet

(the meaning of the word *Khalifah*), is probably agreed ; the second of these successors is said to have been the inventor of the alternative title, *Amir al-mu'minin* ('Prince of the Believers'). Another name used by jurists for the holder of this office is *Imam* ('sovereign'). Though the ruling Caliphs, from the time of the fourth Caliph, if not from that of the first, had rivals who aspired to dispossess them, it would seem that the simultaneous existence of two Caliphs in different parts of the territory covered by Islam first occurred in 789, when Idris Ibn Abdallah, a descendant of Ali, established himself in north-west Africa with the above-mentioned titles, while Eastern Islam recognized the Abbasid ruler of Baghdad. Though the latter, Harun al-Rashid, got rid of his rival by poison, the dynasty continued for a time. In 932 these titles were also assumed by the Umayyad ruler of Spain ; and since then there have always been several sovereigns claiming these names simultaneously in different regions.

Till the middle of the third Islamic century the Khalifah was also *de facto* autocrat. In the middle of that century the institution of a foreign body-guard in Baghdad or Samara, which for a time was the metropolis of the Eastern Caliphate, rendered it possible for the commander of the guard to depose and institute Caliphs at pleasure ; but the definite fall of the Eastern Caliphate dates from 936, when the Caliph of the time delegated his powers, with the title 'Prince of Princes' to an official, who, in consequence of this delegation, became *de jure* as well as *de facto* autocrat. Owing to the division of the lands of the Caliphate at that time into numerous states, some nominally, others actually independent of the authority in Baghdad, the autocrat of that city was not recognized in all the provinces which professed to pay homage to the Caliph. Within each province the *de facto* ruler was autocrat; and the

title 'Sultan', which for the first four centuries of Islam was used for the Caliph in the sense of 'the Government', was towards the end of the fourth taken by provincial rulers. The right of the Caliph to appoint Sultans was maintained even when he had lost all his other rights, as was the case with the Abbasids of Egypt. And, since the astutest of the Mamluk Sultans thought it worth while to keep up the office for this purpose, it must be supposed that there were classes of Moslems whom the title impressed, even when its owner was absolutely in the power of the Sultan to whom he was supposed to have delegated his authority.

The rights most usually associated with the title 'Caliph', and indicating that his authority was recognized, were those of the *khutbah* (i. e. being mentioned in the prayer of the Friday sermon) and the *sikkah* (i. e. having his name inscribed on coins). So early as the third century of Islam it would appear that both rights were either usurped by, or conferred upon, provincial governors as well. This is symptomatic of the decline of the power of the Abbasid Caliph, which coincides with the moment when he ceased to occupy the pulpit himself.

For a right understanding of the term *khalifah* as used in the Mohammedan world, it is important to avoid misleading analogies drawn from the Holy Roman Empire, in which the Emperor claimed to be the head of a secular organization, the origin of which went back to a period anterior to Christianity, and which was based upon a political theory independent of religious dogma; it was accordingly possible in Christendom to draw a clear distinction between the temporal and the spiritual power. But in the Mohammedan system, the Caliph was the successor of Mohammed in all his functions, imperial and religious

(except that of the prophetic mission, which ceased with the life of 'the seal of the prophets'); and the Koran, the Word of God, was held to be the basis, not only of the dogmas of the faith, but also of the principles of civil administration and statecraft.

In Moslem theory, therefore, the Christian distinction between the spheres of temporal and religious power does not arise; though, in historic fact, the one or the other aspect might receive more or less emphasis at different periods. Thus we find that the early Caliphs always led the prayers in the mosque; and even the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, Mu'awiyah, was in the habit of preaching in the mosque and leading the Friday prayer. He exercised his authority both in religious and in temporal matters; but, under the later and more scandalous Umayyads, religion was apt to be thrust into the background. The Abbasids took advantage of the religious reaction against the godlessness of the Umayyads to displace this dynasty, and accordingly emphasized the hieratic character of the dignity. In proportion as their imperial power declined, this hieratic character of the Caliph as Imam received increasing emphasis; and titles such as 'Khalifah of God' (which occurs even in the earliest period of Islam) and 'shadow of God on earth' came more commonly into use.

According to the theory of the Mohammedan jurists (such as al-Māwardī, *ob.* 1058), the Khalifah must possess the following qualities: (i) a blameless character, (ii) a sufficient knowledge of law to give a legal decision in difficult cases in regard to which a logical deduction has to be drawn from existing statute law, (iii) knowledge of rhetoric, (iv) soundness of hearing, sight, and speech, (v) sufficient intelligence for the conduct of State business, (vi) courage for waging holy war, and (vii) descent from the tribe of the Quraish. His duties

are defined as: the defence of the faith, the decision of legal disputes, the preservation of public safety, the punishment of wrongdoers, the defence of the frontiers, war against those who refuse to accept Islam or to submit to Moslem rule, the collection and administration of taxes, the payment of salaries, the appointment of competent officials, and personal attention to the details of government. These principles, of course, represent only an ideal; and in practice most of these functions were delegated to officials who by theory were supposed to derive their authority from the Khalifah.

§ 11. *Sufism*

This is a name for Islamic mysticism and asceticism, which at times have kept within modest limits, but often have been pursued to extravagance. It is clear that, whereas the early conquests of Islam led to the accumulation of wealth and the desire for luxury, there were persons who disapproved of such indulgence, and endeavoured to impart to the new religion a more spiritual character; and such persons distinguished themselves either by excessive abstinence and devotion, or by efficiency as preachers and reformers. The fact that celibacy rarely if ever formed part of the equipment of a Moslem saint rendered complete renunciation of property on the part of the ascetics difficult, if not impossible; and, while the term 'Sufi' seems properly to have denoted the conspicuous devotee and revivalist preacher, such persons were not always easily distinguished from the official students and expounders of the sacred code. Constant meditation on the text of the Koran, accompanied in many cases by ascetic practices, led to the development of a theology which bears little resemblance to the ostensible message of that work; and the

robe of Sufism was not unfrequently used to cover schemes which aimed at the subversion of established authority in favour of some ambitious adventurer, or at something like complete abrogation of the Islamic system. In the third Islamic century the Sufis are thought of chiefly as the authors of impressive sayings; in the fourth they also attract attention as wonder-workers; they claim that command over nature is to be acquired by the practice of particular forms of abstinence or other religious exercises. There are references in the literature of this century to societies formed by, or called after, some particular saint, and these at times have political importance; doubtless they must have had some form of organization, though details are not apparently recorded.

At what time the Sufic doctrine became associated with Pantheism, i. e. identification of God with nature and of subject with object, cannot be stated with precision; if the documents which we possess are correctly dated, this system had reached its extreme development in the fourth Islamic (our eleventh) century. Owing to the danger of association with heretical doctrine, neophytes were only admitted to the mysteries step by step, and to the extent to which their loyalty could be trusted; it is therefore natural that we should be in the dark as to the extent of the organizations and the nature of many of their doctrines.

Of Sufic Orders we hear little prior to the latter half of the sixth Islamic century, when fame was acquired in Baghdad by Abd al-Qadir of Jilan, whose Order is usually regarded as the model for the others. He himself appears to have been a revivalist preacher. After his time the theory of an Order implies the use of a definite ritual in addition to the ceremonies which the Islamic law prescribes; and such Orders usually possess oratories, meeting-houses, and hostels, erected

and endowed by the liberality of the pious. Where they have succeeded in attracting many adherents in wide areas, the needs of administration have rendered some sort of hierarchy of officials necessary. Since membership of an Order is usually conferred only after a period of probation, there is a closer relation between members of the same Order than exists between ordinary Moslems; hence there is a possibility of utilizing these organizations for political schemes. In the case of the most recent of notable Orders, that of the Senussis, this has been accomplished; and attempts were made at such utilization prior to the existence of this confraternity. Normally it would appear that adherents are occupied with devotion, and are persons whose religious needs are not adequately supplied by the ceremonial prescribed in the law-books.

THE PAN-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT

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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

1838–96. Jamal al-Din.
1870 (*c.*). League for uniting Islam formed in Bokhara.
1878 (*c.*). Abdul Hamid adopts the principles of Pan-Islamism.
1881–2. First use of the phrase ' Pan-Islamism ' in the West.
1884. *The Firmest Handle,* started by Jamal al-Din at Paris. Mohammed Abdo's articles published.
1891 (?)–6. Jamal al-Din at Constantinople.
1897. The Sherif of Mecca supports the doctrine.
1898. The German Emperor's visit to Constantinople and Syria.
1902. Death of Abdul Rahman Kawakibi.
1903. Pan-Islamic Society founded in London.
1904. Ata Bey Hasani's declaration.
1908. Young Turk Revolution.
1910–11. Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress at Salonika.
1911. The Tripolitan War. The Young Turks definitely adopt Pan-Islamism.
1911–14. Growth of Pan-Islamic ideas in Constantinople.
1914 (?). Publication of *The New Nation.*

§ 1. *Historical Basis of the Movement*

It is evident that the original success of Islam was due to the close co-operation which the Prophet secured among his followers, and their readiness to set above all other obligations that which their religious brotherhood imposed upon them. Forcible measures were at times adopted by the Prophet for the suppression of older associations and alliances; and in some Islamic institutions there are signs of a desire to render the system irreconcilable with others, the dis-

tinction of non-Moslems from Moslems by their dress having often been enforced by Mohammedan rulers. During the Prophet's lifetime there were some dissensions among his followers, but these were checked by his authority. For a quarter of a century after his death the Moslems all recognized one head, at least in public; but since the murder of his third successor in A. D. 656 there has always been division, which, since the fall of the Umayyads in 750, has been sufficiently serious to break up the community into separate states. While the religious area of Islam continued to widen, its political divisions increased; and by the year 325 A. H. (A. D. 937) the Islamic world consisted of a score or more of independent states, whose mutual struggles led to frequent re-grouping. The theory that Islam could have only one legitimate successor or representative of the Prophet still held, but the title was claimed for more than one person simultaneously. Recognition of the claim was often merely formal, and in no way affected the independence of the sovereign who chose to make it.

The reunion of the Islamic world has naturally been the dream of many Moslem potentates, notably of the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (A. D. 1512–20), whose conquests, added to those of his predecessors, brought this dream to partial realization; still, large areas both to the east and to the west were inhabited by Islamic peoples forming states which were completely independent of the Ottoman Sultan. Moreover, whereas during its first expansion Islam had forced its adherents to adopt the language of the Koran, Arabic, though retained as the ecclesiastical language, proved in many places otherwise unable to displace the national speech; and the retention of these national languages, though written in varieties of the Arabic script, placed a barrier in the way of any such fusion

of the Moslems into a nation as had taken place in the earliest centuries of the system.

Since the Peace of Carlowitz, at the end of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire has ceased to be a menace to Europe; in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries great expanses of territory largely inhabited by Moslems, some of which had at one time belonged to the Ottoman Empire, came under the rule of Great Britain, Russia, Holland, and France. In the nineteenth century Turkey not only lost some of her European possessions and some of her territory in Asia, but was subjected to European influence at the capital; and no other Islamic state was so strong as Turkey. Meanwhile the growth of the means of communication and the establishment of printing-presses and schools, largely through Christian missionary effort, in most Islamic countries aroused greater interest in, and spread more accurate knowledge of, contemporary events than had been possible before. It became evident that the Islamic communities were becoming more and more dependent politically on the European Governments, adherents of the Christian Faith. These Governments, though they tolerated the Moslem religion, prohibited much which it enjoins; and its founder had by no means contemplated toleration for it, but domination over the world.

Now, though the Moslem communities are divided by race, language, and sect, and though even such terrible dangers as the Crusades and the Mongol invasion were unable to produce co-operation between them, they have a bond in the possession of one Sacred Book—the Koran—in the common name Moslem, and in the history of the period when they were united and swept all before them. This bond is sufficient to make them take pride in each other's successes and sympathize in each other's misfortunes. And the pious at least

among them everywhere look back with regret to the time when the Islamic sovereign could aspire to be the ruler of the world. It is natural that some should assume that disunion is the cause of their political weakness, and hold that, if unity could be restored, Islam would again become politically formidable.

§ 2. *The Pan-Islamism of Sultan Abdul Hamid II*

The notion of uniting the Islamic communities for the purpose of resisting European aggression and ultimately ousting European rulers from Asia and Africa is expressed in Arabic and Turkish by a phrase meaning 'Islamic union'. Pan-Islamism, a translation of this phrase, first appeared in English (it would seem) in an article published in *The Times* of January 19, 1882, agreeing in most points with, though apparently independent of, one by M. G. Charmes which had appeared a few months before in the *Revue des deux Mondes*,[1] where the word occurs for perhaps the first time in French. The French writer traces the movement to a league originally founded about 1870 in Bokhara, of which Khudayar Khan, ex-ruler of Khokand,[2] served as emissary in Arabia; he preached to various Arab, Kurd, and Indian sheikhs and Mullahs the necessity of a Holy War against Russia and England. Owing to the humiliating conditions imposed on Turkey by the Treaty of Berlin, the league desired to place at the head of the Islamic confederation, not the Ottoman Sultan, but rather the Sherif of Mecca, Husain, who was appointed in 1877 and assassinated in 1880.

The notion, however, that the religious headship of Islam might be politically utilized was adopted by

[1] 1881, vol. xlvii, p. 924.

[2] His fortunes are traced down to the year 1875 by Schuyler, G., *Turkistan*, 2 vols. (London, 1876).

Abdul Hamid II, who had not, like his predecessor at the time of the Crimean War, received support from any Christian Power against Russia. The persons supposed to have impressed him with this idea are Si Mohammed Zafir, a Marabout of Tripoli who had foretold his accession, this Marabout's cousin, Sheikh Asad, and a certain Abu'l-Huda Effendi; they persuaded him that his predecessors had been mistaken in cultivating the friendship of European Christian Governments, and that his true course was to attempt to reunite Islam against Christendom. It is asserted that he sent agents and emissaries to different parts of the Islamic world with this object; and we possess detailed accounts of some of these operations. Brahim as-Senusi was sent to the Sultan of Morocco with presents and an invitation to join in the *jihad*; with the aid of the British consul at Tangier he obtained an audience, but only an evasive answer, and one which could not be presented, because the Sultan of Morocco, being unable to set his seal to the document without claiming superiority or acknowledging inferiority to the Sultan of Turkey by the place where he set it, disregarded that formality, and an unsealed letter was valueless.[1] Hamzah, the brother of Sheikh Zafir, was sent in 1882 on a mission to Tripoli, which also failed.[2] Since these missions were from their nature secret, it is natural that they should only be known by hearsay.

It appears that throughout his long reign Abdul Hamid II adhered to the policy of figuring as the head of Islam; and the official French account of the Islamic Orders in North Africa asserts that some of these

[1] See Le Chatelier, A., *Les Confrèries Musulmanes du Hedjaz*, (Paris, 1887), pp. 114 sqq.

[2] An account of it is given in Charmes, G., *La Tunisie et la Tripolitaine* (Paris, 1883).

organizations were employed by the Sultan for the propagation of the Pan-Islamic idea, especially the Rifa'i Order, of which Abu'l-Huda was the head, and the Madani Order, of which the Sheikh Zafir was the head.[1] These organizations were (1897) aided by the Sherif of Mecca, who appointed as guides to the pilgrims persons willing to circulate the doctrine. Abdul Hamid's Turkish biographer observes that his construction of the Hejaz railway was undertaken with the idea of conciliating the Moslems throughout the world; the same motive is found in various pointless acts of aggression, though some suppose the Sultan's action in these matters to have been intended to impress his own subjects rather than those of other Governments. To the end of his reign he was in the habit of sending embassies to Moslem communities outside Turkey, such as those in China and Afghanistan.

It is clear that his policy of uniting Islam differed widely from that of his predecessor Selim I, whose idea was to annex to his empire by force of arms all Islamic states that were outside it; the number of Moslems who in Selim's time were subject to non-Moslem rulers was still insignificant. It is not probable that Abdul Hamid ever contemplated leading a confederation of Moslem states to war against Christendom; his endeavours to enter into friendly relations with European Powers, especially with Germany, render this unlikely. Still, by representing himself as the natural champion of Moslems who were subject to Christian Governments, he hoped to render himself formidable to those Governments; and, as Germany had far fewer such subjects than Great Britain, France, or Russia, his policy was regarded as helpful to Germany. Within his empire, however, his claim

[1] Depont, O., and Coppolani, X., *Les Confrèries Religieuses Musulmanes*, pp. 261 sqq. (Algiers, 1897).

to be Pontiff of Islam was disputed in many quarters; and, outside it, India appears to be the country where it gained most adherents.

§ 3. *Theory of the Movement current in the East*

Oriental writers hold that the inventor of Pan-Islamism—i. e. the person who thought that by the restoration of unity among the Moslem communities European aggression might be stopped, and lost territory ultimately regained—was a certain Sayyid Jamal al-Din, who lived 1838–96. He is known as 'the Afghan'; but according to the most recent account of him[1] he was born in a village of Persia, near Hamadan, was educated at Nejef, and resided for some years in Afghanistan, whence he took the name *Afghani*. He was with Dost Mohammed when he took Herat in 1863. In the civil war which broke out shortly afterwards he was in the employ of Azim Khan. But after this prince's defeat by Shir Ali in 1869 he thought it unsafe to remain in Afghanistan, and proceeded to India, where the British Government would not permit him to stay; and it would seem that his belief that his master's downfall had been engineered by Great Britain made him a bitter enemy of this empire. He travelled and taught in Egypt and Constantinople, whence he was expelled in 1871 on the ground of unorthodoxy. Returning to Egypt, he was granted a small monthly allowance by Riyad Pasha, but was expelled in 1879 for starting an anti-British propaganda. He then went to Hyderabad, but, owing to the outbreak of trouble in Egypt, was compelled by the British Government to reside in Calcutta until the Arabi revolt was over, so that he might be under observation.

[1] Sykes, Sir P. M., *History of Persia*, 2 vols. (London, 1915), ii, 501. What follows is taken from the Sayyid's biography in Zaidan, G., *Mashahir al-Sharq*, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1903).

Jamal al-Din subsequently took up his abode in Paris, where in 1884 he started an Arabic journal called *The Firmest Handle*, containing violent attacks on England as the European Power which had under its sway the largest number of Moslems and was, according to him, the implacable and treacherous enemy of Islam; her political programme was, he asserted, to deprive all Moslems of their independence, seize their possessions, and generally humiliate them. After a time the publication of this journal was stopped; but it had attracted the attention of the Shah Nasiru'd Din, who invited Jamal al-Din to Persia, and made him Minister of War. Presently he suspected the intentions of the Shah and left Persia to travel in Europe; but, meeting the Shah at Munich in 1889, he accepted an invitation to return to Teheran, whence, owing to his endeavour to spread revolutionary ideas, he was expelled in 1890. He then came to London, where, according to his biographer, he tried to influence the Government to obtain the deposition of the Shah—notwithstanding his disapproval of European, and especially British, interference with Islamic concerns.

While in England he received an invitation to Constantinople, which he accepted; and there he lived in the enjoyment of the Sultan's favour till his death in 1896. During these years he is said [1] to have made an attempt to induce the Persian Shiahs to recognize the Caliphate of Abdul Hamid. Hundreds of letters were written by him and by his colleague, Ruhi Effendi, to persons of eminence and learning, whose acquaintance Jamal al-Din had made during his stay in Persia, urging that, if the Persians would acknowledge the Turkish Sultan's claim to the sovereignty of Islam,

[1] Hecquard, Ch., *La Turquie sous Abd al-Hamid II* (Brussels, 1901), pp. 123 sqq., is the authority for this statement; he appears to be well informed.

Turkey and Persia united would be able to defy European aggression. The negotiations showed signs of leading to a successful result, when they were betrayed or somehow came to the knowledge of the Persian Government; and the execution of Ruhi Effendi presently resulted.

The most celebrated of Jamal al-Din's assistants was the Sheikh Mohammed Abdo, afterwards a Mufti in Egypt, and friendly to the British occupation. The ideas which made up the Pan-Islamism of his master are expressed by him in two papers, first published in *The Firmest Handle* (1884), and reprinted in the Mufti's biography.[1] He shows that the political subordination of any Islamic community to non-Moslems is a violation of the Islamic religion, which enjoins on its followers not only to shake off all foreign yokes, but also to defy all Powers that are not Islamic. He attributes the actual subjection of the great majority of Moslems to non-Moslem Governments to the neglect by Moslem rulers of their duties and to the private quarrels of these potentates, who invoked the help of outsiders to settle them; these outsiders ultimately becoming masters of the situation. These princes and governors, who thus sacrificed the interests of Islam to their petty interests, 'had become chains on the necks of those lions (the Islamic warriors), keeping them from their prey, nay, making them the food of foxes'. Still there was no occasion to despair. Between Adrianople and Peshawar there was a continuous chain of Moslem states, all united in their belief in the Koran, numbering not less than 50,000,000, distinguished above all other races for their bravery; could they not unite in self-defence, and by co-operation divert from themselves the torrents that were rushing upon them from all sides? The writer concluded by expressing the hope

[1] Two volumes (Cairo, 1324 A. H.), ii, pp. 279 sqq.

that the call to such union and co-operation would come in the first place from the most exalted of the Islamic potentates.

In a second paper he urged that the two essentials for success in a nation were unity and imperialism. The desire for conquest in a people was like that for food in the frame of the individual; but unity was essential before conquest could be contemplated. These principles were not only taught by experience, but were inculcated in the Koran. It was, however, necessary to arouse the Moslems, who appeared to have forgotten them; and in the sanctuary to which every true Moslem goes on pilgrimage there was a centre where joint effort could be made the subject of deliberation and practical plans devised.

As has been seen, the idea of utilizing Mecca for this purpose had been anticipated (see § 2, p. 46), and the organization of the religious orders was already being turned to account. Abdul Rahman Kawakibi, whom some name with Jamal al-Din among the chief promoters of Pan-Islamism, but who appears to have been no friend of Abdul Hamid, proposed holding a Pan-Islamic Congress in Mecca, for which apparently the Sultan's consent could not be obtained. He died in the year 1902.

§ 4. *Pan-Islamism as a Religious Revival*

Whereas Jamal al-Din's expedients for restoring the political dominance of Islam were decidedly drastic, his followers wished to prepare the way by founding Islamic colleges, newspapers, and societies. In 1903 a Pan-Islamic society was founded in London, of which the objects were thus enumerated:

'1. To promote the religious, social, moral, and intellectual advancement of the Mussulman world.

2. To afford a centre of social reunion to Moslems from all parts of the world.

3. To promote brotherly feelings between Moslems and facilitate intercourse between them.

4. To remove misconceptions prevailing among non-Moslems regarding Islam and the Mussulmans.

5. To render legitimate assistance to the best of its ability to any Mussulman requiring it in any part of the world.

6. To provide facilities for conducting religious ceremonies in non-Moslem countries, and to found centres of Moslem thought.

7. To found branches of the Central Pan-Islamic Society in different parts of the world, hold debates and lectures, and read and publish papers likely to further the interests of Islam.

8. To collect subscriptions from all parts of the world in order to build a Mosque in London and endow it.'

It was suggested by the Egyptian translator of this document that four more objects should be added:

'9. To support the Ottoman Caliphate.

10. To carry on propaganda in this sense till all Islamic potentates and authorities are agreed about it.

11. In return for this, to obtain the support of the Ottoman Caliph for the Islamic communities, and his intervention with the European Governments in control of such communities for the redress of their grievances.

12. To call the attention of the Islamic Governments to cases wherein their measures violated Islamic law, when such measures affected the whole community and gave Islam a bad name.'

The London society presently changed its name from Pan-Islamic to Islamic, and seems to have conducted its operations on a modest scale. Other societies, schools, and newspapers were started. One Egyptian of eminence declared, in the year 1904,[1] that Pan-Islamism by no means signified anything like a crusade or union of the Islamic Powers under

[1] Ata Bey Hasani. His papers were collected under the title *Al-Nahdah al-Sharqiyyah* (Cairo, 1906), p. 84.

one banner for the purpose of fighting Europe; what it did mean was not, however, apparently very different, *viz.* the establishment of a bond of unity and friendship between the Moslems of the world, to help each other morally, materially, and politically, and to group themselves round the Ottoman Caliphate as representing the greatest Moslem Power. Should such a bond be realized, it would be difficult for the European to continue to appropriate Moslem lands and the produce of Moslem toil.

One English convert to Islam tries harder than many others to avoid the consequence that, if Pan-Islamism is to effect its object, it must enter the service of the Ottoman Empire; but the result is obscure:

'Instead of being a danger to Europe or civilization, Pan-Islamism is a movement that should have the support of every lover of peace and civilization. If the world at large is ever to see that higher and truer civilization of which it is capable, the Powers must abandon that lust of conquest which is but a drag on all true progress; they must cease to look on the interest of each as a claim to which the interests of all others must yield, and combine to seek the benefit of all. The more nearly that ideal is reached, the more important will it be that Islam should be prepared to take its fitting place in the grand scheme of regeneration. That it should do so it must follow now and for ever the ideas that are the mainspring of Pan-Islamism.'[1]

This seems to confuse Jamal al-Din's programme with that of a reformed Islam, which is at times associated, but appears to have no essential connexion, with it. As in other religions, so in Islam, the earnest adherents are as much attached to what divides the sects as to what unites them; it seems impossible to loosen the tie of the sect without loosening the bond of the religion.

[1] Browne, Hajji A., *Bonaparte in Egypt* (London, 1907), p. 324.

Since Pan-Islamism, after being discussed for close on thirty years, by 1908 had produced no result, Oriental writers of authority began to declare that it had no existence. One of them defined it as 'a phantasm abstracted from the Moslem profession of religious fraternity, and magnified by the European imagination'. Another declared that the notion of a Pan-Islamic movement was an invention of European politicians, whose purpose was to excite animosity against the Moslems and so justify fresh attempts against such independence as any of them still possessed; and, though the Oriental press greatly exaggerated the alarm which the word excited in Europe, there is no doubt that much was attributed to Pan-Islamism that was not really connected with it. Inquiries addressed to missionaries in various Islamic countries, including one from the German Emperor, failed to elicit evidence of any considerable organization with a practical scheme of operations. The division of the Islamic world between the European Governments proceeded apace; and, though the Italian invasion of the Tripolitaine, the arrangement of Moroccan affairs in the interest of France, and the division of Persia into British and Russian spheres of influence, seriously wounded Islamic susceptibilities throughout the world, the co-operation between the Moslems of different countries on these occasions scarcely went beyond the sending of subscriptions, the occasional enlistment of recruits, and the holding of indignation meetings where such were permitted. This was used by Moslem writers as evidence that Pan-Islamism was not organized; that the strength of the sentiment which it represented had been greatly overrated; and that the spirit of aggression was confined to European Christianity, and could not with justice be attributed to the Islam of Asia and Africa. It was pointed out that,

centuries ago, the far more terrible menaces of the Crusades and the Mongol invasion had failed to produce co-operation among the Moslem communities, some of which aided the common enemy ; and that it was not to be expected that the milder prospects which European aggression held out would have the power to produce it. Further, the fact, established by statistics though not readily acknowledged, that Islam spreads faster in Asiatic and African countries protected by European Governments than in independent states is calculated to discourage the efforts of intelligent Moslems in the direction of realizing Jamal al-Din's plans. Reformers complain that their efforts to elevate Islam are thwarted mainly by Moslems.

§ 5. *Pan-Islamism and the Young Turks*

The proclamation of the Turkish Constitution in 1908 was at first regarded as unfavourable to Pan-Islamism. Since that Constitution gave equal rights to all religions and sects, it was supposed that no Sultan in the future would be able to proclaim a Pan-Islamic crusade, and that the fanatical tribes of Asia and Africa would be slow to accept the counsels of a Sultan at the head of a free, self-governing, civilized people. Further, of the two persons who had been most prominent in effecting the reform, whereas Niyazi states that, before the Constitution could be launched, the Turks had with difficulty been induced to abandon their rights as conquerors, Enver Bey (since Pasha) was quoted for the declaration that the new constitution would have nothing to do with Pan-Islamism.[1] The views of the Young Turk party were thus expressed by one of their organs :

[1] Jessup, H. H., *Fifty-three Years in Syria* (2 vols., New York, 1910), ii. 791.

'We Ottomans belong to a race sufficiently intelligent and practical to understand that the pursuit of the Pan-Islamic designs of the visionaries would be contrary to our dearest interests.'[1]

It was pointed out that the Young Turks had expressed little sympathy with Egyptian nationalism, which had a Pan-Islamic bias. And indeed the fact that the proclamation of the Constitution involved the arming of the non-Moslem subjects of the Porte seemed to preclude it from favouring Pan-Islamic projects.

The course of events led to a change in that matter. Equality between members of all cults is without doubt an infraction of Koranic law, and very shortly after the proclamation we hear of a *Mohammedan Confraternity Society* at Constantinople, ostensibly for the restoration of the sacred law; it was joined by great numbers in the capital, and soon had ramifications in all the provinces. Nor does there appear to be any doubt that, by the year 1911, the Committee of Union and Progress had definitely adopted the Pan-Islamic programme,[2] and was employing agents in various countries with the object of exciting the Moslem subjects of non-Moslem rulers to look to the Sultan of Turkey as their legitimate sovereign.

The Times of December 27, 1911, stated that the following decisions were among those arrived at by the Salonika Congress (1911) of the Committee of Union and Progress:—

MEASURES OF PAN-ISLAMISM

'A Congress of delegates, summoned from all the Moslem countries of the world, ought to meet annually in Constanti-

[1] Knight, E. F., *The Awakening of Turkey* (London, 1909), p. 64. See also *The Pan-Turanian Movement*, Part (2) of this book.

[2] That is, in foreign policy.

nople, to discuss questions of interest to the Moslem world. Branches of the Committee should be formed in all Moslem countries, especially in Russia and in Persia. The Mohammedans of Russia ought to be persuaded to make revolutionary propaganda among Russian soldiers. As many Tartars as possible should be induced to become members of the seven branches of the Committee which already exist in Russia. Efforts should be made to bring about an understanding between Persia and Turkey, with the ultimate object of effecting a political and economical union between the two countries. The Turks in Bulgaria and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who should be advised not to emigrate, should be organized in such a way that they would be in touch with the Committee of Union and Progress. Large numbers of Turkish boys from Bulgaria ought to be educated in Turkey, and subsequently sent back as masters to the Bulgarian schools. Schools must be opened with the object of pushing the Turkish language among the Pomaks (Moslem Bulgarians), in the hope of making them forget the Bulgarian language. Turkish teachers should be also sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and attempts made to persuade the Turks in these provinces not to favour the Serbian aspirations and to learn German rather than Serbian in the schools.'

The *Times* correspondent had, indeed, little sympathy with the Young Turks; but M. René Pinon, who is one of the most competent and most impartial judges of Eastern affairs, in his treatise on *Europe and Young Turkey*,[1] published in the autumn of 1911, has a paragraph which is in agreement with the statements of *The Times* :—

'The Young Turks have undertaken the noble task of restoring Ottoman patriotism, but the notion of country correlative to that of nation has had hitherto no existence in the Empire. Among the Turks, who have never known any other than religious patriotism, the awakening of national patriotism could only result in an outburst of Pan-Islamism. If this word is of Western invention, the idea is Eastern and Moslem.

[1] *L'Europe et la Jeune Turquie* (Paris, 1911), p. 134.

The Moslem is a brother, the Christian an enemy, the Sultan the master. This was the naïve conception of politics in the breast of the good Turkish peasant. A long series of years must pass before it can be modified. The Young Turks, then, will do well to watch carefully the Pan-Islamic intrigues which certain subordinate agents would like to conduct. At the Congress of Salonika in 1911 there was a talk of sending Turkish emissaries to the Indian and Caucasian Moslems; it is certain that an active anti-French propaganda is carried on among the Algerians established in Syria, and that agents have been sent into Algeria. Permanent relations have been established between certain Young Turkish clubs and the Young Egyptian societies. Our officials, who after so many efforts have secured the peace and safety of the Sahara, find the traces of Turkish intrigues in the Sahara, and as far as the oases of Kwar and Bilma. Under pretence of a dispute about frontiers, the Turks have occupied part of Azerbaijan, the importance of which has always been considerable from the point of view of communications between Persia, Armenia, and the Caucasus. On this subject a Turkish journal made the statement: "We have the right to interest ourselves in Persian affairs because Persia is a Moslem power."'

This last assertion was repeatedly made in Turkey by authorized persons after M. Pinon wrote, and especially in connexion with the Russian complication.

That the Committee of Union and Progress could be earnest in its Pan-Islamic policy has been denied on various grounds. In the first place it has been pointed out that the leaders of that Committee are, without exception, Freemasons; and such religious fanaticism conflicts with the principles of the Masonic Society. Secondly, it has been observed that the Pan-Islamic policy has been discouraged in regions where it might endanger Turkish authority. Thus in Syria the Turks have to face the movement of Pan-Arabism, which supports the fusion of all Arabic-speaking countries into an independent political unit; and, since such a state would be likely to have for its head an Islamic

religious leader, it is to the interest of the Turks in Syria to emphasize the undenominational character of the Ottoman Constitution, which an Arabian state could not easily share.

It has also been urged that the endeavour of the Young Turks to make Turkish the national language of the Ottoman Empire, even at the expense of Arabic, is an anti-Islamic measure; to which it has been replied that the ostensible Turkification of the Empire was a temporary measure meant to impress the Turkish or Tartar subjects of Russia, and to win them over to the interests of Turkey.

Another view that has been taken is that the experiences of the Tripolitan War convinced the rulers of Turkey that the Pan-Islamic bond was much stronger than they had believed it to be, since both the resistance of the Arabs of Tripoli to the Italian invasion and the contributions which flowed in from Islamic societies throughout the world to aid Turkey in this war exceeded all expectation. This indicated the possibility of utilizing the Pan-Islamic feeling for a variety of purposes, such as obtaining money for the ostensible defence of Islam, silencing the anti-Turkish agitators in the Arabic-speaking provinces, and conciliating the Turkish and Tartar subjects of Russia. Hence the Young Turks subsidized the Pan-Islamic press of Egypt and Constantinople.

The history of Turkey from 1911 to the outbreak of the War appears to show a gradual increase of Pan-Islamism among the members of the Turkish Government. The exile Sherif Pasha asserted that there was a great Pan-Islamic league, called *Jam'iyyet Hairiyyeh Hamiyeh*, which was identical with the Committee of Union and Progress; 'the last meeting was attended by five Indians.'[1] Declarations that any real tolera-

[1] *Mecheroutiette* (Paris), December 1913, p. 58.

tion by Islam of other religions and any progress of the Moslem world in the direction of European civilization were impossible are quoted by a collaborator of Sherif Pasha from the writings of a member of both these bodies, the Sheikh Abdul Haqq of Baghdad;[1] and apparently the Comtist Ahmad Riza, first President of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, came round to the view that the Moslem religion was the only force capable of uniting the different elements of the Ottoman Empire, and that the theory of such a double personality as that with which the Turkish Constitution invested the Sultan could not be maintained. It was the duty (he held) of all Moslems to labour to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Islam was a great international family; it was the Caliph's business to facilitate the relations of its members, and rally the believers under his priestly banner. The question whether this 'unification of the Islamic Empire under the spiritual power of the Sultan' would be a danger to Christian states would depend on the attitude which the latter adopted towards it; he hoped that the Moslem attitude would continue to be purely defensive, but, if attacked, they would exchange it for another.[2]

This view, *viz.* that the unification of the various elements which constitute the Ottoman Empire can only be on the religious basis of Islam, and that consequently, if the Turkish Government is to survive, it must be Pan-Islamic, is argued by other writers representative of thought in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, in a political treatise published in Constantinople a few months before the War broke out, it is urged that, whereas in Europe nationality takes precedence of religion, in the East religion takes precedence of nationality; an

[1] *Ibid.*, August 1912, pp. 12 sqq.

[2] Quoted, *ibid.*, p. 17, from Ahmed Riza, *La crise de l'Orient* (Paris).

Afghan, Turk, or Tunisian is a Moslem first, then a member of a particular nation or tribe; and this difference between East and West is too deeply rooted to be left out of consideration. This author's ideal was therefore a confederation of the Moslem peoples, with Turkey occupying therein the place occupied by Prussia in the German Confederation. In Turkey itself he would grant no political rights to others than Moslems, and no full rights to others than Turks.[1]

Evidence was adduced by Sherif Pasha to show that, during the Italian War, Pan-Islamic opinions and publications were encouraged by the Ottoman Government, and the rights of Christians accorded them by the Constitution in various ways infringed.

Shortly before the beginning of the war there appeared in Constantinople a book bearing the title *The New Nation*, representing the views of the advanced section of the Committee of Union and Progress. Its author argued that by abandoning the *jihad*—i. e. by failing to enlist in the Ottoman army for the purpose of fighting the infidels and reconquering the provinces which they had wrested from the believers—all Moslems, with the exception of such as could show some excuse from the Koran, had incurred the reproach of apostasy, which Islam punishes with death. They could only recover their title to be regarded as Moslems if they contributed half their goods to the Islamic Government for the purpose of such a religious campaign, and enlisted with the view of taking part therein. This, he asserted, represented the policy of the Party of Union and Progress, which regarded the essence of Islam as consisting not in its ceremonies but solely in the *jihad*. The mere fact of Moslems being regarded by Christian rulers as loyal subjects indicated that

[1] Jalal Nuri, *Ta'rikh Istiqbal* (3 vols. Constantinople, 1332 A. H.), i, pp. 154 sqq.

such Moslems were apostates. This epithet might with justice be applied to all Moslems within the Ottoman Empire who did not join the forces of the Turkish commanders, and all outside it who did not hasten to help the Caliph. Examples of such apostates were to be found in the Albanians who had rebelled, and in the Egyptians, Indians, natives of Bokhara, Tartars, inhabitants of Fez, Tunis, and Algiers, and the people of Hejaz and Nejd, who sent no subscriptions to the Sultan. It is true that the view of Islam taken by this writer differs widely from that held in orthodox circles, since he rejects as unimportant everything but the duty of supporting the Ottoman Caliph and his army.[1] Apparently the party which he represents is aware that the conditions of modern warfare put those who adhere to the beliefs and observances of old-fashioned Islam at a disadvantage, while religious enthusiasm is a valuable asset, and hopes in this way to profit by the enthusiasm while eliminating the disadvantage.

Although Pan-Islamism has had, as we have seen, little positive effect, it appears to have done something to keep the Ottoman Empire together prior to the war; and, although the notion of an independent Arabic state seems to have been in circulation from the time of Midhat Pasha's government of Syria (1879–1880), it is asserted that the leading men in Syria and Mesopotamia refrained from taking any step against the Ottoman Government for fear of weakening the only powerful Islamic Empire that remained, their dread of European aggression being shared by their Christian fellow-subjects. From this loyal attitude they were driven by the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress, which was resolved

[1] Long extracts in an Arabic translation are given in the *Manar* (Cairo, 1332 A. H.), xvii, pp. 539 sqq.

on the Turkification of the whole Empire; for they held that Islam was too intimately bound up with the Arabs and the Arabic language to be able to survive the effects of this policy. The entry of Turkey into the war was signalized by violent persecution of the Arabs in Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Hejaz,[1] which however diminished when the Sherif of Mecca declared his independence. Nevertheless, the hostility of the Arabs to the Turks has been increased to a degree which renders reconciliation of the former to the rule of the latter unthinkable; whence the chance of a Pan-Islamic combination against Europe seems to have been reduced to zero. And indeed, however the war may end, it is not easy to see how this particular result can be altered.

[1] The statements in this paragraph are taken from an article in the *Manar*, 1918 (1335 A. H.), xx, pp. 33 sqq.

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THE RISE OF THE TURKS
AND
THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

THE RISE OF THE TURKS

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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

B. C.
1400. First mention of Hsiung-nu.
c. 250. Great Wall of China built.
A. D.
c. 430. Settlement of the Tú-Küeh.
567. Turkish Embassy to the Emperor Justin II.
582. Division of Tú-Küeh into northern and western Turks.
630. Northern Turks conquered by Chinese.
659. Western Turks conquered by Chinese.
c. 680. Northern Turks regain their independence.
c. 714. Transoxiana becomes Mohammedan.
c. 750. Northern Turks conquered by Uighurs.
c. 1000. Uighurs converted to Islam.
c. 1050. The Seljuk leader Toghrul restores and seizes the temporal power of the Caliphate.
1071. Alp Arslan defeats the Emperor Romanus at Manzikert.
1092. Death of Malik Shah. Seljuk Empire falls into eastern and western divisions.
1219. Mongols under Jenghiz Khan overrun eastern Seljuk principalities.
1227. Ertoghrul settles near Erzerum.
1243. Defeat of the western Seljuks at Kuzadag.
1300–26 Osman reigns as an independent monarch.
1326. Orkhan captures Brusa.
1328–38. Orkhan captures Nicaea and Nicomedia.

THE RISE OF THE TURKS

1. The Tú-Küeh

In general usage the word 'Turk' denotes the Turkish element of the Ottomân Empire. With greater accuracy, however, all who talk one of the dialects of the Turkish language may be called Turks. The Turkish-speaking peoples extend, at present, roughly from the Great Wall of China on the east to the limits of Turkey in Europe in the west, to northern Persia in the south, and the neighbourhood of the Arctic in the north.

Chinese annals from 1400 B.C. to 200 B.C. make frequent mention of the Hsiung-nu, vigorous and

barbarian nomads who wandered over the area north of the Chinese frontier. In the third century B.C. the Great Wall of China was built as a protection against the incursions of these warriors. In the first half of the fifth century A.D. a subdivision of the Hsiung-nu called Turks (in Chinese Tú-Küeh) moved eastwards and settled down in the service of another tribe, known as the Juan-juan (avares). The Turks soon revolted against their masters, and, with a remarkable rapidity, spread their conquests to the northern boundaries of Persia. It is interesting to notice the progress in civilization attained by the Turks between the earliest mention of the Hsiung-nu, who knew neither of writing nor of agriculture, and the sixth-century Turks, who had a script, a system of ranks, and emblems of royal authority for taxation or the levying of troops. The Turks were, in the main, warriors. A Chinese pilgrim who was entertained by the Khan of the western Turks in A.D. 630 and has left a description of the organization of the Khan's head-quarters, makes it clear that the Turks lived in camps, built no cities, and would not settle in any that they conquered. But the Turkish embassy to the Emperor Justin II in 567 had in view the opening up of the silk trade, and it would therefore appear that the Turks must have paid some attention to commerce. As in their later history, they were a means of communication between forms of civilization greater than their own; through them Nestorian Christianity and Zoroastrianism passed to China, and Chinese Buddhism was kept in contact with India.

2. The Northern and Western Turks[1]

In 582 the people divided into two communities, known as the northern and the western Turks. The inscriptions discovered during the last century on the Yenisei and Orkhon rivers, in the neighbourhood of Lake

[1] These early 'western Turks' should be kept distinct from the Seljuks and Osmanlis who became 'western Turks' as opposed to the Turks of Transoxiana and Kashgar.

Baikal, give a first-hand account of the northern Turks; while a great deal is known of the other branch from Chinese, Greek, Arabic, and Armenian sources.

The western Turks were, after a period of civil war, annexed by the Chinese in 659; but neither Turks nor Chinese held their territory strongly, and Transoxiana was conquered for Mohammedanism at the beginning of the eighth century. The direct consequence of this was the gradual conversion to Islam of the whole Turkish stock. The negative character of the Turkish paganism, the absence of a hierarchy and a priestly code, as well as the coincidence of the good points of Mohammedanism with the particular excellences of the Turkish temperament—'energy, obedience, and fighting spirit'—facilitated such a conversion.

The northern Turks were conquered and enslaved by the Chinese in A.D. 630. They recovered their independence fifty years later; but about A.D. 750 a coalition of three Turkish tribes, chief of whom were the Uighurs, occupied all their country.

3. The Uighurs

The Uighurs attained a very high level of culture, and recent archaeological research has brought to light a vast amount of Uighur literature and art from which we learn that Christianity, Buddhism, and Manichaeism were all practised in their kingdom, the utmost toleration being observed. The Uighurs were certainly the most civilized of all the northern neighbours of China; their kingdom was temporarily destroyed in 847 by the Khirgiz, a northern Turkish tribe, but recovered under its greatest ruler, Bogra Khan. During the latter's reign, at the end of the tenth century, the people were converted to Islam. Up to the fifteenth century small Uighur principalities and states are found, while the Uighurs were extensively employed in Mohammedan chancelleries, playing much the same rôle in the government offices of Turkistan as the

Hindus under the Delhi Moghuls and the Bengalis under the British in India.

The Uighur language bears the closest resemblance to the Turkish of the Orkhon inscriptions, and continued to be employed as a literary medium at any rate down to the twelfth century. But prior to the conversion of the Uighurs to Mohammedanism their language had been widely used for the translation of Buddhist, Christian, and Manichaean works which have only been brought to light in recent years.

4. The Seljuks

Of greater importance to history than the Uighur Kingdom is the rise of the Seljuks. The latter were the ruling family of a branch of the group of tribes known as Ghuzz (Οὔζοι). They migrated first from the Khirgiz Steppes to Bokhara, where they embraced Islam in its orthodox form. They then moved westwards at the invitation of the weak Abbasid Caliphate; and in the middle of the eleventh century the Seljuk leader, Toghrul, expelled the Persian Viziers, and restored the temporal power of the Caliphate, only to take it for himself. Alp Arslan, the successor of Toghrul, conquered Egypt from the schismatic Fatimite Caliphs, and defeated the Byzantine Emperor Romanus at Manzikert (1071). The empire of his son, Malik Shah, was bounded on the east only by China. The contrast between these two warrior princes and their minister, Nizam ul-Mulk, a statesman of great learning, who founded numerous universities and is said to have been a friend of Omar Khayyam, marks the transition (never perhaps completely accomplished) between the wandering militant Turkish tribes and a settled non-Christian State. After Malik Shah's death in 1092 the unwieldy empire fell into eastern and western divisions. The eastern principalities were swept away by the hordes of Jenghiz Khan (1219), though the Turkish conquests of the latter kept their Turkish speech and customs. Numerous minor Turkish dynasties rose and fell. In an unpublished Persian MS. of the thirteenth

century the following curious account of the Turk occurs:

It is common knowledge that all races and classes while they remain among their own people and in their own country are honoured and respected; but when they go abroad they become miserable and abject. The Turks, on the contrary, while they remain among their own people are merely a tribe among many tribes, and enjoy no particular power or status. But when they leave their own country and come to a Mohammedan country (the more remote they are from their own homes and relatives, the more highly they are valued and appreciated) they become Amirs and Generalissimos. Now from the days of Adam down to the present day no slave bought at a price has ever become King except among the Turks; and among the sayings of Afrasyab, who was King of the Turks, and was extraordinarily wise and learned, was his dictum that the Turk is like a pearl in its shell at the bottom of the sea, which only becomes valuable when it leaves the sea and adorns the diadems of kings and the ears of brides.

The western Seljuk power grew at the expense of the Byzantine Empire. Konia became its capital; and, but for the pressure of the Mongols, it is possible that Byzantium would have fallen to the Seljuks rather than the Osmanlis. The hordes of Jenghiz Khan did not touch Konia; but, even before the destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate, the Mongols came into touch with the Seljuks. The Seljuk Sultan was defeated at Kuzadag in 1243.

5. The Ottoman Turks

It was during the subsequent struggles between Seljuks and Mongols that the Ottoman Turks first came into prominence. 'Viewed from Europe, they appear like the matador in the bull-fight, appointed to slay an animal maddened and weakened by the attacks of numerous foes. Viewed from Asia, they are merely another instance of the sudden rise of a small clan to eminence and empire.'[1] Tradition makes Khorasan the home of Suleiman, the founder of the family. His son Ertoghrul settled first at Erzerum, and then moved westwards in order to serve under the Seljuks of Konia. His service against the Mongols proved

[1] "Odysseus" [Sir C. Eliot], *Turkey in Europe*, p. 84.

valuable enough to secure him the fief of Eskishehir. Suleiman's grandson Osman (whence 'Osmanli' and 'Ottoman') proclaimed himself independent of the Seljuks; and his son Orkhan took Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicomedia from the Byzantine Empire. On the complete break-up of the western Seljuk Empire in the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Ottoman chiefs were lords of the province of Khudavendigyar, the modern official Turkish name for the vilayet of Brusa. Thence they spread their conquests over Turkey in Europe and Asia.

Note on the Words 'Tartar' and 'Mongol'

The word 'Tartar', or 'Tatar', is probably derived from the Chinese word 'Ta-ta', or 'Ta-tse', which first appears in the Christian era and corresponds more or less to the Greek term 'barbaros'; it was applied by the Chinese to the nomads beyond their northern frontiers much in the same way as the Turks were in the habit of classing all Europeans under the general name of Franks. The name 'Tartar' is now only used by and applied to the Turks of the Volga and Caucasus, the descendants of those Tartars who for several centuries ruled over central and southern Russia.

The names 'Mongol' and 'Moghul' have of course a common origin; and the Mongolians have survived as a race since the days of Jenghiz Khan. In the fifteenth century Russian Turkestan was known to Mohammedan writers as Moghulistan; and the famous Emperors of Delhi, the descendants of Tamerlane, were known as the Great Moghuls, though they were in reality not Moghuls, but Turks. The Ghaznavid dynasty of the tenth to the twelfth centuries, which preceded them in northern India, were, however, avowedly Turks, while the Slave dynasty which ruled over northern India from 1206 to 1290 was founded by a Turkish slave named Kutb-al-Din. The reason why the Delhi Emperors called themselves Moghuls rather than Turks was probably not unconnected with their desire to claim descent from the great Jenghiz Khan as well as from Tamerlane.

THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

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THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

1. Origin of the Name 'Pan-Turanian'

Turan is a Persian word. In Persian mediaeval poetry it means the steppes and deserts of Central Asia, in contrast to the settled country of Iran or Persia. The 'people of Turan' are the nomads (of many different languages and races) who constantly overran Persia from the north-east, till the Russians pacified Central Asia half a century ago.

Nineteenth-century philologists in Europe appropriated the name *Turanian* for the languages of north-eastern Europe and Asia which are 'agglutinative' in structure, in contrast to the Indo-European family. It was really a negative term—a provisional label for an unexplored mass. 'Turanian' research was first taken up seriously by the Magyars, who speak one of these agglutinative languages (of the Ugro-Finnic group) and have always felt themselves isolated among the Latin, Slavonic, and Teutonic peoples of Europe. A mediaeval Hungarian monk once made a pilgrimage eastward to discover his lost kinsmen, and lighted upon the Bashkirs of the Ural region; and during the European War Magyar professors are said to have conducted a propaganda among Russian prisoners of war belonging to easterly Finnish tribes, to prove to them that the Magyars are their brethren and Buda-Pest their cultural home. Magyar Pan-Turanianism has followed in the wake of Russian Pan-Slavism. The Hungarian savant, Vambéry, was led by this Turanian idea to prosecute research among the Turkish-speaking peoples of Central Asia, but the Magyars addressed themselves chiefly to the Osmanlis. When the Magyar struggle for independence in 1848 was crushed by the combined Austro-Russian armies, many leading Magyar refugees found an asylum at Constantinople. In 1867 these exiles returned to Hungary and became a power in

the newly-constituted Dual Monarchy. During the Balkan upheavals of 1875–8 the Magyars were strongly pro-Ottoman; and a deputation of Magyar students presented a sword of honour to the Sultan during the Serbo-Turkish War.

This Magyar-Ottoman *rapprochement* was not really racial but political. It rested not on a common consciousness of 'Turanianism' but on a common hostility to certain Slavonic States. The same political motives led people in Bulgaria to accept the Turanian label when the Bulgarian Government intervened against Serbia and Russia in the European War. Yet the Bulgars rank to-day among Slavonic peoples. The original founders of the Bulgarian State, thirteen centuries ago, were certainly 'Turanian' nomads from the steppes; but they left only slight traces on the Slavs whom they subdued.

Thus Pan-Turanianism, in its origin, is at once artificial and European. The Osmanlis did not extract it for themselves from Persian literature (though they study Persian as we study the Greek and Latin classics); it was offered to them from Europe, and they have not been the wooers but the wooed. The Osmanli has no genuine sentiment for the Bulgar or the Magyar, who are both ex-subjects of his, like the Serb and the Greek. If supposed self-interest induces the Bulgar and Magyar to fight his battles, subscribe to his loans, give his young men technical instruction, and supply him with machinery, he will take full advantage of their services. But he feels no more kinship with them than with the other Christian nations of Europe;[1] and his principal object in the European war was to rid the Ottoman Empire of external European influences, whether these are 'Central' or 'Entente', 'Turanian' or 'Teutonic'.

[1] This is true even of the Turkish doctrinaire Pan-Turanians, as may be seen from the following quotation from 'Tekin Alp': 'It is a matter of congratulation that the *rapprochement* between Magyars and Turks is being so well received here. . . . Yet the Turk's national idea cannot be the race theory, because the latter is really nothing but a Utopian dream.'

2. Pan-Turanianism as Pan-Turkism

A trained philologist may be conscious of some unity of structure in all Turanian languages as contrasted with the Indo-European family; but to the uninitiated Osmanli there is no visible relation between his own language, which belongs to the Turkish group, and Magyar, which is Ugro-Finnic. On the other hand, the relation of the various Turkish dialects to one another is obvious to any one. It can be seen on the map in the names of rivers, mountains, and towns. The Turkish-speaking peoples stretch from Turkey in Europe through Anatolia, Transcaucasia, northern Persia, and Afghanistan, to Russian Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan, and, in a more broken chain, round the northern shores of the Black Sea, through Bulgaria, the Dobruja, Crimea, the Volga provinces and Siberia, to the neighbourhood of the Arctic Ocean. They cover an even more extensive though less compact area than the Slavs; and the different Turkish dialects are as readily intelligible to all Turks as the different Slavonic languages are to any speaker of one of them. It was therefore only natural that, as soon as the Ottoman Turks became linguistically conscious of their nationality, they should become conscious at the same time of their affinities with other Turkish-speaking peoples, just as the national revival of the separate Slavonic populations produced a common sense of Pan-Slavism among them.

Pan-Turanianism, then, in the sense of a Pan-Turkish movement originating among the Ottoman Turks, is part and parcel of Ottoman Turkish nationalism, and can only be understood in relation to it.

3. Turkish Nationality in the Ottoman Empire

The consciousness of nationality, like the word 'Pan-Turanian', has come to the Osmanlis from Europe. The Ottoman Empire began as the very opposite of a national State. It is not called after any people who

inhabit it, but after the prince who founded it—Osman. It is true that Osman and his tribe were Turks, but they were only one out of a dozen Turkish states in Anatolia, and their Turkish neighbours were their most formidable rivals and enemies. They built up their power by conquests in Europe. Their best taxpayers were Christian subjects, their standing army Christian converts, their most loyal supporters apostate Albanians and Slavs, who changed their religion but kept their language. Till a century ago the Turkish nationality contributed practically nothing to the Ottoman State except the literary and official language of the governing classes; and that was so diluted with Persian and Arabic that it had little left in common with the vulgar Turkish of the Anatolian peasantry. The bulk of Anatolia was a comparatively late acquisition of the Empire. It was a neglected region, to a large extent practically independent, under local feudal chiefs.

During the last century, however, Anatolia has taken the place of the Balkan Peninsula as the 'home country' of the Ottoman Empire; for, while the Balkan provinces have been breaking away, the Asiatic provinces have been brought more and more under central control. The same Sultan who lost Greece broke the power of the feudal aristocracy in Anatolia and Kurdistan. The process of disintegration in Europe reached its climax in the Balkan War of 1912–13; the process of centralization in Asia Minor has been completed by the Committee of Union and Progress since the Treaty of Bucarest, and especially since Turkey's entry into the European War.

The most significant change has been in the composition of the Ottoman army. The Janissaries, a hereditary professional army descended from forced Christian converts of all races, were destroyed in 1826. The modern Turkish army is organized on the nineteenth-century European basis of conscription from the civil population. Down to 1908 the conscripts were nominally drawn from the whole Moslem population of the Empire; and since the Revolution Christians and Jews have been made liable as well. But the

Government never got hold of the nomads and mountaineers; the settled Arab population was not good military material nor easily mobilized on the most threatened frontiers, which till the recent war were those in Europe. Both before and after 1908 the Moslem Turkish-speaking Anatolian peasantry have been the staple of the Ottoman conscript army, affording its most amenable recruits and its toughest soldiers; and the Anatolian upper classes have more and more supplied the centralized Empire with its officers and officials. Thus, when the conscious Turkish national movement began, the Ottoman State was already resting on a practical foundation of Turkish nationality.

4. The Beginnings of Turkish Nationalism

The cultivation of national consciousness by the Ottoman Turks was partly an imitation of older nationalist movements in Europe and partly the spontaneous product of similar conditions. Like most European nationalisms (Czech nationalism for instance), it started by being cultural rather than political. The first nationalist society was founded at Salonika in 1909, in the comparatively free atmosphere that prevailed during the first three years after the Young Turk Revolution. The founder of this society was a provincial notable—one Ziya Bey, of Diarbekir, who had come up to attend a Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress. Diarbekir is a Turkish enclave in Kurdish and Armenian territory; and it is characteristic of nationalist movements that their most fanatical leaders come from the debatable borderlands.

Ziya Bey's group started a campaign to purge the literary Ottoman language of its Arabic and Persian borrowings, and replace these by old Turkish words which had never been admitted into Ottoman literature. This might seem a fantastic aim, for it is only through the adoption of foreign words, idioms, and rhythms that Turkish has been given literary form at all. Yet submerged languages in Europe have been revived under circumstances of almost equal difficulty, and

this 'Pure Turkish' movement claims to have had complete success. The Turkish writers of the traditional school were routed; and the use of Arabic was even attacked in the ecclesiastical field. The Nationalists wished to translate the Koran, Friday Sermon, and Khutbah (Prayer for the Caliph) into Turkish, and to remove the Arabic texts from the walls of Turkish mosques; but they had to drop this part of their programme, which was far in advance of ordinary Turkish opinion.[1]

This phase of Turkish Nationalism lasted from 1909 to the Balkan War of 1912–13. It was a doctrinaire imitation of the linguistic Nationalism of Europe, so far unpolitical in character. Our chief information about it comes from *Türkismus und Pantürkismus*, by 'Tekin Alp',[2] a pseudonym which is believed to cover the name of Albert Cohen, a Salonika Jew.[3] This work illustrates the artificial origins of the movement and its prospects of success. The Salonika Jews are inseparable from the Committee of Union and Progress; and one of their number would hardly have taken up Pan-Turanianism so strongly unless he thought it had found favour in the eyes of the Committee of Union and Progress leaders. Cohen evidently feels it politic to identify himself with the Nationalism of the ruling race in Turkey, as the Jews in Hungary have identified themselves with Magyarization. But his book has to be used with caution; for, though it was written after the Committee of Union and Progress had taken up the Pan-Turanian idea, it is impossible to tell how much (if any) of its contents represents the Committee of Union and Progress policy. On the whole it is safer to take 'Tekin Alp' as representing the doctrinaire school of Ziya Bey, and to judge the Pan-Turanianism of the Committee of Union and Progress solely on the evidence of their political actions since the Balkan War.

[1] See Appendix III.

[2] Published as Part II of *Deutsche Orientbücherei* (edited by E. Jäckh) by Kiepenheuer, Weimar, 1915.

[3] Salonikan by residence only and not by origin, to judge by his forename. His residence in Macedonia is proved by allusions in the book itself, where he actually calls himself a Macedonian.

5. The Effects of the Balkan Wars

The Balkan Wars made Pan-Turanianism practical politics. The shock of this disaster penetrated to wider circles than had been affected by the academic movement of the previous years, and seems to have kindled a genuine desire for national regeneration among all educated Turks. A number of societies, with local branches in Anatolia, the Caucasus, and Turkestan, were founded to promote education, physical culture, emancipation of women, and other really constructive aims; and from this time onwards the Government lent its support. The Ministry of Evkaf (or Religious Endowments) has made grants out of its enormous funds for the multiplication of national schools; there has been a scheme for reforming the Medressehs—the reactionary Moslem ecclesiastical seminaries; and, during the recent war, the Government challenged the whole existing ecclesiastical order by sweeping legal reforms which will bring much of the former domain of the Sheriat (Sacred Law) under the civil jurisdiction. The Sheikh ul-Islam resigned over this, but he was and remained an active 'Unionist'; and the *fait accompli* was accepted by his successor. It is possible that both were acting in collusion with the Government, calculating that this formal protest would be a safety-valve for discontent among the humbler members of the ecclesiastical body.[1]

All these activities were inspirations from Europe, like the crusade for a pure Turkish language, but they were of a much sounder kind. The Osmanlis seem to have been impressed by the example of the Balkan states, which had built up their strength by internal reforms till they were able to beat Turkey in war. Unfortunately they also borrowed from them another idea—irredentism.

'Observers,' Tekin Alp writes, 'who like myself are Macedonians and like myself had ample opportunity of gaining an

[1] See *Zwei Kriegsjahre in Konstantinopel*, by Harry Stürmer, ex-correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung* (Lausanne. English translation, *Two Years of War in Constantinople*. London, 1917). The incident is referred to in Chapter VIII.

intimate knowledge of the irredentist propaganda of the Bulgars, Greeks, Serbs, and Vlachs, are able to judge the significance of this national ideal, and how sweet and inspiring it is to go through the greatest dangers for such a cause.'

He proceeds to sketch the life-history of several young Macedonian Christians, who, before the Balkan War, had sacrificed everything to work for their national unification. This may, of course, simply represent 'Tekin Alp's' personal philosophy, but it is probably true that the Balkan War did influence such public opinion as exists in Turkey in this direction. During the century ending in the years 1912–13 the centre of gravity of Turkey had actually shifted from Europe to Anatolia. After 1913 there was a corresponding change in the national consciousness. The Turkish nation abandoned the tradition of being a dominant race in Europe, resolved to develop its own latent possibilities in Anatolia, and conceived the ambition of making up for lost alien subjects by attracting to itself the scattered branches of the Turkish race outside the Ottoman frontiers.

6. The Policy of the Committee of Union and Progress

Irredentism gave a new significance to the linguistic reforms of the Ziya Bey group; for the Ottoman literary language, relieved of its special Arabic and Persian borrowings and reinforced by an eclectic pure-Turkish vocabulary, might become a *lingua franca* for all who spoke the various living Turkish dialects. The Pan-Turanian movement was thus advancing on to purely political ground, and at that point it was taken up by the Committee of Union and Progress.

The Committee of Union and Progress were not Nationalists to begin with, chiefly because they ignored the nationality problems of the Ottoman Empire. Their primary aim was to maintain the integrity of the Empire, especially in Europe; and in this they agreed with Abdul Hamid and all previous rulers of Turkey. They only differed as to the means, for, while Abdul

Hamid believed in despotism at home and a balance of jealousy among the European Powers, the Committee of Union and Progress held that Turkey's best safeguard was internal strength, and the best source of strength political liberty. Their ideas of liberty were drawn from the French Revolution. 'Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity' would be proclaimed; all inhabitants of the Empire would rally to the State as free Ottoman citizens, just as Picards and Marseillais and Alsatians rallied to the French Republic after 1789; and the question of Nationality would solve itself.

This actually happened during the first six weeks after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1908. Men of all creeds and races embraced each other in the streets. But then they drew apart again and considered how they might turn the new regime to their own advantage. The Balkan nationalities rejected the offer of a liberal Turkey altogether, and determined to take the first opportunity of completing their own unity and independence at Turkey's expense. Others, like the Arabs, the Armenians, and the Constantinopolitan and Anatolian Greeks, recognized that secession was impossible, but strove just then to defend their national individuality within the Ottoman State. The Arabs formed the main opposition in the new Parliament; the Armenians also wished for decentralization, though they co-operated in Parliament with the Committee of Union and Progress. The Committee of Union and Progress found that the Turks were the only element in the Empire that was not opposed to centralization and had no political ideal incompatible with the Ottoman State idea. They therefore fell back upon their Turkish nationality, and came to think of Turkification as the natural means of achieving their ends. After the Balkan War they incorporated Turkification in their programme, but it is important to examine precisely what place they gave it.

7. Turkish Aims in the European War

It has been shown above that the Turkish version of Pan-Turanianism contains two general ideas: (*a*) to purify and strengthen the Turkish nationality within the Ottoman Empire, and (*b*) to link up the Ottoman Turks with the other Turks in the world. These objects were first pursued in the cultural sphere by a private group of 'Intellectuals', and promoted by peaceful propaganda. After 1913 they took on a political form and were incorporated in the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress. But, while for Ziya Bey's followers Pan-Turanianism was an end in itself, for the Committee of Union and Progress it was only an instrument. They would not give up movements like Pan-Islamism, that conflict with it, if these movements could still serve their turn; and they would not persist in it indefinitely in circumstances where it does not pay, for instance in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia.

The contrast between academic Pan-Turanianism and the Pan-Turanianism of the Committee of Union and Progress [1] can be summed up as follows:

(*a*) The first aim of the Ziya Bey group was to purge the Turkish language and culture from foreign (i. e. chiefly Arabic) influences. They were ready to violate some of the strongest prejudices of Islam for the sake of carrying this aim to its logical conclusion.

The first aim of the Committee of Union and Progress is to purge the Turkish State from foreign (i. e. chiefly European) influences: extra-territoriality of foreign subjects, foreign control of Ottoman finance, railways, raw materials, and education. The doctrinaires dared to defy Islam; the Committee of Union and Progress are far too prudent to do so, but they have defied Europe. When the Concert of Europe broke down, they intervened in the war and

[1] Of course some Committee of Union and Progress leaders have taken up Pan-Turanianism in its academic form.

denounced the Capitulations. And in 1916 they passed a 'language ordinance' making the use of Turkish compulsory, after a year's delay, for banks, newspapers, trams, railways, steamship companies, book-keeping of private firms, and all business of a remotely public or legal character.[1]

(*b*) The doctrinaires proposed to strengthen the Turkish nationality in Anatolia by education and social reform. The Committee of Union and Progress's method has been to exterminate the non-Turkish nationalities scattered through the country—first the Armenians and latterly the Greeks—and to give their lands and houses to 'Muhajirs' (Moslem refugees from the provinces lost in 1912–13, partly Turks, but partly Slavs from the Balkan peninsula and Greek-speaking Moslems from Crete). Another motive for the atrocities was to make the war popular among the Turkish population by sating it with Armenian plunder—a purely temporary and opportunist aim; and they were also an appeal to that reactionary spirit of Moslem fanaticism against which the doctrinaires have declared war.

(*c*) 'Tekin Alp' seeks to change the political ideal of the Ottoman Turk from Imperialism to Irredentism—from ruling over alien Christian nationalities in Europe to 'liberating' kindred Turkish populations in Russia and central Asia.

For the Committee of Union and Progress it is rather a quantitative problem. In the Balkan War they lost territory, population, and military prestige on their European frontiers. In the European War they hoped to compensate or even outbalance these losses by corresponding gains in Asia and Africa; and here we have a fourth motive for the Armenian massacres, for the Armenians are an alien *bloc* separating the Ottoman Turks of Anatolia from the Tatars of northern Persia and Russian Transcaucasia.

[1] The stringency of the original draft was afterwards somewhat relaxed in the passage of the Bill through the Senate.

8. Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism

The opportunism of the Committee of Union and Progress appears most clearly in their attempt to drive Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism in double harness, though the two creeds are diametrically opposed to one another. The Committee of Union and Progress are devotees to neither, but exploit them both.

Pan-Islamism is not really a religious doctrine. If it were, it would not be so incompatible with Pan-Turanianism as it is. Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism are rival political programmes for increasing the power of the Ottoman Empire abroad.

Most of the religious revivalism in Islam during the nineteenth century has been definitely anti-Ottoman. The Wahhabis of Nejd and the Mahdists of the Egyptian Sudan both regarded the Turks as little better than Franks and infidels; the Senussi retired to the Libyan desert to escape the contamination of Stambul. It is noteworthy that the supporters of all these movements were (*a*) Arabs, (*b*) uncivilized, and (*c*) independent, by force of arms, of either Ottoman or European control. The Ottoman doctrine of Pan-Islamism appealed, on the other hand, to settled, civilized Moslem populations under the government of European Powers like Britain, France, and Russia.[1] These populations had seen enough of European institutions to wish for them themselves. They aspired to become self-governing nations playing an independent part in international politics, and they admired Turkey because they believed her to be a Moslem State which already realized their ideal. They were not sufficiently well-informed to see through Turkey's European masquerade to the weakness and corruption underneath; they only saw in Turkey a model of what they hoped to become themselves, an existing guarantee for the political future of the peoples of Islam. For Islam is theoretically a political as well as a religious society.

The possibilities of political propaganda on these

[1] See above, pp. 54–62 of this book.

lines were perceived by Abdul Hamid, and he exploited them cleverly. The Ottoman strategic railway from Damascus to Medina, largely built out of the contributions of the Faithful in foreign countries, is a good example of his diplomacy; and this diplomacy has been continued by the Committee of Union and Progress. In Tripoli, for instance, before the Italian conquest, the Ottoman Government was regarded by the natives as an irksome foreign oppression, but Enver Pasha succeeded in winning over native sympathies. The Libyan Arab now looks on the Turk as his natural ally against the European invader; and even the Senussi has made common cause with him during the recent war. In Asia the Committee of Union and Progress have posed as the liberators of Moslem States caught in British or Russian toils. They sent a mission to the late Amir of Afghanistan which seriously embarrassed him in his neutrality. In the districts of Western Persia which they invaded they persuaded the Persian Nationalists to give them armed support. They have suggested a triple alliance of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, based on the idea of political independence for Islamic States. The 'Holy War' proclaimed in the name of the Caliph by the Sheikh ul-Islam [1] in October 1914 has turned out a fiasco, but that is because Turkey has suffered military defeat. The presupposition of the Pan-Islamic policy is Ottoman military prestige. If Turkish armies had marched victoriously into Tiflis, Cairo, and Teheran, and if the Allies had never driven them out of Baghdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo, nor occupied Constantinople, Pan-Islamism might have produced far-reaching military and political effects; even now it is by no means bankrupt.

But this Pan-Islamic propaganda would be ruined at once by a logical following out of the Pan-Turanian idea. If the Ottoman Empire assumes the rôle of a Turkish National State instead of that of an Islamic Great Power, and if the party that brings about this

[1] The same who afterwards resigned over the question of legal reforms.

change regards Turkish Nationalism and Islam as ultimately irreconcilable, the moral links between Turkey and the Moslem populations of other States are thereby broken. There is no more salvation for non-Turkish Moslems in Turkey than in Britain or Russia or France; and the Committee of Union and Progress have no more claim on them than their established Governments. The Committee of Union and Progress realize this very well, and have avoided committing themselves openly to the Pan-Turanian creed where it is in flagrant contradiction to the Pan-Islamic. There have been anti-Islamic and anti-Arab declarations by Pan-Turanian writers, and acts of tyranny and repression by Committee of Union and Progress officials in the Arab provinces, which have produced resentment and driven Arab military forces to join the Allies. Nevertheless it would be difficult to convict the Committee of Union and Progress, as a party or a government, of a Pan-Turanian programme which would discredit their Pan-Islamic professions.

The policy of the Committee of Union and Progress is to exploit both movements at once, and of the two Pan-Islamism is the more useful to them abroad; but at the same time it is clear that they set more store by Pan-Turanianism at home. Their object being to convert the Ottoman Empire into a highly organized militaristic State on the German pattern, they naturally find a more appropriate basis in common language than in common religion; and the following passage occurs in a resolution passed at the Committee of Union and Progress Congress of October 1911:

'The character of the Empire must be Mohammedan, and respect must be secured for Mohammedan institutions and traditions. Other nationalities must be denied the right of organization, for decentralization and autonomy are treason to the Turkish Empire. The nationalities are a negligible quantity. They can keep their religion but not their language. The propagation of the Turkish language is a sovereign means of con-

firming the Mohammedan supremacy and assimilating the other elements.'

This illustrates how the Committee of Union and Progress try to combine the two ideas in their internal policy, and shows on which of the two they lay more stress. The suggestion that the subject nationalities 'may keep their religion but not their native language', is a complete reversal of the traditional policy of the early Ottoman conquerors, who allowed the Albanian and Bosnian nobility to keep not only their language but their estates when once they had accepted the Mohammedan religion.

9. Prospects of Turkish Irredentism Abroad

On the other hand, in estimating the possibilities of Pan-Turanian propaganda among Turkish populations outside the Ottoman Empire, it may be assumed that no Ottoman Government will pursue a policy in any way prejudicial to the Pan-Islamic idea. It may also be assumed now that, if the political reunion of the scattered branches of the Turkish race becomes a practical possibility (which it is not at present), this will come about not through Ottoman military victories, but through the internal disruption of Russia. This disruption of Russia was frankly hoped for by 'Tekin Alp'—in fact it was the presupposition of his irredentist programme—but, writing before the Russian Revolution, he only looked forward to its being achieved from outside by Turkey and the Central Powers.

The following are the chief groups of Turkish-speaking population outside Turkey which come into consideration:

(*a*) *The Tatars of Kazan* (*about* 1½ *millions*) [1]

These live along the middle course of the Volga, between Nizhni Novgorod and Samara. They are an almost isolated enclave, surrounded by Great Russians

[1] Including the Tatars of Astrakhan, along the lower Volga.

on the west and Finnish tribes[1] on the north and south. They are also intermingled with Russians in Kazan itself. They have been under Russian government more than three hundred years; and the barrier between Islam and Christianity has been broken down more successfully here than anywhere else in the world. The Kazan Tatars are prosperous and educated. The other Turkish-speaking groups in Russia incline rather to follow their lead, and in the last few years their printing-presses have spread their influence widely through the Mohammedan world. The success or failure of Pan-Turanianism as an Ottoman-Turk irredentist movement largely depends on the attitude which the Kazan Tatars adopt towards it; and this in turn depends upon the political evolution of Russia.

The Kazan Tatars sent Red Crescent workers and relief funds to Turkey during the Balkan War, but geography and material interests bind them to Russia; and they have a conservative temperament which would disincline them to break away violently from a State under which they have lived for three centuries. They naturally objected to the Tsarist regime, and in particular to its policy towards the non-Russian nationalities. Before the Revolution their point of view was roughly that of the Cadets.[2] But they agreed neither with the anti-nationality policy for which the Cadets came to stand, nor with the extreme separatism of the Finns and Ukrainians, which would leave them isolated from the Tatars of the Crimea and the Caucasus. They would almost certainly have declared for national autonomy within a federal Russian Republic; for, if Russia could have been successfully reorganized on this basis, they had a brilliant future before them as the possible leaders of the Turkish-speaking element in a democratic state con-

[1] Nominally Christian, virtually still pagan, without a culture of their own, and capable of being assimilated by Tatars or Russians —whichever have the final ascendancy in this region.

[2] That is, in internal policy. In foreign policy they were violently opposed to the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia, which the Cadets desired.

taining a considerable majority of the Turkish-speaking populations of the world (about 16 millions out of about 27 millions altogether, whereas there are probably less than 8 million Turks in the Ottoman Empire).

(*b*) *The Tatars of Crimea* (*under* 200,000)

and

(*c*) *The Tatars of Western Siberia* (*about* 50,000)[1]

Both these are likely to follow the lead of Kazan

(*d*) *The Tatars* (*Azerbaijanis*) *of the Caucasus* (*over* 2,000,000)

These have also felt the influence of Kazan. On the other hand, they have been under Russian government for less than a century, they live close to the Ottoman frontier, they have virtually adopted Ottoman-Turkish as their literary (i. e. newspaper) language; and they have a strong interest in common with the Anatolian Turks in their fear and hatred of the Armenians. In 1905 there was a racial war between the Tatars and Armenians in the Caucasus, and on the whole the Armenians had the best of it.

When Enver launched his disastrous invasion of the Caucasus in the winter of 1914–15, the Committee of Union and Progress sent out propagandists to follow the army, and drew up a scheme for partitioning the Caucasus and part of Turkish Armenia into autonomous Tatar, Georgian, and Armenian national States under Ottoman suzerainty. They tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Ottoman Armenians to co-operate with them in this scheme. But the Ottoman armies never reached the Tatar districts of the Caucasus; and the only Russian subjects who sided with them were the Adjars, a Moslem tribe of Lazo-Georgian nationality in the district of Batum.

Since the Russian Revolution the idea of national

[1] There are also in Western Siberia about 100,000 semi-Tatarized Ugro-Finns.

autonomy for the Caucasus and Ottoman Armenia has been revived, on the basis, firstly, of federalism under Russia instead of Turkey, and subsequently of complete independence. But the delimitation of national frontiers affords room for endless disputes; and it is noticeable that, whereas formerly the Tatars and Georgians tended to combine against the more vigorous and progressive Armenians, there is now a Georgian-Armenian *rapprochement*, while relations between Georgians and Tatars are strained because both are claiming the Adjars of the Batum district and the Lazes of the Ottoman Vilayet of Trebizond—the Georgians on the ground of race, the Tatars on that of religion. This, however, may only be a passing phase; and in the land question, which in the Caucasus is as important as the demarcation of national boundaries, the old grouping of Georgian and Tatar *versus* Armenian has appeared again.

The Tatars of the Caucasus are backward in civilization, and are hampered by their sectarian division into Shiahs and Sunnis. If there had been a government in Russia liberal enough to grant national autonomy, and strong enough to do justice between the various national claims, they would have remained loyal to Russia; in which case Baku would probably have ultimately superseded Kazan as a political centre for the Turkish-speaking populations of Russia. Kazan leads at present in virtue of its older culture, but Baku, with its oil-fields, has a greater industrial future; and, while Kazan is on the periphery of the Turkish world, Baku lies at its middle point. Kazan and Crimea, Anatolia and Azerbaijan, and the Central Asiatic *bloc* (*via* the Trans-Caspian Railway), are ranged in a circle round Baku, and are in easy communication with it. But the prospects of Baku depend upon the future of Russia.

(*e*) *The Turkish-speaking Populations in Persia*

The migrations from Central Asia, between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries A. D., which carried

Turkish-speaking tribes to Kazan, the Caucasus, and Anatolia, also deposited them in the provinces of Persia north of the Central Desert, especially in the most north-westerly province, Azerbaijan.

These Turkish-speakers in Persia have at present no Turkish national consciousness. They are Shiahs, like the Persians, not Sunnis, like the Anatolian Turks. Tekin Alp admits that they still write letters in Persian and read Persian newspapers; and, as a matter of fact, Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan, has been the centre of the Persian Nationalist movement.

Tekin Alp wishes to give the Azerbaijanis a 'Turkish soul', and tries to prove that this would strengthen Persia internally. It would really split Persian Nationalism, and drive the Persians proper into hostility towards the Ottoman Empire. The Committee of Union and Progress has shown no signs of committing such a blunder. Their policy during the war was to support Persian Nationalism in Persia, and to inflame it against the Anglo-Russian regime. They were playing for a strong united Persia, freed from Anglo-Russian control, which would then make an alliance with the Ottoman Empire and fall under Ottoman hegemony.

Apart from this, the Osmanlis have always coveted Azerbaijan; they occupied it more than once during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and they overran it for a few weeks in the winter of 1914–15, as an incident in their Caucasus offensive. The Tatars of the Caucasus, who also belonged to Persia before the Russian annexation, are only separated from the Azerbaijanis by an artificial frontier, and are closely connected with them in economic and other ways.

(*f*) *The Turkish-speaking Population in Afghanistan*

The provinces of Afghanistan between the Hindu-Kush and the Oxus are inhabited by a predominantly Turkish population. They were formerly independent Turkish (Uzbeg) khanates like Khiva and Bokhara. They were only annexed by Afghanistan in 1850–59.

The situation is the same as in Persia. Pan-Turanian doctrinaires might like to rouse these Uzbegs to a sense of Turkish nationality; the Committee of Union and Progress would prefer to draw the State of Afghanistan into the Ottoman political orbit.

(g) *The Turks of Central Asia (about* 13 *millions,* 12 *millions of whom are under Russia)*

Turkish-speaking Central Asia is one of the largest continuous language areas in the world—larger than the Great-Russian area and almost as large as the English or the Spanish-speaking area in America. It is bounded roughly by the Volga and Caspian on the west, the Trans-Siberian Railway on the north, the Altai Mountains on the east, the Kwen-Lun and the Pamirs on the south. The whole of it except the Tarim basin ('Chinese' or 'Eastern' Turkestan) has hitherto belonged to Russia.[1] The continuity of its Turkish-speaking population is only broken by some Cossack settlements in the north, and by the Persian-speaking Tajik peasantry and townspeople along the Oxus and upper Syr Darya.

Within this area there are great economic and cultural contrasts. The Bashkirs in the Ural district are in transition from nomadism to agriculture. The Khirgiz, south of them, are still nomads, scattered over vast steppes. The Turcomans of the Trans-Caspian province (such as have survived the Russian conquest) are not only nomads but are still predatory when they have the chance.[2] South-eastward, on the other hand, along the rivers, there is a fairly dense agricultural population. In Ferghana, Samarkand, and Tashkend, the Russians have accomplished a great deal of irrigation during the last fifty years, and have successfully fostered the

[1] The people of the Tarim basin rebelled against China in the sixties of last century, and maintained their independence for several years. During the last half-century they have been held down by force by Chinese garrisons.

[2] In the case of the Turcomans, civilization has produced degeneration. The Russian conquest overtook them in a more primitive stage than most other Turkish stocks in Central Asia.

cultivation of cotton. In Chinese Turkestan, on the contrary, where European organization has not yet come to the rescue, agriculture is fighting a losing battle against wind and sand.

To set against these differences, there are powerful factors that make for unity—the common language, a common religion (for all these populations are devout Sunnis), and the common government and better communications that the Russian conquest has brought. The provinces along the Oxus and Syr Darya, for example, which are the heart of Turkestan, are now linked up directly with Kazan by the Russian railway from Orenburg to Tashkend across the Khirgiz Steppe, and with Baku by the Trans-Caspian Railway and the steamship service across the Caspian Sea.

The problem of Turkish Nationalism in Central Asia was infinitely remote before the Russian Revolution; the Revolution and the consequent disruption of Russia have made it imminent.

We have little direct information concerning the effect which the Revolution has had here. There is said to have been a rising in the autonomous khanates of Khiva and Bokhara, to extort a constitution from the Khans. Religious outbreaks are a more serious probability. Before the Russian conquest Central Asia was a hotbed of Sunni fanaticism. Khiva and Bokhara, which have never been brought directly under Russian administration, are likely to be fanatical still; and a spark struck here might set the whole region ablaze. Russia having fallen to pieces, Central Asia will probably break away. It is linked with Russia by Tashkend and Trans-Caspian Railways, but otherwise isolated from it by a difficult belt of steppe and desert.

The disruption of Russia thus opens greater opportunities for Ottoman Irredentism in Central Asia than in any other Turkish-speaking area. In Central Asia, Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism do not conflict with each other. The whole population is Turkish; the whole population is Sunni; and the present possessor is not an ancient Moslem State, but a recent Christian conqueror. If Russia vanishes as a power

from Central Asia, it might still be open to Ottoman diplomacy to work for a Turkish-Islamic State in Central Asia, which would then be added as a fourth member to the projected Islamic alliance of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan.

(*h*) *The Yakuts* (*about* 250,000)

The Yakuts are a Turkish-speaking tribe thinly scattered over an immense area in the basin of the River Lena, extending to the shores of the Arctic Ocean. They are quite outside the range of any Pan-Turkish movement, for, in the first place, they are either pagans or nominal Christians, not Moslems; and, secondly, they are separated from the other branches of the Turkish race by a broad belt of non-Turkish populations—pagan Tungus and Buddhist Mongols.

10. Prospects of Turkification in the Ottoman Empire

A survey of the Turkish-speaking world outside Turkey seems to show that Ottoman Irredentism has become a serious possibility through the break-up of Russia. It remains to examine the other aim of Pan-Turanianism—the Turkification of the non-Turkish nationalities inside Ottoman Asiatic territory, which now seems likely to be confined to Anatolia.

The Turkish language possesses great vitality. Wherever Turkish-speaking peoples go, they impress themselves on the landscape; Turkish names of mountains, rivers, and villages (monotonous and unimaginative though they are) tend to drive out the ancient nomenclature; and the conquered populations begin to use Turkish as their household language, even though they do not intermarry with the Turks, and though they adhere jealously to their ancestral culture and religion. This process was taking place peacefully in Anatolia before the war. Among the Armenians in the Cilician Highlands it was practically complete. Their vernacular language had become Turkish instead of

Armenian; and the dialect of the Greek enclaves in the Kaisaria district was in a curious stage of transition from Greek to Turkish. The first translations of the Bible which the American missionaries found it advisable to make were into the Turkish language, written in Greek and Armenian characters; and that was early in the nineteenth century. Even without the racial war of extermination which the Committee of Union and Progress waged in Anatolia and Armenia from the spring of 1915—first against the Armenians and then against the Greeks—the Turkish language would before long have become the universal vernacular speech of the Anatolian peninsula, from the Aegean to the Euphrates.

But the recent massacres and deportations have swept away not only non-Turkish languages, but non-Turkish cultures. The Turkish-speaking or semi-Turkish-speaking Greeks and Armenians of Anatolia, with their religion, literature, education, industry, and economic efficiency, have been to a large extent removed; and their places have been taken by Muhajirs—Moslem emigrants from the lost Ottoman provinces in Europe, who are perhaps on a higher level than the native Turks of Anatolia, but are also brutalized by hardships and made fanatical by their exile. The Muhajirs are quite incapable of compensating for the lost Greeks and Armenians as a factor of civilization; and as (in Anatolia at any rate, whatever may happen in Armenia east of the Euphrates) there seems little prospect of repatriation for the Armenians still surviving in the Syrian and Mesopotamian exile-camps, the country will presumably have to start after the war from the low-water mark of Turkish barbarism.

The native Anatolian Turk, diluted with the Rumelian Muhajir, will be the material on which the Turkish national movement will have to work. What are its prospects? If the Ottoman State is confined to Anatolia, the constructive side of nationalism—represented in the Pan-Turanian movement by figures like Halidé Edib Hanum—may come to the fore.

A Turkish National State in Anatolia may go through the same course of development which the Balkan nationalities have gone through since their liberation from the Ottoman Empire. There is no reason to suppose that the Anatolian Turk is ultimately less capable of civilization than the Balkan peoples. There is very little in him of the real Turkish blood from Central Asia; the strongest strain in his race is the aboriginal Anatolian peasantry, which turned Turk *en masse* after the Seljuks had overrun the country in the eleventh century A. D. The ancient Anatolian was able to assimilate the civilization of Greece and Rome; why should his descendants not assimilate that of Modern Europe? Only the process will be slow, for the Turk now is much more backward than the Greek and the Serb a century ago; and Islam does not assist the growth of a nation, as the Orthodox Church has done in the Balkans.

11. Conclusions

(*a*) The Ottoman Turk has no 'Pan-Turanian' sense of kinship with any nation in Europe. The policy of the Committee of Union and Progress towards Europe has been quite unsentimental; it has aimed at the maximum of European assistance to Turkey combined with the minimum of European control.

(*b*) The power of the Ottoman Empire rests *de facto* upon the Turkish population in Anatolia; and there is a very obvious linguistic kinship between all the Turkish-speaking populations in the world. It is therefore natural that a Turkish national consciousness should arise among the Osmanlis, and that this should be accompanied by a 'Pan-Turkish' consciousness as well.

(*c*) Nationalism was stimulated among the Osmanlis by the shock of the Balkan War, but it is important to distinguish between the doctrinaire nationalists and the Committee of Union and Progress. The Committee

of Union and Progress always think in terms of the Ottoman State rather than of the Turkish nationality.

(*d*) Above all, the Committee of Union and Progress are not likely to sacrifice their Pan-Islamic policy either to Turkish Nationalism at home or to Turkish Irredentism abroad, except in so far as the disruption of Russia opens opportunities for the latter in the Turkish-speaking provinces of the Russian Empire.

(*g*) If the Ottoman Empire ceases to be a Great Power, there may be a genuine Turkish national revival in Anatolia.

APPENDIX

I

STATISTICAL TABLE OF TURKISH-SPEAKING POPULATIONS [1]

Yakuts	250,000	
Kazan (and Astrakhan) Tatars	1,500,000	
West Siberian Tatars [2]	50,000 [2]	
Crimean Tatars	200,000	
Total in Western Russia and Siberia		2,000,000
Tatars in the Caucasus		2,000,000
Bashkirs and Chuvashes	2,400,000	
Khirgiz	4,692,000	
Turcomans	290,000	
Other tribes in Russian Central Asiatic provinces (mostly sedentary)	2,772,000	
Tatars of Altai	?	
Sedentary Turkish population of Khiva and Bokhara	1,000,000	
Nomadic Turkish population of Khiva and Bokhara	500,000	
Turkish population of Chinese Turkestan	1,000,000 +	
Total in Central Asiatic Area		13,000,000 ±
Ottoman Empire (Constantinople and Anatolia)		8,000,000 –
Persia, Afghanistan, and lost Ottoman provinces in Europe		2,000,000 ±
Total Turks in the World		27,000,000 ±
Turks in the Russian Empire	16,000,000 +	
Turks in the Ottoman Empire	8,000,000 –	
Turks under other Governments	3,000,000 ±	
Total Turks in the World		27,000,000 ±

[1] Statistics can only be given in round numbers. Russia is the only country inhabited by Turks where there has been an official census, and even in Russia the last (and first) census was in 1897. The figures here given for Russia consist of estimates made in 1911 on the basis of the census of 1897. The rest of the figures are more conjectural still.

[2] Not including about 100,000 semi-Tatarized aliens (mostly Ugro-Finn

ADDENDUM. In 1909 the Moslem Ecclesiastical Court of Orenburg, an official body which, under the old regime, exercised authority over the Moslems of the Russian Empire, excluding the Caucasus, Crimea, and Central Asiatic provinces, and which, among other duties, kept a record of births and deaths, estimated the number of Moslems under its jurisdiction at 5,283,618. This is more than a million in excess of the figures given above for the Kazan, Astrakhan, and West Siberian Tatars, Chuvashes, and Bashkirs combined. The difference is probably accounted for by the inclusion of certain sections of the Khirgiz, whose territory is reckoned administratively as part of European Russia.

II

THE KURDS

From the Pan-Turanian point of view the Kurds have considerable importance as a negative factor. They are an Iranian people, speaking dialects of Persian, and their original home is in the mountain ranges which separate the plateau of Persia from the basin of Mesopotamia. South-eastward they are adjoined by kindred mountain populations—the Lurs and Bakhtiaris—and their expansion has been principally in the opposite, or north-westerly, direction.

This expansion has been closely connected with the Turkish migrations. When the Turks made their way from Central Asia into Northern Persia, in the eleventh century A. D., they did not dislodge the Kurds, who had occupied the western ramparts of the Persian plateau for about 3,000 years. They avoided the Kurdish mountains, and turned northwards into Azerbaijan, up the valley of the Araxes, and so into Armenia and Anatolia by a route that left Kurdistan untouched. Anatolia was their goal and Armenia their high road, with the result that, after migrations which went on intermittently for five centuries, Anatolia had become the seat of a new Turkish nation, while Armenia was left depopulated and half desolate. This was the Kurds' opportunity. Kurdish tribes drifted into the vacuum which the Turks had made, and they have gradually spread over the lake country of Urmia and Van, and the upper valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, till they have come almost within sight of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

From the point of view of 'Pan-Turanian' geography, they have thus possessed themselves of a strategical position. Stretching in a broad arc from a point north of Aleppo to a point east of Baghdad, they form an almost continuous buffer between the Turkish-speaking populations of Anatolia, the Caucasus, and Azerbaijan, on the one hand, and the Arab world on the other. And what is still more important, they combine with the Armenians, and with certain indigenous mountain tribes of Armenia now classed as Kurds,[1] to cut off the Anatolian (Ottoman) Turks from all the Turks farther east. During the Armenian massacres of 1915, a Turkish gendarme said to a Danish Red Cross Nurse :[2] 'First we kill the Arme-

[1] Chiefly in the Dersim highlands, between the two branches of the upper Euphrates.

[2] They were travelling from Erzerum to Sivas, along the ancient route of the Turkish migrations. (See Blue Book, Misc. 31 (1916), p. 253.)

nians, then the Greeks, and then the Kurds'; and so far as the Pan-Turanian idea was a motive for the treatment of the Armenians by the Committee of Union and Progress, the gendarme was stating the logical consequences of his superiors' policy.

On the other hand, under the old regime, before the Ottoman Empire began to be either a centralized or a nationalistic state, the Kurds were the most faithful and favoured supporters of the Ottoman Government; and their expansion towards the north and west was in great part due to Ottoman encouragement.

When the Osmanlis conquered Armenia at the beginning of the sixteenth century, their main concern was to establish a bulwark against Persia, and the Kurdish tribes served excellently for the purpose. Notwithstanding their Persian dialect, the Kurds have not, and never had, a vestige of Persian national feeling. Their social consciousness is limited by the tribe, the sole object of the tribal policy is to evade external control, and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Persian Government, which was near and powerful, seemed a more immediate menace to tribal independence than the distant Ottoman Government at Constantinople. The Ottoman Government was content with a nominal suzerainty over the Kurdish chiefs, and in return the Kurds guarded the Ottoman Empire's Persian frontiers—playing the same rôle here as the Bosniaks and Albanians in the Balkans.

Friction between the Kurds and the Ottoman Government began in the early nineteenth century, when Sultan Mahmud reduced the semi-independent Kurdish chiefs in Armenia and Kurdistan, and set up the beginnings of an official Ottoman administration in their place.[1] This centralizing policy was reversed about 1890 by Abdul Hamid, who hoped to keep his various subjects in subjection by playing them off against each other and weakening them all. Abdul Hamid gave the Kurds rifles, and their chiefs the title of commanders of Hamidié gendarmerie, and let them loose on the Armenians; but Ottoman policy was reversed again in 1908 by the Committee of Union and Progress, who hoped to regenerate the Empire by unity and internal strength. The Committee of Union and Progress attempted to call the Kurds to order, and they had a notable success in subduing the practically independent Milli Confederation built up by Ibrahim Pasha. But they could

[1] This was the Sultan who destroyed *Ali Pasha* of Janina and lost Greece; and it is notable that the Committee of Union and Progress, in pursuing the same policy from 1908 to 1913, were also successful against the Kurds (breaking up the power of Ibrahim Pasha), but failed to reduce Albania and lost Macedonia.

not call in the arms which Abdul Hamid had given out, though they improved the situation by allowing the Christian population to bear arms too.

As soon, however, as they intervened in the European War, the Committee of Union and Progress went back deliberately to Abdul Hamid's policy. They distributed more arms to the Kurdish tribes, encouraged them to take part in the invasion of Azerbaijan, and incited them against the Christians. From April, 1915, onwards, the massacres of Armenian convoys in course of deportation were generally carried out by Kurdish bands, reinforced by released criminals and Ottoman gendarmes. But not all the Kurds took the Government's side. In Cilicia, for instance,[1] the Kurds deplored the treatment of the Armenians, as did the rest of the Moslem population ; and in the Dersim highlands the Kurdish or pseudo-Kurdish tribes have given shelter to Armenian refugees from Kharput and elsewhere.

The Kurdish sense of independence has been galled by the Ottoman conscription, and the percentage of Kurd deserters has notoriously been higher than that of Armenians, not to speak of Turks. Many of the Dersimli tribes refused altogether to supply recruits, and the Ottoman military authorities have failed to send punitive expeditions against them.

Russian influence among the Kurds dated from the Russian occupation of Azerbaijan, for, except in the Erivan district, there were practically no Kurds in the Caucasus provinces under direct Russian sovereignty. The occupation of Azerbaijan increased Russia's political prestige among the Kurds, and roughly coincided with the fall of Abdul Hamid and the substitution of a regime in Turkey hostile to Kurdish privileges. The Russian Government, as a power making for disorder from outside, was more congenial to many Kurds than the Committee of Union and Progress in its first genuine enthusiasm for order and good government.

During the War the partisanship of the Kurds varied with the military situation. They were pro-Turk when the Turks were on the offensive in Azerbaijan and the Caucasus ; they turned pro-Russian in the Ottoman territories which the Russians subsequently occupied. The Russian military authorities treated these Ottoman Kurds with extraordinary favour, left them their arms, and connived at their raids, not only upon returned Armenian refugees, but even upon the Russian line of communications. The Kurds were naturally a more congenial element than the Armenians to the Tsarist Government ; but the Armenians complained that even after the Revolution

[1] Misc. No. 31 (1916), p. 498.

the Russian military authorities continued their pro-Kurdish policy.

But the future of the Kurds lies less in Armenia (under whatever regime Armenia may come) than in Northern Mesopotamia, which is certainly on the eve of economic development. So long as it lay fallow, the steppe-country between Aleppo and Mosul was an Arab domain—though the Kurds drove their flocks thither for the winter, and Ibrahim Pasha, the last great Kurdish chieftain, made his head-quarters at Viranshehr, on the edge of the plain.[1] But agriculture is now following the Baghdad Railway from Aleppo towards the east; and, where Kurd and Bedawi have taken to the land, the Kurd has shown himself so far to be the better man. If therefore the agricultural development of the country proceeds gradually, and if the local population is not swamped by reservoirs of man-power from abroad, northern Mesopotamia seems destined to become Kurdish land; and here, freed from their tribal tradition and their nomadic habits, the Kurds will be more susceptible to the influences of civilization.

III

ANTI-ISLAMIC TENDENCIES IN THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

There are several distinct degrees of opposition to Islam in the Pan-Turanian movement:

(*a*) Ziya Bey's group first came into conflict with Islam over the language question. They probably thought of translating the Koran, &c., into Turkish because they knew that the translation of the Bible and the Christian liturgy into English and German at the Protestant Reformation had been the foundation of the modern English and German national literatures. The idea is not intrinsically contrary to the Mohammedan religion; but it is distinctly contrary to Islamic prejudice, and has therefore not been taken up by the Committee of Union and Progress.

(*b*) The opposition of the Moslem ecclesiastics to the translation of the Koran into Turkish led the Turkish Nationalists into an attack on Islam as an ecclesiastical institution. This secularist movement, too, is partly an imitation of Europe, as 'Tekin Alp's' use of the word 'clericals' shows; but it also embodies

[1] And the Yezidis of Jebel Sinjar, though probably not Kurds by race, had already adopted the Kurdish language.

sound and necessary reforms like the secularization of Education and the Law; and steps in this direction have been taken by the Committee of Union and Progress themselves. The chief difference on this head between the Committee of Union and Progress and the doctrinaires is that, while the latter trumpet their 'anti-clericalism', the Committee of Union and Progress try to carry secularization through with as little friction as possible, and without ever admitting that their measures are anti-Islamic.

(*c*) The Nationalists have also started a 'pre-Islamic' movement, and starting a cult of the pagan Turanian conquerors, like Jenghis Khan and Hulaku (both of whom, incidentally, were Mongols and not Turks). Members of the 'Turk Gyuju ('Turkish Power') Society—an association for the promotion of physical culture, probably modelled on the Slavonic 'Sokols' —have to take 'Turanian' club-names in place of Moslem (e.g. 'Oghuz' for 'Mohammed'); and a corps of Turkish boy-scouts has been instituted, who likewise take 'Turanian' scout-names, cheer for the 'khakan of the Turks' instead of the 'Padishah', and carry flags with the Turkish wolf on them, though the representation of living creatures in art is condemned by good Moslems. But there is no evidence that the 'Back to Paganism' movement has any influence over the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress.

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ISLAM IN INDIA

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ISLAM IN INDIA

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ISLAM IN INDIA

Chronological Summary

712 A.D. Sind invaded by Mohammed ibn Kāsim.
1000–26. Raids of Mahmud of Ghazni into India.
1175–1206. Mohammed Ghori.
1206–1526. Sultans of Delhi.
1398–9. Invasion of Timur.
1526. Battle of Panipat. Moghul Empire founded.
1723–40. Independence of the Deccan, Haidarabad, Oudh, Bengal, and Rohilkhand.
1799. Storming of Seringapatam; end of Mohammedan domination in S. India.
1856. Oudh annexed by East India Company.
1857. Indian Mutiny.
1858. Self-governing Mohammedan states enlarged under British Crown.
1877. National Mohammedan Association founded.
1885. First Indian National Congress.
1906. First meeting of All-India Moslem League.
1909. Indian Councils Act.

I. Political History

Early Mohammedan Dynasties.—The introduction of Islam into India dates from the invasion of Sind in 712 by Mohammed ibn Kāsim. This led to a permanent occupation of the valley of the Indus about Multan, but the rest of India was unaffected, and it was not until the close of the tenth century that a fresh invasion began with the raids of Mahmud of Ghazni (1000–26); he overran a large part of Hindustan, but the province of Lahore was the only part of the country permanently occupied by his troops. The conquest of the rest of India dates from the campaigns of Mohammed Ghori and his generals (1175–1203); on his return to Ghazni he committed the charge of the military operations to Kutb-ud-din Aibeg, who became the first of the Sultans

of Delhi. When Mohammed Ghori died in 1206, the greater part of India north of the Vindhyas had been subjugated by his Turkish officers, some of whom now became practically independent sovereigns. But the Sultans of Delhi claimed a suzerainty, which they were sometimes able to enforce, over the Moslem states. Thirty-four sultans reigned in Delhi from 1206 to 1526 —the Slave Kings, 1206–90; the Khaljis, 1290–1320; the Taghlaqs, 1320–1413; the Sayyids, 1414–51; the Lodis, 1451–1526. During this period the Mohammedan conquests were extended farther to the east and the south, in spite of frequent internal conflicts and revolutions, and the disasters caused by the inroads of Mongol hordes at intervals from 1223 to 1305, and by the invasion of Timur in 1398-9. Outlying provinces took advantage of the weakness of the suzerain power, and a number of independent kingdoms arose, which were ultimately absorbed in the Moghul Empire, e. g. Bengal (1338–1576), Jaunpur (1394–1500), Gujarat (1396–1572), and Malwa (1401–1530) in the north, and Khandesh (1370–1599) and Gulbarga (1347–1526) in the Deccan.

The (Mogul) Mughal Empire.—The invasion of Babur and his defeat of Ibrahim Lodi at Panipat in 1526 laid the foundations of the Moghul Empire, but his son, Humayun, was driven from his throne for fifteen years, and the Afghan Sher Shah established the Sur dynasty, which ruled in Delhi from 1540 to 1555. Humayun regained his kingdom in 1555, but died the following year. His son, Akbar, was engaged in warfare during the greater part of his long reign (1556–1605); he brought under his authority the Mohammedan kingdoms of Gujarat, Bengal, Kashmir, and part of the Deccan, and, after breaking down the opposition of the Rajputs, reconciled them to his rule by adopting towards his Hindu subjects the wise policy of conciliation. His son, Jahangir (1605–27), and his grandson, Shah Jahan (1627–58), kept intact the Indian dominions of Akbar; and Aurangzeb (1658–1707) brought the Moghul Empire to its greatest expansion by the

conquest of the last of the independent kingdoms of the Deccan, Bijapur (1489–1686) and Golkonda (1512–1687). Aurangzeb thus subjected the whole of India as far south as Tanjore to his rule; but his intolerant policy towards the Hindus alienated the Rajputs, and the last twenty years of his life were spent in a vain attempt to crush the rising power of the Marathas. Under his successors, the Moghul Empire rapidly declined; the Marathas encroached upon one district after another, and during the reign of Mohammed Shah (1719–48) a general revolt of the provinces began, which resulted in the independence of the Deccan from 1723 under the Nizam of Haidarabad, of Oudh under Sa'adat Khan about the same period, of Bengal under Alivardi Khan in 1740, and of Rohilkhand under the Rohillas, an Afghan clan. Further, the invasion of Nadir Shah of Persia in 1738 struck a blow at the very centre of the Empire from which it never recovered; his successor to the throne of Persia, Ahmad Shah Durrani, invaded the Panjab and occupied Delhi in 1756–7, and though he joined with other Mohammedan forces in overthrowing the Marathas in the third battle of Panipat in 1761, the ruin of the Moghul Empire was complete.

Relations with English.—Shah Alam (1759–1806), in an endeavour to assert his authority in Bengal, came into conflict with the English (1760–1), and having fallen under the power of Shuja ud-Daulah, the Nawab Wazir of Oudh, shared his defeat in the battle of Buxar (1764). In the following year he granted to the East India Company the Diwani or financial administration of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa in return for an annual subsidy of 2,600,000 rupees, and under the protection of the British kept his court in Allahabad until 1771, when he was persuaded to return to Delhi; he was blinded by one of his officers in 1788, and became a puppet in the hands of the Marathas, until General Lake's victory over them in 1803 set him free, and left him with a nominal sovereignty over the city of Delhi and the surrounding district, and a monthly pension of 90,000 rupees.

In the south Haidar Ali had made himself master of Mysore in 1761, and was succeeded by his son, Tipu Sultan (1782–99), whose death at the storming of Seringapatam marked the disappearance of Mohammedan domination from southern India. The kingdom of Oudh lasted longer; the Nawab Wazir, Ghazi-uddin Haidar, assumed the title of king in 1819; the gross mismanagement of the country led the East India Company to annex it in 1856.

In Delhi, Shah Alam's son, Mohammed Akbar (1806–37), and his grandson, Bahadur Shah (1837–57), retained the empty titles of their ancestors, as pensioners of the East India Company; but Bahadur Shah's complicity in the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 caused him to be banished to Rangoon, where he died in 1862.

None of the self-governing Native states under Mohammedan rulers joined in the attempt to drive the English out of India, and the more important of these states, e. g. Haidarabad, Bhopal, and Rampur, rendered substantial assistance, without which the condition of the English would have been still more precarious than it was. After the government was assumed by the Crown, in 1858, these states either had their territories enlarged by grants of land, or received other rewards for their loyalty.

II. Mohammedan India under the British Crown

(*a*) *Native States.*—Nearly two-fifths of the total area of British India is administered by native chiefs. Of these Native states (693 in number) the following are governed by Mohammedans, under the suzerainty and protection of the British Crown. The largest is Haidarabad, with an area of 82,698 square miles, and a population of 13,374,676, of whom about one-tenth is Mussulman; this is the only Mohammedan state in direct political relations with the Government of India; the others communicate either with an Agent to the Governor-General or with one of the Provincial Governments.

Agency or Province.	*State.*	*Area in sq. m.*	*Population.*	*No. of Musalmans.*
Baluchistan	Kalat	73,278	359,086	345,906
	Las-Bela	7,132	61,205	59,386
Bombay Presidency	Khairpur	6,050	223,788	182,827
	Junagarh	3,284	434,222	88,130
	Palanpur	1,766	226,250	25,158
	Cambay	350	72,656	9,715
	Janjira	324	88,747	14,769
	Radhanpur	1,150	65,567	8,320
	Balasinor	189	40,563	4,578
	Sachin	42	18,903	2,278
	Savanur	70	17,909	5,448
Paying tribute to the Gaikwar of Baroda	Dabha	12	—	—
	Punadra	11	—	—
	Ramas	6	—	—
Central India Agency	Bhopal	6,902	730,383	81,996
	Jaora	568	75,951	13,686
	Basni	122	20,121	2,349
	Korwai	111	18,456	2,309
	Basoda	40	4,630	737
	Muhammadgarh	29	2,863	422
	Pathari	22	3,866	390
Madras Presidency	Banganapalle	255	39,355	8,054
Panjab	Bahawalpur	15,918	780,641	654,247
	Malerkotla	167	71,144	25,942
	Loharu	222	18,597	2,401
	Patawdi	52	19,543	3,338
Rajputana Agency	Tonk	2,600	303,181	40,432
United Provinces	Rampur	892	531,217	244,604

(*b*) *British India.*—After the suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny (1858), the Moslems (especially in northern India) found themselves exposed to grave suspicions on the part of the British Government. Though large numbers of Hindus had taken part in this insurrection, its ostensible aim had been the restoration of the Moghul Empire, and it had consequently enlisted the sympathies of many Mohammedans. The estates of those who were convicted of complicity with the mutineers were confiscated, and thus a number of families of the old Mohammedan aristocracy were ruined. The members of these aristocratic families for the most part held aloof from the service of the British Government and sullenly watched the Hindus crowd into those numerous administrative and judicial posts which the Mohammedan aristocracy were by tradition and training peculiarly fitted to fill. A few of these

families migrated into Mohammedan countries; for the common soldiery there was the fanatic settlement at Sattana, over the north-west frontier.

Rebel Camp at Sattana.—This originated in the Jihad stirred up among the Pathan tribes, especially the Yusufzais and the Barakzais, by the Wahhabi preacher, Sayyid Ahmad, of Bareli, who, after a successful missionary progress through Bengal, crossed the north-west frontier and in 1826 commenced a Jihad against the Sikhs, who were the rulers of the Panjab. Constant accessions to the Mujahidin of Sattana were received from India, and especially from Bengal, where they had an active organization. After the annexation of the Panjab in 1849, the British had to bear the brunt of their fanatical incursions, and sent against them as many as twenty separate expeditions between 1850 and 1863 (cf. below, p. 129).

Mohammedan Attitude towards British Rule.—Besides the mutineers who swelled the numbers of the Sattana camp, there were those Mohammedans whose consciences would not permit them to remain in a country the government of which was not Mohammedan. For Moslem opinion at this period was much exercised to decide whether India under British rule was to be regarded as *Dar ul-harb* ('the land of war') or *Dar ul-Islam* ('the land of Islam'), and whether a Jihad against the Christian rulers was obligatory on the Mussulmans. Except among the more fanatical, the opinion began to prevail that, inasmuch as the British Government left the Mohammedans free to practise the observances of their faith and made no attempt to restrict their religious freedom, they might live under its rule as loyal subjects. But their power and wealth had been steadily declining during the British period, largely through their failure to adjust themselves to the changed conditions of administration, and to avail themselves of the opportunites of acquiring education on Western lines. Up to the early part of the nineteenth century the Mohammedans had enjoyed the greater part of State patronage, as collec-

tors of revenue, military and police officers, and judges, but as the old order changed these posts came to be filled by English and Hindu officials; when in 1837 Persian ceased to be the official language, and English or the provincial vernaculars took its place, a considerable number of subordinate offices passed out of the hands of the Mohammedans, and the abolition (by Act xi of 1864) of the posts of qadis (kadis, or Moslem law officers) closed to a large number of learned men what had previously been an honourable means of livelihood. (Act xii of 1880 gave power to the provincial governments to appoint a qadi in any particular locality if the Mohammedans of the place so desired.) Though the more far-sighted members of the community recognized that the altered conditions of the country called for a change in the methods of Mohammedan education, and urged their co-religionists to study Western sciences and learn English, their efforts for some time bore little fruit and met with much opposition.

The Mohammedans and the National Congress. —In 1877 Mr. Syed Ameer Ali founded in Calcutta the National Mohammedan Association, which was afterwards, when branches had been established in other cities of India, styled the Central National Mohammedan Association; in 1882 this association endeavoured to organize a national conference of Mohammedans, but the project fell through on account of the strong opposition of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. In 1885 the first meeting of the Indian National Congress was held in Bombay; while the third meeting was being held in Madras, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan delivered in Lucknow on December 28, 1887, the first of a series of political lectures with the object of inducing the Mohammedans to hold aloof from the National Congress and similar political movements. He also endeavoured to organize the Mohammedan opposition by the formation of a society entitled 'The United Indian Patriotic Association', to which more than fifty Anjumans in various parts of the country became affiliated; but its

activity was short-lived, mainly through lack of funds to continue its propaganda. But, though his efforts were successful in persuading the main body of his co-religionists to refuse their support to the National Congress, each yearly gathering continued to be attended by a small number of Mohammedans, especially from the cities of Bombay, Calcutta, and Lucknow; and on two occasions the president of the Congress was a Mohammedan, at the third (Madras, 1887) the Hon. Mr. Badruddin Tyabji (afterwards Judge of the High Court, Bombay), and at the twelfth (Calcutta, 1896) Rahmat Ullah Mohammed Sayani. The latter in his presidential address enumerated and discussed the objections of the Mohammedans to joining the Indian National Congress. They were mainly that the success of the aims of the Congress would imply that a preponderating share in the administration of the country would pass into the hands of Hindus, and that the Mohammedans would be reduced to an inferior position; that the movement was disloyal to the British Government; that Western methods of government, and especially that of selecting officers for administrative appointments on the basis of educational qualifications, &c., were not suited to India, and would be detrimental to the Mohammedans, as owing to their backwardness in education they could not readily adapt themselves to such methods. The main body of the Mohammedans continued to hold aloof from the Indian National Congress, and from 1886 held on the same dates a separate gathering of their own, entitled the Mohammedan Educational Conference, the main object of which was to impress upon the Mohammedans the importance of modern methods of education.

All-India Moslem League.—But after the powerful personality of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was withdrawn, some of the younger generation came to the conclusion that Mohammedan interests suffered in consequence of their abstention from political life, and they founded an organization entitled the All-India Moslem

League, the first meeting of which was held at Dacca in December 1906. In October of the same year a deputation of influential Mohammedans, headed by His Highness the Agha Khan, had presented a memorial to the then Viceroy, Lord Minto, and had urged that special consideration should be given to the Mohammedans in the proposed enlargement of the Legislative Councils, and in the bestowal of posts in the higher branches of the public services. This deputation gave the impulse to the formation of the All-India Moslem League, which rapidly extended its organization by the establishment of provincial leagues affiliated to the central body, together with a branch in London, and held a general meeting every year in some city with a large Mohammedan population.

Mohammedans in Official Positions.—In 1907 Nawab Imad ul-Mulk Syed Husain Bilgrami was made a member of the Council of the Secretary of State for India, and was the first Indian to become a member of that body. In 1909 Mr. Syed Ameer Ali (formerly a judge of the High Court, Calcutta) was appointed a Privy Councillor, and, as a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, sits in the final court of appeal for Indian cases. In 1910 [Sir] Syed Ali Imam was made Legal Member of the Council of the Governor-General of India; he was the second Indian to hold that office. These appointments were made in pursuance of a policy of associating Indians more closely with the direction of affairs of State, a policy which led to the passing of the Indian Councils Act of 1909. This Act and the regulations and rules under it increased the size of the Legislative Councils, and arranged for the inclusion of elected members (previously all the members had been nominated), and gave to these Councils greater liberty of discussion and interrogation than they had before enjoyed. The Mohammedans claimed to be represented as a separate community; and special regulations were framed for securing the election of Mohammedan members, in accordance with the relative importance and numerical strength of the

Mohammedans in different provinces. There was, however, a feeling among the Mohammedans that due consideration had not been paid to their claims.

Partition of Bengal.—There were other circumstances which contributed to this feeling of dissatisfaction. In 1905 the Partition of Bengal into two separate provinces had caused the Mohammedans to become a majority in Eastern Bengal; and they were beginning to take a more prominent part in the affairs of that province, when in December 1911 this partition was reversed. Through the readjustment of the boundaries of Bengal the large Mohammedan population of Eastern Bengal again became a minority in respect to the Hindus, and lost that opportunity of self-development which had been opened to them in 1905.

Influence of decline of Mohammedan Powers.—Further, the declining fortunes of such independent Mohammedan states as Morocco, Persia, and Turkey excited much sympathy in India; and this state of feeling was intensified by the successive disasters of the Turks in their wars with Italy (1911–12) and the Balkan States (1912–13). Sums of money, considerable in relation to the general poverty of the community, were collected on behalf of the Turks; and a medical mission was fitted out and sent to Turkey under the charge of Indian doctors. The growing sympathy with Mohammedans in the Turkish Empire prompted the foundation, in May 1913, of the Anjuman-i-Khuddām-i-Ka'ba, the objects of which were stated to be the maintenance of the respect due to the Ka'ba and the defence of it against non-Moslem aggressors; the designation of this society was undoubtedly suggested by the title of the Sultan of Turkey, as protector of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina—Khādim ul-Haramain—and indicated the pro-Turkish sympathies of the founders.

Moslem League and National Congress.—In January 1913 the council of the All-India Moslem League altered its constitution, and included among its objects the attainment of a system of self-government in India.

From this date, the Moslem League began to draw nearer to the Indian National Congress; and the younger generation of Mohammedan politicians definitely abandoned the separatist policy of the older school and advocated co-operation with the Hindus in political activities. In December 1913 a Mohammedan, Nawab Syed Mohammed, was elected president of the National Congress.

Feeling during the War.—The declaration of war in 1914 between Great Britain and Turkey evoked many expressions of loyalty towards the British Government on the part of the Mohammedan native princes, the Anjumans, and other organized bodies; but the pro-Turkish journalists still came under suspicion, and towards the end of the year four prominent Mohammedan newspapers were suppressed.

In 1916 the Sherif of Mecca revolted against Turkey, and Mohammedan feeling, among those who had pro-Turkish sympathies, was much disturbed by what was correctly recognized to be a serious blow to Turkish authority in Arabia; the action of the Sherif was strongly condemned by several prominent members of the Moslem League. Meanwhile, the younger leaders of the Moslem League tended towards co-operation with the extreme Hindu politicians; and in November 1916 representatives of the Indian National Congress and the Moslem League met and decided to accept the Home Rule programme. But the whole of educated Mohammedan opinion did not follow the Moslem League in its agreement with the National Congress, e. g. the Mohammedans of the Panjab broke away from the main organization, and there was also considerable expression of disapproval in the United Provinces.

III. Ethnology of the Indian Mohammedans

General Backward Condition.—The general mass of the Mohammedan population of India has been but little touched by the political movements of the latter part of the nineteenth and of the present century. Of the various religious communities in India, the Mohammedan on the whole exhibits the greatest degree of illiteracy, with the exception of the animistic tribes; only 69 men and 4 women per thousand are able to read and write. This backward condition of the Mohammedans generally is largely due to the low level of education in the parts of the country (e. g. the north-west of India and Eastern Bengal) where they are chiefly to be found. Accordingly, in reference to the main body of the Mohammedan population, racial and tribal characteristics tend to assume greater importance.

Main Ethnological Types.—Within this Mohammedan population of over 66,000,000 there is a great ethnological diversity. One broad distinction may be drawn between the descendants of foreign Moslem immigrants on the one hand and of the indigenous converts on the other. Among the latter, the physical types that are most numerously represented are (1) the Indo-Aryan type, occupying the Panjab, Rajputana, and Kashmir, to which belong the Rajput and Jat Mussulmans; (2) the Aryo-Dravidian type, found in the United Provinces and Bihar; and (3) the Mongolo-Dravidian type, represented by the majority of the Mohammedans of Eastern Bengal. Though by far the larger proportion of the indigenous Mohammedan population owes its origin to the lower Hindu castes or to *pariahs*, still there are few of the higher castes that have not at one time or another contributed converts to Islam. Brahmans were forcibly converted during the Mohammedan conquest, or in periods of intolerance under some settled Mohammedan government; other Brahmans embraced Islam through the persuasion of Moslem missionaries, or to gain some social or financial advantage. From

the warrior castes Islam has received large accessions from the earliest days of its entrance into India; Rajput Mussulmans are found in large numbers in the Panjab, and to a less extent in the United Provinces and Rajputana. From the lower castes among the Hindus there has been a constant stream of accessions during the whole Mohammedan period, as well as from the aborigines of the country who stood outside the pale of Hinduism. In the case of the various Mongoloid or Mongolo-Dravidian tribes of Eastern Bengal, there was probably a mass movement towards Islam; adherence to the new faith raised them out of the despised condition to which the higher Hindu castes consigned them.

Mussulmans of Foreign Origin.—The Mussulmans of foreign origin are numerically fewer than the descendants of native converts, but their influence in the history of Mohammedan civilization in India has been vastly more important; the various conquerors, Arabs, Turks, Pathans, and Moghuls, brought into the country large bodies of foreign troops, whose services they rewarded by grants of land; when their power was established, their courts attracted into India military adventurers, poets, scholars, and theologians, most of whom remained and settled in the country; this movement of immigration went on during the whole period of Mohammedan ascendancy, and has not ceased even under British rule.

Arabs.—Of these foreign immigrants, the first to enter India were the Arabs, who invaded Sind in 712; the trade in spices, gems, &c., early attracted Arab merchants to the west coast of southern India, and the Mapillas are descended from the Hindu women they married. Thus from the earliest period of the Mohammedan occupation to modern times there has been an immigration of Arabs into India; their numbers have been small, but their influence has been profound and widespread. There was a Sayyid dynasty in Delhi from 1413 to 1451, and one in Bengal from 1493 to 1537; a dynasty of Arab origin ruled

over the kingdom of Khandesh from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century; in the second decade of the eighteenth century two Sayyids of Barha for seven years enjoyed the position of king-makers, and set whomsoever they chose on the throne of Delhi. As administrators, generals, men of letters, teachers, and saints, the Sayyids in India have played an important part in the history of Mohammedan culture.

Numerically, however, the Arabs form the smallest group of Indian Mohammedans of foreign origin.

Turks.—Another important group, likewise not numerous, is made up of the descendants of the Turki invaders, to whom the establishment of Mohammedan rule in India is really due; Mahmud of Ghazni was a Turk, as also were the generals of Mohammed Ghori, who founded dynasties in Delhi and elsewhere, and Babur, the founder of the so-called Moghul empire; the founders of the Adil Shahi, Kutb Shahi, and Barid Shahi dynasties were all Turkish officers, who had succeeded in raising themselves above the mass of soldiers of fortune and mercenaries whose history is more obscure. Timur settled a number of families of Karlugh Turks in what is now the Hazara district of the North-west Frontier Province, on his return from his invasion of India in 1399, and their descendants are found there to the present day. A group of Kizilbash migrated from Kabul to the Panjab as recently as 1842, and their descendants have received grants of land and are permanently settled in the country.

Persians.—Among the smaller groups of immigrants, the Persians have exercised considerable influence on Mohammedan culture in India. Saints, religious teachers, poets, and men of letters, as well as soldiers and statesmen, have brought into India the refinement and subtlety of the Persian genius. Traders from the Persian Gulf settled in the cities of Gujarat as early as the ninth century. Political troubles have driven Persians at various periods to take refuge in India, e. g. during the devastations of the Mongols in the thirteenth century, in the eighteenth century when the

Afghans brought the Safavid dynasty to an end in 1722, and again when Nadir Shah seized the throne in 1736. Naturally, many Persians were attracted to the Shiah kingdoms in India, and Persian mercenaries still come as recruits to the Persian regiment of the Nawab of Cambay.

Abyssinians, &c.—A small number of Abyssinians or Somalis, known as Habashi or Sidi, settled in western India; mention of them as soldiers and sailors is found as early as the thirteenth century. The Sidis were admirals of the Moghul fleet, and a dynasty of Habashi kings ruled over Bengal from 1486 to 1490; the present chiefs of Janjira and Sachin are also of Habashi origin.

Afghans or Pathans.—The largest group of foreign stock is that of the Afghans or Pathans, who are found in greatest number in the north-west, but also as far east as Bengal and as far south as the Deccan. The terms Afghan and Pathan are used indifferently by the natives of India to designate this large section of the Mohammedan population, but it is a matter of dispute whether the original Afghan and Pathan stocks were the same, or whether a purely Indian origin must not be assigned to the Pathans. There has been a constant stream of immigration from Afghanistan into India, from the end of the twelfth century up to modern times. Most of the Mohammedan conquerors of India have entered the country through Afghanistan, and have brought in their armies large numbers of Afghan soldiers, who received grants of land as military fiefs and settled in the country. Of the Afghan tribes found in India the most widely distributed are the Yusufzai, of whom a body of 1,200 accompanied Babur in his final invasion of India, and settled in the plains of Hindustan and the Panjab. Migrations on a large scale into the fertile plains of India have also taken place at various times, e. g. during the period of the Lodi (1451–1526) and Sur (1540–55) sultans of Delhi. The Prangi and Sur tribes from which these dynasties sprang, and their neighbours, the Niyazi,

appear to have migrated almost bodily from Afghanistan into India. The great bulk of the Baluchis has similarly migrated across the border into India; there are about ten times as many of them in India as in the whole of Baluchistan.

IV. Religious Sects

Sunnis and Shiahs.—The majority of the Indian Moslems are Sunnis, and owing to the high level of theological learning maintained by the 'ulamā for centuries, and the close relations kept up with centres of religious life and thought in other parts of the Moslem world, there has always been a large body of orthodox opinion and practice among the Indian Sunnis, and these have not differed materially from similar manifestations in other Moslem lands. The Shiahs have always been in a numerical minority in India; under the rule of the Shiah sultans of Bijapur and Golkonda, and later under that of the kings of Oudh, the Nawabs of Murshidabad, and such of the Nawabs of Rampur as became Shiah, they enjoyed the favour of the ruling power; but under Sunni rule they were often exposed to persecution. The Shiahs in India form less than 10 per cent. of the total Moslem population, and are mainly of Persian or Turki descent, with the exception of the converts of Hindu origin, belonging especially to the Ismailī sections of the Bohoras and Khojahs.

Wahhabis.—Among the modern sectarian developments, the most important are the Wahhabi, the Ahmadi, and the Ahl-i-Koran. The Wahhabi movement was introduced into India about 1820 by Sayyid Ahmad and Shariat Ullah, who initiated entirely independent movements; the latter worked in Bengal and confined himself to peaceful propagandist methods, but Sayyid Ahmad made his way to the Panjab (which was then under Sikh rule) and stirred up a Mohammedan insurrection against the Sikhs on the Peshawar frontier. After his death in 1831, his followers established themselves at Sattana on the north-west frontier,

and there formed a centre (cf. p. 118) which later was swelled by the mutineers who after 1857 were unwilling to live under the restored British Government. Their numbers were constantly increased from various parts of Bengal and northern India, until this rebel camp was broken up by the campaign of 1863; but the organization has continued to exist up to the present day, and has shown signs of reviving activity during the recent war.

Ahmadis.—Unlike the Wahhabi movement, which is distinguished by its hostility to Christian influences and its zeal for Jihad, or war against unbelievers, the Ahmadi sect strongly condemns Jihad and all deeds of violence committed in the name of religion. It was founded about 1880 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (of Qadian, in the Panjab), who claimed to be the promised Mahdi and Messiah, and to inaugurate a period of peace and righteousness. Since the death of the founder in 1908, the sect, which at that time did not exceed 19,000, has split into two rival parties, and appears to be declining in numbers.

Ahl-i-Koran.—The sect of the Ahl-i-Koran, though insignificant in numbers, is remarkable for the boldness with which it rejects all traditional theology and accepts the Koran alone as authoritative in matters of faith and practice; a new form of prayer has been devised and other innovations have been introduced.

Moslems and Hindus.—Owing to the fact that the Moslems in India have lived for centuries in close contact with Hindus, and are themselves to a large extent descended from Hindu converts, many Hindu characteristics are to be found in the religious life, especially of the uneducated classes. The process of conversion was often incomplete, and the converts, ill-instructed in their new faith, carried with them many of their old beliefs and practices. Such survivals from Hinduism are more marked in villages and country districts, remote from the influence of the 'ulamā; here the Mussulmans still continue to worship the tutelary gods of the village, join in Hindu festivals,

and employ Brahmans in their marriage ceremonies. This close association with Hindus has also led to the formation of some mixed sects, which attempt to bring about a reconciliation between Hindus and Mohammedans, e. g. the Pirzadas, the Husaini Brahmans, the Lalbegis, &c. A like syncretism shows itself in the teaching of Kabir, the founder of the Kabir-panthis, and of Nanak, the founder of the Sikh religion. In some instances the incompleteness of the process of conversion has rendered possible the return to Hinduism of the descendants of the converts. The Arya Samaj has recently been very active in the work of reconversion; and one of the societies affiliated to it, called the Rajput Suddhi Sabha, has for its special object the reconversion of Mohammedan Rajputs to Hinduism. The process is facilitated by the fact that intermarriage between such Mohammedan Rajputs and Hindus has been common, and the tribal bond with Hindu sections of the tribe has always been stronger than any difference of religion.

V. Education

Mohammedan Learning.—During the Mohammedan period, the condition of learning was apt to vary with the goodwill of the sovereign, but from the earliest period of Mohammedan rule scholars received generous patronage from the State, and several emperors and sultans founded and endowed *madrasas*, or theological colleges. The largest of these *madrasas* were naturally to be found in the chief centres of government, and the students trained in them became teachers in the maktabs and mosque-schools that existed in most Mohammedan villages up to modern times. The decay of the Mohammedan rule and the consequent loss of patronage led to a decline in Moslem learning. Warren Hastings attempted to arrest this decline by establishing a *madrasa* in Calcutta in 1781; but, with the disappearance of Persian as the official language and the substitution of English in the higher courts, and the vernacular language of the various provinces in

the lower courts, the older type of education no longer fitted persons for employment in Government service.

English Education.—In 1835 Lord William Bentinck, then Governor-General of India, established the policy of promoting education in the English language. While this policy was warmly supported by the Hindus, the Mohammedans held almost entirely aloof from the English schools and colleges, preferring a system of learning in harmony with their own faith, and thinking that English education induced a spirit of disbelief in religion. From time to time the Government of India proposed measures for dealing with the backward condition of education among the Mohammedans, and laid down the lines of policy to be pursued in Resolutions of 1871, 1885, 1888, 1894, and 1913. Liberal grants-in-aid have been given to colleges, such as Aligarh, and other educational establishments, and scholarships granted to Mohammedan students. The total number of Mohammedan pupils under instruction in all classes of educational institutions in 1912 was 1,562,000. Though the general level of literacy among the Indian Mohammedans is very low, there has been in recent years a remarkable increase in the number of those who have entered schools and colleges for an English education.

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Chronological Summary

Tenth century. Mohammedan Arabs build a mosque at Soba, the Christian capital of Nubia.

1009. King of Songhay converted to Islam.

1042. Abdallah ibn Yāsīn leads the militant Almoravid movement.

1076. Ghāna becomes Mohammedan.

1090–1147. Almoravids masters of Spain.

1200. Foundation of Mohammedan kingdom of Melle.

c. 1200. Islam spreads over the kingdom of Kanem.

Thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Infiltration of Mohammedans into Abyssinia.

1311–31. Mansa Musa, King of Melle, conquers the Songhay kingdom, and captures Timbuctoo. Timbuctoo a centre of Moslem influence.

1352. The King of Dongola becomes a Mohammedan.

Fifteenth century. Kadiriyyah Order introduced into West Africa.

1492. Death of Ssonni Ali, the greatest King of Songhay, after it had broken away from Melle.

1499–1530. Christian kingdom of Nubia, already weakened by internal dissensions and Arab and Negro attacks, falls before the Fung Empire.

Sixteenth century. Portuguese conquests in East Africa. Check to Arab and Mohammedan expansion.

1528–43. Mohammed Grāñ, a Somali chief, ravages Abyssinia.

c. 1550. Bakkayiyyah Order founded in Timbuctoo.

1568–1608. First Mohammedan King of Baghirmi.

c. 1600. Islam becomes the State religion of Darfur.

1612. Abd al-Kasim, the first Mohammedan King of Wadai, heads a national rising against the Tunjar Arabs.

1632. Expulsion of the Portuguese from Abyssinia, followed by confusion and anarchy.

Seventeenth, eighteenth, and first half of nineteenth centuries. Gradual increase of Moslem influence in Abyssinia.

c. 1700. Final collapse of the kingdom of Songhay before the Moors.

1750–1800. Conversion of the greater part of the Baghirmi population to Islam.

1781. Tijaniyyah Order founded in Algeria. Spreads rapidly in Tunis, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan, and thence to the hinterland of Sierra Leone.
c. 1800. Rahmaniyyah Order founded by a Moroccan.
1800–50. Spread of Islam in Uganda by Arab traders.
1802. Revolt of Danfodio.
1802–16. Danfodio conquers the whole of Haussaland and founds a fanatically Mohammedan Fulbe kingdom.
1827–33. Haj Omar in Mecca.
1835. Sanusiyyah and Amirghaniyyah Orders founded.
1841. Haj Omar heads another anti-pagan Fulbe expedition against the Upper Niger and the Senegal.
1855–68. Christian reaction in Abyssinia under Theodore II.
1857. Haj Omar's westward progress into Senegambia checked by the French.
1865. Death of Haj Omar. He is succeeded by his son, Ahmadu.
1876. Introduction of Christian missions into Uganda checks the spread of Islam.
1880. Edict of King John of Abyssinia compelling Mohammedans to become Christians or leave the country. Schemes for religious uniformity ineffective owing to war.
1881. Samory (a Mandingo) establishes himself on the Upper Niger.
1881–85. The Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmad, attempts to found an Empire, with Omdurman as its capital.
1889–1913. Reign of Menelik II in Abyssinia.
1891. Subjugation of Ahmadu's kingdom by the French.
1898. Defeat of Khalifa Abdullah, successor to Mohammed Ahmad, at Omdurman by the British. Defeat of Samory by the French.
1901–4. British Somaliland expeditions against Mohammed ibn Abdallah, the 'Mad Mullah'.

Introductory

No attempt is made here to include the history of Egypt and those parts of North Africa which were once provinces of the Roman Empire; but a brief sketch is given of the progress of Islam southward through the Sahara into the Sudan and the tribes of the West Coast, and then on the East Coast and into those parts of the Eastern Sudan where Mohammedan influences coming southward from Egypt met those coming eastward through the Sudan.

I. Kingdoms of Ghāna and Songhay. The Almoravid Movement

The early history of the spread of Islam among the negroes of the Sudan is obscure; but there seems to be little doubt that it was the Berbers who first introduced this faith into the lands watered by the Senegal and the Niger. Here they met with two negro kingdoms of some importance, Ghāna and Songhay, said to have been founded, respectively, about A. D. 300 and about A. D. 600. Sporadic conversions appear to have occurred so early as the tenth century; but the Berbers of the Sahara did not show themselves very zealous Mohammedans until the rise in their midst of the Almoravid movement, which originated in the first half of the eleventh century among the Lamtūna clan, a branch of one of the Berber tribes of the Sahara. The Lamtūna had led a nomadic life between southern Morocco and the banks of the Senegal and the Niger, until the Marabout Abdallah ibn Yāsīn settled among them as a religious reformer, stirring up religious zeal and rebuking them for their lax observance of the ordinances of their faith. By 1042 he found himself strong enough to place himself at the head of his followers (the so-called Almoravids), and to attack the neighbouring tribes and force upon them the acceptance of Islam. The success that attended his expeditions served as a powerful appeal to the tribes of the Sahara, and his death in 1059 did not check the movement he had initiated. Many heathen tribes of Berbers came to swell the numbers of their Moslem fellow-countrymen, and adopted their religion. The Almoravids poured out of the Sudan over North Africa, and later made themselves masters of Spain (1090–1147). This Almoravid movement reacted on the pagan tribes of the Western Sudan. In 1076 the Berbers, who had been spreading Islam in the kingdom of Ghāna for some time, drove out the reigning dynasty (which was probably Fulbe), and this ancient kingdom became entirely Mohammedan; at the beginning of the thirteenth

century, it lost its independence and was conquered by the Mandingo. On the ruins of Ghāna rose the kingdom of Melle, whose Mandingo chiefs became Mohammedans about 1200. The most important King of Melle was Mansa Musa (1311–31), who conquered the Songhay kingdom and took the prosperous town of Timbuctoo (which had been founded on the bank of the Niger towards the end of the eleventh century). This town was not only a great trading centre, but exercised a wide influence as a seat of Moslem learning and piety; and students and divines flocked there in large numbers. The Mandingo who ruled there until 1433 were described by Leo Africanus as being the most civilized, intellectual, and respected of all the negroes; and modern travellers have praised them for their industry, cleverness, and trustworthiness. These Mandingo have been among the most active missionaries of Islam, and many tribes in the Western Sudan owe their conversion to them.

Another town on the bank of the Niger, south-west of Timbuctoo, and like it an important trading centre, was Jenne (founded about the middle of the eleventh century); it was the centre of a flourishing cotton industry and a powerful rival of Melle. The first King of Jenne to become a Mohammedan was Kunburu in the thirteenth century; he is said to have collected together all the 'ulamā in his kingdom to the number of 4,200, and to have publicly declared himself in their presence a Moslem, his example being followed by the inhabitants of the city; he had his palace pulled down, and in its place built a great mosque, which stood up to 1830.

Of the introduction of Islam into the kingdom of Songhay we have only the record that the fifteenth king of the Zā dynasty was converted about the year 1009. The centre of this kingdom lay within the great curve of the Niger, south of Timbuctoo; but after it broke away from the authority of the King of Melle, it grew in power—especially under the energetic rule of Ssonni Ali (who died in 1492)—until its territory included all the country on the Upper Niger and the

Senegal and extended as far as the sea-coast on the west and far into the desert. The kingdom of Songhay came into conflict with Morocco, and finally succumbed to the invasion of the Moors at the end of the sixteenth century.

II. The Haussa Kingdoms. Further Northern Influences

With the destruction of the kingdom of Songhay the Haussa states rose into increasing political importance; and the central point of the civilization of the Western Sudan shifted from the Upper Niger, where influences from the north were most rapidly felt, eastward to the country contained in the angle of the Central Niger and its tributary, the Benue, i. e. the modern Northern Nigeria. The Haussa states and their dependencies were situated in a country settled by agricultural negroes, with a remarkable aptitude for commerce; the main sources of their wealth were their manufactures, especially the making and dyeing of textile fabrics, which they distributed far and wide. The Haussas are an energetic and intelligent people; and their numerous trading caravans have gained for them an immense influence among the various peoples with whom they have come into contact; their language has become the language of commerce for the Western Sudan; and wherever the Haussa traders go—and they are found from the coast of Guinea to Cairo—they carry the faith of Islam with them, and by their devout behaviour and superior culture impress the heathen inhabitants. But of their own adoption of the faith, and of the rise of the various Haussa states (such as Kano, Katsena, &c.), historical evidence is almost entirely wanting, because the Fulbe,[1] who conquered them at the beginning of the nineteenth century, destroyed most of their historical records.

[1] Fulbe is the name by which these people call themselves; upwards of a hundred variants are applied to them by their neighbours, the commonest of which are Fulah and Fulani.

Certain other streams of influence came into the Central Sudan from the north and the north-east. It was from Egypt that Islam spread into Kanem—a kingdom which, shortly after its adoption of Islam, rose to be a state of considerable importance, and extended its sway over the tribes of the Eastern Sudan to the borders of Egypt and Nubia; the first Mohammedan King of Kanem is said to have reigned towards the close of the eleventh century; his successors entered into friendly relations with the rulers of the Hafsid dynasty in Tunis, and thus facilitated the infiltration of Moslem influence from that state. At the close of the fourteenth century, the capital was moved to the territory of Bornu west of Lake Chad, and the kingdom of Kanem was henceforth known as Bornu. In the sixteenth century, this kingdom was the predominant power in the Central Sudan. In the fourteenth century the Tunjar Arabs, migrating either south from Tunis or west from Nubia, made their way through Bornu and Wadai to Darfur; but it was some time before Islam became the State religion in Darfur, under King Suleiman, who began to reign in 1596; and it was not until the sixteenth century that Islam gained a footing in the other kingdoms lying between Kordofan and Lake Chad, such as Wadai and Baghirmi. The first Mohammedan King of Wadai was Abd al-Kasim, who, in 1612, headed a native rising against the supremacy of the Tunjar Arabs; under his rule the power of Wadai gradually increased. The nucleus of this kingdom is formed by the mountainous country on the east, inhabited by a tribe of great tenacity and military prowess, whose origin was probably Ethiopian, though it has experienced considerable infusion of negro blood. This mountain people still form the ruling class, and derive their wealth from agriculture and a flourishing system of cattle-breeding. In the south of the kingdom are districts still inhabited by heathen tribes of pure negro blood. The people of Baghirmi were fetish-worshippers when Islam was brought into their country by the Fulbe in the sixteenth century they came under the authority of

immigrants from the east, who gradually adopted the religion of the Baghirmians; the first Mohammedan king reigned from 1568 to 1608; but it was not until the latter part of the eighteenth century that the mass of the people of Baghirmi were converted to Islam; and many of the negro tribes are still fetish-worshippers.

The Mohammedan history of the Western and Central Sudan during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries shows that the progress of Islam was slow; and the survival of considerable groups of fetish-worshippers in the midst of territories which for centuries had been under Mohammedan rule seems to indicate that the influence of Islam was for long confined to the towns, and only by degrees made its way among the pagan population. In spite of the propagandist activities of races such as the Mandingo, Haussa, and Fulbe, the progress of Mohammedanism was checked by the savage internecine wars which caused one Mohammedan state to work the destruction of another. As these Mohammedan kingdoms declined with the wholesale massacres characteristic of warfare in the Sudan, fetishism regained much of the ground it had lost; the heathen districts which suffered from the merciless slave-raids that were a considerable source of wealth to the Mohammedans could hardly be expected to welcome the extension of Mohammedan rule. In cases where the heathen tribes possessed some political organization of their own, they sometimes, indeed, gained strength and a more coherent political consciousness as the result of the united efforts they made to resist the militant propaganda of their Mohammedan neighbours.

III. Nineteenth-century Revival in the Sudan

(*a*) *Militant Activities*

The nineteenth century witnessed a remarkable expansion of Islam in the Sudan. The first impulse in this direction came from the Wahhabi reformation, which profoundly stirred the whole Mohammedan world.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century Othman Danfodio, a Fulbe sheikh, made the pilgrimage to Mecca, whence he returned full of zeal for the reformation and propagation of Islam. Influenced by the doctrines of the Wahhabis, he denounced the practice of prayers for the dead and the honour paid to departed saints, and deprecated the excessive veneration of the Prophet himself; at the same time he attacked the two prevailing sins of the Sudan, drunkenness and immorality. Up to his time the Fulbe had consisted of a number of small scattered clans leading a pastoral life; they had early embraced Islam, and had hitherto been content to form colonies of shepherds and planters in different parts of the Sudan, and were generally a peaceful and industrious people. Danfodio united into one powerful organization these separate communities, scattered throughout the various Haussa states. An attempt in 1802 by the King of Gober—a kingdom which was still pagan and which had gained ascendancy over the northernmost of the Haussa states—to check the growing power of the Fulbe in his dominions caused Danfodio to raise the standard of revolt. He soon found himself at the head of a powerful army, which attacked not only the pagan tribes, forcing upon them the faith of the Prophet, but also the Moslem Haussa states. These fell one after another; and the whole of Haussaland came under the rule of Danfodio before his death in 1816. His grave in Sokoto is still an object of reverence to a large number of pilgrims. He divided his newly-conquered empire between his brother, Abd Allahi, to whom he gave the western provinces on the Central Niger, and his son, Mohammed Bello, who succeeded to the sovereignty of the eastern provinces, with Sokoto as their capital. In this town the chief Fulbe power was centred. Adamawa, founded in 1837 on the ruins of several pagan kingdoms, marked the limit of Fulbe conquests to the south-east; and the town of Ilorin, in the Yoruba country, founded in the lifetime of Danfodio, was the bulwark of their empire in the south-west.

Mohammed Bello met with a formidable rival in Mohammed al-Kanemi, who stirred up the people of Bornu to shake off the yoke of the Fulbe, so that they succeeded in regaining their independence. But, with varying fortunes, the dominant power remained in the hands of the Fulbe, who showed themselves cruel and fanatical propagandists of Islam, until British administration was established in Nigeria in 1900.

An independent Fulbe movement was originated in the country about the Senegal and the Upper Niger by Haj Omar, whose family came from the earliest settlements of the Fulbe people on the Senegal. Haj Omar was born in 1797 near Podor on the Lower Senegal, and appears to have been a man of considerable endowments and personal influence, and of a commanding presence. He was the son of a Marabout, and had received a careful religious education; he was already famed for his piety and learning when, in 1827, he set out on the pilgrimage to Mecca, and was there initiated into the Tijaniyyah Order. He did not return to his own country until 1833, when he commenced an active propaganda of the teaching of that order, fiercely attacking his co-religionists for their ignorance and lukewarmness. He traversed the Central Sudan, winning many adherents and receiving honour as a new prophet, until, about 1841, he reached Futah-Jallon, where he armed his followers and commenced a series of expeditions against those tribes that still remained pagan about the Upper Niger and the Senegal. After devastating these districts, he found himself in contact with the French, who under General Faidherbe defeated him in 1857 and checked his progress westward into Senegambia; he also suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the Tuaregs, who had driven out his garrison from Timbuctoo and resisted his attempt to retake this town in 1863. Nevertheless, he succeeded in uniting the territory on the Upper Senegal and the Niger into a great kingdom. On his death in 1865 he left this kingdom to his son Ahmadu, who chose Segu-Sikoro as his capital, and thus lived among the Bambara

negroes, the chief among the tribes subject to him. But Ahmadu succeeded in holding together the various provinces of his father's kingdom for a few years only. Internal conflicts and the advance of the French, under whose protection he had to place the valley of the Upper Niger as far as Timbuctoo in 1881, led to the break-up of his power; Segu was conquered by the French in 1890, and a year later Ahmadu's kingdom was completely subjugated.

But, before the French could establish their supremacy in the Western Sudan, they had to crush the rising power of another military adventurer, Samory, a Mandingo, who was born about 1846. Samory established himself south of Senegambia, in the upper basin of the Niger. His conquests were marked by wholesale massacres and devastation, and he reached the height of his power about 1881, shortly after which he came into conflict with the French, who took him prisoner in 1898 after a series of harassing campaigns. He died in captivity in 1900.

Mention should also here be made of the attempt of Rabeh Zubair, a former slave of Zubair Pasha, to create a Central African Empire about Lake Chad, about the years 1896 to 1902. He was finally crushed, and killed, by the French in 1902.

(*b*) *Missionary Activities*

Side by side with these militant Mohammedan movements and the creation of these short-lived kingdoms in the Sudan, the revival of Islam in the nineteenth century found further expression in a missionary activity, marked by considerable zeal and success, on the part of the religious orders. As many as eighty-eight religious orders are in existence in the Mohammedan world; and those which are represented in North Africa exercise an enormous influence, from Egypt to Morocco; in Algeria more than half the Moslem inhabitants are connected with one or other of them. In the Sudan, the most powerful of the

Orders are the Tijaniyyah, the Kadiriyyah, and the Sanusiyyah or Senussi. The Tijaniyyah Order originated in Algeria in 1781 and spread rapidly in Tunis, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan, and later as far south as the hinterland of Sierra Leone. The members of this Order have been largely militant in their methods, and Haj Omar was a member of it. Since French authority has been established in the Western Sudan, the Order has had to confine its activity to peaceful methods, but still exercises a widespread influence through its mosques and schools.

The Kadiriyyah Order, in accordance with the spirit of its founder, Abd al-Kadir al-Jilani (who died in 1166 A.D.)—one of the most popular saints of Islam—has always adopted peaceful and tolerant methods. Established in the twelfth century, it was introduced into western Africa in the fifteenth century by emigrants from Tuat, one of the oases in the west of the Sahara. These emigrants made Walata the first centre of their organization; but later on their descendants were driven away from this town and took refuge in Timbuctoo, farther to the east. In the beginning of the nineteenth century the spiritual revival that was so profoundly influencing the Mohammedan world stirred up the Kadiriyyah of the Sahara and the Western Sudan to renewed life and energy; and, before long, small colonies of persons affiliated to the Order were to be found scattered throughout the Western Sudan from the Senegal to the mouth of the Niger. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century most of the schools in the Sudan were founded and conducted by teachers trained under the auspices of the Kadiriyyah; and their organization provided for a regular and continuous system of propaganda among the heathen tribes.

Enormous influence has also been exercised by the Senussi Order.[1]

Besides these three great Orders, others may be mentioned. The Rahmaniyyah Order, founded by

[1] For the Senussi, see *Italian Libya*, No. 127 of this series.

a Moroccan towards the end of the eighteenth century, which has great influence in the Western Sudan; the Bakkayiyyah Order, founded in the middle of the sixteenth century, having its centre in Timbuctoo; the Amirghaniyyah, which takes its name from a certain Mohammed Othman al-Amir Ghani, who in 1835 was sent from Mecca on a proselytizing mission to the Nile valley and Kordofan; and several others.

The initiates of these religious Orders exercise considerable political influence, and have sometimes (notably in the case of the Tijaniyyah) succeeded in establishing independent Mohammedan states; they are often welcomed in the midst of a pagan population as public scribes, legists, writers of amulets, and schoolmasters. They thus acquire in quite a peaceful manner influence over the fetish-worshippers among whom they settle, and form centres of Islamic influence from which the knowledge of their faith expands in a continually widening circle. These religious Orders constitute the best-organized religious bodies in the Moslem community, and have attracted to themselves those Mohammedans who view with dismay the growing extension of European influence and domination in countries that had hitherto formed part of the Moslem world. Through them can operate most successfully those Pan-Islamic movements which are hostile to European civilization and represent a conservative reaction; hence the great increase in the number of the adherents of these Orders in recent years, and the necessity of their being closely watched by European Governments ruling over Mohammedan populations.

IV. Eastern Africa, Nubia, and Abyssinia

In this part of the continent, the expansion of Islam has in the main had a history unconnected with that of the territories already mentioned. Before the arrival of Islam there were in existence here two ancient Christian kingdoms: Nubia, which was converted to

Christianity about the middle of the sixth century, and Abyssinia, which had accepted Christianity two centuries earlier. The Nubians resisted the progress of Arab rule up the Nile, and succeeded in maintaining their independence for several centuries, in spite of the frequent expeditions sent against them from Egypt. But Mohammedan Arabs gradually formed settlements in Nubian territory, and by the tenth century had so increased in number and wealth that they were able to ask permission to build a mosque in Soba, the capital of the Christian kingdom, a few miles above the modern Khartum. In the thirteenth, and especially from the the beginning of the fourteenth century, there began a general process of interpenetration through the migration into Nubia of Arabs, especially of the Juhaina tribe, who intermarried with the women of the land and gradually succeeded in breaking up the power of the Nubian princes. In 1352 the mass of the Nubians were still Christian, but the King of Dongola, their chief city, was a Mohammedan, and it is probable that Islam had made considerable progress there; even so late as the early part of the fifteenth century, however, the repeated expeditions of the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt had not succeeded in pushing their conquests south of the first cataract, near which was their last fortified station. The Christian Nubian kingdom appears to have come to an end partly through internal dissensions and partly through the attacks of Arab and negro tribes on its borders, and finally by the establishment of the powerful Fung Empire between 1499 and 1530.

Abyssinia has more successfully resisted the inroads of Islam. The foundation of an Arab dynasty at the end of the twelfth century alienated some of the coast lands of the Red Sea from Abyssinia, and in the course of the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries a considerable number of Mohammedans penetrated into the Christian kingdom, some of them entering into the State service in various capacities. By the beginning of the sixteenth century there were Mohammedan

tributary states in the low-lying country that had formed the northern boundary of Abyssinia, from the Red Sea westward to Sennar, and on the south and the south-east of the kingdom. Between 1528 and 1543 Abyssinia suffered from the invasions of the Galla chief, Mohammed Grāñ, who ravaged the country again and again, and penetrated up to its northern frontiers. Grāñ was defeated and killed in 1543, and with the help of the Portuguese the Abyssinians preserved their country from coming under Mohammedan rule. Islam had, however, gained a footing which the troublous condition of affairs during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries enabled it to retain. After the expulsion of the Portuguese, about 1632, the condition of Abyssinia became one of terrible confusion and anarchy, taking advantage of which some tribes of the Galla race thrust their way right into the very centre of the country, where their settlements remain to the present day. Before the end of the seventeenth century, one-third of the population of Abyssinia was said to be Moslem, and their faith made continuous though slow progress during the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth centuries, by which time the Moslems had in their hands all the commerce as well as all the petty trade of the country, enjoyed vast possessions, were masters of large towns and central markets, and had a firm hold upon the mass of the people. But under King Theodore II (1855–68) a reaction set in; this was strengthened during the national struggle against the aggressions of Egypt, especially between 1864 and 1882. In 1880 King John promulgated an edict compelling the Mohammedans either to embrace Christianity or to leave the country; he is said to have compelled about 50,000 Mohammedans to be baptized; but their conversion was often nominal only; and King John was soon too much occupied in fighting at once with the Italians and the followers of the Mahdi to make his schemes for religious uniformity effective. Under his successor, Menelik, Christianity again became

powerful as the State religion; but there is still a considerable Moslem population in Abyssinia, and Islam is still a force to be reckoned with in the country. The Galla state of Jimma has remained one of the strongholds of Islam, as its ruler, Aba Ja'far, by his timely submission to Menelik, managed to keep his kingdom, the inhabitants of which are nearly all Mohammedans. The capital of Jimma is one of the most important markets in Abyssinia. The majority of the Galla tribes throughout Abyssinia are also Mohammedan—especially the powerful Wollo Gallas, north-east of Lake Tsana.

V. East African Coast and Uganda

Along the coast of East Africa, owing to its proximity to Arabia, there have been settlements of Arabs from an early period; but the facts recorded as to their establishment are very meagre. In the Mohammedan period, the Arabs, about 908, founded Magadaxo (Mogadishu), which afterwards rose to such power as to assume lordship over all the Arabs of the east coast; and a Persian expedition, about 975, founded the town of Kilwa, farther south. The coming of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century dealt a severe blow to Arab domination in this part of Africa; but, even after the decline of Portuguese influence and the restoration of Arab rule under the Sayyids of Oman (from whom the independent sultanate of Zanzibar became separated in 1856), the influence of Islam does not appear to have extended far inland, or to have affected the tribes of the interior, with the exception of the Galla and the Somali, until the beginning of the present century.

Harrar has been a centre of Mohammedan influence and propaganda in Somaliland for several centuries, but since 1887 it has been under Abyssinian rule. The opposition to the extension of Christian authority was carried on by Mohammed ibn Abdallah, a mullah of the neighbouring district of Ogaden, commonly known as the Mad Mullah. He declared himself to be the Mahdi in 1900, and in his raids came into conflict not only with the Abyssinians but also with

the authorities of British Somaliland. A number of expeditions were sent against him by the British from 1901 to 1904, when it was decided to abandon further operations. An arrangement was made according to which Mohammed ibn Abdallah established himself under Italian surveillance.

The Arabs along the coast of East Africa have been given up wholly to the pursuits of commerce or to slave-hunting, and made little effort to spread their faith. A notable exception, however, is the propagandist activity of the Arab traders who were admitted into Uganda in the first half of the nineteenth century; they probably recognized that the sturdy independence of the Baganda made slave-raiding among them impossible, so they sought to gain their confidence by winning them over to their own faith. They met with some success, and many of the Baganda became Mohammedans; but the introduction of Christian missions in 1876, the rapid increase in the numbers of the Christian converts, and the subsequent establishment of a British protectorate in 1894, led to a decline of Mohammedan influence. A number of Mohammedans, however, still hold important positions in Uganda; and it is even stated that there is a possibility of the eastern province becoming Moslem.

To complete the survey of Islam in East Africa reference should be made to the attempt of the Mahdi Mohammed Ahmad, between 1881 and 1885, to overthrow Egyptian domination in the Sudan and establish an empire with its capital at Omdurman; this came to an end after the battle of Omdurman in 1898 and the death of the Mahdi's successor, the Khalifa Abdullah, in the following year.

VI. Effects of European Occupation on the Spread of Islam

In its movement to the south during the nineteenth century, Islam was met by two formidable obstacles. The first of these was the activity of the wealthy and

active Christian missionary societies, which, starting from the coast, both on the east and the west, gradually made their way inland, and increased the number of their stations as European authority became more widely and firmly established. The second was the opposition offered by the pagan tribes. The cruel and devastating campaigns of Mohammedan leaders, such as Haj Omar and Samory, caused the faith of Islam to be bitterly hated by the heathen tribes whose country they overran, and stiffened the resistance offered by such pagan negroes as the Bambāra, who have maintained their independence, though (dwelling between the Upper Senegal and the Upper Niger) they have been hemmed in by a Mohammedan population for centuries. The heathen state of Galim (to the south of Adamawa) has similarly been strengthened by the addition of numerous pagan refugees. The terror of Mohammedan aggression and slave-raiding was removed from these heathen tribes when, by a series of agreements between England, France, Germany, and Italy, from 1886 onwards, the bulk of that part of Africa which has any Mohammedan population came under European rule.

But the changed conditions of life and political administration operated in an unexpected manner to the advantage of the faith of Islam. The suppression of the slave-trade has removed one of the great obstacles to the spread of Islam in pagan Africa, because it was to the interest of the Arab and other Mohammedan slave-dealers not to narrow the field of their operations by admitting their possible victims into the brotherhood of Islam. The advent of peace to countries formerly harassed by wars of extermination or the raids of slave-hunters, and the establishment of ordered methods of government and administration, have enabled Mohammedan merchants, the members of religious Orders, and other propagandists to move freely about the country and to penetrate among pagan tribes which had hitherto kept all Mohammedan influences rigidly at bay. During the period of disorder before European occupation, the Moslems were for the most part congregated

in large walled towns; but under the new conditions of security they are able to reside permanently in scattered villages and near the scene of their agricultural labours, and Mohammedan influences have thus become more widely extended over the country. That most active propagandist of Islam, the trader—whether Arab, Fulbe, Haussa, or Mandingo—whose very profession brings him into close and immediate contact with those he would convert, avails himself of the increased facilities of communication offered by roads and railways.

The new administrations required literate and intelligent natives as officials, and these could as a rule be found only among the Mohammedan section of the population; thousands of such posts were created and given to Mohammedan officials, who have used their influence to bring over whole villages to Islam. An instance may be taken from German East Africa. Here the district of West Usambara was said in 1891 to be still closed to Islam; and the feeling of both chiefs and people was hostile to the Mohammedans, who were hated and feared as slave-dealers. But, when an ordered administration was established, the first native officials appointed were almost entirely Mohammedan; they impressed upon the chiefs and other notables who came in touch with them that it was the correct thing for those who moved in official circles to be Mohammedans, and thereby achieved the conversion of some of the greater chiefs, who afterwards exercised a similar influence on chiefs of an inferior degree. Similarly, the teachers in Government schools are largely Mohammedan, and are able to influence their heathen pupils to the advantage of their own faith. The preference often given to Mohammedan soldiers among the troops enlisted by European officers reacts upon the non-Moslem soldiers; and the pagan recruits often adopt Islam in order to escape ridicule and gain in self-respect, being made to feel that the acceptance of Islam is a sign of an elevation to a higher civilization.

The pagans are not slow to recognize that the be-

lievers in Islam are everywhere respected by European governors, officials, and merchants. Brought suddenly into contact with European culture, they have received an impulse to advance in the path of civilization; but being unable to bridge over the gulf that separates them from their foreign rulers, they find in Islam a culture corresponding to their needs and capable of understanding their aspirations. The Mohammedans are not so far removed from them in race, appearance, dress, or manners as to make admission into the brotherhood of Islam impossible for them; and so soon as the pagan negro, however obscure or degraded, shows himself willing to accept the teachings of the Prophet, he is at once admitted as an equal; conversion implies no violent break with his family or his social institutions; for the habits and manner of life in the new community are similar in many respects to those he has been accustomed to; but a new meaning and dignity are added to life, and the convert finds himself at once a member of an influential, if not of a dominant, caste.

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MAPS

A small map, on the scale of 1:30,000,000, showing the extension of Mohammedanism in India, is to be obtained from Bartholomew (Edinburgh).

A sketch map of 'Islam in Africa', on the scale of 1:28,500,000, is given in the International Review of Missions for October, 1912, and has been reproduced (with consent) by the War Office (G.S.G.S., No. 2908) in connexion with this series.

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FRANCE AND THE LEVANT

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EDITORIAL NOTE

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the

sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,
General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

1099	Conquest of Jerusalem by the First Crusade.
1187	Conquest of Jerusalem by Saladin.
1248–54	The Crusade of St Louis.
1291	Loss of Acre.
1453	Fall of Constantinople.
1536	Treaty between Francis I and Suleiman.
1553	Renewal of Treaty.
1672	Leibnitz urges Louis XIV to conquer Egypt.
1762–81	Plans of Vergennes, Choiseul and Saint-Priest.
1798	Bonaparte conquers Egypt.
1799	Bonaparte invades Syria, but is forced to withdraw.
1806	Alliance of France and Turkey.
1831–9	Struggle between Mehemet Ali and Mahmud for Syria.
1840	Palmerston secures the restoration of Syria to the Sultan, despite French opposition.
1854–6	The Crimean War.
1859–60	Massacre of Christians in the Lebanon and Damascus. Landing of French troops.
1861–4	Lebanon receives autonomy.
1869	Opening of the Suez Canal.
1882	France declines to aid Great Britain in the suppression of Arabi's rebellion.
1905	The French Republic breaks with the Church.
1918	Conquest of Palestine and Syria by Allenby.

FRANCE AND THE LEVANT

EUROPE, ASIA and AFRICA meet in the Levant, the land of the rising sun; and of all the nations of Christendom France claims by far the largest share in its romantic story.

I. THE CRUSADES

French interests and ambitions in the Levant date from the Crusades, which, though springing from a common Christian sentiment, owed their main impulse and their greatest achievements to France. The First Crusade was preached by Urban II, himself a Frenchman, and by itinerant preachers, such as Peter the Hermit, of Amiens, and, though the King stood aloof, was largely the work of French nobles, French troops and French money. To French feudatories belonged the glory of rescuing the Holy Places from the infidel in 1099; and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, ruled as it was by French Kings, was for nearly a century an outpost of France. When the inevitable counter-attack of Islam was launched half a century later and Edessa was lost, it was a French Abbot, Bernard of Clairvaux, who summoned Christendom to save the remaining Christian principalities in the Levant. Louis VII cooperated with Conrad III, and Damascus was attacked; but the Second Crusade ended in failure. The capture of Acre and Jerusalem in 1187 by Saladin set the Third Crusade in motion; but Barbarossa, who was first in the field, perished in Asia Minor. He was followed by Richard I—himself a French feudatory as well as an English King—and Philip Augustus, who recovered Acre, after which Philip quarrelled with his colleague and returned to France. Cyprus, which had been conquered by Richard I, was granted by him as a fief to Guy de Lusignan. The Fourth Crusade, though planned by Germans and aided by

Venetians, was largely French in composition; it established at Constantinople the line of French Emperors who ruled the shrinking Byzantine Empire for half a century, and created a number of petty principalities with French rulers in Greece. In the Fifth Crusade, proclaimed by Innocent III at the Lateran Council in 1215 and carried out by Germany and Austria, France took no part; and she also stood apart from the Sixth, in which the Emperor Frederick II regained Jerusalem in 1229 by negotiation. When the Holy City was lost again in 1244, St Louis in the Seventh Crusade revived the ardent piety of the First. Conquering Damietta, which had been won and lost in the Fifth Crusade, he essayed the conquest of Egypt, but was captured with his whole army in 1250. Winning his liberty by a heavy ransom, he spent three years in the Holy Land, fortifying Acre and other coast cities. On his return to France in 1254 he attempted to secure peace among the rulers of Christendom in order to combine against the infidel; but Europe had outgrown its crusading fervour, and in the Eighth Crusade St Louis found himself alone at the rendezvous. His death in 1270 in Tunis, which he had resolved to regain for the faith, consecrated the life of the last and noblest of the Crusaders. Acre was stormed by the Mamelukes in 1291, and the last Christian posts in the Levant were abandoned.

The result of two centuries of effort, marred as they were by cruelty, treachery and self-seeking, was to leave the infidel even more strongly entrenched in the possession of the Holy Places. Yet France had more to show for her pains than any of her comrades or rivals. The kingdoms and principalities founded during the Crusades in Palestine and Syria, Asia Minor and Cyprus, were French. The Latin Emperors at Constantinople were French, and French princelets retained some fragments of territory in Greece. The French tongue was never forgotten; and for centuries to come the Christians of Europe were "Franks" to dwellers in the Levant. In any future rivalry for power or privilege in the Eastern Mediterranean, France, with her memories

of *Gesta Dei per Francos*, would start with more substantial assets and richer traditions than any of her competitors.

For two and half centuries after the death of St Louis Christendom turned a deaf ear to the appeals of successive Popes to stem the tide of Turkish conquest. France averted her glance from the East, being fully occupied with the Hundred Years' War and with the consolidation of her Monarchy. Her place in the foreground of the stage was taken by the City Republics of Italy, whose steps were drawn to the Levant not by religion but by lure of gain, and who witnessed the rapid growth of the Ottoman dominion without a qualm. Bertrandon de la Brocquière, a French traveller in Syria and Asia Minor in 1432, found that the Turks were well disposed towards the French; but, whenever he or any other Frenchman was in a difficulty, he was compelled to have recourse to the protection of the Venetians or the Genoese. On reaching Constantinople he discovered that these two States possessed not only their own markets but officials corresponding to modern Consuls, and that no other Christian nation could boast of similar representatives in the capital of the Byzantine Empire. When the city was besieged and fell in 1453 no Christian Power lifted a finger to avert its fate. For one moment alone did the old glamour of the East reassert its sway, and it is characteristic of the atmospheric change of the fifteenth century that the vision of a new crusade was vouchsafed to an eccentric, if not half-witted, ruler. It was the dream of Charles VIII to prepare for the domination of the East by the conquest of Italy, and at Naples he crowned himself King of Jerusalem. But his invasion of Italy led to a combination not against the Turks but against the French, and he had enough to do to withdraw his forces to France.

II. The Alliance of France and Turkey

A new chapter in the history of France and of Europe opens with Francis I, who boldly broke with the traditional hostility to Islam and summoned the infidel

to aid him in his struggle with a Christian rival. On his accession he expressed his desire to unite all Christian Princes against the Turks, and he joined the League formed by Pope Leo X in 1517, despatching a naval force against the African corsairs. But his defeat and capture at Pavia in 1525 effected his conversion, and led to the first alliance between the ruler of a great Christian State and the Turk. Since all Europe was on the side of the Emperor, the King turned to the Turks, whose armies could attack his rival from the Hungarian plains and whose fleets swept unchallenged through the Mediterranean. Sultan Suleiman was almost as eager for an alliance as the captive monarch, for the Turks lived under the perpetual menace of a combination of Christian Powers. To detach from this potential coalition the Most Christian King and the nation which had inspired the Crusades was to insure his dominions in Europe and to render possible their extension. The theoretical unity of Christendom vanished when France substituted the policy of interest for the policy of principle, and when the dream of delivering the Eastern Christians from the infidel was replaced by the ambition to dominate Europe.

While Francis was a prisoner in Madrid, his mother sent an envoy to the Sultan imploring intervention on behalf of her son. The envoy and his suite, who carried rich presents, were murdered in Bosnia; but at the end of the same year (1525) another envoy arrived in Constantinople and began negotiations, which eventually led to a treaty signed in 1536. The original has not been preserved, but its outlines may be recovered from the pact of 1553 which renewed it. In return for handsome payment the Sultan engaged to send a fleet to the western Mediterranean to cooperate with the navy of France. The vessels of the Emperor Charles and his allies captured by the Ottoman Fleet should belong to the Sultan, the conquered towns should be given up to plunder by the Turks and their inhabitants become their prisoners and slaves, the towns themselves, with their munitions of war, falling to the King of France.

When the "Most Christian King" had made his decision, he determined to extract all possible profit from the new alliance. The Turk was expected not only to furnish military aid, but to grant commercial privileges and to improve the position of his Christian subjects. The results of the alliance, however, proved disappointing to Francis, whose policy appeared sacrilegious to the Catholic sentiment of France. The antagonism of Christendom weakened the King's arm, and he declined cooperation on land; but Turkish corsairs ravaged the coasts of the Mediterranean, and in 1541 Toulon welcomed Turkish galleys rowed by thousands of Christian slaves. In 1553 the allies agreed to take Corsica as an armed base for an attack on Spain; but Turkish methods of waging war outraged French opinion, and the enterprise was abandoned. The Turks lost faith in the sincerity of France; and in 1557 the French Ambassador reported that he could not convince the Sultan or his Ministers that the alliance was or ever had been advantageous to Turkey. Henceforth, though France and Turkey remained enemies of the Habsburgs, they no longer cooperated in the attack, and France took no part in the battle of Lepanto (1571). The destruction of the Turkish navy rendered a Turkish alliance less attractive; and the religious zeal of the Counter-Reformation, which burned nowhere more fiercely than in France, forbade close association with Islam. The substitution of the Bourbons for the Valois broke another link in the chain; and the Grand Design of Henry IV proposed to secure the equilibrium of Europe at the expense of the Turk. Within half a century of the battle of Pavia the political association between France and Turkey was at an end; and French policy, when it gave a thought to the Eastern Question, reverted to the earlier principle of the defence of Christendom.

The second element in the transaction between Francis and Suleiman was the promise of commercial monopoly. By the pact of 1536 all nations desiring to trade with the Turks were compelled to transport their goods under the French flag. This privilege was especi-

ally onerous for the Venetians, who had long maintained an active trade with Turkey and possessed an imposing mercantile marine. The French monopoly could not survive the political association with Turkey; and in 1581 the Venetians were specifically exempted from its observance. The Levant Company was founded in 1581; and, despite French protests, British vessels were allowed to trade under their own flag. A third breach in the monopoly occurred soon after, when the Dutch obtained a similar privilege; and in the eighteenth century Austria, Russia, Sweden and Spain concluded commercial treaties on the same lines. Thus, despite a good deal of trade between Marseilles and the Syrian coast, above all with Sidon, the port of Damascus, the French monopoly gradually crumbled to pieces, leaving France little but a titular primacy in the commerce of the Eastern Mediterranean.

While the military and commercial fruits of the cynical pact of Francis and Suleiman proved disappointing, the privileges secured in the domain of law and religion were more enduring. The Letters Patent granted to France in 1536, confirmed in 1569, 1581, 1597, 1604, 1607 and 1673, and commonly known as the Capitulations, secured to France a position of uncontested influence throughout the Turkish Empire. The right to appoint resident consuls who should be the sole judges in commercial and criminal proceedings between French subjects; the right to demand the assistance of Turkish officials in the execution of the consuls' decrees; the right of French subjects to have their dragoman present at the hearing of any charge against them; the right of appeal to the Sultan or the Grand Vizier against the decision of any subordinate official; the freedom of French subjects from responsibility to the Turkish Government for any but personal debts; immunity from slavery; freedom from compulsory service, civil or military; the right of French subjects dying in Turkey to devise their property by will—such was the charter granted to France and enjoyed by her exclusively for half a century. The Capitulations were renewed by

successive Sultans till 1740, when the Sultan declared that for the future they should be regarded as a contract binding on both parties for ever.

Among the rights granted by the Capitulations was that of free Christian worship; and the Catholic monks found an excuse for the Turkish alliance in the privileges thus secured to the Church. As the political and commercial primacy of France crumbled away, the Sultans granted compensation in a field which involved but little sacrifice of their power and gave lively satisfaction to their ancient ally. While in politics and commerce France had worked for herself alone, in the religious sphere the toleration of Christians and Christian worship which she had secured was shared by the priests, monks, and pilgrims of other countries. The protection of Christians of all nationalities was never conferred on France specifically by any treaty; but it came to be accepted not only by Turkey but by all the Christian Powers, including the Papacy. Little by little the Catholic clergy of the races conquered by the Turk escaped from the yoke of their territorial sovereign to participate in the privileges of the "Franks"; and the tutelage of France was extended from the clergy to their flocks. Soon the Orthodox Christians sheltered under the protection of France; for the Turkish invasion had submerged all countries of Orthodox faith except Russia, who in the sixteenth century was too weak to protect her co-religionists beyond her own borders. Thus France became the representative throughout the Levant not only of Catholicism but of Christianity in all its forms.

III. The Plan of Leibnitz for the Conquest of Egypt

A century's experience convinced French statesmen that the Turkish policy of Francis had been a failure in its political and commercial aspects; and the Bourbon Monarchy, which prided itself on its zeal for the faith, was under no temptation to revive it. Louis XIII repeated the old wish "to draw the sword only against

the Turks, heretics or oppressors of the weak"; Père Joseph, the secret collaborator of Richelieu, dreamed of uniting Christian Europe for another Crusade; and the wealthy Mazarin left a legacy for a war against Turkey. In 1649 a letter was addressed to the Maronites, a Christian sect resident in the Lebanon, assuring them of the protection of Louis XIV; and when the young King came of age Boileau and Fénelon appealed to him to take up the cross. The Turks were at this time dominating the Mediterranean, embarking on the conquest of Crete and invading Hungary. To join them would have placed Europe at the mercy of Louis XIV; but the temptation was resisted. In 1664 French troops took part in Montecucculi's great victory at St Gotthard; and the French flag was planted on the coast of Algiers as a security against the Moslem pirates who infested the Mediterranean.

It was above all the desire to divert the Catholic zeal of Louis XIV from Protestantism to a combat with Islam that inspired Leibnitz, the German philosopher, mathematician, historian and theologian, to plunge into the region of high politics. In 1671 he composed his *Fabula Ludovisia*, in which St Louis appears in a dream and urges his descendant to undertake an expedition to Egypt, a command which the King, on awaking, promises to obey. The philosopher hoped for an introduction to Louis through the Elector of Mainz, to whom the scheme had been communicated; but it was agreed to begin by sending a summary of the plan. In February 1672 the French Minister of Foreign Affairs reported that his master wished for further explanations from the author. Leibnitz at once started for Paris, which he reached at the moment when France and England declared war against the Dutch. The Foreign Minister sent a message from headquarters that Holy Wars had gone out of fashion; but in June a quarrel occurred between France and Turkey at Constantinople, and a war was freely discussed. Accordingly, while awaiting the King's return to Paris, Leibnitz drew up a full statement of his design, entitled *De Expeditione*

Aegyptiaca regi Franciae proponenda Justa Dissertatio. A shorter edition, whether a first draft or a summary, was written under the title of *Consilium Aegyptiacum.*

The scheme is presented as the most important undertaking on which France could enter, since its success would carry with it the military leadership of Christendom. It is also the least dangerous and difficult of large schemes, and its failure would do her no irreparable damage. Egypt is the Holland of the East, and its conquest would overthrow the Dutch enemy, whose strength lies in her colonies and in the East Indian trade. The master of Egypt could render infinite service or disservice to the world, by stopping trade as the Turks have done or developing it by means of a canal. In comparison with such gains the conquest of a few towns on the Rhine or in the Low Countries is worth very little. Assuming the general interest of Europe in the expulsion of the Turk and the advance of the Christian faith, Leibnitz urges the King to take Egypt, which falls by right to France; Syria, to consolidate the domination of Egypt; Malta, where most of the Knights are French; and finally to assume the protection of the Church throughout the East.

"Constantinople," he observes, "is the centre of the Turkish power; but, in the event of a sudden attack, Egypt is so distant that it could not receive timely succour. The whole East, and not Egypt alone, awaits the arrival of a liberating force on which it may rely for protection. If Egypt be conquered, the Turkish Empire will crumble to pieces in every direction. Its possession will open the road to the richest countries of the East, will unite the commerce of India with that of France, and will prepare the way for conquests worthy of Alexander. When the expedition is ready it will be well to countenance the rumour already in circulation that it is directed against the Morea or the Dardanelles; and then, while all Europe is in suspense, Your Majesty's attack will fall on Egypt like a thunderbolt. By this profound discretion you will insure the success of an enterprise which has already been undertaken by your ancestors."

Even the facilities for retreat, should the expedition unexpectedly fail, are explained in detail.

The memoranda never reached the King, for he never asked to see them. The two versions of the scheme remained buried among the author's papers at Hanover for a century and a quarter; but Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt in 1798 led the British Government, which had received a copy of the larger document, to publish a summary in pamphlet form in 1803. When the French seized Hanover shortly afterwards, they obtained a copy of the *Consilium Aegyptiacum*, which was read by the First Consul.

IV. Louis XIV and Louis XV

A spirited foreign policy in the Levant was urged on Louis XIV in the same year 1672 by the French Ambassador at Constantinople, d'Arvieux, who was well acquainted with the Turkish Empire. The Turks, he complained, had permitted foreigners to enter and to trade with Turkey under the protection of other flags than that of France, had pillaged French subjects by land and sea, had imposed extra taxes on French goods, and had treated the King of France with disrespect by sending to him Ambassadors of lower grade than the French Ambassadors accredited to the Porte. It was time to show that these breaches of the Capitulations would no longer be tolerated.

"Your Majesty may bring the Grand Vizier and the Porte to reason," wrote d'Arvieux to Louis XIV, "without any other expense than that which you habitually incur in the Mediterranean. And, if you adopt my plan, Your Majesty will find the Turks ready to please you in all things and to renew the Capitulations according to your pleasure. Your Majesty has 15 men-of-war always cruising in the Mediterranean. They are enough for my purpose, but you can increase them to 20 if you will. You should then direct them to anchor unexpectedly at the entrance to the Dardanelles. Three ships of war and two fire-ships should then be sent to Princes' Islands, where the envoy who bears Your Majesty's demands should reside until they have been granted. If they resist, you will blockade the straits and in eight days there will be a famine in the capital, as they never have any store of provisions."

The advice fell on deaf ears; for Louis was deeply committed to the Dutch war and dared not embark on more distant adventures.

In 1673 the king arranged his differences with Turkey and lost interest in the plan for conquering the Levant. When, however, the Turks besieged Vienna for the second time in 1683, he recognized his obligation to defend Christendom even in the person of his Habsburg enemy; but, while he was bargaining for his services, Sobieski marched south from Warsaw and relieved the beleaguered city. In like manner, though Charles of Lorraine and Eugene of Savoy led armies against the Turks which contained many French volunteers, the French Government stood aloof from the arduous process of rolling back the invaders from South-Eastern Europe. Indeed, the French encouraged Turkey in her war with Austria in 1739, and aided her to secure favourable terms in the Treaty of Belgrade. As a reward for their services the Capitulations were extended and made permanent in 1740, special privileges being granted to French traders and Catholics throughout the Empire.

The advice of Leibnitz nevertheless haunted the minds of French statesmen; and in 1762 Vergennes presented a detailed memoir on Turkish affairs to Louis XV, urging that France should cease to drift and should once more pursue a definite policy. She should either prevent or assist the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. In the former case her ships and troops should be near the territory which she desired to defend; in the latter, she should forestall her rivals and seize Egypt. The idea was taken up by Choiseul, but nothing came of it. A similar scheme was recommended in 1781 in a *Mémoire sur la Turquie* by Saint-Priest, the Ambassador at Constantinople. But France was not in a position to undertake adventures in the Levant, and could do nothing when the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji in 1774 proclaimed the Tsar protector of all Orthodox Christians in the Turkish Empire.

V. The Revolution and Napoleon

The propaganda of Revolutionary France extended as far as Turkey; and in 1793 the representatives of Austria, Russia and Prussia complained that a "Tree of Liberty" had been planted in the court-yard of the French Embassy in Pera, and that throughout the Levant French cockades were being displayed. They demanded, though in vain, that the obnoxious tree should be cut down and that the Republican fêtes and demonstrations should be forbidden. When the tide of invasion had been rolled back from her frontiers, Republican France reverted to the old aggressive policy of the Monarchy. Her Consuls and commercial agents never lost sight of the Egyptian plan; and in February 1798 one of them sent in a detailed report. In the same month Talleyrand, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, presented a memorandum to the Directory setting forth the advantages of an attack on Egypt. The document had probably been prepared with the aid of Bonaparte, who, at any rate, stood ready to carry out its policy.

The plan appealed to the Directory, which hoped to inflict a staggering blow on Great Britain by attacking her possessions and commerce in the East and founding a colonial Empire on the ruins. The expedition was approved in March, and in April the Government signed its instructions to Bonaparte.

"The Army of the East shall take possession of Egypt. The Commander-in-Chief shall chase the English from all their possessions in the East which he can reach, and in particular he shall destroy all their *comptoirs* in the Red Sea. He shall have the isthmus of Suez cut through, and he shall take all necessary steps to assure the free and exclusive possession of the Red Sea to the French Republic. He shall ameliorate the lot of the natives of Egypt and shall maintain a good understanding with the Sultan and his subjects."

An excuse for the enterprize was found in the oppression of French merchants at the ports by the Mamelukes who ruled the country subject to the nominal sovereignty of

the Sultan. Alexandria fell after a slight resistance, and the Battle of the Pyramids laid the country at the conqueror's feet. But if the French General had formed the gigantic projects which he afterwards put forward of conquering India and returning home by Constantinople to "take Europe in the rear," the possibility of their realisation vanished with the destruction of the French fleet at Aboukir.

During the autumn and winter of 1798 Bonaparte busied himself with the suppression of revolts and the administration of the country, in which he received aid from the distinguished scholars and men of science whom he had brought with him and who formed the Institute of Egypt. But his hope that the Porte would not regard the seizure of Egypt as a *casus belli* was disappointed, for by September Turkey was at war with France. He determined to forestall an attack from the combined forces of the Sultan and the Mamelukes by invading Syria, and early in 1799 he fought his way by El Arish, Gaza and Jaffa to Haifa, whence he could discern two British men-of-war lying off Acre. After fierce fighting he abandoned the siege of Acre and led his reduced forces back to Egypt amid terrible hardships, entering Cairo in June, after an absence of six months. A month later he routed a Turkish army which had been brought by sea to Aboukir. But in the moment of his triumph he slipped away from Egypt to push his fortunes at home and to defend France against the Second Coalition, leaving the command to Kléber. In August, 1801, the last French troops surrendered to a British force, and the three years' experiment in oriental conquest came to an inglorious end.

In June 1802, shortly after the Peace of Amiens, France and Turkey signed a treaty by which France recognised the Sultan's possession of Egypt. But the First Consul had no intention of abandoning his schemes in the East. In the autumn of 1802 he sent Sébastiani on a "commercial mission" to the Levant, in the course of which he visited Alexandria and Cairo, Acre, Smyrna, and Constantinople. Returning home

he reported that Turkey was weak and that 6000 troops could retake Egypt. Bonaparte's policy, however, at the moment was to maintain friendly relations with the Sultan. The Government's intention, he wrote in 1802 to the French Ambassador in Constantinople,

"is that the French Ambassador shall regain by all possible means the supremacy which France possessed in that city for 200 years. His palace is the most beautiful in Pera. He must assume a rank above that of all other Ambassadors, and must never appear without great state. He must again take under his special protection all the Christians and all Christian institutions in Syria and Armenia, and all Christian pilgrims to the Holy Places. On every possible occasion he must endeavour to attract the attention of the Turks to France. Thus the French Embassy may be illuminated on the birthday of the prophet."

Sultan Selim returned these civilities by presents to Josephine, and by giving instructions that in all future official decrees Napoleon should be described as "Padishah" and Emperor of France. In 1805, however, when Turkey renewed her treaty of 1798 with Russia, Napoleon turned from flattery to threats.

"How can you permit Russia to dictate to you?" he wrote. "If you persist in refusing me what France has always had, namely, the first place at Constantinople, I shall range myself on the side of your enemies. Trust only to your true friend, who is France, or you and your religion and your family will perish."

In the following year he ordered Cambacérès to prepare an onslaught on Russia in the shape of a brochure entitled *Un Vieil Ottoman à ses Frères*. This was translated into Turkish, and a thousand copies were despatched to Dalmatia, Vienna and Constantinople respectively, while another thousand were sent to Marseilles for distribution among the ships trading with the Levant. In 1806, after Jena and Austerlitz, the Emperor despatched Sébastiani to persuade the Sultan to declare war against England and Russia. The mission succeeded, and French aid was sent against attacks by land and sea. But Turkey was a mere pawn in the Emperor's game, and at Tilsit he abandoned his ally to the tender mercies of Russia,

finding an excuse in the deposition of Selim, the news of which arrived during the discussions. The Franco-Russian compact aimed at the spoliation of the Ottoman Empire, Napoleon, however, stipulating that the Tsar should not take Constantinople. The execution of their plans was prevented by the quarrels which succeeded their momentary reconciliation.

VI. Mehemet Ali, Thiers and Palmerston

French influence in the Levant might be based either on the defence of Turkey against her enemies or on the support of rebellious subjects against their Ottoman ruler. After the fall of Napoleon the latter course was followed for a generation. France aided Great Britain and Russia to liberate Greece from the Turkish yoke by sharing in the destruction of the Turkish fleet in the bay of Navarino in 1827, and by landing troops in the Morea. But the most serious effort since Bonaparte's invasion of Syria was made ten years later. Since Turkey had fallen under the influence of Russia at the treaty of Adrianople (1829), the most promising policy for France was to support the most formidable of the Sultan's rivals. Mehemet Ali, the Albanian adventurer who had won the Viceroyalty of Egypt, was not content with Crete, which had been assigned to him in reward for his services during the Greek War of Independence; and in 1831 he despatched his son Ibrahim at the head of a formidable army, which over-ran Syria, crossed the Taurus, and advanced into the heart of Asia Minor. The Sultan, failing to obtain help from England or France, turned to Russia, who sent a fleet to the Bosphorus in 1833. Syria was ceded to Mehemet by Mahmud, who, however, in 1839 attempted to recover his lost province. His troops were routed by Ibrahim at the battle of Nisib, and a few days later his fleet was treacherously surrendered at Alexandria. Mehemet Ali demanded the hereditary government of Egypt and Syria, and the Sultan was ready to yield. It seemed as if Egyptian rule in Syria, detested though it was by the Mussulman chiefs, had come to stay.

In the misfortunes of the Ottoman Empire France saw an opportunity of restoring French influence in the Levant. To aid Mehemet Ali to obtain hereditary possession of Syria as well as Egypt was to secure French predominance in the Eastern Mediterranean. The plan was ingenious; but France had reckoned without Great Britain. The French Ambassador in London was summoned to the Foreign Office and informed that the Cabinet took a grave view of the crisis.

"I start with the belief," began Palmerston, "that our common object is to maintain the Ottoman Empire as a guarantee for the preservation of the European equilibrium. If it is admitted that this is the object which we both have in view, we must defend it from its friends as well as from its enemies. France and England should act together, and should send out joint expeditions to bring both the combatants to reason."

Reason, as understood by the Foreign Secretary, demanded that Egypt should be preserved to Mehemet Ali and his heirs, but that Syria should remain in the possession of the Sultan.

This conversation occurred shortly before the battle of Nisib and the death of Mahmud; but the Turkish *débâcle* failed to move Palmerston from his position. In his subsequent interview with the French Ambassador he repeated that the interest of both France and England was to restore the Turkish Empire to a condition which would involve the least risk of foreign intervention.

"This we can only obtain by separating the Sultan and his vassal by the desert. Let Mehemet Ali have his Egypt and the hereditary investiture which he demands, but do not let the two Powers adjoin. If we thought that Mehemet Ali could make himself strong and respected on the Ottoman throne, we should say Amen; but nothing will induce the Turks to regard him as a descendant of the Prophet."

If Syria were thus lopped off, he added, Russia would try to seize the European provinces of Turkey, which she had long coveted, and the Powers would have no title to protest. In a word Russia and France would dominate the Turkish Empire.

Unable to secure the consent of Great Britain to its protégé's possession of the whole of Syria, the French Government suggested that he might retain the territory up to Acre; but Palmerston cut short the discussion with the emphatic words, "Egypt only, and the desert for a frontier." In January 1840 Guizot was sent to London to convert the Foreign Secretary; but his efforts were unavailing.

"France would like to see in Egypt and Syria," Palmerston remarked with his usual bluntness, "a new and nominally independent Power, which would owe its existence to her and consequently be her ally. You already have Algeria. Between Algeria and your Egyptian ally what remains? Nothing except the poor little states of Tunis and Tripoli. The whole African shore and a part of the Mediterranean shore from Morocco to the Gulf of Alexandretta would be under your influence. That will not suit us."

The prize was too great to forgo without further efforts, and Thiers, who became Prime Minister in February, spent the first half of 1840 in naval and military preparations. On July 15 Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria concluded the Convention of London, pledging themselves to force Mehemet Ali to accept the terms arranged by them with the Sultan. A British fleet captured Beirut and Acre, and the Egyptians were swept out of Syria.

France had not been invited to discuss or to sign the Convention, for her support of Mehemet Ali was notorious. But Palmerston was convinced that Louis Philippe, whose throne was none too secure, was "not the man to run amok." The King, though angry, was wise enough to recognize facts; and in October Thiers was succeeded by the pacific Guizot. France now entered the Concert, and a second Treaty of London was signed in 1841. It was agreed that Mehemet Ali should receive the hereditary Viceroyalty of Egypt which he had sought, and renounce Crete, Syria and Palestine.

VII. The Crimean War

When the Eastern question again became acute in the following decade, a new ruler, convinced of the necessity of British support, was governing France; and Louis Napoleon fought side by side with Great Britain in defence of Turkey against Russia. The Capitulations had entrusted the care of the Holy Places to France, but had neglected to enumerate the sanctuaries concerned. Profiting by this obscurity and by French neglect, the Orthodox Church occupied and repaired certain shrines, and in 1808 obtained permission to restore the dome of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre after a destructive fire. The progress of the Greek Church delighted the Tsar Nicholas, who determined to assert his power throughout the dominions of the Sultan. A quarrel in 1847 between Latins and Greeks in the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem was followed by the return of the Latin Patriarch (who had resided in Rome since the failure of the Crusades) to Jerusalem, with a French Consul-General to back him. In 1850 Louis Napoleon took up the cause of Catholicism in the Levant; and in 1852 the French Ambassador at Constantinople was ordered to insist on the claims of the Latin monks to be the guardians of the Holy Places. The demand was supported by the other Catholic Powers and was substantially conceded by the Sultan. Nicholas was indignant, and in March 1853 sent Prince Menschikov to obtain satisfaction in regard to the Holy Places and also to press for a Treaty acknowledging Russia's Protectorate over all the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan.

The two questions were separate. The first claim had much to justify it in the history of the past century, and was settled to the satisfaction of Russia; but the second was at once pronounced inadmissible by Clarendon and Stratford de Redcliffe, on the ground that it would give Russia a perpetual right to interfere in Turkish affairs. Acting on the advice of the British Ambassador, the Porte refused to concede the pro-

tectorate. Menschikov quitted Constantinople, and a conflict became inevitable. The Crimean War, while nominally arising from a quarrel of Greek and Latin monks, was in reality a duel between France and Russia for the mastery of the Levant; and France had the best of the contest.

VIII. The Lebanon

Shortly after the Crimean War events provided France with another opportunity which she was quick to seize. Syria had suffered grievously in the long duel between Mahmud and Mehemet Ali; and, though the Ottoman Empire was enabled by Palmerston to maintain its possession of the province, its prestige had suffered and the administration was weak and inefficient. Liberated from the firm hand of Ibrahim, the races and creeds of Syria resumed their quarrels. During the Egyptian occupation Christians were told by their priests that Mehemet Ali was the friend of France; but the consideration shown to non-Moslems was bitterly resented by their neighbours. Till 1840 the Maronites (Christians) and Druses (Mohammedans) of the Lebanon were governed by Sheikhs and Emirs, the central power being exercised by the (Moslem) Shehab family, which received its investiture from the Sultan. Before the Egyptian occupation an annual tribute was paid to the Porte; and in certain circumstances a contingent of soldiers had to be provided for service in the Ottoman army. In 1841, after the expulsion of the Egyptians and the Shehab Emir Beshir, Druses and Maronites flew at each other's throats. When, by 1843, Turkish efforts to restore direct government had failed, the five Great Powers intervened and compelled the Sultan to cancel the appointment of a single Turkish Governor and to divide the region into a Maronite mountain and a Druse mountain, with a Christian chief for the Maronites. A renewal of war took place in 1845, when the Maronites determined to expel the Druses and demanded the reinstatement of the Shehab family. The Porte refused and sent a strong force into the Lebanon,

but ultimately conceded a council composed of Christians and Druses. After the Crimean War the reiteration in the *Hatti Hamayun* of the promise of equal rights to Christians and Jews led the Druses to believe that the Maronites were to be supreme in the Lebanon; and in 1859 blood again began to flow.

The fighting in the Lebanon was followed in 1860 by fierce attacks on the Christians of Damascus. The Turkish Governor, finding that Moslem lads had been insulting the Christians by making crosses on the roads in the Christian quarter and then trampling and spitting on them, ordered some of the culprits to be put in chains and to clean the district. They were quickly liberated by the passers-by; and the excited mob then attacked the Christians and plundered some of the European Consulates. On the eve of the Damascus massacres the Sultan had sent Fuad Pasha to restore order in the Lebanon, and when he heard of the new explosion he issued a stern threat of reprisals against individuals and towns which should insult a Christian.

Had these events, so common in the Ottoman dominions, occurred elsewhere, little notice would have been taken of them; but Syria was bound to France by the ties of memory and ambition, and nothing that happened there could be indifferent to her ruler, himself the nephew of the invader of 1799. It was no longer a question of supporting a rival claimant to Syria, as in the reign of Louis Philippe, but of occupying the country with French troops. On the news of the Damascus massacres the French Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the French Ambassador in London that France merely desired to discover, in concert with other Governments and with the Porte, the best means of obtaining the compensations due to humanity and of re-establishing peace in Syria. His proposal was for the joint occupation of Syria by French and British troops; and Great Britain assented, but in the end sent no military force.

On August 7 the Emperor addressed the departing troops:

"Soldiers, you are going to Syria, not to make war against any Power, but to aid the Sultan to bring back to obedience those of his subjects who have been blinded by fanaticism. In this distant land, rich in glorious memories, you will prove yourselves worthy descendants of those heroes who have gloriously carried there the banner of Christ."

The troops (barely 6000 in all) landed at Beirut, marched to within a few miles of Damascus, restored order, and withdrew. So far as the Lebanon was concerned, the problem was solved by the Organic Statute of 1861, confirmed in 1864, which constituted the district a Vilayet and granted autonomy under a Christian Governor approved by France and Great Britain. In theory the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was maintained; but French prestige had been enhanced, and her intervention secured peace to the Lebanon till the outbreak of the Great War in 1914.

IX. Gain and Loss in Egypt

The prestige if not the power of France in the Levant was further advanced by the cutting of the Suez Canal by de Lesseps, who thus realized the project commended by the Directory to Bonaparte in 1798 and popularized by the disciples of Saint-Simon in the middle of the century. The Canal was opened in the presence of the Empress in 1869; and during the reign of the Khedive Ismail French influence was supreme in Egypt. The excavations of Mariette increased the reputation of French Egyptology, which had been brilliantly inaugurated by Champollion's deciphering of the Rosetta Stone. The creation by England and France in 1876 of the Dual Control to check the extravagance of Khedive Ismail, seemed to hold out the promise of growing power in the Valley of the Nile. Gambetta was eager to cooperate with Great Britain in defending the throne of the Khedive Tewfik against the rebellious Arabi; but the fall of Gambetta, after holding office for two months, brought a more cautious Ministry into power. Freycinet was ready for the military occupation of the Canal; but, scenting the hostility of Bismarck, he refused to recom-

mend armed intervention. The Chamber refused to vote funds even for the limited project, and the decision sounded the knell of French power in Egypt; for Great Britain, after suppressing the revolt, naturally became the real ruler of the country. For another twenty years France hesitated to recognize the position which her abstention had created; but the Agreement of 1904, by which France withdrew her opposition to the British occupation of Egypt in return for British recognition of French claims in Morocco, brought a period of painful tension to a close.

X. Orthodox and Protestant Competition in Syria

While France fought a losing battle with Great Britain in Egypt, her historic influence in Syria and Palestine was thwarted by other competitors. In 1840 the Frères des Écoles Chrétiennes and the Filles de la Charité began their educational work. The French tongue deposed Greek and Italian from their predominant position; and to-day the French possess more schools than any other Power. On the other hand the growth of Russian power throughout the nineteenth century, combined with the immense influx of Russian pilgrims to the Holy Places, gave the Orthodox Church a prestige that it had never before possessed. The interest of Protestant nations has also steadily increased. English missionaries commenced operations in the Levant in the twenties; and in 1841 Prussia and England agreed to establish a Bishopric at Jerusalem, with jurisdiction over Palestine, Chaldaea, Egypt and Abyssinia. The Bishop was to be selected alternately by the two Powers and to be consecrated by the Archbishop of Canterbury; and the system remained in operation till 1883, when Bismarck declined to fill the vacancy. Since then the Bishopric has been entirely Anglican.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century several attempts were made to challenge the semi-official position of France as Protector of the Eastern Christians. In 1870 Austria asked to be allowed to

share the protectorate, but was met with a flat refusal and had to content herself with the right of protecting the Christians in Macedonia and Albania, conferred on her by the Porte in the treaties of 1699 and 1718. The next challenge came from Germany. In consenting in 1874 to the substitution of Mixed Courts for consular jurisdiction in Egypt, France excluded religious and educational establishments, over which she reserved her ancient protectorate. When Germany gave her consent to the establishment of the Courts in the following year she declared that she could not recognize France's exclusive protectorate over Catholic institutions in the East, and reserved all her rights over German subjects belonging to any such establishment.

In accepting the invitation to the Congress of Berlin in 1878, France stipulated that it should deal only with questions raised by the Russo-Turkish war, thus ruling out the discussion of Egypt, Syria, and the Holy Places, and preventing the Congress from either confirming or condemning the action of Germany in 1875. The promise was given, but in the opinion of some Frenchmen it was not kept. On the initiative of Great Britain the following clauses were inserted in Article 62.

"Ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks of all nationalities travelling in Turkey shall enjoy the same rights, advantages and privileges. The right of official protection by the Diplomatic and Consular Agents of the Powers in Turkey is recognised both as regards the above-mentioned persons and their religious, charitable and other establishments in the Holy Places and elsewhere."

In submitting this text to Congress Bismarck remarked that the British formula meant "the substitution of Christendom for a single nationality." Instead of opposing the proposition, the French plenipotentiary Waddington contented himself with demanding that the text should have regard to the rights of France and record the maintenance of the *status quo*. He therefore proposed and carried the addition of the formula, "the rights of France are expressly reserved"; and Prince Gorchakov added, "It is well understood that no

alterations can be made in the *status quo* in the Holy Places."

In 1898 M. Delcassé, Minister of Foreign Affairs, obtained through the Cardinal-Archbishop of Reims a satisfactory declaration from the Pope in reply to the Cardinal's proposal to form a Committee of Defence of the French Protectorate of the Christians in the Levant.

"France has in the East a special mission which Providence has confided to her," wrote Leo XIII in an autograph letter. "It is a noble mission which has been consecrated not only by centuries of practice but by international treaties. The Holy See is resolved not to modify in any way the glorious patrimony which France has received from her ancestors, and which she is doubtless determined to continue to deserve by showing herself always equal to her task."

The situation underwent a serious change in 1905 when the French Government denounced the Concordat and terminated official relations with the Papacy. Austria at once informed the Vatican that in her opinion France had forfeited her right to protect the Christians, and argued that that mission should be transferred to herself. The Austrian demand failed; but a breach in the French Protectorate was made when France conceded the Italian claim to protect Catholic missions in which Italians formed a majority. Though a special application had to be made in every case, thirty-three such missions had been transferred from the protection of France to that of Italy before the outbreak of the Great War.

It was, however, perceived that the breach with Rome had regrettable consequences abroad. In a speech in the Chamber in March 1914 M. Louis Martin declared that since 1901, the year in which many of the Orders had been suppressed, the French members of the French religious establishments in the Near East had fallen from 2000 to 1000. In the following month the Chamber, on the proposal of M. Leygues, adopted a motion "inviting the Minister of Foreign Affairs to take the necessary measures to maintain and develop the French establishments in the East." A special authorization, it was suggested, should be granted to the

various religious congregations supplying the *personnel* of the missions, schools and charitable institutions in the Levant to re-open their seminaries and training schools in France. The proposal was more readily accepted by the Foreign Minister since the law suppressing the Orders contained a clause empowering the Government to permit, with the approval of the Council of State, the re-opening on French territory of establishments of congregations formerly authorized. Before, however, this considerate policy could be put into practice, the world conflict had broken out.

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